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Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes/Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


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es 


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method: 


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1  Col.  Boall's  Kogiincnt. 

2  Sailors  mid  MarineB. 
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4  tst  Reg't  of  Smith's  Bripnde. 


5  2(1  Rcf?'t  of  Smith's  Brigade, 
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7  Major  Warinf,''s  Battalion, 
s  l.t.-col.  Scoft'H Reg't  Rpffularg. 


9  StuU's  and  Uividson'sCoi 

10  Stansbury's  llrij,'ade — Kuj 
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1 1  Stansbury'B  Drignde  —  Stii 


0  StuU'8  mill  l>&vi(i8<)irH('()iiii)'s.  IJ  .Mil  Ui'lt'i  lliilliiMiiri' Viiluntecr.-'.  I(i  -'('(imirs  Militiii  uml  1  tit'Ullk'K. 

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Kogiment.  [Hepinipnt.  14  Tlio  Ciivnlry.  IS  Major  I'iiikin'y's  l!iltt'iiit>n. 

11  Stansbury'B  Dripade  —  Shutz's  l.'i  C'apt.  Doii<;hty's  Company.  ^?  Liuut.-co).  Kninicr's  BattiilinM. 


fMaAj 


HISTORY 


OF 


THE    INVASION    AND    CAPTURE 


OF 


WASIUIGTOi^, 


AM)    OF 


THE   EVENTS    WlllCir    vrrcn^rr^    a^-t^ 

y\  iiiK^U    ILECEDED    AND    FOLLOWED. 


BY   lOlU  S.   U^LLIAMS, 

«  AH  OF  1812. 


>f  THE 


NKW    YORK: 

"ARPER  *  nROTHERs.  P  U  B  L  I  S  H  E  R  ., 

^' RANK  I,  IX  SQlAlti;. 

1857. 


mm§ 


Entered,  accorcling  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  y  >ar  1857,  by 

Harper  &  Brothers, 
In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  tlie  Soutiiern  District  of  X^iW  York. 


:3I 


)    .. 


!</ 


I 


TO 


COL.  WILLIAM  W.  SEATON. 


My  dear  Colonel, — The  practice  of  dedication, 
like  many  other  pleasant  customs  of  the  olden  time, 
which  tended  to  check  the  growth  of  cold  and  seltish 
feelings,  has  "become  so  nearly  obsolete  that  I  have  had 
some  hesitation  in  giving  way  to  my  impulses  on  this 
occasion.  I  have  doubted  whether  it  would  be  at  all 
agreeable  to  you  to  be  implicated  in  any  thing  that 
smacked  so  much  of  '•'■  old-fogy  ism.''''  But,  independ- 
ently of  the  dictates  of  my  feelings,  there  appeared  to 
me  so  many  good  and  appropriate  reasons  why  this 
volume  should  be  dedicated  to  you,  that  I  will  run  the 
risk  of  taking  your  consent  for  granted.  ;  know  of 
no  one  to  whom  the  work  is  more  likely  to  prove  in- 
teresting, or  who  will  be  better  able  to  judge  of  the 
accuracy  of  its  statements,  and  at  the  same  time  more 
disposed  to  view  its  faults  with  lenity,  knowing  that 
they  have  not  proceeded  from  any  intention  to  misrep- 
resent facts,  or  a  willingness  to  asperse  the  fame  of 
living  or  dead.  The  work,  too,  relates  to  the  most 
important  event  in  the  history  of  the  city  over  which 
you  so  long  presided  with  so  much  honor  to  yourself 


*i  ►.> 


IV 


DEDICATION. 


and  aclvaiitagc  to  your  fellow-citizens  as  chief  magis- 
trate, and  with  that  event  you  were  personally  con- 
nected, both  as  combatant  on  the  ill-fated  field  and  as 
a  sufferer  by  the  destruction  of  property  in  the  city. 
Taking  all  these  reasons  into  consideration,  I  think 
you  will  at  least  excuse  your  old  companion  in  arms 
for  publicly  offering  you  this  testimonial  of  his  esteem 
and  friendship. 

J.   S.  WiLLIAiAIS. 
Washingtox,  Oct  1,  185G. 


I 


* 
^ 


HSj 


PREFACE. 


The  primary  motive  by  -vvhicli  the  author  of  this 
work  was  actuated  in  getting  together  the  materials 
from  which  it  has  been  composed,  was  tlie  hope  of  be- 
ing able  to  do  something  to  remove  the  obloquy  which, 
in  his  opinion,  has  been  undeservedly  cast  upon  the 
American  troops  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Bladensburg. 
It  is  true  that  this  obloquy,  being  shared  among  so 
many,  was  never  very  severely  felt  by  any  individual 
among  them.  This,  indeed,  is  the  reason  why  it  was 
so  easily  thrown  upon  them  in  the  first  instance,  and 
why  it  has  been  suffered  so  long  to  continue.  It  was 
not  the  business  of  any  one  of  the  crowd,  more  than 
of  another,  to  expose  the  injustice  of  the  imputation 
cast  upon  them ;  and  as  "  what  is  every  body's  busi- 
sess  is  nobody's  business,"  the  duty  has  never  yet 
been  discharged.  If  the  troops,  as  a  body,  could  have 
called  for  a  court  of  inquiry  into  their  conduct,  and 
had  counsel  of  ordinary  ability  to  defend  them,  or  if 
they  could  have  had  a  voice  in  the  selection  of  the 
committee  appointed  by  Congress  to  investigate  the 
causes  of  the  capture  of  tiie  City  of  Washington, 
there  would  probably  have  been  no  necessity  for  un- 
dertaking a  work  like  the  present,  or,  rather,  the  neces- 
sity would  have  been  transferred  to  those  high  digni- 
taries of  the  nation  whose  complacency  was  not  at  all 


VI 


PREFACE. 


I! 


disturbed,  nor  intended  to  be  disturbed,  by  the  non- 
committal report  made  by  the  committee  actually  ap- 
pointed. 

It  may  be  asked,  Wliy,  after  the  lapse  of  more  than 
forty  years,  seek  to  disturb  an  arrangement  which  is 
admitted  to  be  the  most  comfortable  that  could  have 
been  made — that  is,  the  one  'which  inflicted  the  least 
pain  upon  individuals  ?  The  troops  generally  were 
little  inconvenienced  by  the  obloquy,  and  went  about 
their  business  as  unconcernedly  as  if  nothing  had  hap- 
pened ;  whereas,  if  public  censure  had  been  concen- 
trated upon  a  few  powerful  party  leaders,  their  wrath 
and  that  of  their  partisans  might  have  thrown  the 
country  into  an  uproar. 

It  might  seem  Pharisaical  to  profess  an  abstract 
love  of  truth,  and  not  imperatively  necessary  to  con- 
tend for  it  as  an  essential  ingredient  in  history.  If 
works  of  fiction  or  parables  are  written  for  the  purpose 
of  moral  instruction,  and  are  found  to  answer  that  pur- 
pose, why  should  truth  be  considered  an  essential  in- 
gredient in  history  ?  or  why  should  any  more  of  such 
a  precious  ingredient  be  used  than  is  necessary  to  give 
a  flavor  of  probability  ? 

But  moral  instruction  is  not  the  sole  object  of  his- 
tory, which  furnishes,  or  ought  to  furnish,  valuable 
lessons  in  the  art  of  government  and  art  of  war,  and 
these  lessons  can  not  be  so  well  learned  from  imagin- 
ary events  as  from  a  faithful  statement  of  real  occur- 
rences. National  disasters,  too,  are  often  more  preg- 
nant with  instruction  than  national  successes,  and 
more  may  sometimes  be  learned  from  a  defeat  well 
studied  than  from  half  a  dozen  victories ;  and  in  this 


»«. 


PREFACE. 


Vll 


T 


respect  a  correct  narrative  of  the  battle  of  Bladcns- 
burg,  and  of  the  events  preceding  and  attending  it, 
might  be  considered  as  higlily  important  and  desirable. 
It  fortunately  happens  that  the  means  of  compiling 
a  correct  narrative  of  this  battle  are  unusually  abund- 
ant— perhaps  more  so,  owing  to  fortuitous  circum- 
stances, than  with  respect  to  any  similar  event  in  his- 
tory. The  event  took  place  among  a  reading  and  in- 
quiring people.  It  was  not  only  sutHciently  extraor- 
dinary in  itself  to  arouse  the  strongest  curiosity  as  to 
its  causes  and  details,  but  it  was  deeply  wounding  to 
the  pride  of  the  nation.  A  prompt  investigation  by 
Congress  was  a  matter  of  course,  and  tliis  in(|uiry  had, 
at  least,  the  effect  of  calling  forth  a  mass  of  evidence, 
in  the  shape  of  statements  and  official  reports  from  in- 
dividuals prominently  connected  with  the  event,  which 
may  be  considered  as  having  all  the  solemnity  and 
credibility  of  testimony  before  a  judicial  tribunal,  and 
■which,  however  conflicting  on  some  points,  yet  furnish 
the  means,  upon  patient  study  and  comparison,  of  arriv- 
ing at  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  material  fiiots.  This 
fund  of  information  has  since  been  increased  by  vari- 
ous publications,  including  narratives  of  British  writ- 
ers. Probably,  at  this  date,  little  of  importance  relat- 
ing to  the  subject  remains  to  be  revealed  to  the  pubhc, 
except  what  may  be  contained  in  the  manuscript  pa- 
pers of  jMr.  Madison,  now  in  possession  of  Colonel  Pe- 
ter Force,  of  the  City  of  Washington.  Having  been 
informed  that  these  papers  contained  some  very  inter- 
esting matter  in  relation  to  the  capture  of  the  seat  of 
government,  we  applied  to  Colonel  Force  for  permis- 
sion to  consult  them,  stating  to  him  the  deep  interest 


^vSml 


VIU 


PKEFACE. 


which  we  took  in  the  subject.  With  his  usual  cour- 
tesy he  coinpUed  with  our  request,  granting  us  access 
to  the  papers  as  often  as  we  pleased,  for  the  purpose 
of  perusal  and  study,  but  declining  to  allow  any  por- 
tion of  them  to  be  transcribed.  We  gladly  availed 
ouryelves  of  the  privilege,  and  the  information  thus  ob- 
tained will  appear  in  its  proper  place  in  the  following 
pages. 

To  the  sources  of  information  above-mentioned,  and 
to  the  author's  own  personal  knowledge  of  events 
which  he  witnessed,  he  has  been  enabled  to  add  recent 
statements  from  some  of  those  whose  position  at  the 
time  of  the  capture  of  the  scat  of  government,  and 
whose  high  standing  in  the  community  at  present, 
give  a  deep  interest  to  the  written  connnunications 
Avith  which  they  have  favored  him.  Among  these  arc 
letters  from  the  lion.  Richard  Rush,  a  member  of  ]\Ir. 
Madison's  cabinet,  and  the  venerable  Major  George 
Peter,  of  i\Iontgomery  County,  ^Maryland,  commander 
of  the  District  Light  Coi*ps,  which  will  be  found  in  the 
Appendix.  Other  communications  of  a  similar  char- 
acter, which  have  been  useful  to  us  in  preparing  the 
work,  are  omitted,  in  order  that  the  bulk  of  the  volume 
might  not  be  unnecessarily  increased. 

We  will  here  take  occasion  to  remark,  in  justice 
both  to  the  livint;'  and  the  dead,  tliat  in  anv  reflections 
which  we  have  been  tempted  to  indulge  in  on  the  con- 
duct of  Mr.  ^Madison's  administration,  we  have  had  no 
intention,  and  certainly  not  the  slightest  inclination,  to 
include  jMr.  Rush,  who  was  Attorney-general  at  the 
time,  nor  I\[r.  Campbell,  then  Secretary  of  the  Treas- 
ury.    We  arc  well  satisfied  that  neither  of  them,  either 


ft 


m 


PREFACE. 


IX 


«, 


m 


from  his  position  in  the  administration  or  from  his 
personal  character,  was  Hkely  to  be  connected  with 
any  plans  or  movements  which  had  not  for  their  sole 
and  exclusive  object  the  welfare  and  honor  of  their 
country. 

It  has  been  our  purpose,  in  compiling  a  history  of 
the  campaign  of  AVashington,  to  resort  as  often  as 
practicable  to  the  language  of  the  principal  witnesses, 
and  make  such  use  of  their  testimony  that,  if  the  read- 
er is  not  satisfied  Avith  the  views  wliich'  we  have  taken 
of  the  subject,  he  may  substitute  other  views  of  his 
own  for  them,  based  upon  the  facts  which  we  have 
presented,  with  an  assurance  that  we  have  neither  de- 
signedly omitted,  nor  presented  in  a  deceptive  manner, 
any  information  necessary  for  the  formation  of  a  cor- 
rect judgment.  This  will  account  for  the  nudtitude 
of  extracts  and  quotations  in  the  work. 

Different  persons  will  draw  a  dilfcrcnt  moral  from 
the  same  story.  The  moral  which  we  are  disposed  to 
draw  from  the  history  of  the  battle  of  Bladensburg  is, 
not  that  Americans  were  too  "  pusillanimous*"  to  de- 
fend their  seat  of  government,  and  that,  therefore,  it 
would  be  safer  to  hire  an  army  of  foreign  mercenaries 
to  defend  it  for  us ;  nor  that  militia  troops  are  not  to 
be  depended  upor  and  therefore  a  large  standing  army 
of  regular  troops  is  necessary  ;  but  tiuit  politicians  of 
the  fairest  fame  require  watching,  and  will  not  hesitate 
to  sacrifice  or  jeopard  the  interests  and  honor  of  their 
country  in  order  to  advance  themselves  or  ruin  a  rival. 
We  present  in  this  book  the  grounds  which  we  think 
justify  us  in  deducing  this  moral :  and,  as  we  believe 
them  sufficient,  we  have  not  hesitated  to  express  our 

A  2 


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X  rilEFxVCE. 

opinion  in  plain  terms,  witliout  respect  to  the  rank  or 
reputation  of  the  eminent  individuals  implicated.  We 
do  not  understand — thou^'h  the  Congressional  Com- 
mittee of  Investigation  did — why  truths  which  may 
benefit  the  public,  and  which  the  public  have  a  right  to 
know,  should  be  suppressed,  or  cautiously  and  fear- 
fully hinted  at,  rather  than  boldly  spoken,  in  order  to 
spare  any  individual  reputation  or  fame,  if  it  were  as 
"  sacrosanct"  as  that  of  General  Washington  himself. 
Nor  do  we  think  that  men  who  did  not  hesitate  to  ca- 
lumniate others  in  order  to  screen  themselves  have 
any  claim,  however  exalted  their  position  in  history, 
to  be  treated  with  reverence  or  profound  respect  by  any 
of  those  upon  whom  their  unfounded  imputations  were 
cast. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  we  have  made  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  author  and  the  editor  or  compiler 
of  this  volume.  The  person  who  originated  the  idea 
or  plan  of  the  work,  and  who  sought  out  and  furnished 
the  materials  from  which  it  has  been  compiled,  may 
properly  be  termed  the  author  of  it.  At  his  request, 
the  literary  execution  of  it  was  undertaken  by  a  friend, 
now  no  more,  whose  progress  in  the  work  was  much 
impeded  by  other  more  imperative  calls  upon  his  time, 
and  who  had  not  advanced  farther  than  the  seventh 
chapter  of  the  present  volume,  when  his  death  occa- 
sioned a  suspension  of  the  work.  One  of  his  sons, 
however,  undertook  the  completion  of  the  undertaking. 
This  will  account  for  the  difference  between  the  style 
of  the  first  seven  chapters  of  the  work  and  that  of  the 
subsequent  portion.  Some  change,  also,  which  took 
place  in  the  plan  of  the  work,  and  tlie  fact  that  the 


«*■ 


• » 


PEEFACE.  ^j- 

first  portion  of  it  had  not  been  revised  by  the  writer, 
rendered  it  necessary  to  make  alterations,  which,  it  is 
feared,  have  rendered  the  whole  production  inferior,  as 
a  literary  composition,  to  what  it  would  have  been  liad 
the  able  pen  which  commenced  it  been  permitted  to 
contmue  it  to  the  end. 

Washington,  August,  1856. 


' 


* 

1 


»«W!«t* 


i;!f 

Vif 


v::; 


■■'.i, 


*' 


-*i| 


■li 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

Shadows  of  forthcoming  Events.-Apparent  Indme,-.  uce  of  C<.„.ress 
ana  the  Administration  to  the  Signs  of  the  Times Pa^e  lu 

CHAPTER  II. 

The  same  subject  continued 

CHAPTER  III. 

The  Administration  1,egins  to  awake.-Cabinet  Meeting  of  the  1st 

t'l-ict   ''■"    ""^''''  ''^"  ^^'^^^"^^•-Creation  of  a  new  xMilitary  Dis- 

4;; 

CHAPTER  IV. 

^'0"^!"'™°"''  '"  '''  Cabinet. -Selection  of  a  Commanding 
'  G() 

CHAPTER  V. 

Difficulties  in  the  ^yay  of  the  Commanding  General si 

CHAPTER  VI. 

General  Armstrong's  Letter  to  the  Editors  of  the  Baltimore  Patriot 
-Comments  upon  its  extraordinary  Disclosures 90 

CHAPTER  VII. 

Mr^Madison's  private  Opinion  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Secretary  of 

112 

CHAPTER  VIII. 
Landing  of  the  British  Troops  at  Benedic.t.-Uncertaintv  as  to  their 
Destmat.on.-Xature  and  An.ount  of  the  An.erican  lA.rce.-Pla 
of  Operation*  dictated  to  the  Commanding  General vjI 


mmmfiMmiWi 


■  r ' 

i 


i'i' 


XIV 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Results  of  the  Recor.noitring  Expedition  under  Mr.  Monroe. — Ad- 
vance of  the  Enemy  from  Benedict. — General  Winder  marches 
to  meet  him,  and  retreats  to  the  City Page  157 

CHAPTER  X. 

Cabinet  Council  at  General  "Winder's  Head-quarters  at  the  Eastern 
Branch  Bridge. — The  Secretary  of  War  has  no  Advice  or  Plan  to 
offer. — Tlie  Secretary  of  State  undertakes  to  arrange  the  Order  of 
Battle 18-1: 

CHAPTER  XI. 
The  Order  of  Battle 205 

CHAPTER  XII. 
The  Battle 221 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
Remarks  on  the  Battle  and  Retreat 239 

CHAPTER  XIV. 
Proceedings  of  the  Enemy  in  the  City 254 

CHAPTER  XV. 
The  Capitulation  of  Alexandria 282 


'J 


APPENDIX. 

No.  I.  Narrative  of  General  Winder,  addressed  to  the  Chair- 
man of  the  Committee  of  Investigation 301 

No.  II.  Report  of  General  Stansbury 331 

No.  III.  Statement  of  General  Walter  Smith 343 

No.  IV.  Colonel  George  Minor's  Statement 355 

No.  V.  From  Major  George  Peter  to  Colonel  J.  S.  Williams....  357 

No.  VI.  A  Volunteer  Corps  from  Virginia.. 3G^7 


I3r 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE 


OF 


WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTEE  I. 

Shadows  of  forthcominf;;  Events. — Apparent  Indifference  of  Congress 
and  the  Administration  to  the  Signs  of  the  Times. 

]\IORE  tlian  fifteen  months  "before  tlie  actual  invasion 
of  the  District  of  Cohimbia,  the  enemy  had  plainly  in- 
dicated their  design  to  maintain  a  sufficient  force  in 
the  Chesapeake  Bay  to  control  its  commerce.  They 
had  repeatedly  landed  marauding  parties  on  hotli  its 
shores ;  the  town  of  Havre  de  Grace  on  the  western, 
and  Frenchtown,  Georgetown,  and  Fredericktown  on 
the  eastern  shore  of  ^laryland,  and  Hampton  and  other 
places  in  Virginia,  had  all  been  attacked,  pillaged,  and 
burned ;  many  of  their  inhabitants  had  been  killed, 
and  many  had  been  carried  off  to  their  ships  of  war  as 
prisoners.  ^laryland  and  Virginia,  it  is  well  known, 
both  border  on  the  District  of  Columbia,  and  the  towns 
wdiich  have  been  named  as  the  scenes  of  the  enemy's 
destructive  operations  may  be  said  to  be  in  the  imme- 
diate neighborhood  of  the  seat  of  government. 

These  were  indications  deemed  by  almost  every  in- 
telligent and  prudent  citizen,  except  those  directly 


'  rtSWBHft  H  W(^^W» 


i 


16 


INVASION    AND    CAPTL'IIE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


connected  with  the  government,  sufficiently  strong  to 
excite  apprehensions  that  the  enemy  contemplated  an 
attack  also  upon  the  City  of  Washington.  On  the 
15th  of  July,  1813,  a  few  days  before  the  adjourn- 
ment of  Congress,  and  while  the  House  of  Ilepresent- 
atives  were  sitting  with  closed  doors  upon  a  message 
from  the  President  of  the  United  States,  which  had 
heen  suggested  by  the  presence  of  the  enemy  in  the 
Bay,  General  Philip  Stuart,  a  member  from  ^Maryland, 
a  veteran  soldier,  who  bore  the  scars  of  numerous  hon- 
orable wounds  received  in  our  Revolutionary  battles, 
a  fearless,  calm,  dispassionate  observer  of  passing 
events,  and  one,  therefore,  not  likely  to  sound  the  alarm 
when  no  cause  for  it  existed,  introduced  a  preamble  and 
resolution  in  the  following  words  : 

"  Whereas  the  seat  of  government,  from  the  unpre- 
pared and  defenseless  state  of  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, is  in  imminent  danger,  if  an  attack  should  be 
made  thereon  ;  and  whereas  the  fleet  of  the  enemy  is 
understood  to  be  within  a  few  hours'  sail  of  the  capi- 
tal ;  and  whereas  the  immense  value  of  public  prop- 
erty exposed  to  destruction,  the  great  value  of  the 
public  records,  and  other  deeply  interesting  considera- 
tions, render  it  peculiarly  important  that  any  invasion 
of  the  metropolis  should  be  met  with  vigor  and  success- 
fully repelled,  whereupon 

^^Hesolved,  That,  in  the  opinion  of  this  House,  a  dis- 
tribution of  such  arms  as  are  in  the  possession  of  the 
government  within  the  District  of  Columbia  should 
be  immediately  made,  to  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  all 
able-bodied  men  within  the  district  willing  to  be  em- 
bodied to  perform  military  duty,  and  also  in  the  hands 


<   i 


i 


ACTION    IN    THE    llOLSE. 


17 


of  such  iiicinbers  of  this  House  as  may  be  wllUng  to 
receive  thern,  to  act  against  the  enemy  in  any  manner 
not  incompatible  with  their  pubhc  duties.'"* 

The  words  of  this  resohition  show  that  its  mover, 
at  least,  expected  an  early  invasion,  and  the  preamble 
discloses  the  ground  of  that  expectation — '■'•  the  fleet 
of  the  enemy  in  understood  to  be  inlthhi  a  few  howii' 
mil  of  the  capital.''^  But  it  had  been  so  from  the  pre- 
vious month  of  April.  Other  places  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  capital  had  been  invaded,  and  Washington  had 
been  undisturbed.  This  was  the  delusive  ground  of 
argument :  the  enemy  did  not  follow  \ip  their  success- 
ful inroads  upon  Havre  de  Grace  and  the  other  towns 
by  an  immediate  attempt  against  the  Federal  City,  and 
therefore  it  formed  no  part  of  their  design  to  invade  it 
at  any  time.  It  was  admirable  logic,  it  must  be  con- 
fessed. 

The  first  question  raised  upon  the  introduction  of 
this  preamble  and  resolution  was  whetlier  the  discus- 
sion of  the  subject  required  secrecy;  and  this  "passed 
in  the  aflirmative."  The  next  vote  taken  was  to  la;;' 
the  matter  "on  the  table,"  and  this  "was  determined 
in  the  negative — yeas  G4,  nays  74."  A  motion  to 
strike  out  the  preamble  was  then  made  and  carried, 
and  the  naked  resolution  was  committed  to  the  "  Com- 
mittee on  ]\Iilitary  ^Vftairs."  On  the  following  day, 
before  it  was  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  any 
personal  examination  on  the  part  of  the  conmiittee  of 
the  preparations  for  defence,  even  within  the  city  itself, 
could  have  been  accomplished,  and  much  less  tlie 
whole  district  and  the  numerous  approaches  to  it,  the 

*  Annals  of  Conjrrcss,  I3th  Congress,  in  die. 


i 


'Hmmm 


'III 


^ii 


18        INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

chairman  of  that  committee  made  the  t'olJo^\'ino•  re- 
port : 

"  The  Committee  on  Military  Aftairs,  to  whom  was 
referred  a  resolution  of  yesterday  having  relation  to  the 
present  movement  of  the  enemy,  report, 

"  That  they  have  examined  into  the  state  of  prepa- 
ration, naval  and  military,  made  to  receive  the  enemy, 
and  are  satislied  that  tlie  preparations  are,  in  every  re- 
spect, adequate  to  the  emergence,  and  that  no  meas- 
ures are  necessary  on  the  part  of  this  House  to  make 
it  more  complete." 

That  this  committee,  within  the  time  that  intervened 
between  the  close  of  one  day's  session  and  the  open- 
ing of  the  next,  couhi  have  made  a  personal  inspection 
of  the  naval  and  military  strength  of  the  citj',  is  alto- 
gether beyond  credibility.  The  report  was,  therefore, 
little  less  than  an  insult  to  the  common  sense  of  the 
House.  The  chairman,  it  may  be,  "examined''  the 
secretaries  of  the  two  departments  of  War  and  the 
Navy,  and  received  assurances  from  those  officers  re- 
spectively that  every  preparation  for  defence  had  been 
made ;  but  ought  this,  under  the  circumstances,  to  have 
"satisfied"  the  committee? 

The  reader  will  observe  that  there  are  here  two 
opinions  expressed,  diametrically  opposite  in  their  na- 
ture, and  both  advanced  with  equal  confidence  and 
boldness  in  the  face  of  the  world  by  persons  whose 
means  and  opportunities  of  obtaining  correct  informa- 
tion were  alike  ample  and  authoritative.  The  one  as- 
serts that  the  seat  of  government,  "  from  the  unpre- 
pared and  defenceless  state  of  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia, is  in  mimi?ie?it  danger,  if  an  attack  should  be 


f 


■^ 


!) 


INSUFFICIENT    PREPARATION. 


19 


I 


made  thereon ;"  the  other,  that  the  state  of  prepara- 
tion for  defence  "is,  ifi  every  re^i^ecU  ade(j^uate  to  the, 
emergence." 

It  is  impossible  that  any  two  persons  of  ordinary 
capacity  should  have  differed  so  widely  as  to  the  ac- 
tual state  of  preparations  in  the  district  to  defend  the 
seat  of  government ;  these  discordant  opinions,  there- 
fore, must  have  been  formed  from  the  different  light  in 
which  their  respective  entertainers  viewed  the  proba- 
bility of  "«^i  attack.'"'  On  the  supposition  that  the 
enemy  did  not  contemplate  an  invasion  of  the  District 
of  Columbia,  it  was  very  natural  to  believe  that  no 
measures  were  necessary  on  the  part  of  the  House  to 
render  the  preparations  for  defence  "more  complete." 
But  the  question  for  history  is,  were  the  means  of  de- 
fence, naval  and  military,  such  as  to  give  a  reasonable 
assurance  that  they  would  prove  sufficient  to  repel  the 
enemy  "if  an  attack  should  be  made?"  xVnd  history 
itself  answers  this  question  in  the  negative  ;  for,  even 
after  the  lapse  of  more  than  a  year  from  this  time, 
during  which  some  additions  had  been  made  to  what 
were  regarded  as  preparations  for  defense,  the  enemy 
did  make  an  attack,  which,  unhappily,  was  not  re- 
pelled. 

On  the  20tli  of  the  same  month  in  which  the  pro- 
ceedings just  mentioned  took  place,  in  the  secret  ses- 
sion of  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  transmitted  to  Congress  a  message 
which,  as  it  is  short,  and  contains,  as  we  think,  a  clew 
to  the  very  extraordinary  report  of  the  Military  Com- 
mittee, is  here  presented  to  the  reader  without  abridg- 
ment. 


(!!■  ; 


'\    I 


!' 


iS! 


if    I 


20       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

"  Confidential. — To  the  Senate  and  llou.sc  of  llep- 
rcscritatives  of  the  United  Stales:  There  behig  siiHi- 
cient  ground  to  infer  that  it  is  the  purpose  of  tlie  ene- 
my to  combine  with  the  bloclvade  of  our  ports  special 
license  to  neutral  vessels,  or  to  British  vessels  hi  neu- 
tral disguise,  whereby  they  may  draw  from  our  coun- 
try the  precise  khids  and  quantity  of  exports  essential 
to  their  wants,  whilst  its  general  conuncrce  remains 
obstructed ;  keeping  in  view  also  the  invidious  discrim- 
ination between  different  ports  of  the  United  States ; 
and  as  such  a  system,  if  not  counteracted,  will  have 
the  effect  of  diminishing  very  materially  the  pressure 
of  the  war  on  the  enemy,  and  encouraging  a  persever- 
ance in  it,  at  the  same  time  that  it  will  leave  the  gen- 
eral commerce  of  the  United  States  under  all  the  press- 
ure the  enemy  can  impose,  thus  subjecting  the  whole 
to  British  regulation,  in  subserviency  to  British  mo- 
nopoly; I  recommend  to  the  consideration  of  Congress 
the  expediency  of  an  immediate  and  effectual  prohibi- 
tion of  exports,  limited  to  a  convenient  day  in  tlieir 
next  session,  and  removable  in  the  mean  time  in  the 
event  of  a  cessation  of  the  blockade  of  our  ports. 

"James  Madison. 

''Washington,  July  20,  1813." 

A  comparison  of  the  tenor  of  this  message  with  the 
report  of  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  immediate- 
ly preceding  it,  would  seem  to  render  it  manifest  that 
both  were  the  offspring  of  the  same  delusion.  Both 
seem  to  have  been  dictated  by  the  conviction  that  the 
enemy,  though  at  that  moment  within  a  few  hours' 
sail  of  the  seat  of  government,  had  no  intention  what- 


I 


i 


DELUSION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT. 


21 


ever,  citlicr  then  or  at  any  later  periotl,  of  attempting 
an  expedition  against  it.  In  Loth  eases,  indeed,  the 
deluriivc  and  iinstatcsmanlike  opinion  seemed  to  have 
prevailed,  that  a  Iiostilc  invasion  of  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, through  the  instrumentality  of  the  British 
squadron  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  was  not  within  the  range 
of  possibility.  Otherwise,  it  is  inconceivable  on  what 
grounds  it  could  have  been  asserted,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  defences  of  the  District  wanted  nothing  to 
their  completeness,  or  why,  on  the  other  hand,  the  at- 
tention of  Congress  should  be  called*  only  to  the  com- 
mercial evils  which  would  be  likely  to  result  from  the 
continued  blockade  of  our  ports. 

If  it  had  been  an  ascertained,  indisputable  fact, 
about  which  there  could  be  no  difference  of  opinion, 
that  the  enemy  meant  to  limit  their  operations  in  the 
Chesapeake  to  the  regulation  and  control  of  the  com- 
merce of  which  it  was  the  channel,  then,  indeed,  the 
measure  recommended  by  the  President  might  have 
been  regarded  as  the  most  appropriate  and  suitable  one 
to  counteract  the  design ;  but,  to  say  the  least,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  mere  assumption  of  such  a 
fact,  and  that,  too,  against  strongly-expressed  views  of 
a  different  character,  could  justify  him  in  his  silence  as 
to  other  than  commercial  interests  in  equal  want  of 
protection,  and  which  would  be  in  equal  jeopardy  if 
assailed.  It  would  certainly  have  been  safer  and.  wiser, 
and  more  consonant  with  a  due  regard  to  the  general 
welfare,  to  have  taken  into  account  the  possibility,  at 
least,  that  the  enemy  might  have  more  extensive  de- 
signs than  those  which  were  apparent  to  every  body. 

It  can  not  be  considered  extraordinary  that  Individ- 


:-%jvn'a'g- 


I 


I  .   I 


i:: 


22        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

uals  should  differ  in  opinion  as  to  the  prohability  or  im- 
probability of  any  occurrence  yet  in  the  womb  of  time, 
"but  it  is  passing  strange  that  men  of  equal  discernment, 
having  equal  capacity  to  examine  and  inquire,  and 
equal  authority  to  draw  information  from  the  same 
sources,  should  come  to  opposite  conclusions  as  to  a 
simple  question  of  fact — that  is,  whether  there  existed 
or  did  not  exist  in  the  District  of  Columbia  any  evidence 
of  preparation  to  resist  an  invading  enemy.  If  the 
Military  Committee  of  tlic  House  of  Kcpresentatives 
had  said,  in  so  many  words,  We  have  reason  to  believe 
that  the  enemy  now  in  the  Chesapeake  Bay  have  not 
the  remotest  idea  or  intention  of  invading  the  District, 
and  therefore  we  can  not  conceive  that  there  exists  any 
necessity  for  providing  means  of  defence,  tlieir  report 
might  have  been  regarded  as  kindly  designed  to  relieve 
the  House  from  all  apprehension  as  to  their  own  safe- 
ty ;  but  when,  in  speaking  of  "the  state  of  preparation, 
naval  and  military,"  they  make  the  unqualified  asser- 
tion "  that  no  measures  are  necessary  on  the  part  of 
the  House  to  make  it  more  complete,"  they  can  be 
understood  in  no  other  way  than  as  meaning  to  say 
tliat  they  had  found  it,  upon  examination,  to  be  al- 
ready  complete.  This  understanding  of  it  imposes 
upon  us  the  necessity  of  inquiring  into  the  correctness 
or  incorrectness  of  this  implied  alHrmation. 

At  the  moment  that  this  rci)ort  was  made,  it  was  a 
fact  notorious  to  every  inliabitant  of  the  District  of 
Columbia,  and  which  ouglit  to  have  been  equally  so  to 
Congress,  tliat  the  only  fortification,  so  called,  on  the 
Potomac  lliver,  from  its  embouchure  into  the  Chesa- 
peake Bay  up  to  the  scat  of  government  on  its  banks. 


ASTONISHING    REMISSNESS. 


23 


a 


had  not  move  than  a  brace  of  guns  mounted,  nor  men 
enough  to  serve  more  if  they  had  been  mounted.  It 
■vvas  a  fortiiication  in  name  only,  not  prepared  to  have 
repulsed  even  the  smallest  of  the  enemy's  vessels,  had 
an  attempt  been  made  to  pass  it.  At  the  mouth  of 
the  Anacostia,  or  eastern  branch  of  the  Potomac,  where 
there  now  stands  an  arsenal,  surrounded  by  a  neat 
embattled  wall,  there  was  then  nothing  but  an  unpro- 
tected magazine.  From  that  point  to  the  Xavy  Yard 
there  was  not  a  gun  of  any  description  to  present  even 
a  show  of  defence,  while  at  the  yard  itself  a  few  artifi- 
cers and  laborers,  and  still  fewer  marines,  constituted 
the  sole  means  of  protection. 

Such  was  "the  state  of  preparation"  on  the  ap- 
proaches to  the  seat  of  government  by  water.  The 
defences  on  the  land  routes  were  in  no  respect  "more 
complete."  Throughout  the  whole  boundary-line  of 
the  District  of  Columbia  there  was  not  a  single  point 
fortified  ;  not  a  redoubt,  dike,  or  ditch  ;  not  a  solitary 
piece  of  artillery  ;  not  a  single  battalion  of  regular  sol- 
diers ;  not  one  company  of  militia  or  volunteers  prop- 
erly armed,  equipped,  and  disciplined. 

The  neglect  to  take  advantage  of  the  full  ojiportu- 
nity  allowed  by  the  enemy,  and,  it  may  be  added,  of 
the  long  warning  given  ]jy  them,  to  place  the  seat  of 
government  in  a  condition  to  have  dcHcd  the  utmost 
force  and  skill  of  attack,  is  utterly  incomprehensible  1  o 
plain  common  sense.  There  was  not  an  inhabitant  of 
the  District,  whether  fixrmer,  merchant,  mechanic,  or  la- 
borer, who  did  not  know  tl)f;t  the  city  was  totally  des- 
titute of  defences,  and  wiio  did  not  believe  in  the  prob- 
ability of  an  invasion.    The  President  and  his  muiisters, 


'I' '      I 


:i  :  I 


24       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHIXGTC:T. 

and  their  friends  in  Congress,  alone  entertained  a  differ- 
ent opinion,  and,  unfortunately,  these  were  the  author- 
ities in  whom  was  vested,  by  the  law  and  Constitution, 
the  sole  power  of  making  the  necessary  preparations. 

We  dwell  upon  the  treatment  which  General  Stu- 
art's resolutions  received  longer  than  it  may  he  thought 
to  deserve,  hut  avc  do  so  because  we  believe  that  to 
that  treatment  may  be  traced  all  the  misfortunes  of 
the  24th  of  August,  1814.  The  necessity  of  resorting 
to  any  measures  of  preparation  was  not  admitted  by 
Congress  or  the  administration,  because,  as  already 
intimated,  they  did  not  believe  that  the  enemy  enter- 
tained the  remotest  design  of  attempting  an  invasion 
of  the  District  of  Columbia.  By  what  process  of  rea- 
soning, or  by  what  unknown  facts  tlieir  minds  were 
brought  to  this  conviction,  we  do  not  pretend  to  know, 
and  will  not  venture  to  guess.  AVhether  the  Congress 
imbibed  their  belief  from  the  President,  or  whetlier  the 
latter  trusted  so  implicitly  to  the  prudence  and  judg- 
ment of  the  former  as  to  deem  it  unnecessary  to  bring- 
to  their  notice  what  he  took  it  for  granted  would  not 
escape  their  foresiglit,  is  a  question  the  discussion  of 
which  perhaps  would  be  more  curious  than  useful.  It 
is  enough  to  know  that  both  the  one  and  the  other  la- 
bored under  a  most  unhappy  delusion,  or  were  guilty 
of  gross  negligence  and  indiiference. 

The  House  of  Kepresentatives  promptly  acted  upon 
tlic  message  of  the  President,  and  complied  with  his 
recommendations  by  passing  a  bill  laying  an  embargo 
upon  all  shi})s  and  vessels  in  the  ports  and  harbors  of 
tlie  United  States :  a  measure  wliich,  if  his  Hmited 
view  of  tlic  enemy's  intentions  had  been  correct,  wouhl 


A 


THE    EMBARGO. 


-25 


the 


•i 


§. 


probably  have  been  the  most  judicious  that  could  have 
been  devised  to  counteract  tliem.  The  Senate,  how- 
ever, entertained  a  different  idea,  and  did  not  concur 
in  the  proposed  embargo.  So  tar,  then,  as  the  protec- 
tion or  defence  of  the  District  of  Columbia  was  con- 
cerned, nothing  was  done  during  that  session  of  Con- 
gress, which  terminated  on  the  2d  of  August,  1813, 
three  days  after  the  Senate  had  announced  their  non- 
concurrence  in  the  bill  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. 

The  fact  that  within  a  few  days  after  the  next  meet- 
ing of  Congress,  which  took  place  on  the  Gth  of  De- 
cember, 1813,  the  President  renewed  with  better  suc- 
cess his  recommendation  of  embargo,  and  again  omit- 
ted all  allusion  to  any  other  measure  as  being  called 
for  by  the  existing  state  of  things,  clearly  shows  that 
nothing  had  occurred  during  the  four  months  of  recess 
to  change  his  view  as  to  the  exclusive  purpose  of  the 
enemy  in  holding  possession  of  Chesapeake  Bay. 
Though  parties  of  the  troops  from  their  ships  of  war 
had  been  daily  committing  depredations  upon  the 
neighboring  shores  of  .Maryland  and  v'irginia,  the  ap- 
prehension that  their  inroads  might,  sooner  or  later, 
extend  to  the  District  of  Columbia  does  not  seem  yet 
to  have  entered  into  his  mind. 


lupon 
h  his 
Ibargo 
^rs  of 
niited 
ivould 


B 


i 


r  A) 


26       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


'     I 


1' 

i 


': 

1, 


!  t 


;    I 


CIIAPTi:!!  II. 

The  same  subject  continued. 

Scarcely  had  there  been  time  allowed  tor  the  em- 
bargo act  of  the  17th  of  December,  1813,  to  reach  the 
more  remote  ports  and  harbors  of  the  United  States, 
before  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Foreio-n  Re- 

o 

lations  introduced  a  bill  to  repeal  it.  On  tlie  3d  of 
April,  Mr.  Calhoun  presented  a  bill  to  that  effect,  taking 
that  occasion  to  address  the  House  in  one  of  his  hap- 
piest strains  of  eloquence  and  argument.  The  prin- 
cipal ground  for  the  measure  now  proposed  was,  that 
the  embargo  and  non-importation  acts  were  utterly  in- 
compatible with  the  avowed  objects  of  the  war,  whicli 
had  been  declared  for  the  purpose  of  defending  and 
maintaining  the  principles  of  ''free  trade  and  sailors' 
rights."  The  wrongs  and  outrages  connnitted  by  the 
enemy  were  scarcely  more  abhorrent  or  destructive  of 
this  principle  than  was  the  operation  of  a  system 
Wiiicli  compelled  our  ships  and  vessels  to  lie  and  rot 
in  port,  while  it  deprived  our  seamen  of  their  only 
means  of  subsistence. 

The  same  argument  had  been  frequently  before 
urged  by  tiic  opponents  of  the  restrictive  system, 
when  it  was  lirst  jiroposed  and  adoi)ted ;  and  it  now, 
of  course,  met  with  their  hearty  concurrence,  while,  at 
the  same  time,  it  furnished  them  a  fair  0])portunity  of 
exultation — which  they  did  not  fail  to  seize — at  this 
acknowledged  endorsement  of  their  opinions. 


yXATE    OF    EUROPE. 


27 


ai 


id 


lors 
the 
of 

item 
rot 

only 

fore 
teni, 

lOW, 

c,  at 
of 
this 


But,  in  addition  to  this  all-sufficient  reason  for  the 
proposed  repeal  of  the  embargo  and  non-importation 
acts,  the  distinguished  statesman  who  introduced  the 
bill  urged  another  consideration,  which  had  influenced 
his  own  opinions,  and  which,  he  thought,  would  be  re- 
garded as  a  poweriid  motive  in  the  decision  of  the 
House.  This  was  the  entire  change  which  had  re- 
cently taken  place  in  the  circumstances  of  the  Euro- 
pean belligerents.  All  Europe,  which  had  been  so 
lono;  shut  a2;ainst  the  commerce  which  constituted  the 
vital  breath  of  our  enemy,  was  now  open  to  them ; 
and  our  restrictive  system,  which,  as  auxiliary  to  that 
of  other  countries,  pressed  severely  upon  them,  would, 
in  the  changed  relations  of  those  countries,  press  more 
heavily  upon  ourselves  than  upon  Great  I^ritairu  It 
is  with  the  statement  of  the  fact  upon  which  this  last 
argument  is  founded  that  our  subject  has  any  thing 
to  do. 

Here  is  proof  that  the  change  in  the  relative  con- 
dition of  the  belligerent  powers  in  Europe  was  known 
in  this  country  so  early  as  the  Gth  of  April,  1814 — 
more  than  four  months  before  the  invasion  and  cap- 
ture of  the  City  of  AVashington ;  and  the  statesman 
must  have  wilfully  closed  his  eyes  to  passing  occur- 
rences who  did  not  see  the  cause  of  that  change. 
No  public  man  or  politician  of  that  day  could  be  ex- 
cusable if  he  remained  in  ignorance  of  the  fact  that 
almost  every  arrival  from  Europe  brought  information 
of  some  new  success  of  the  allied  armies,  of  which  that 
of  our  enemy  constituted  one.  The  colossal  power 
of  France,  which  had,  for  twenty  years,  not  merely 
withstood  the  attacks  of  all  Europe,  but  had  actually 


1 1 


I 


M 


I! 


I  ! 


I      ,  , 

1  , 


I  i 


28        INVASION   AND   CAPTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

waxed  greater  and  greater  by  their  results,  was  now 
seen  to  be  tottering  to  i^s  fall.  Notwithstanding  a 
few  occasional  slight  reverses,  the  Allies  were  known 
to  be  every  wliere  gaining  ground,  and  though  a  few 
enthusiasts  still  affected  to  believe  in  the  invincibility 
of  Napoleon,  no  one  doubted  that  the  war  in  Europe 
would  soon  be  at  an  end. 

The  great  statesman  was  right  in  bringing  forward 
this  argument  in  support  of  his  bill  for  the  repeal  of 
the  embargo  and  non-impcrtation  acts.  So  long  as 
all  Europe  was  shut  against  the  products  and  manu- 
factures of  England,  and  these  acts  remained  in  force, 
she  would  necessarily  feel  with  greater  severity  the  ef- 
fect of  that  seclrsion ;  and  so  far  they  might  be  con- 
sidered good  war  measures  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  But  even  this  was  thought  doubtful  by  many 
wise  politicians,  inasmuch  as  it  compelled  Great  Brit- 
ain, in  her  own  defence,  to  f"eize  upon  all  the  channels 
of  commerce  in  the  United  States,  and  thus  secure  to 
herself  the  opportunity  of  seducing  our  citizens  to  en- 
gage in  an  illicit  trade  with  her—  -an  opportunity  by 
which,  as  the  President  had  informed  Congress,  she 
did  n  A  fail  to  profit  to  the  fullest  extent.  It  was  the 
only  means  she  possessed  of  forcing  a  market,  out  of 
her  own  colonies,  and  if  an  inference  may  be  drawn 
from  the  several  acts  passed  by  Congress  to  prohibit 
the  use  of  British  licenses  or  passes,  and  the  conclu- 
sive ransoming  of  vessels  and  cargoes,  it  may  be  as- 
sumed that  her  actual  blockades  produced  for  her  more 
than  a  compensation  for  the  restrictive  system.  All 
Europe  being  again  opened  to  her,  the  blockades  wetv.; 
kept  up  only  against  the  United  States,  and  were  the 


I 
I 


STRANGE   UNCONCERN. 


29 


)C  as- 

inorc 

All 

L-c  the 


more  rigorously  eutbrcecl,  as  obedience  to  tlie  order  of 
their  government,  on  the  part  of  the  officers  intrusted 
with  them,  was  rewarded  by  considerable  pecuniary 
gains  to  the  latter. 

But  what  is  most  of  all  remarkable  and  difficult  of 
comprehension  in  this  state  of  things  is  that  neither 
the  President,  nor  tlic  enlightened  and  lar-seeing  states- 
man at  the  head  of  the  Connnittee  of  Foreign  Kcla- 
tions,  though  well  aware  of  the  cliange  in  the  cir- 
cumstances of  Europe,  seems  to  have  thought  of  tlic 
possible  eilect  wliich  that  change  might  produce  in 
the  conduct  of  the  war  that  Great  Bi'itain  was  sep- 
arately wao'inn;  aG;ainst  the  United  States. 

Was  the  apprehension,  which  we  have  seeii  was  en- 
tertained by  many  observant  and  reflecting  individu- 
als, that  some  of  the  British  troops,  left  without  em- 
ployment in  Europe,  would  be  forthwith  sent  to  aid  in 
a  more  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war  on  this  conti- 
nent, regarded  as  too  chimerical  to  deserve  the  notice 
of  statesmen '?  Was  there  any  thing  unreasonable  or 
far-fetched  in  such  an  anticipation  ?  It  is  true,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  had  accepted  the  of- 
fered mediation  of  the  Emperor  of  llussia,  and  had 
sent  envoys  extraordinary  to  Europe  with  commis- 
sions to  treat  of  the  terni.s  of  peace  with  those  who 
might  be  appointed  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  if  she 
also  should  accept  the  mediation.  But,  though  tlie 
President  had  reason  to  believe  she  would  accept  tliat 
mediation,  she  had  not  yet  done  so,  and  it  is  manifest, 
from  his  various  messages  to  Congress  on  the  subject 
of  the  war,  that  this  consideration  did  not  influence  him 
to  believe  in  the  expediency  of  neglecting  any  means 


1 

I 


I 


il! 


I'.  I 


I    I 


111 

■ii; 


III 


ii 


I  .1! 


I 


1 


I  111 


30 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 


that  might  be  tlecincd  necessary  for  carrying  it  out 
with  the  same  vigihince  and  energy  as  if  no  nego- 
tiations for  peace  had  been  thouglit  of.  In  this,  per- 
haps, it  may  be  thought  that  lie  did  all  which  his  duty 
re([uired  him  to  do,  and  that  the  whole  blame  of  not 
making  the  proper  preparations  to  put  the  Distiict  of 
Columbia  in  a  complete  state  of  defence  ought  properly 
to  rest  upon  Congress.  J5ut,  on  the  otlicr  hand,  it 
may  be  said  that  the  District  of  Columbia  was  more 
peculiarly  under  the  guardianship  of  the  President 
than  any  otlicr  portion  of  the  United  States.  Here 
was  the  seat  of  government,  of  wliich  he  was  the  head, 
and  the  condition  of  which,  as  it  rccrardcd  the  cxistins; 
state  of  warfare,  he  must  be  supposed  to  have  had  bet- 
ter opportunities  of  forming  a  correct  opinion  of  than 
the  body  of  Congress.  Tliey  would,  from  these  con- 
siderations, naturally  wish  to  be  informed  by  him  that 
additional  defences  were  deemed  necessary  before  they 
instituted  any  legislatiA'c  proceedings  concerning  them. 
As  lie  gave  them  no  such  information,  they  had  a 
right,  perhaps,  to  take  it  for  granted  that  no  inquiries 
on  the  subject,  by  them  or  their  committees,  Avould  be 
expedient  or  proper. 

But,  though  the  President  had  not  only  omitted  to 
rcconnnend  any  s])ecial  measures  for  the  protection 
and  defense  of  tlie  District  of  Columbia,  but  had  left 
Congress  to  infer  from  his  message  that  the  sole  ob- 
ject of  the  enemy'.-  ships  of  war  in  its  vicinity  was  to 
regulate  and  control  the  conn)?erce  of  the  cities  and 
ports  on  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  jct  he  had, 
during  their  session  of  the  previous  year,  connnuni- 
cated  to  them  various  documents,  proving  beyond  a 


-| 


'I 

m 


'  til 


ill! 


T 


INROADS    OF    THE    EXKMY. 


31 


ed  to 

■  - 

iction 
d  left 

c  ob- 

.1 

as  to 

i 

and 

! 

had, 

» 

4 

luni- 

f 

[id  a 

4 

l4 

([iiostio7i  that  the  ships  liad  nuincrous  troops  on  board  ; 
that  tlicsc  troops  liad  landed,  in  larger  or  smaller  par- 
tics,  at  various  towns  and  villages  in  jMaryla  and 
A'irginia ;  had  pillaged  and  destroyed  large  amounts 
of  jjrivate  property ;  and  had  killed  or  earricd  off  as 
prisoners  of  war  many,  not  only  of  the  organized 
militia,  but  non-combatant  citizens.  The  District  of 
Columbia,  it  was  well  known  to  every  body,  was  al- 
most as  easily  within  their  reach  as  the  places  actually 
invaded  and  made  desolate,  and,  as  the  enemy  well 
knew,  vras  (juite  as  defenceless.  These  facts  were 
quite  as  well  known  to  every  member- of  Congress  as 
they  were  to  the  Pvesidcnt  of  tlie  United  States  ;  and 
yet  the  session  Avas  closed  soon  after  the  repeal  of  the 
embargo  and  non-importation  acts  without  a  single 
legislative  enactment  ha\ing  in  view  the  protection  of 
the  seat  of  government,  unless  a  trifling  augmentation 
of  the  marine  corps,  and  the  authority  given  to  the 
President  to  appoint  officers  for  the  flotilla  service  may 
be  construed  as  an  exception. 

Now"  let  us  observe  the  regular  progress  of  events. 
On  the  31st  of  31arch,  1814,  the  allied  armies  entered 
Paris  in  triumph,  and  on  the  6th  of  April,  the  very 
day  on  which  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  of  For- 
eign delations  reported  his  bill  for  the  repeal  of  the 
cmljargo  and  non-importation  acts,  which  had  been  so 
recently  enacted  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
Na])oleon  abdicated  the  imperial  throne  which  he  had 
liimself  created,  and  around  which  he  had  strewed  so 
many  dazzling  glories.  It  rarely  happens  that  "  com- 
ing events" — such,  at  least,  as  this — do  not  "  cast 
tlieir  shadows  l)efore  tliem."'     We  have  said  that  cv- 


1 


I 

111 


J"  I 


i     !!■! 


ill 


! 


!l 


iij, 


i     II!  I 

'  ip: 
i  li 


I 


1  ,0 , 

.  .1: ! 
i  ill 


I! 

III, 


I   IP 


f ; 
I' I 


.   I! 

'I 
'  'I 


ll 


32        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

cry  arrival  from  Europe,  for  a  month  or  more  before 
the  adjournment  of  Congress,  brought  with  it  rumors 
which  affected  the  whole  country,  the  govemment 
alone  excepted,  with  apprehensions  that  the  end  of  the 
war  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  M'ould  be  but  the 
aggravation  of  it  on  tliis.  Napoleon  had  made  it  the 
fashion  in  Europe  to  dash  on  through  all  obstacles  to 
the  capital  of  the  enemy,  and  the  presumption  was  not 
unnatural  that  the  Britisli  general  here  would  endeav- 
or to  imitate  that  fashion,  particularly  if  re-enforcec'  by 
a  few  of  the  conquerors  v.dio  had  thus  entered  Paris. 

The  President  and  his  two  veteran  secretaries,  of 
Revolutionary  memoiy,  liowever,  still  savf  all  this  with 
calmness.  Tliey  would  not  believe  it  possible  tliat 
what  had  happened  to  so  many  otJicr  nations  could 
happen  to  theirs.  Lieutenant-colonel  Cliach,  with  500 
recruits  from  North  Carolina  for  the  regular  army,  ar- 
rived in  the  City  of  Washington  soon  after  tlie  ad- 
journment of  Congress,  and  remained  encamped  here 
for  the  purposes  of  drill  and  exercise  for  si\  weeks. 
Tiiey  were  still  liere  on  the  7th  of  June,  when  the  Pres- 
ident held  a  cabinet  council,  at  whicli  tlie  Secretary  of 
AVar  reported  that  the  whole  force  of  the  Fiftli  ^Military 
District,  of  which  the  District  of  Columbia  tlien  formed 
a  part,  consisted  of  2154  enlisted  men,  scattered  over 
the  District,  and  one  company  of  marines  at  the  bar- 
racks in  the  City  of  AYashington.  At  Fort  Warbur- 
ton,  in  ^Maryland  —  now  called  I'ort  A^'ashington — 
there  was  one  small  company  of  artillerymen.  And 
these  two  last-mentioned  companies  constituted  the 
whole  "  state  of  preparation"  which  a  committee  of 
Congress,  sanctioned  by  the  whole  body,  deemed  it  un- 


NEWS   OF   THE    CHANGES    IN    EUROPE. 


3.:. 


of 


1 

^ 


yof 

tary 

med 

over 

bar- 

bur- 

■' 

11 — 

J 

Vnd 

1 

the 

f 

of 

•1 

\m- 

'^ 

necessary  to  make  "more  complete"  for  the  protection 
of  the  scat  of  government. 

On  tlie  0th  of  Jutio,  a  French  sloop  of  war,  having 
on  board  a  bearer  of  dispatches  from  the  restored  Bour- 
bon dynasty  to  the  French  minister  at  AVashinglon, 
arrived  at  New  York.  Though  traveling  at  that  day 
was  not  quite  so  rapid  as  at  present,  the  distance  from 
New  York  to  'Washington  was  not  so  great  but  that 
it  was  accompHshed  by  the  mail-stages  in  four  or  live 
days  at  the  most,  so  that  the  messenger,  -vvitli  liis  dis- 
patclies,  must  ha^'c  reached  the  seat  of*  government  on 
the  13th  or  14th  of  the  same  month.  As  the  news  he 
brought  was  not  designed  to  be  secret,  not  many  hours 
elapsed  after  Ins  arrival  before  it  was  known  to  the 
citizens  of  Washington.  But  it  could  hardly  be  called 
neics^  for  the  brig  Ida,  from  llochclle,  which  had  ar- 
rived at  Boston  on  the  12th  of  May,  brought  informa- 
tion tliat  the  alUed  a/mies  had  entered  Paris  on  the 
30tli  of  Marcli,  and  that  proclamations  had  been  every 
where  issued  in  the  name  of  Louis  XVIII.  ;  and  on 
the  15th  of  31ay,  the  cartel  Fair  American  had  arrived 
at  Sandy  Ilook  from  Liverpool,  tlie  passengers  on  board 
of  which  had  read  in  the  London  papers  the  official  ac- 
count to  the  same  purport.  Both  these  arrivals,  and 
the  intelligence  they  brought,  were  announced  in  the 
papers  of  the  District  on  the  iSth  of  ^lay.  But,  un- 
fortunately, in  addition  to  the  news  from  France,  let- 
ters from  England  held  out  the  prospect  that  peace 
would  certainly  be  concluded  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  in  the  course  of  the  sum- 
mer. 

Perhaps  if  this  had  not  been  so  confidently  expected, 

B  2 


I 


I   1 


'I 


If' 


if  ' 


'  1 


hi  '■ 

Kill 


ijii ' 

in 


iiii! 

;|i 
il 


I  I .  I 


I  111 


34 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


the  other  news  niin-ht  have  fallen  witli  a  more  whole- 
some  effect  upon  the  cars  of  our  President  and  his  ad- 
visers. 

On  the  18th  of  ]\[ay,  then,  it  was  known  in  Wash- 
ington that  the  Eni])eror  of  Kussia  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  had  entered  Paris  on  the  oOth  of  ]\Iarch  witli 
180,000  men  ;  that  AVellington,  with  his  Englisli  and 
Portuguese  army,  was  on  his  way  thither,  liaving  tri- 
umphed over  every  obstacle  in  his  marcli ;  that  Na- 
poleon was  at  I'ontainebleau,  without  an  army,  and 
completely  at  the  mercy  of  the  allied  sovereigns.  On 
the  13th  or  14tli  of  June  official  dtsj^atches  came  to  the 
French  minister,  whose  duty  it  was — a  duty  which  he, 
no  doubt,  for  his  own  sake,  lost  no  time  in  performing 
— immediately  to  communicate  to  the  President  that 
he  was  no  longer  the  representative  of  imperial  France, 
but  of  his  most  Christian  majesty  Louis  XVIII. ; 
and  yet,  notwithstanding,  and  in  the  teeth  of  all  this, 
it  is  asserted  by  General  Armstrong  and  others  that 
our  government  did  not  receive  o^icial  information  of 
the  general  pacification  in  Europe  until  the  26th  of 
June.  This  is  little  more  than  an  unworthy  play 
upon  words.  The  information  given  by  the  French 
minister  here  was,  if  not  in  every  respect  official,  as 
well  founded  and  credible  as  that  received  from  our 
minister  then  in  Paris. 

The  information,  however,  which  our  minister  com- 
municated to  the  government  was  not  confined  to  the 
simple  fact  that  a  general  peace  had  been  restored  to 
Europe.  It  stated  the  actual  embarkation  of  British 
troops  for  the  United  States,  thus  merely  confirming 
what  every  body  but  those  in  power  had  long-  antici- 


% 

M 


,;iii 


INEXCUSABLE    DILATOKINKSS. 


?H) 


I,  as 
our 

Jom- 

the 

to 

tisli 

fing 

tici- 


I 
I 


patctl.  This  was  the  official  information  which  tliey 
hail  tIier<itotbre  stubbornly  refused  to  believe,  or  to  ac- 
knowlf'ilgc  thaf  thoy  believed,  that  was  not  received 
until  ilic  2(Jtli  of  June. 

Hut  it  can  hardly  bo  considered  an  excuse  for  the 
dihitor}"  and  seeming-ly  reluctant  movements  of  the  ad- 
ministration, in  a  conjuncture  vvdiich,  to  the  eyes  of  the 
whole  country,  teemed  with  causes  of  serious  ap])rc- 
hcnsion  for  the  safety  of  the  seat  of  government,  that 
they  waited  for  (yjficlal  notice  that  re-enforcements  to 
our  enemy  here  were  on  the  way.  There  was  not  the 
sliii'htcst  reason  to  doubt  the  truth  of  the  news  lone; 
before  received,  and  confirmed  by  every  arrival  from 
Europe,  that  the  war  on  the  Continent  was  ended. 
The  naked  fact  that  proclamations  had  been  issued, 
under  the  sanction  of  the  allies,  in  the  name  of  Louis 
XVIIL,  was  enough  to  show  that  the  "long  agony" 
in  Europe  was  over,  that  the  Bourbons  had  been  or 
were  about  to  be  replaced  on  the  throne  of  their  an- 
cestors, and  that,  as  a  necessary  consequence,  England 
would  have  men  to  spare  for  her  Cisatlantic  contest. 
Preparations  for  the  defence  of  our  capital,  even  if  its 
invasion  never  took  place,  could  do  no  harm,  except 
that  of  auo-mentino;  to  a  trifling;  de2:rec  the  amount  of 
the  war  debt  already  incurred ;  and,  surely,  it  was 
worth  some  sacrifice  of  treasure  to  allay  the  disquie- 
tudes of  the  people,  admitting  their  fears  to  have  been 
"idle  dreams,"  as  they  were  called,  and  to  place  the 
safety  of  the  seat  of  government  beyond  all  hazard. 

Though  it  may  be  a  iiritted  that  our  government 
did  not  receive  ojicial  information  until  the  26tli  of 
June  that  some  of  Wellington's  veteran   reo-iments. 


1     1     !?: 


'    ;  |i 


!    Mlil 


I 


I  ! 

Ill';  I 


iitji 

ilili 
ilr  ' 


lit  1 1 
nit! ' 

fir 


111!'  ' 

•'I'' ; 


y       ini  I 

V      I  >«^'  I 


■I 


:l 


m 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


commanded  by  experienced  and  enterprising  ofticers, 
had  been  actually  embarked  on  board  of  transports  for 
the  United  States,  and  that  their  destination  for  tlic 
Chesapeake  Bay  was  no  secret,  Ave  shall  be  able  to 
show  from  historical  records  of  the  time  that  the  Pres- 
ident, at  least,  if  none  of  his  cabinet,  had  long  before 
that  expressed  Iiis  belief  that  the  City  of  Washington 
would  be  one  of  the  objects  of  the  enemy's  attack. 

In  the  "  Report"  by  Colonel  Richard  ]\[.  Johnson, 
chairman  of  the  committee  appointed,  on  his  motion, 
to  inquire  into  the  causes  of  the  capture  of  AVashing- 
ton,  &c.,  -SVC  find  sunmiaries  of  the  "  proceedings  of  the 
cabinet"'  at  several  meetings.  That  of  the  7th  of 
June,  he  says,  ^''  had  no  j)artlcular  rdat'ion  to  the  de- 
fence ofanyjMvt  of  Military  Dhtnct  No.  5,''  of  which 
the  District  of  Columbia  then  constituted  a  part. 
"  But  soon  after,''  he  goes  on  to  say,  "certain  intelli- 
gence being  received  of  the  success  of  the  allies  in  tlio 
subjugation  of  France  [we  have  shown  that  this  intel- 
ligence was  received  and  appeared  in  many  of  the  jour- 
nals of  the  United  States  long  hforc  the  7th  of  June, 
to  wit,  on  the  18th  of  May],  the  President  believed 
that  the  enemy  had  the  inclination  and  the  power  to 
increase  his  military  and  naval  forces  against  the 
United  States,  and,  in  tliat  event,  he  believed  that  a 
variety  of  considerations  iroidd present  this  city  as 
one  of  tlie  prominent  objects  of  attach.  On  the  2Gtli 
of  June,  dispatches  were  received  from  ]\Ir.  Gallatin 
and  ]\Ir.  Bayard  conjirniing  the  views  of  the  Presi- 
dent, which  led  him  to  convene  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments on  the  1st  of  July,  when  he  2>resented  a  jAaii 
of  a  force  innnediatoly  to  be  called  into  the  field,  jukI 


1?' 


CABINET    MEETING. 


37 


to 
the 
it  a 

as 

nil 

it  in 

csi- 

irt- 

'(Ol 

ii.l 


an  additional  force  to  be  kept  in  readiness  to  march 
imthout  delaii^  in  cuisc  of  iiects^'ity.  '-'■It  seemed  to  be 
his  object  that  some  position  sliould  be  taken  on  tlie 
Eastern  Branch  and  Patnxcnt,  witli  two  or  three  thou- 
sand men,  and  that  an  additional  force  of  ten  or  twelve 
tJiousand  militia  and  volunteers  should  be  held  vi  read- 
i)iess  in  the  neighhorimj  atates^  including  the  militia  of 
the  District  of  Columbia,  and  that  convenient  depots 
of  arms  and  military  equipments  should  be  established. 
The  measures  suggested  were  Jipproved  by  the  heads 
of  the  departments,  oi\  in  other  u'0'/\h\  it  does  not  aj)- 
2'>ear  that  anij  dissent  icris  ej'pressed.''''^ 

My.  Moiu'oe,  the  Secretary  of  State,  in  his  letter  to 
the  chairmain  of  the  connnittee,  merely  says,  "The 
events  in  France  having  greatly  augmented  the  dis- 
posable force  of  the  enemy,  and  his  disposition  to  cm- 
ploy  it  against  the  United  States  being  made  known, 
the  safety  of  this  metropolis  was  thought  to  require 
particular  attention. "f 

It  will  be  observed  that  3Ir.  3Ionroe  does  not  refer 
to  any  date  when  "the  events  in  Fr.i'ice"  became 
known  to  liimsclf  or  the  President,  or  when  "the  safe- 
ty of  this  metropolis  vas  thouijht  to  require  })articular 
attention;"  but,  from  wliat  immediately  folloM's  in  his 
letter,  we  may  suppose  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the 
effect  produced  upon  the  President  by  those  events, 
or  if  he  did,  chose  to  say  nothing  of  it  until  "on  or 
about  the  first  of  July,"  when  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments were  convened  to  liear  his  "plan."     This  is 

*  ATiiPiicnu  State  Papers,  cliap.  v..  Military  Airairs,  vol.  i.,  ]).  .'.2-1. 
The  words  in  Itnlks  nrc  so  niarkeU  l»y  the  editor  of  this  volume, 
t  Ibid.,  p.  fl4U, 


=-*„ll 


i 


1  I 


J' 

til! 


I 


!!|lii 
\$ 

II' 
lillii 


Illll' 

llkli 


li 


I    .»! 


It*'' 
iltl' 


38        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   01'    WASHINGTON. 

somewhat  remarkable  ^vhcn  we  reflect  upon  the  close 
intimacy  and  mutual  respect  existing  between  these 
great  men. 

Mr.  A\^illiam  Jones,  Secretary  of  the  Xavy,  in  his 
first  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  committee,  is  equally 
silent  as  to  dates.     The  following  is  his  language : 

"  The  serious  apprehension  of  invasion  and  devasta- 
tion which  succeeded  the  knowlcdG;c  of  those  extraor- 
dinary  events  which  liberated  the  powerful  naval  and 
military  forces  of  the  enemy  from  European  hostilities, 
and  the  temper  of  the  British  nation,  as  displayed  in 
the  language  of  its  journals  and  the  conduct  of  its  gov- 
ernment in  relation  to  the  pacific  mission  which  it  had 
invited,  were  deeply  felt  and  frequently  discussed  in 
occasional  conversations  prior  to  the  cabinet  meeting  on 
the  first  of  July  last,  in  which  the  probable  points  of 
attack  were  variously  considered.  ]My  own  impres- 
sions inclined  to  the  opinion  that  there  were  some 
points  more  exposed,  less  dithcult  of  access,  and  more 
inviting  to  the  enemy,  upon  the  system  of  warfare  he 
had  adopted,  than  the  metropolis  ;  the  only  important 
objects  which  it  presented,  according  to  my  view,  being 
the  naval  depot  and  public  shipping. 

"  I  recollect,  on  one  of  the  occasions,  that  the  Pres- 
ident expressed  very  great  solicitude  for  the  safety  of 
the  metropolis,  his  belief  that  the  enemy  would  attempt 
its  invasion,  and  urged  the  expediency  of  immediate 
defensive  ])re])arations,  but  nuist  confess  I  was  not 
cqmilly  impressed  with  the  ap]trehension  of  immediate 
danger,  as  well  from  flic  reasons  I  have  before  assigned, 
as  from  the  then  existinix  fact  that  the  force  of  tiie  en- 
cmy  in  tlic  waters  of  the  Cliesapeake  was  entirely  na- 


"I 


Jl> 


SECRET    RY    OF   THE    NAVY. 


39 


cs- 
of 
11  pt 
utc 
not 
ate 

cn- 
la- 


val,  and  apparently  very  satisfactorily  engaged  in  eon- 
flagratiiig  larm-lioiises,  and  depredating  upon  slaves 
and  tobacco,  on  the  shores  of  the  Patuxcnt.  In  this 
sentiment  1  was  not  alone."* 

Without  stopping  to  criticise  the  language  of  this 
letter,  we  may  be  permitted  to  remark,  that  the  vari- 
ous conversations  and  frequent  discussions  said  to  have 
taken  place  between  the  I^'csident  and  individual  mem- 
bers of  his  cabinet  could  hardly  all  have  occurred 
between  the  21st  of  June  and  the  meeting  of  the  1st 
of  July.  Some  of  them,  we  have  a  right  to  conclude, 
took  place  before  the  arrival  of  the  official  dispatches ; 
and  we  are  strengthened  in  this  conclusion  by  the  sec- 
ond letter  of  3Ir.  Jones  to  the  chairman  of  the  com- 
mittee. Jieforc  we  give  the  extract  to  which  wc  de- 
sire to  call  tlic  attentif  n  of  the  reader,  it  will  be  proper 
to  say  that  there  is  an  obvious  error  in  the  date  of  the 
letter,  as  given  in  the  volume  from  which  it  is  copied. 
The  first,  from  which  the  extract  already  given  is 
quoted,  is  dated  "Oct.  31st,*'  and  purports  to  be  in 
reply  to  Colonel  Johnson's  "  letter  of  the  24th  uistant.'''' 
That  from  which  the  following  extract  is  quoted  is 
dated  "•  October  3,  '  and  pur^wrts  to  be  in  reply  to  the 
same  gentleman's  "letter  of  the  2Gth  instant.'''  It  is 
probable  they  were  both  written  on  the  same  day — 
31st  of  October— the  figure  1,  in  the  latter,  being  ac- 
cidentally omitted,  it  will  be  remembered  tliat  our 
object  in  quoting  these  letters  from  members  of  the 
cabinet  is  to  sliow  that  the  President  was  fully  aware 
of  the  danger  that  threatened  the  scat  of  government, 
or  at  least  professed  to  be  so,  long  bclbre  the  heads  of 
♦  State  Papers,  %a  anti\;.  p.  540. 


I    m 


m 


m 


40 


INVASION    AND   CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


departments  were  called  together  to  decide  upon  the 
expediency  and  sufficiency  of  the  j^lan  which  he  had 
devised,  or  seemed  to  have  devised,  for  its  defence. 
This  is  Mr.  Jones's  statement : 

*'  In  ohcdience  to  the  general  instructions  and  early 
solicitude  of  the  President,  in  anticipation  of  the  prob- 
able designs  of  the  enemy  to  harass  the  country  in  this 
vicinity,  and  to  attempt  the  invasion  of  this  metrojm- 
lis,  I  directed,  ?;i  the  7}ionth  of  May  last,  three  twelve- 
pounders  to  be  mounted  on  field-carriages  by  the  me- 
chanics of  the  navy-yard,  and  completely  equipped  and 
furnished  for  field  service.  To  these  the  marines  at 
headquarters  were  trained,  under  the  command  of  Cap- 
tain ]\Iiller,  and  prepared  to  act  either  artillerist  or  in- 
fantry, as  the  service  might  require."* 

Nothing  could  be  more  explicit  than  this.  Though 
Colonel  Monroe,  who  bore  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  all 
the  discussions  and  volunteer  expeditions  of  the  period, 
seemed  to  have  known  nothinn;  of  the  President's  so- 
licitude  for  the  safety  of  the  metropolis  earlier  than 
"  on  or  about  the  first  of  July,"'  ]\Ir.  Jones  was  not 
only  made  aware  of  it,  but  received  general  instruc- 
tions in  the  month  of  May. 

We  shall  see,  by-and-by,  how  this  statement  agrees 
with  the  after  conduct  of  the  President.  The  chairman 
of  the  committee  of  investigation,  as  wc  have  seen, 
reported  that  the  cabinet  meeting  of  the  7tli  of  June — 
after  the  President's  expression  of  solicitude  for  the 
safety  of  the  city,  be  it  remembered — had  no  relation 
to  the  defence  of  any  j^art  of  the  military  district  in 
which  it  was  situated.     This  is  confirmed  by  Mr. 

♦  State  Papers,  nt  antea.  ]>.  r>7n. 


A 

y 
I 


THE   ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 


41 


mi  an 
5eeii, 
ic — 
the 
ition 
it  in 
Mr. 


rA 

i 


Hush,  the  attorney-general,  who,  in  liis  second  letter 
to  the  chairman  of  the  committee,  in  relation  to  the 
convocation  of  the  heads  of  departments  of  the  7th  of 
June,  says,  "'The  meeting  was  called  and  the  esti- 
mate of  force  submitted  for  jmrjwscs  quiU  distinct 
from  the  d fence  of  District  No.  5."*  But  in  his  first 
letter  he  says 

"That,  ill  the  month  of  June  of  the  past  summer, 
when  the  momentous  changes  in  Europe  had  become 
revealed  to  us,  I  had  the  honor  of  holding,  individu- 
ally, occasional  interviews  witli  the  President.  In 
dwelling  upon  our  public  alfairs,  he  expressed  his 
strouii'  belief  of  the  inau.s])icious  results  which  these 
changes  held  out  of  every  likelihood  of  superducing 
upon  them ;  that  the  entire  liberation  of  ]3ritish  mili- 
tary power  from  European  conflicts  created  a  corre- 
sponding probability  that  portions  of  it,  unexpectedly 
formidaljle,  would  be  thrown  upon  our  shores.  In 
one,  at  least,  of  the  conversations,  he  also  dwelt  upon 
the  probability  of  an  attack  upon  Washington,  ex- 
pressing his  opinion  on  the  grounds,  among  others,  of 
its  own  weakness,  and  the  eclat  that  would  attend  a 
successful  inroad  upon  the  capital  beyond  the  intrinsic 
magnitude  of  the  achievement.  He  S])okc  of  the  im- 
mediate necessity  of  preparing  for  its  defence.  His 
impressions  of  the  danger  appeared  to  acquire  new 
force  from  the  2()th  of  the  month,  upon  which  day  di  - 
patches  were  received  from  two  of  our  ministers 
abroad,  dated  early  in  j\Iay.''*t 

If  any  of  these  occasional  interviews  which  Mr. 
llusli  Iiad  with  the  President  had  occurred  jrrevious 

*  State  Pniicrs,  ul  uutca,  \).  542.  f  Ibid.,  p.  .">U. 


4 


A  : 


'I  w 


i«   : 


lis     I 


42        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASIIIXOTON. 

to  tlie  7tli  of  June,  it  would  surpass  belief  that  lie 
failed  to  impart  his  apprehensions  and  solicitude  for 
the  safety  of  the  capital  to  the  asrenibled  heads  of  de- 
partments on  that  day.  AVe  are  constrained  to  believe, 
then,  that  they  must  all  liavc  been  held  between  the 
7th  and  the  26th  of  that  month,  since,  accordinp-  to 
i\Ir.  Rush,  the  President's  nnpressions  of  the  danger 
only  appeared  to  acquire  new  force,  and  not  to  have 
been  created  by  the  dispatches  received  on  the  day  last 
mentioned.  It  is  singular,  indeed,  that  ]\Ir.  Jones 
should  have  been  the  only  member  of  his  cabinet  to 
whom  the  President  communicated  his  veri/  (jreat  so- 
licitude for  the  safety  of  the  metropolis  so  early  as  the 
Qiionth  of  2 fay.  It  certainly  was  not  because  he  mci; 
with  a  more  sympathizing  listener  in  ]\Ir.  Jones  than 
in  cither  of  the  other  heads  of  departments,  for  the  Sec- 
retary of.  the  Navy  takes  good  care  to  repeat  more  than 
once  that  he  did  not  participate  in  the  President's  ap- 
prehensions of  an  attack  on  Washington,  though  he 
promptly  obeyed  his  instructions  in  preparing  for  its 
defence,  so  far  as  t/rree  twehe-jwunders  'mounted  on 
field-carriages,  with  Captain  ]\liller  to  train  his  ma- 
rines to  their  exercise,  could  contribute  to  that  object. 
Having  given  all  that  has  been  said  by  three  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  on  the  particular  points  of  the  Pres- 
ident's expectation  of  an  attack  on  Washington,  his 
acknowledgment  of  the  insufficiency,  the  "weakness" 
of  its  defences,  and  of  his  silence  on  the  subject  at  the 
meeting  of  the  heads  of  departments  on  the  7th  of 
June,  a  month  after  his  conversation  with  and  instruc- 
tions to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  let  us  now  sec 
what  his  Secretary  of  War  says  of  that  meeting.     (lon- 


,5^ 


4 
% 


"    I 


!• 


THE   SECRETARY    OF    WAR. 


43 


," 


I 


oral  Armstrong,  in  lii.s  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the 
committee,  thus  speaks  of  it : 

"  Early  in  the  month  of  June  last,  a  call  was  made 
on  the  War  Department  for  a  general  report  of  the 
nmnbers  of  regular  troops  and  militia  employed  by 
the  United  States,  and  the  distribution  which  had  been 
made  of  them  for  the  service  of  the  present  campaign. 
This  statement  was  promptly  rendered,  and  submitted 
by  the  President  to  the  heads  of  departments.  It  is 
not  recollected  that  any  alteration  of  the  provisions 
exhibited  bv  this  document  was  either  made  or  suo-- 
gestcd.  A  reference  to  it  will  show  what  was  the 
force  then  deemed  competent  for  tlic  defence  of  ]\Iili- 
tary  District  No.  5,  of  which  the  City  of  AVashington 
Avas  a  part."* 

In  a  note  to  this  passage.  General  Armstrong  says, 
"This  document  is  in  the  possession  of  the  President. 
No  copy  of  it  was  retained  by  me."  But  a  copy  of  it, 
we  take  it  for  granted,  is  the  paper  marked  No.  1,  to 
be  found  among  the  documents  that  were  submitted 
by  the  committee  along  with  this  report.  It  is  called 
"A  lieport  of  the  Army,  its  strength  and  distribu- 
tion, previous  to  the  1st  of  July,  181 4.  "f  By  this 
report  it  appears  that  there  were  in  the  whole  "  dis- 
tnrtiYo.  5"  2154  "  elfeetives,"  of  which  1083  were  at 
Norfolk,  532  at  Baltimore,  40  at  Annapolis,  79  at  Fort 
Washington,  and  320,  comprising  the  36th  regiment 
of  intantry,  in  8t.  Clary's.  In  the  District  of  Colum- 
bia ?iot  one.  and  yet  this  force  was  deemed  coinj)etent 
for  the  defence  of  2fUltan/  Bhtrkt  Xo.  5,  of  xrhlch 
the  City  of  Washinyton  loas  a  part — so  deemed  by  all 


*  State  PajH'is,  vt  anti(u  p.  aOS. 


t  Ibid.,  p.  r»3.~>. 


J 


! 


;  71 


V         I 

'     I 


44       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

the  lieads  of  departments ;  for  it  icas  not  recollected^ 
says  General  Armstrong,  tliat  any  alteration  of  the 
2)rovmons  of  this  document  loas  either  made  or  sag- 
(jested.  Colonel  Johnson  and  3Ir.  Rush  Loth  tell  us, 
indeed,  that  this  meeting  of  the  7th  of  June  had  no 
particular  relation  to  the  defence  of  any  part  of  j\lili- 
itary  District  Xo.  5 ;  hut  it  exhibited  the  distribution 
of  the  troops  in  the  district,  and  showed  clearly  enough 
that  the  distribution  was  not  such  as  to  promise  any 
etfective  defence  of  the  City  of  Washington,  if  it  should 
be  attacked,  as  the  President  believed  it  would  be.  And 
07ie  of  the  gentlemen  present,  at  least,  knew  tliat  tlie 
President  so  believed,  or  perhaps  we  ought  rather  to 
say,  must  have  rocollccted  that  the  President  had  so 
told  him  in  the  month  of  ]May.  It  was  known  to  all 
that  nothing  had  occurred  in  the  mean  time  to  weaken 
any  of  the  grounds  u^wn  which  llie  President  had 
rested  that  belief,  but,  on  the  contrary,  much  to  con- 
hrm  and  strengtlien  it. 


\-\ 


I      I 


i' 


t  i! 


I        I 


1 

Si 

1 


CABINET    MEETING. 


45 


CF..iTErv  III. 

The  Administration  begins  to  awake. — Cabinet  Meeting  of  the  1st 
of  July. — rrojects  of  Defence. — Creation  of  a  new  Military  Dis- 
trict. 

EousED  at  length  to  a  sense  of  the  necessity  of 
showing  a  deep  solicitude  for  the  safety  of  the  metrop- 
olis by  some  more  public  demonstration  than  his  fre- 
quent interviews  with  the  members  of  liis  cabinet  in- 
dividually, on  the  30th  of  June  the  President  invited 
them  to  meet  him  at  his  mansion  on  the  follow  ing  day, 
the  first  of  July,  for  consultation.  The  result  of  that 
consultation  we  shall  present  in  the  words,  respective- 
ly, of  the  several  members,  of  whom  inquiries  were 
made  by  the  chairman  of  the  committee  of  investiga- 
tion. We  have  already  placed  before  the  reader  the 
brief  summary  of  the  proceedings  of  the  cabinet  on 
that  day,  as  given  in  the  report  of  the  committee,  and 
the  next  in  order  is  the  statement  made  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State.  In  his  letter,  marked  "  No.  2"  in  the 
list  of  documents  presented  to  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, we  find  the  following : 

"  On  or  about  the  first  of  July  last,  the  President 
convened  the  heads  of  departments  and  the  attorney- 
general  to  consult  them  on  the  measures  which  it 
would  be  proper  to  adopt  for  the  safety  of  this  city 
and  district.  He  appeared  to  have  digested  a  plan  of 
the  force  to  be  called  immediately  into  the  field ;  the 
additional  force  to  be  kept  under  orders  to  march  at  a 


Ill 


!•     I 


II    ! 


:  .1 


If 


I'   ! 


I    ! 


;      I 


I  ■ 


'■  i! 


ij;i 


III  ll 


46        INVASION    AND   CAPTUKE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

moment's  notice  ;  its  composition,  and  necessary  equip- 
ment. It  seemed  to  be  liis  object  that  some  position 
should  be  taken  between  the  Eastern  Branch  and  the 
Patuxent  with  two  or  three  thousand  men,  and  that 
an  additional  force  of  ten  or  twelve  thousand,  includ- 
ing the  militia  of  the  District,  should  be  in  readiness 
in  the  neighboring  states  to  march  when  called  on ; 
the  whole  force  to  be  put  under  the  command  of  an 
officer  of  the  regular  army. 

"  The  measures  siiggested  by  the  President  were 
approved  by  all  the  members  of  the  administration. 
The  Secretaries  of  War  and  Navy  gave  the  informa- 
tion required  of  them  incident  to  their  respective  de- 
partments. The  former  stated  the  regular  force  which 
lie  could  draw  together  at  an  early  day,  infantry  and 
cavalry  ;  the  amount  of  the  militia  of  the  District,  and 
the  states  from  which  he  should  draw  the  remaining 
force  in  contemplation,  and  in  wliat  proportions.  The 
latter  stated  the  aid  which  he  could  afford  from  tlie  of- 
ficers and  seamen  of  the  flotilla  on  the  Patuxent  and  the 
marines  at  the  navy-yard  on  the  Eastern  Branch.  The 
result  of  the  meeting  promised  prompt  and  efficacious 
measures  for  carrying  these  objects  into  execution. 
The  command  of  this  ^vhole  force,  w^itli  that  of  the  Dis- 
trict No.  5,  was  given  to  Brigadier-general  Winder." 

If  the  reader  will  compare  this  statement  with  the 
summary  to  which  we  have  just  referred,  to  be  found 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  he  will  see  that  the  same 
singular  mode  of  expression  is  used  in  both  when 
speaking  of  the  President's  plan:  ^'■Jle  a])pearcd  to 
have  dlgeded  a ijlan^''''  &c.  ''''It  seemed  to  he  his  ob- 
ject,'"' &c. 


h 


!  I 


.X 


i 


CABINET    MEETING. 


47 


cquip- 
osition 
nd  the 
id  that 
includ- 
idiness 
ed  on; 
L  of  an 

it  were 
tration. 
itbrma- 
ive  de- 
e  which 
try  and 
ict,  and 
naining 
The 
the  of- 
and  the 
The 
vicious 
Icution. 
le  Dis- 
Ider." 
th  the 
found 
same 
Avhcn 
red  to 
is  ob- 


■h 


There  arc  not  wanting  those  wlio  have  attributed 
this  phm  of  a  force  to  31r.  3lonroe  himself.  Every 
body  knows  that  Mr.  ■Madison  made  no  pretensions  to 
mihtary  science,  and  it  certainly  is  not  improbable  that, 
at  a  time  when  the  whole  country  was  looking  with 
absorbing  interest  to  the  movements  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  when  skill  and  experience  in  modes  of  war- 
fare were  more  than  ever  required,  he  would  consult 
fctimc  military  friend  before  he  would  hazard  his  repu- 
tation by  submitting  to  the  animadversions  of  the 
heads  of  departments  his  own  crude  notions  on  a  sub- 
ject which  nobody  expected  him  to  understand.  He 
had  no  friend  on  whose  fidelity  he  could  more  coniid- 
ingly  rely,  no  friend  to  whom  he  would  more  readily 
expose  his  ignorance,  or  who  would  be  more  willing  to 
aid  him  at  a  time  of  need,  than  his  Secretary  of  State. 
The  surmise,  therefore,  was  not  unreasonable  that  ]\Ir. 
Monroe  himself  was  the  planner  of  the  scheme  which 
2)romised  to  be  so  ejficadous  if  promptly  carried  into 
execution. 

Tlie  statement  of  General  Armstrong,  marked  No. 
3,  follows  that  of  ]Mr.  jMonroe.  As  our  present  object 
is  confined  to  the  exposition  of  what  took  place  at  the 
meeting  of  the  cabinet  on  the  1st  of  July,  we  shall 
give  only  that  portion  of  General  Armstrong's  letter 
which  relates  to  the  discussions  then  held.     He  says : 

"On  tlie  1st  of  July  a  consultation  of  the  heads  of 
departments  was  had.  The  questions  proposed  for  dis- 
cussion were  two : 

"1st.  By  what  means  can  the  seat  of  government 
and  Baltimore  be  defended,  in  case  the  enemy  should 
make  these  cities  objects  of  attack  ? 


i 


i   i 


f  i 


I  1 
r  I 


! 


i     i 


I       ! 


111 
f  i  i  i  • 


I  ,    I 


48        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


C( 


2d.  Sliciild  he  select  the  former,  will  his  approach 
be  made  by  way  of  the  Potomac  or  by  that  of  the  Pa- 
tuxent  ? 

*'  On  these  questions  I  took  the  liberty  of  offering 
the  following  statements  and  opinions : 

*'  1st.  That  the  principal  defence  to  be  relied  upon 
for  either  place  was  militia  ;  that,  besides  the  artil- 
lerists comprising  the  garrisons  of  Fort  IM'IIenry  and 
Washington,  about  one  thousand  regular  troops  only 
could  be  collected,  viz.,  the  thirty-sixth  regiment,  one 
battalion  of  the  thirty-eighth,  two  troops  of  dragoons, 
two  companies  of  the  tenth — ordered  from  North  Caro- 
lina, and  l>elieved  to  be  on  their  march — one  company 
of  the  twelfth,  and  two  companies  of  sea  fcncibles ; 
that  the  number  of  militia  called  into  service  should  be 
proportioned  to  the  known  or  probable  strength  of  the 
enemy,  and  be  taken  from  the  states  of  A^irginia,  ]\Ia- 
ryland,  and  Pennsylvania ;  that  it  is  not  believed  the 
enemy  will  hazard  a  blow  at  either  place  with  a  force 
less  than  five  thousand  men  ;  that,  to  repel  one  of  this 
extent,  we  should  at  least  require  double  that  number 
of  militia ;  that  these  should  be  assembled  at  some  in- 
termediate point  between  Baltimore  and  the  District  of 
Columbia,  leaving  the  sedentary  or  undrafted  militia 
of  both  places  an  auxiliary  force  at  the  disposition  of 
the  commandmg  general,  and  that  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion were  in  depot  and  ready  for  this  supply."' 

[Under  this  head  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  stated 
that  the  removal  or  destruction  of  the  flotilla  would 
put  at  his  disposition  between  six  and  eight  hundred 
.seamen,  and  that  the  marines  then  in  barracks  exceeded 
one  hundred.] 


'I' 


IM 


:i    I 


1 


TON. 

s  approach 
of  the  Pa- 

of  offering 

•died  upon 
5  the  artil- 
Ilenry  and 
troops  only 
^iment,  one 
f  dragoons, 
S'^orth  Caro- 
le company 
I  fencibles ; 
:e  shoukl  be 
2ngth  of  the 
rginia,  !Ma- 
beheved  the 
th  a  force 
one  of  this 
at  number 
at  some  in- 
District  of 
:'tcd  mihtia 
position  of 
d  ammuni- 

[avy  stated 

tilla  would 

it  hundred 

s  exceeded 


CAIMNE'J'    MKETlNf}. 


49 


\vi 


*'  2d.  That  the  navi^-ation  of  the  Potomac  is  lonjr 
and  sinuous,  and  if  not  doubtful,  as  to  practical.iihty, 
by  large  sJiips,  is  at  least  uncertain  in  relation  to  the 
time  its  ascent  may  occupy  ;  while  that  of  the  Patux- 
cnt  is  short  and  safe,  and  may  be  calculated  with  sufli- 
cicnt  precision  for  military  purposes ;  that,  should  the 
enemy  ascend  the  former,  his  object  is  unmasked — he 
at  once  declares  his  destination,  and  of  course  leaves 
us  at  libcrtv  to  concentrate  our  whole  force  apjainst 
him  ;  that,  on  the  other  hand,  should  he  ascend  the 
l^ituxent  (or  South  River),  his  object  is  uncertain — it 
may  be  the  Hotilla,  or  Baltimore,  or  "Washington  ;  and 
that,  as  long  as  his  point  of  attack  is  unknown,  so 
long  must  our  force  remain  divided ;  tliat  these  con- 
siderations suggest  tJic  preference  he  will  probably  give 
+he  Patuxent,  but  that  this  route  is  not  without  ob- 
jections ;  that  a  separation  from  his  tleet,  and  a  land 
march  of  twenty  miles  through  a  country  covered  vrith 
woods,  and  offering  at  every  step  strong  positions  for 
defence,  becomes  inevitable  ;  that,  if  these  circum- 
stances be  turned  to  proper  account  against  him,  if  he 
be  not  absolutely  stopped,  his  march  will  be  much  re- 
tarded ;  that  this  state  of  things,  on  which  every  wise 
general  will  calculate,  renders  necessary  a  provision 
train,  or  the  establishment  of  small  intermediate  posts, 
to  keep  open  his  communication  with  his  shipping; 
that  the  loss  of  these  would  make  his  situation  peril- 
ous ;  and  that,  should  the  main  battle  be  given  near 
AVashington,  and  he  to  him  disastrous  or  even  doubt- 
ful, his  destruction  is  complete;  that,  after  all,  be- 
lieving he  will  not  hazard  the  movement  but  with  a 

C 


il 


II 


1 1 


i     I 


i  :■ '! 


I ,  ,1 


III 


'  <  1 1 


I 


I! 


,1.     t! 


!l 


I    I    II 


50 


INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


very  superior  force,  or  one  he  thinks  such,  it  is  also 
believed  tiiat  he  will  prefer  this  route. 

*••  Conformably  to  these  opinions,  an  order  was  taken 
to  assemble  a  corps  and  form  a  camp  at  such  point 
between  the  City  of  AVashington  and  Baltimore  aa 
might  be  selected  by  the  commanding  general."* 

This  comprises  all  tiiat  is  said  in  General  Arm- 
strong's letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  committee  as  to 
the  consultation  of  the  1st  of  Julv.  It  will  be  ob- 
served  that  the  President's  })lan  of  a  force  is  not  even 
mentioned.  Mr.  ]Monroe,  in  his  letter,  is  entirely  silent 
as  to  these  detailed  views  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
He  gives  him  no  credit  for  having  so  well  foreshad- 
owed what  the  enemy  would  do,  and  described  the 
method  by  which  his  marcli  might  be,  if  ''not  abso- 
lutely stopped,"  at  least  "  much  retarded."  He  merely 
says,  with  regard  to  tiie  part  taken  by  the  vSecrctary 
of  War  at  the  meetinc;  tliat  he  stated  "the  re^rular 
forces  which  lie  could  have  drawn  together  at  an  early 
day — infantry  and  cavalry,  the  amount  of  the  militia 
of  the  district,  and  the  states  from  which  he  should 
draw  the  remaining  force  in  contemplation,  and  in  what 
proportions."  If  General  Armstrong  had  obtruded 
these  opinions  upon  the  cabinet  imasked,  tliey  iiiight 
possibly  have  been  misinterpreted  as  an  objection  to 
the  measures  ••'  suggested"  by  the  President ;  but  he 
tells  us  they  were  enlU^d  out  by  "  <pi(  stions  projioscd 
for  discussion.''''  ^J'his  is  another  piece  of  information 
wliich  could  not  be  gathered  from  any  thing  said  in 
the  letter  of  ]Mr.  ]\Ionroc.  From  what  he  communi- 
catefc',  wc  are  led  to  suijjiosc  that  tiic  President  called 

♦  fcjtatc  Papers,  nt  antea,  \k  538. 


'   '  »l 


CABINET   MEETING. 


51 


% 


his  heads  of  departments  together  merely  to  consult 
upon  tlie  {)l;ni  wiiirli  ill:  ujijiaAi'^d  to  have  digested; 
v.lillc  lioni  til.;  l(tl;r  of  Cleu.ial  .V;in-u'ong  we  arc 
f,rvtd  10  believe  that  tiicy  werr.  caliud  together  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  diseussiiig  two  given  (picstions,  neither 
of  whieh  liad  any  alhision  to  a  phin  already  duje^ted. 

But,  though  General  Armstrong  says  nothing  in  his 
l«  tter  to  the  ehairman  of  the  committee  on  the  subject 
of  the  President's  plan,  he  does,  in  another  place, 
state  the  result  of  the  consultation  held  on  the  1st  of 
J  idv. 

*'Ollieially  informed  on  the  2Gth  of  June  of  the  pa- 
cilieation  in  Europe,  and  aware  of  the  great  disposable 
force  this  event  would  give  to  Great  Britain  in  prose- 
cuting her  contest  with  the  United  States,  the  heads 
of  departments  and  the  attorney-general  were  con- 
vened on  the  1st  of  July  for  purposes  of  consultation, 
when  it  was  decided, 

"  1st.  That  ten  or  twelve  thousand  drafts  from 
the  militia  of  Pennsylvania,  ]\Iaryland,  and  Virginia 
should  be  held  in  reserve  in  their  respective  states, 
ready  to  marcli  at  a  moment's  notice. 

"  2d.  That  not  less  than  two  nor  more  than  three 
thousand  of  the  aforementioned  drafts  should  be  as- 
sembled for  immediate  service  at  some  central  point  be- 
tween the  Potomac  and  Baltimore ;  and, 

"3d.  That  the  militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia, 
forming  two  brigades,  the  ^jiJth  ITnited  States  regi- 
ment of  infantrv,  one  battalion  of  the  3Sth,  two  com- 
panies  of  the  UHli,  one  company  of  the  12th,  two 
troops  of  regular  dragoons,  two  companies  of  fenci- 
bles,  and  one  hundred  marines,  makinii"  an  atrji-rcsate  of 


52        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


I     II 


three  thousand  combatants,  should  constitute  a  corps 
at  all  times  disposable,  under  the  direction  of  the  com- 
manding general.'"* 

The  reader  of  these  two  extracts  from  General  Arm- 
strouQ-'s  letter  to  the  chairman,  of  the  committee,  and 
from  his  Notices  of  the  AVar,  published  twenty-six 
years  afterward,  would  never  imagine  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  "  digested*'  a  plan  for  the  defence  of  the  seat 
of  government,  and  had  called  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments together  for  the  jmrjiose  of  submitting  it  to 
their  consideration  and  approval.  On  the  contrary, 
with  no  other  statement  before  him  of  the  proceedings 
at  that  meeting,  he  would  naturally  come  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  Secretary  of  War  had  himself  devised 
it  on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  and  that  his  colleagues 
had  been  so  well  satisiied  of  its  efficiency  by  the  able 
arguments  with  which  he  supported  it,  that  they  "  de- 
cided*' at  once  to  adopt  it,  without  discussion. 

Before  we  proceed  to  the  statements  of  ^[r.  Jones, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  on  the  subject  of  this  mem- 
orable cabinet  meeting,  we  would  ask  the  reader's  at- 
tention to  the  very  great  difference  in  the  amount  of 
the  forces  said  to  l)e  placed  immediately  under  the  or- 
ders of  the  commanding  general,  in  the  respective  ac- 
counts of  Mr.  jMonroe  and  (General  Armstrong.  The 
former,  after  enumerating  the  forces  embraced  in  the 
President's  plan,  says,  "  77/^'  ic/tolc  force  to  be  put  un- 
der the  command  of  an  officer  of  the  regular  army." 
And  again,  "The  command  of  t/u's  ichole  fvvce^  with 


I  i  u 


♦  Notices  of  the  "War  of  1S12,  l)y  .Tolin  Armstrong:,  late  Miij()r-<rcn- 
crnl  n  the  Army  of  tlic  United  IStatey,  and  ^-^ccretary  of  War,  vol.  ii., 
p.  127,  1128. 


CABINET   MEETING. 


53 


e  ac- 
Thc 
II  the 
t  un- 
,ny." 
vuili 

jr-;rcn- 
ol.  ii., 


that  of  District  iVt>.  5  [No.  10],  was  ghen  lo  Briga- 
dier-general Winder."  It  is  important  to  Lear  in 
mind  that  ^Ir.  Monroe  is  speaking  of  what  took  plaee 
at  the  meeting  of  the  heads  of  departments  "  on  or 
about  the  first  of  July."  General  Armstrong  says,  in 
his  letter  to  tlie  committee,  in  the  lirst  place,  that  his 
opinion  was  that  "the  sedentary  or  undrafted  militia 
of  Baltimore  and  the  District  of  Columbia  should  be 
left  "  at  the  disposition  of  the  commanding  general ;" 
and,  in  the  second  place,  in  his  Notices  of  the  War  of 
1812,  as  just  quoted,  he  says,  after  enumerating  the 
troops  intended  to  '■'' constitute  a  corps  at  all  times 
disjiosahle,  ynder  the  direction  of  the  coinnianding 
general^''''  that  they  formed  "  an  aggregate  of  three 
thousand  Qomh^i^wX^  ;"  and  we  shall  see  hereafter  that 
c.  v»  this  small  portion  of  the  force  thought  neces- 
s.  ■}  '^.is  not  for  some  time  "disposable"  by  the  com- 
manding' o;eneral. 

The  next  account  of  the  cabinet  meeting  is  that  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  In  his  letter,  marked 
"  No.  4"  in  the  documents  already  described,  he  says, 

"  On  the  30tli  day  of  June,  the  members  of  the 
cabinet  were  invited  to  attend  a  meetinix  at  the  Pres- 
idcnt's  mansion  on  the  following  day  at  noon. 

"  At  or  near  the  time  appointed,  the  Secretaries  of 
State,  Treasury,  War,  and  Navy,  and  the  Attorney- 
general,  assembled. 

"The  President  stated  the  object  of  the  meeting  to 
be  the  consideration  of  the  nuMiacing  aspect  of  things, 
in  conse(picnce  of  the  augmciited  power  of  the  enemy 
by  the  great  ])olitical  changes  which  liad  taken  place 
in  Europe,  and  the  disposition  manifested  by  the  gov- 


II 


I 


U  ■:*! 


i<.' 


^\ 


ilh  :l 


: 

1 

•1 

I 

Si 

i 

1 1 

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54       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

ernment  and  people  of  Great  Britain  to  prosecute  the 
war  Avitli  the  most  vindictive  and  devastating  spirit ; 
represented  the  motives  and  inducements  which  he 
conceived  the  enemy  had  to  prefer  tlie  invasion  of  the 
capital  rather  than  any  other  immediate  enterprise ;  and 
urged  the  necessity  of  speedy  and  efficient  preparation 
for  the  defence  of  the  District  and  capital ;  inquired 
into  the  existing  state  of  its  military  and  naval  de- 
fences, and  the  extent  of  the  disposable  force  which  it 
would  be  practicable  to  concentrate  in  the  District. 

"The  Secretary  of  War  estimated  the  disposable 
regular  force  applicable  to  the  intended  purpose,  to  the 
best  of  my  recollection,  at  about  twelve  hundred,  in- 
cluding about  two  hundred  cavalry  at  Carlisle,  Penn- 
sylvania, who,  I  think  he  said,  were  not  all  mounted, 
but  would  probably  be  so  in  a  short  time.  lie  brought 
into  view  the  volunteer  corps  of  tlie  city  and  District, 
the  particulars  of  which  I  do  not  vccollect,  and  esti- 
mated  the  depot  at  Harper's  Ferry,  I  tliink,  to  contain, 
at  that  time,  about  tliirty-six  thousand  stand  of  arms. 
"  The  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  enumerated  tlie  naval 
force  within  immediate  reach  as  follows  :  The  marines 

at  headquarters  about 120 

The  force  attaclied  to  the  flotilla  under  the  com- 
mand  of  Commodore  Barney,  on  the  Patux- 

ent 500 

"620 
*'  To  the  regular  force,  the  President  proposed  to 
add  ten  thousand  militia,  ro  be  designated  and  hold  in 
rcadlncs:^  in  such  neighboring  districts  as  should  be 
found  most  convenient,  lie  also  suggested  the  pro- 
priety of  depositing  at  a  suitable  place,  contiguous  to 


THE   AITORNEY-GENERAL. 


55 


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be 
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the  metropolis,  a  supply   of  arms,  ammunition,  and 
camp  equipage. 

"  These  propositions  produced  very  little  discussion. 
The  propriety  and  expediency  of  the  measures  ap- 
peared to  be  admitted,  though  no  formal  question  was 
taken,  nor  was  any  dissent  expressed. 

"  The  meeting  separated  with  the  understanding, 
on  my  part,  that  the  measures  proposed  were  to  be 
carried  into  effect,  but  what  order  took  place  thereon, 
other  than  in  tlic  Department  of  the  Xavy,  I  know 
not."- 

3Ir.  liush,  in  his  narrative,  marked  Xo.  5,  says : 

"On  the  oOtli  of  June,  the  heads  of  departments 
were  desired  to  meet  at  the  President's  house  on  the 
following  day  at  12  o'clock. 

"  They  accordingly  assembled.  All  were  present. 
I  also,  in  pursuance  of  the  President's  re(|uest,  at- 
tended. Our  public  affairs  were  brought  into  discus- 
sion :  their  altered  and  more  menacing  character ;  the 
probable  reluctance  of  the  Xorthern  powers  of  Europe 
to  regard  favorably,  at  such  a  moment  of  European 
Iiomnge  to  tlie  British  name,  the  just  rights  for  which 
we  were  contending;  tlie  fierce  aspect  whicli  British 
military  j)Ower  now  had  the  means,  and  probably 
would  not  want  the  disposition  to  put  on  toward  us; 
the  parts  of  our  country  most  vulnerable  to  immediate 
irruj)tion,  as  well  as  the  general  trials  before  us,  were 
broui>;lit  into  view.  The  President  mentioned  what  I 
had  Jieard  him  individually  express  before  relative  to 
Washington,  stating  his  impressions  unequivocally  to 
bo,  tliat  if  it  fell  within  tlic  plans  of  the  enemy  to  send 
'  Stare  J^ijK'Ts,  tit  ankfu  p-  '>-iO. 


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5()       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON, 

troops  for  operation  upon  tlio  Atlantic  frontiers  tins 
season,  lie  thought  the  capital  would  be  marked  as  tlio 
most  inviting  object  of  a  speedy  attack  ;  that  it  "svould 
be  right  forthwith  to  put  in  train  measures  of  precau- 
tion and  defence,  lie  then  declared  that  to  him  it 
a})peared  that  a  force  of  ten  thousand  men  should  be 
got  in  readiness  for  the  city  and  District ;  that  it  would 
be  desirable  to  have  as  large  a  portion  of  it  as  practi- 
cable regular  troops,  but  that,  at  the  least,  there  should 
be  <i  thousand  of  this  description,  and  more  if  more 
could  be  obtained.  That  tlie  residue  should  be  made 
up  of  the  volunteers  and  mililia  of  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, combined  with  that  from  the  parts  nearest 
adjacent  of  Virginia.  ^Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania. 
That  convenient  depots  of  arms  and  military  Cfpiipage 
should  also  be  established.  No  dissent  was  express- 
ed to  these  opinions  of  the  President.  The  Secretary 
of  War  made  some  verbal  estimate  of  the  rea;iments 
or  parts  of  regiments  near  at  hand.  Py  this  it  ap- 
peared that,  either  v.'itli  or  independent  of  the  marines 
at  the  navy-yard  (tor  of  this  I  am  not  certain),  the 
portion  of  regular  force  mentioned  could  readily  be 
had.  I  recollect  nothing  farther  to  have  passed  at  the 
meeting  about  the  defence  of  Wasliington.  What 
measures  were  subsequently  taken,  how  far  those  jiro- 
posed  were  carried  into  effect,  or  })y  what  causes  they 
have  been  retarded  or  frustrated,  I  have  not  had  the 
means  of  knowing  with  any  certainty,  and  therefore 
can  not  speak.  In  regard  to  vrhat  1  have  said,  I  am 
disposed  to  entertain  the  less  distrust  of  its  general 
accuracy  from  the  habit  of  keeping  occasional  memo- 
randum=5  connected  with  our  public  history,  and  from 


SECRETARY   OF   THE   TREASURY. 


57 


\y 

10 

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liavino:  refreshed  my  memory  by  a  relcrencc  to  some 
in  the  present  instance  made  at  the  time."* 

We  have  now  seen  the  respective  narratives  of 
what  took  place  at  the  meeting  of  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments and  Attorney-general  on  the  1st  of  July,  of  all 
who  were  present  at  it,  with  the  exception  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury,  who,  in  his  communication  to 
the  connnittee,  says : 

"  The  state  of  my  health  was  very  imperfect,  and 
some  offici.'^-  di  ^  according  to  m^  ,  ;sent  recollec- 
tion, requiring  to  uc  attended  to  at  a  certain  hour,  oc- 
casioned mc  to  withdraw  before  the  subject  of  the  de- 
fence of  the  seat  of  government  was  formally  taken  up 
for  discussion." 

The  reader  will  have  observed  that  General  Arm- 
strong makes  a  statement  differing  in  many  respects 
from  those  of  the  other  gentlemen.  From  his  letter  to 
the  chairman  of  the  committee,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid 
the  inference  that  his  "  opinions,"  as  there  set  forth, 
constituted  the  groundwork  of  the  "plan"  upon  which 
the  cabinet  "  decided"  Avithout  a  dissenting  voice  ;  and 
from  the  statement  given  of  the  same  meeting  in  his 
"Notices  of  the  War  of  1812,"  which,  witli  some  un- 
important exceptions,  is  but  a  different  form  of  ex- 
pressing tlie  same  "  opinions,"  no  reader  could  imagine 
that  the  President  bore  any — much  less  the  principal 
— part  in  the  discussions  of  the  day.  It  is  true  he  in- 
troduced his  historical  narrative  of  "  the  means  of  de- 
fence" by  saying  they  were  "  prescribed  by  the  Pres- 
ident for  the  safety  of  the  city  and  District."  But 
every  body  knows  that  this  is  an  ojjiclal  style  of 
*  State  Papers,  xu  antea,  p.  Ml. 
('  2 


'I 


11.      t 


58 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


speaking  common  to  tlic  members  of  all  cabinets,  and 
borrowed  from  the  legal  fiction  qui  faclt 2)^'i'  aliumfa- 
cit  per  se.  If  the  President  had,  literally-  pi'escribed 
the  means  of  defence,  wliy  convene  the  cabinet  "for 
purposes  of  consultation?''''  and  why  say  "?V  icas  de- 
cided" instead  of  he  decided  ?  But  in  the  letter  we 
are  not  left  to  mere  inference  that  the  plan  adopted  was 
his  own,  and  not  the  President's,  for  he  says  expressly, 
*'  Conformahhj  to  these  ojnnions,  an  order  was  taken  to 
assemble  a  cor2)s  and  form  a  camp,"  etc.  How  else 
can  we  understand  him  than  as  meaning  to  convey  the 
idea  that  the  President  approved  his  opinions  and  or- 
dered them  to  be  carried  into  effect?  But  we  shall 
see  by-and-by  that  neither  his  "opinions,"  as  expressed 
in  his  letter  to  the  committee,  nor  the  decision  to  which 
he  says  the  cabinet  came,  were  followed,  in  the  sense 
in  which  a  military  man  would  comprehend  them, 
cither  in  his  actual  orders  or  in  his  subsequent  corre- 
spondence with  the  commanding  general. 

In  tlie  first  extract  from  the  statements  of  the  cab- 
inet ministers  given  in  the  preceding  pages,  particu- 
larly in  those  from  the  letters  of  ]\Ir.  Jones  and  Mr. 
Rush,  tlie  reader  may  have  been  struck  with  the  ex- 
pressions ascribed  to  the  President  wdicn  speaking  of 
the  probable  attack  of  the  enemy  upon  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment. Mr.  Jones  says  "he  expressed  very  great 
solicitude  for  the  safety  of  the  metropolis,"  and  that  he 
"urged  the  expediency  of  immediate  defensive  prep- 
arations." j\Ir.  Hush  says  tliat,  among  the  grounds 
which  induced  tlie  President  to  believe  in  the  proba- 
bility of  an  attack  on  Washington  was  "  its  own 
weakness,"  and  that  "  he  spoke  of  the  immediate  ne- 


REFLECTIONS. 


59 


cessity  of  preparing  for  its  clcfencc."  The  conversa- 
tions in  which  these  expressions  were  used  occurred 
twelve  months  after  a  committee  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives had  reported  upon  tlie  resolutions  of  Gen- 
eral Philip  Stuart,  that  they  had  examined  the  state 
of  preparations  for  defence,  naval  and  military,  and  that 
no  ineasures  icere  necessary  to  render  it  more  com- 
2)letc.  If  the  state  of  preparation  was  so  complete  in 
July,  181.'),  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  make  it  more 
so,  is  it  not  somewhat  extraordinary  that  the  President 
should  feel  such  (jreat  solicitude,  and  he  so  urgent  for 
the  adoption  o^  measures  of  defence  in.  May  and  June, 
1814,  particularly  after  the  important  addition  of 
"three  twelve-pounders,  mounted  on  iield-carriages," 
had  been  made  to  the  comj)lete  state  of  preparation  at 
the  former  period  ?  We  might  suppose  that  the  Pres- 
ident knew  the  report  of  the  coi'^mittec  to  be  incorrect ; 
but  this  is  rendered  improbable  oy  the  fact  that  he  did 
not,  cither  before  the  close  of  that  or  the  beginning  of 
the  next  session  of  Congress,  give  them  information,  as, 
in  that  case,  it  would  have  been  his  duty  to  do,  of  the 
real  state  of  preparation  for  the  defence  of  the  capital. 
If  he  believed  the  report  of  the  committee  to  be  true, 
then  his  expressions  of  solicitude  for  the  safety  of  the 
capital  were  idle  and  ridiculous,  for  he  knew  that  its 
defences  had  been  strengthened  since  they  had  been 
declared  to  be  complete.  There  is  a  mystery  in  all 
this  which  we  do  not  pretend  to  understand.  It  is 
very  plain  that  the  committee  were  wrong,  and  we  can 
not  wonder  at  the  objurgation  leveled  at  them  by  vet- 
eran Wilkin.-^on,  who  said : 

*'  It  is  painful  to  reflect  on  the  proceedings  of  a 


!' 


r  ji . 


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GO 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON 


committee  of  Congress,  appointed  to  inquire  and  x""- 
port  on  matters  of  fact  to  the  popular  branch  of  gov- 
ernment, because,  independent  of  the  obhgations  of  an 
oath,  local,  national,  and  personal  character  arc  all  in- 
terc  .cd  in  the  candor  and  integrity  of  tlieir  proceed- 
ings."'* liut  it  is  not  so  plain  who  led  them  into 
their  error,  or  whose  fault  it  was  that  Congress  was 
permitted  to  remain  under  that  error  until  it  was  too 
late,  by  any  thing  they  could  do,  to  remedy  the  evil. 

It  may,  pcrhaj^s,  throw  some  light  on  the  subject 
to  mention  the  impressions  very  generally  prevalent 
amono;  the  militia  and  other  inhabitants  oi  the  District 
at  the  time  this  famous  convention  was  held  of  the 
heads  of  departments  "for  purposes  of  consultation." 
It  was  generally  thought  and  openly  averred  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  still  adhered  to  his  opinion  that  the 
enemy  would  never  be  so  mad  as  to  make  an  attempt 
upon  the  city,  and  that  it  was  therefore  totally  unnec- 
essary to  make  any  preparations  for  its  defence.  It 
was  also  said  and  believed  by  those  who  were  sup- 
posed to  know  something  of  the  secrets  of  cabinet 
meetings,  that  the  President  and  his  Secretary  of  War 
at  this  time  were  not  on  terms  of  mutual  good  feeling 
and  accord ;  that  no  general  cordiality  existed  amoiig 
the  members  themselves ;  that  the  oidy  two  military 
men  among  them  were  rival  aspirants  for  popular  fa- 
vor; tliat  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  had  been,  in 
fact,  the  author  of  the  war,  was  also,  in  fact,  the  source 
from  which  all  the  military  notions  of  the  President 
were  derived. 

In  a  cirovernmcnt  such  as  ours,  't  is  not  extraordina- 

*  Wilkinson's  Alomoirs.  vol.  i.,  note  to  p.  7r>r>. 


ll 


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WANT   OF   IIARJIONY   IN   THE   CABINET. 


61 


ry  that  the  people,  particularly  those  who  have  daily 
opportunities  of  intercourse  with  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments, should  soo'i  Ijecomc  acquainted  even  with  the 
most  confidential  proceedings  of  those  in  power.  There 
is,  therefore,  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  impressions 
referred  to  had  some  foundation  in  truth.  If  so,  it  was 
certainly  a  most  unfortunate  state  of  things  to  exist 
at  a  time  when  Congress  was  not  in  session,  to  whom 
might  properly  have  been  referred  the  duty  of  provid- 
ing for  the  defence  of  the  city,  and  when  etfective  ac- 
tion so  much  depended  on  the  harmony  and  concert  of 
the  advisers  of  the  chief  magistrate. 

It  would  be  absurd  to  suppose  that  the  cabinet 
could  be  ignorant  of  what  was  known  to  the  public  at 
large ;  nay,  of  what  was  from  time  to  time  announced 
in  the  National  Intelligencer,  the  leading  journal  of 
the  country,  published  at  the  seat  of  government,  and 
enjoying  the  confidence  of  the  administration,  namely, 
that  the  British  troops  even  then  in  the  Chesapeake 
Bay  amounted  to  from  four  to  six  thousand  men.  To 
these  it  would  have  been  no  more  than  reasonable  to 
expect  that  some  three  or  four  thousand  more  would 
be  added  of  the  regiments  known  to  have  been  de- 
tached from  Wellington's  veterans.  It  is  not  at  all 
probable  that,  if  the  cabinet  had  been  a  "unit,"  it 
would  have  supposed  it  had  done  all  that  the  ease  re- 
quired, when,  to  meet  these  well-disciplined  and  expe- 
rienced soldiers  of  the  enemy,  it  gave  its  approval  of 
the  plan  of  calling  into  immediate  service,  and  placing 
at  the  disposition  of  the  commanding  general,  a  corps 
of  "three  thousand  combatants,^''  composed,  in  great 
part,  of  newly-levied,  undisciplined  militia,  who  had 


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62 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURi:   OF    WASHINGTON. 


never  seen  a  comhaU  and  of  regulars  recently  enlisted 
■who  had  never  heard  the  guns  of  the  enemy.  This,  it 
will  be  remembered,  was  the  ic hole  fur cc  ])laccd,  or, 
rather,  to  he  placed  at  the  immediate  disposition  of  the 
commanding  general. 

But  the  reasoning  of  the  government  was  wrong. 
Their  syllogism  was  this :  The  enemy  have  tried  an 
attack  on  Norfolk ;  they  failed  in  it ;  therefore  they 
will  not  dare  to  approach  Washington ;  and  to  this 
fatal  no7i  sequitur  did  the  administration  trust  to  the 
very  last  moment.  The  enemy  were  as  well  aware 
of  tlie  unhappy  infatuation  which,  like  the  inhalation 
of  chloric  ether,  had  soporated  our  government,  as  the 
citizens  of  Washington  themselves  were ;  for  British 
officers  in  disguise,  md  degenerate  Americans  in  the 
pay  of  the  British  gov^ernment,  frequented  the  hotels, 
and  passed  in  and  out  of  the  city  unquestioned.  Be- 
sides, the  newspapers  of  the  District  were  received  al- 
most as  regularly  on  board  the  enemy's  ships  in  the 
Bay  as  they  were  by  daily  subscribers  in  the  city. 
All  this  was  known,  or  certainly  ought  to  have  been 
known,  to  the  members  of  tlie  administration ;  and 
they  ought  to  have  known,  too,  that  the  enemy  would 
be  disposed  to  prolit  by  the  information  thus  obtained ; 
and  yet  they  thought  that  "three  thousand  combat- 
ants"— and  such  combatants — were  quite  enough  to 
be  called  into  immediate  service. 

Besides  the  "plan  of  force''  which  was  decided 
upon  at  this  meeting  of  the  1st  of  July,  a  further  meas- 
ure of  "preparation,"  it  seems,  was  adopted.  This 
was  the  creation  of  a  new  military  district,  by  dismem- 
bering the  5th,  and  constituting  out  of  its  dissevered 


\ 


H 


^ 


TKNTII    MILITARY    DISTRICT. 


63 


parts  a  lOtli  ^Military  District,  to  be  composed  of  tlic 
northern  part  of  Virginia,  the  District  of  Columbia, 
and  ]\Iaryland. 

We  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  measure  had 
been  recommended  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  unless 
we  may  construe  the  following  passage  in  his  letter  to 
the  committee  of  investi^-ation  as  assuminc;  to  himself 
the  authorship  of  it :  "  The  better  to  secure  the  seat 
of  government,  &c.,  from  the  attacks  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  relieve  the  War  Dejxiiimejit  from  details  not 
making  part  of  its  regular  duties,  and  incident  to  Dis- 
trict No.  5,  as  then  constituted,  a  new  /military  district, 
comprising  that  portion  of  country  lying  between  the 
Rappahannock  and  Potomac  rivers,  tlic  Dis'i'ict  of 
Columbia,  and  the  State  of  ^Maryland,  was  created  or- 
the  2d  of  July  last,  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier-general  Winder,  who  had  been  spe  :xt.,liy  as- 
signed by  the  President  to  that  service." 

The  5th  Military  District  was  then  commanded  by 
one  of  the  bravest  and  most  experienced  generals  in 
the  service,  Moses  Porter,  who  had  entered  tin  Revo- 
lutionary army  as  a  common  soldier,  and  had  gradu- 
ally raised  himself,  by  his  own  signal  merits,  through 
every  intervening  grade,  from  a  private  in  the  ranks  to 
the  high  and  distinguished  post  of  brigadier  general 
and  commander  of  a  military  distr:.  .  His  headquar- 
ters were  then  at  Norfolk,  from  which  place  a  simple 
order  from  the  AVar  Departmert  v^ould  have  brought 
him  to  Washington  in  four  <:r  five  days  at  the  most. 
It  could  not  have  been  apprehension  for  the  safety  of 
the  former  post  thiit  prevented  this  transfer,  or,  to 
speak  in  more  military  phrase,  the  order  to  change  his 


B5BS 


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1 

64       INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

headquarters,  for  it  was  known  that  the  enemy  had  al- 
ready made  an  unsuccessful  attack  upon  it  before 
CJeneral  Porter  assumed  the  command,  and  while  its 
fortiiications  \^'ere  comparatively  weak.  These  had 
now,  under  his  orders,  and  with  the  surpassing  indus- 
try and  skill  of  one  of  the  Lest  engineers  in  the  army,* 
been  made  impregnable  to  any  force  which  the  enemy 
could  send  against  it ;  and  this  the  enemy  well  knew ; 
so  that  the  temporary,  or  even  permanent  command 
of  the  place  might  have  been  safely  intrusted  to  either 
of  the  colonels  who  then  respectively  commanded  Torts 
Norfolk  and  Nelson. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  it  appears,  was  desirous  of 
calling  this  veteran  to  the  seat  of  government  for 
the  purpose  of  its  defence,  but  his  wishes  were  over- 
ruled. If,  therefore,  he  cither  originated  or  a])proved 
the  dismemberment  of  the  district,  it  was  probably 
from  motives  very  dilferelit  from  those  assigned  in  the 
extract  quoted  above  from  his  letter.  It  is  diilicult  to 
conceive  how  the  scat  of  government  would  be  less  li- 
able to  an  attack  by  circumscribing  the  limits  of  the 
district  in  which  it  was  situated;  nor  is  it  probable 
that  General  iVrmstrong,  indolent  as  he  was  said  to  be, 
would  openly  shrink  from  any  duties  which  his  of- 
fice im})osed  on  him,  Jiowcver  onerous.  Jiesidcs,  if  he 
could  so  far  forget  himself  as  to  sue  to  be  relieved 
from  any  of  the  responsibilities  of  the  important  sta- 
tion he  occupied,  lie  could  not  be  so  ignorant  as  to 
F.U})pose  that  this  could  be  effected  by  increasing  the 
number  of  military  districts,  and  thus  multiplying  the 

♦  Captnin  S.  Tlmvcr,  nftonvaril  promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieuten- 
ant colonel  for  these  verv  Hervit-es. 


'i 


GENEKAL    TORTEK. 


65 


detalh  wliicli  would  necessarily  require  liia  attention. 
Another  strong  reason  for  believing  that  this  measure 
did  not  owe  its  adoption  to  the  advice  ot'the  Secretary 
of  War  is  that  he  had  Lut  a  short  time  before  said,  in 
a  communication  to  General  Izard,  that  '"territorial 
limits  of  command  arc  found  inco?iir/iic?it."''* 

If  the  Secretary  of  AVar  did  in  truth  propose  the 
dismemberment  of  District  No.  5,  and  the  creation  of 
ic  new  district  No.  10,  it  must  have  been  afk/'  his 
advice  to  call  drcneral  Porter  to  the  defence  of  the  seat 
of  govcrinnent  had  been  disregarded,  and  after  he  dis- 
covered that  there  was  stronger  inlluencc  than  his  own 
at  work  with  the  President  in  diycstuuj  military 
schemes  of  preparation.  Another  general  could  not 
be  appointed  to  an  indejicnJent  command  within  Dis- 
trict No.  o  without  a  gross  insult  to  General  Porter; 
and  as  the  President  had  already  determined  to  have 
anothci,  and  had,  indeed,  "specially  assigned"  him  to 
the  service,  a  commendable  respect  for  his  old  fellow- 
soldier  of  the  Kevolution  may  have  induced  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  to  save  his  feelings  by  suggesting  the 
establishment  of  a  new  district.  It  would  be  decid- 
edly more  civil  to  confnic  him  to  nanowcr  "territo- 
rial limits''  than  to  erect  an  imperhnn  in  imperio — to 
give  to  any  olliccr  an  independent  connnand  within 
the  legitimate  sphere  of  his  supremacy.  This  would 
naturally,  and  honorably  for  the  secretary,  explain  tl.j 
sharc  he  had,  if  he  had  any,  in  the  crealion  of  Dis'.iict 
No.  10. 

•  Wilkinson's  ^^cmo^rs,  p.  7.13. 


>i 


I 


ini 


%i 


1 

1 

Ik 

m  i 

i 

i 

1 

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,1 


CO        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

Want  of  Harmony  in  the  Cabinet.  —  Selection  of  a  Commanding 

(jcneral. 

In  speaking  of  the  force  proj^ioscd  for  the  defence 
of  the  District  of  Columbia,  (icneral  Armstrong  gives 
tlie  following  summary  from  the  report  made  by  the 
Congressional  committee  of  inquiry : 

"On  the  2d  of  July,"  says  the  report,  "the  Tenth 
Military  District  was  constituted,  and  the  command 
given  to  General  A\'indcr.  On  the  4t]i  a  requisition 
on  tlic  states  for  93,500  men  was  issued  ;  on  the  14tli 
the  governors  of  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  acknowl- 
edge tiie  receipt  of  tlie  requisition,  and  promised 
promptitude.  On  the  10th  the  Governor  of  ^Maryland 
was  served  with  a  cojiy  of  the  requisition,  and  took 
measures  to  comply  with  it.  On  tlic  12th  Cicncral 
AVinder  was  authorized,  in  case  of  cither  menaced  or 
actual  invasion^  to  call  into  service  the  wliolc  of  the 
^laryland  quota  ((5(100  men)  ;  and  on  the  18tli  oOOO 
from  Pennsylvania  and  2(100  irom  Virginia,  m.aking 
an  aggregate  (the  regular  infantry  and  cavalry,  nia- 
rines,  tlotilla-men,  and  district  militia  included)  of  6'/*i'- 
tecn  t/ioHsand si,v  hundred  men.  Such  was  the  meas- 
ure of  defence  desimiatcd  for  ^lilitarv  District  No.  10, 
and  such  tlic  measures  taken  by  the  War  Department 
for  assemblinir  it  up  to  the  iSth  of  Julv,  thirtv-six 
days  before  tlie  enemy's  a]  j)roach  to  the  capital."** 
*  Notices  of  the  War  of  1812,  v.)l.  ii.,  p.  128-t). 


I    , 


i 


DELAYS. 


The  purpose  for  which  General  Armstrong  gave  this 
summary  was  to  exonerate  himself  from  one  of  the 
charges  alleged  against  him,  namely,  that  he  had  not 
used  the  promptitude  which  the  occasion  called  for  in 
giving  eftect  to  the  measures  decided  upon  in  the  cab- 
inet. But  even  in  this  he  is  unfortunate  ;  for,  accord- 
ing to  his  own  showing,  his  requisition  on  the  states 
for  93,000  men  was  issued  on  the  4t]i,  and  the  Gov- 
ernor of  ^Maryland,  from  whom  the  largest  quota  for  the 
service  designated  was  required,  was  not  served  ic'Uh 
a  copy  of  it  until  the  10th  of  July.  Here  were  six 
(hnjs!  unnecessarily  lost.  ^^  hy  was  xiot  a  copy  of 
the  requisition  sent  to  him  on  the  day  it  was  issued  ? 
and  why  did  he  delay  until  "  tiic  12th"  to  authorize 
General  Winder,  in  case  of  "menaced  or  actual  inva- 
sion," to  call  for  this  whole  quota  (6000  men)?  The 
cabinet  must  have  thought  that  invasion  was  menaced 
when  it  was  convened  on  the  1st  of  July,  or  it  would 
not  have  decided  to  trouble  "  the  states"  with  so  start- 
ling a  call  uj")on  their  farmers  and  })lanters  to  hold 
themselves  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  no- 
tice. Surely  the  ])ublic  had  some  right  to  conq)lain 
of  tardiness  on  llu>  jiavt  of  tlic  Secretary  of  War  when 
lie  sufirred  eh  ren  d<n/s  to  elaj)se  al'ter  the  new  district 
had  been  creeled,  "and  ])laceil  under  the  conmiand  of 
IJrigadier-general  AA'inder,  who  had  been  spei'ially  as- 
siii'ned  liv  tiie  J*resident  to  that  service,'' before  he  Q-ave 
him  authority  to  call  even  for  the  quota  of  nnlitia  be- 
longing to  his  own  stale.  And  the  very  condition  of 
the  authority  shows  how  reluctantly  it  was  given,  even 
at  that  late  date. 

WIiale\er  might  have  been  the  secretary's  private 


Il 


i    (.■ 


i 


V 


C8        INVASION   AND   CArTUIiE   OF   AVASIIINGTON. 

opinions,  however  lightly  he  might  have  treated  the  ap- 
prehensions of  the  citizens  of  the  District,  there  was  a 
solemn  duty  imposed  on  him  whicli  he  alone  had  the 
leiritiniate  riiilit  to  execute,  and  which  all  his  col- 
leagues  seem  to  have  expected  he  would  execute  with- 
out a  moment's  delay.  If  he  could  not  bring  him- 
self to  Lelieve,  as  others  did,  that  the  city  was  in 
imminent  danger,  and  that  immediate  preparations  to 
place  it  in  a  condition  to  be  defended  were  necessary, 
still  he  knew  himself  to  be  the  mere  minister  of  the 
President,  and  bound  either  faithfully  to  execute  his 
orders  or  give  up  his  ofiice. 

IJut  we  are  by  no  means  disposed  to  think  General 
Armstrong  the  oidy  one  to  blame  in  these  preliminary 
matters.  The  President  and  his  cabinet — those  mem- 
bers of  it  who  pretended  to  give  military  counsel  on 
the  occasion — deserve  no  small  share  of  the  censure 
which  the  result  of  their  consultations  so  richly  merits. 
They  had  evitlence  before  them  that  tlie  enemy,  at  the 
time  of  his  attempt  upon  Norfolk,  had  a  force  of  be- 
tween five  and  six  thousand  men.  That  attempt  had 
failed,  and  it  could  hardly  be  supposed  they  would  risk 
an  expedition  at  a  much  greater  distance  from  their 
Bhip})ing  with  a  less,  or  even  with  no  greater  force. 
These  live  or  six  thousand  men  had  been  afterward 
scattered  along  the  coast  on  various  ])hindering  ex- 
ploits, but  their  rendezvous  was  no  farther  oif  than 
Jlalifax  ;  and  at  the  moment  of  tliis  cabinet  meeting  it 
was  known  that  the  greater  part,  if  not  the  whole  of 
these,  had  again  arrived  in  the  Chesa})eake.  It  was 
reasonable  to  suppose  that  this  large  force,  already  iii 
the  waters  leading  directly  to  the  seat  of  government, 


THE    rilKSIOHNT's    81IAUE    OF    BLAME. 


()9 


4v 

fir 

10. 

r<l 

in 
it 


lu 


would  be  consitlerably  increased  by  the  expected  regi- 
ments from  Europe — regiments  fresh  from  tlie  rich  har- 
vest of  huircls  in  Spain  and  France,  and  flushed,  as 
they  would  naturally  be,  with  the  anticipation  of  add- 
ing still  brighter  lustre  to  the  glories  acquired  in  an- 
other hemisphere. 

All  this  was  for  consideration  before  the  cabinet. 
It  was  all  tali\ed  of,  as  we  arc  told  in  the  interesting 
letter  of  3lr.  liush.  To  put  tlie  District  of  Columbia 
in  a  condition  to  be  able  to  meet  such  a  foe  upon  any 
thing  like  equal  ground,  something  more  was  necessary 
than  a  mere  hasty  rc(juisition  upon  the  neighboring 
states  for  raw  militia,  particularly  as  two  years  of  war 
experience  ought  to  have  taught  the  administration 
that  such  requisitions  had  rarely  or  never  been  com- 
plied with  in  time  to  meet  the  exigencies  for  which 
they  were  made.  It  was  certainly  not  exclusively  the 
fault  of  the  Secretary  of  War  that  nothing  was  done 
in  the  way  of  preparation  from  the  month  of  ]\Iay, 
when,  as  wc  learn  from  the  letter  of  ]Mr.  Jones,  the 
President  expressed  his  apprehensions  of  an  attack, 
and  his  very  great  solicitude  for  the  safety  of  the  city. 
It  was  not  his  fault  that  five  days  were  suffered  to 
elapse  after  the  dispatches  were  received  from  ^Messrs. 
Gallatin  and  Bayard  before  the  cabinet  were  consulted 
on  the  all-important  official  information  contained  in 
them.  These  delays,  for  which  the  executive  alone  is 
responsible,  at  a  time,  too,  when  neither  rail-roads  nor 
electric  telegraphs  oflered  tl>eir  facilities  for  the  trans- 
mission of  orders  and  the  transportation  of  troops, 
were,  to  say  the  least,  evidences  of  a  much  more  culpa- 
ble indilTerencc  to  the  safety  of  the  seat  of  government 


70 


INVASION    AND    CAPTl'RK    OF   WASHINGTON. 


t  I    "  I 


than  that  ascribed  to  the  Secretary  of  War  In  liis 
supposed  want  of  promptitude  in  fiirlherinq"  the  exe- 
cution of  the  phin  of  defence  after  it  was  decried  upon 
in  the  cabinet. 

Nor  can  Ave  fuirly  ini})ute  it  as  a  fault  to  th(^  Secre- 
tary of  Wnr,  eireunistanced  as  we  have  everv  reason  to 
believe  he  was  at  the  council  board — his  opinions  dis- 
regarded, his  advice  set  at  naugiit,  his  selection  of  a 
connnantlinG:  officer  overruled — tiiat  the  chief  rehance 
for  tiie  defence  of  the  capital  of  tiie  country  was  placed 
in  militia  drafts  from  a  distance,  to  be  called  out  at 
a  moment's  notice,  witliout  previous  training:,  and  hav- 
ing no  inducement  to  prompt  them  to  willinn-  service 
other  than  the  general  motive  of  patriotism,  which  it 
must  be  supposed  was  common  to  every  citizen,  rather 
than  in  the  wdiole  body  of  male  inhabitants  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  in  whom,  to  the  eonnnon  interest  of 
American  citizens,  were  superadded  the  dearer  and 
stronger  promptings  of  domestic  relations,  the  preser- 
vation of  which  was  involved  in  the  safety  of  the  city. 
A  proclamation  T)y  the  President,  even  of  so  late  a  date 
as  the  4tli  of  July,  calling  upon  every  citizen  of  the 
District  capable  of  using  a  musket  or  rifle,  would  have 
rallied  around  him,  within  less  than  a  week  after  its  pro- 
nnilgation,  a  body,  old  and  young,  of  at  least  live  thou- 
sand men,  who,  in  the  month  intervening  belbrc  the 
attack,  might  have  been  so  instructed  and  disciplined 
in  tlie  use  of  ju-ms  that,  animated  as  they  would  have 
been  by  the  inspiring  hopes  of  saving  wives,  children, 
and  homes,  they  would,  with  the  assistance  of  a  ihw 
regular  troops,  have  sufficed  to  repel  the  invader. 

When  we  look  at  the  enormous  })aper  army  con- 


COMMANDER    OF   THE    NEW    DISTRICT. 


1 


in- 


jured up  by  the  scrape  of  a  pen  on  the  4th  of  July, 
the  thirty-eighth  anniversary  of  tiiat  glorious  day 
which  had  witnessed  the  pledge  of  "  lives,  fortunes, 
and  sacred  honor"  to  the  nianitenanee  of  American  in- 
dependence, and  reflect  upon  the  ridiculous  handful 
to  which  it  dwindled  at  the  moment  of  need,  we  iind 
it  difficult  to  resist  a  Lelief  in  fatalism.  It  seems 
liardly  possible  tliat  any  power  less  resistless  than  that 
.ascribed  to  the  mythic  Fates  could  have  ruled  the 
deliberations  of  the  American  cabinet  on  this  moment- 
ous occasion. 

After  })avinc!:  crea*'d  ^lilitarv  District  No.  10,  and 
decided  ujiou  the  several  rpiotas  of  militia  to  be  re- 
rpiired  from  the  states  of  Pennsylvania,  ^Marvland,  and 
A'irginia  resj)cctively,  the  next  subject  of  discussion, 
we  may  suppose,  was  the  selection  of  a  military  com- 
mander for  the  new  district — though  it  micrht  be  infer- 
red  from  the  lano-uasic  of  General  Armstrono:  that  this 
had  been  predetermined  by  the  President  himself:  so, 
at  least,  if  we  are  to  credit  the  statement  of  the  other 
members  of  the  cabinet,  had  been  the  pian  of  force  to 
be  called  out ;  and  if  he  submitted  the  one  subject  aft- 
er his  own  mind  had  been  made  up  upon  it,  there  is 
no  reason  to  doubt  that  he  submitted  the  other  in  like 
manner.  It  was  a  point  of  even  more  importance 
than  the  selection  of  troops,  whether  regard  be  had  to 
the  quality  or  number  of  the  latter.  A  commander  of 
well-known  and  acknowledged  experience  and  good 
fortune — for  sometimes  success  is  as  nuich  the  result 
of  the  latter,  in  the  eyes  of  the  soldiers,  as  of  skill  or 
couran'c — would  have  brousiht  with  him  to  the  execu- 
tion  of  his  duties  what  the  French  call  a  predi(jt\  a 


72 


INVASION   AND   CAPTrilE   OF   WASIIINO'nW. 


i  !'l  i, 


prepossession  iu  his  favor,  whicli  would  have  inspired 
the  troops  with  a  confidence  perliaps  suilicient  to  coun- 
terbahmce  all  the  deficiencies  in  their  organization. 
They  would  have  obeyed  the  orders  of  such  a  leader 
with  a  trustful  conviction  that  whatever  he  command- 
ed was  right  and  necessary.  They  would  have  fought 
under  him  with  the  animating  presentiment  of  victory  ; 
and  all  who  arc  acquainted  with  human  nature  are 
aware  that  the  stinmlus  of  such  an  anticipation  rarely 
fails  to  bring  about  its  own  realization. 

We  have  some  reluctance  i]i  assuming  so  positively 
what  can  not  be  rigorously  proved,  that  there  existed 
rivalries  and  jealousies  in  the  high  places  of  i.  .  nation 
at  a  time  when  harmony  and  friendly  concert  of  action 
were  of  so  much  importance  to  the  interests  and  honor 
of  the  country ;  but  human  nature  is,  unfortunately, 
not  changed  by  rank  or  station,  and  the  same  p'tty 
feuds  and  prejudices  that  govern  the  conduct  of  men 
toward  each  other  in  the  humblest  walks  of  life  are 
found  operating  with  equal  force  in  the  highest.  If 
there  had  been  no  mutual  jealousies  between  the  two 
Revolutionary  secretaries,  it  is  not  probable  that  any 
objection  would  have  been  made  to  the  selection  by 
the  head  of  the  AVar  Department  of  Ciencral  Porter  to 
command  the  force  destined  for  the  defence  of  the  scat 
of  government ;  for  that  the  objection  originated,  either 
directly  or  indirectly,  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  was 
never  doubted  by  any  intelligent  citizen  of  Washing- 
ton at  the  ])eriod  referred  to ;  and  it  is  as  little  to  be 
doubted  tiiat  the  jn-incipal  ground  of  the  objection  was 
that  the  Secretary  of  War  rccomuicnded  the  appoint- 
ment. 


PRESIDENTIAL   ASPIRATIONS. 


73 


llT- 


uc 

larf 


1 


d. 


There  was  another  consideration,  perhaps,  which 
0])eratcd  on  the  mind  of  the  secretary  with  an  influ- 
ence not  less  powerful  than  gallantry  and  patriotism, 
to  induce  him  to  take  the  conspicuous  part  he  did  in 
the  agitated  question  of  proper  measures  for  defending 
the  seat  of  government,  and  it  was  quite  natural  that 
it  should  have  that  effect.  lie  was  regarded  as  a  prom- 
inent candidate  for  the  presidential  succession ;  the 
eyes  of  the  whole  people  would  be  upon  the  dc]*cnders 
of  AVashington  ;  a  brilliant  volunteer  achievement,  ac- 
complished without  the  orders  acknowledged  of  the 
commanding  general,  would  win  for  him  the  hearts  of 
liis  countrymen,  and  render  his  future  elevation  sure. 
This  could  not  well  be  attempted  under  the  bluff  old 
soldier  Moses  Porter,  or  any  other  experienced  general 
not  indebted  to  him  for  his  appointment. 

One  of  the  most  eminent  men  and  profound  states- 
men of  the  present  age,  in  his  admirable  sketch  of 
Lord  Nortli,  says  of  him,  that  "when  ho.  found  he 
could  no  longer  approve  the  policy  which  he  wa ,  re- 
quired to  pursue,  and  of  course  to  defend,  he  was 
bound  to  quit  the  councils  of  his  obstinate  and  unrea- 
sonable sovereign.  Nor  can  there  be  a  worse  service, 
cither  to  the  prince  or  his  people;  than  enabling  a  mon- 
arch to  rule  in  his  own  person,  dictating  the  com- 
mands of  his  own  violence  or  caprice  through  servants 
who  disap})rove  of  his  measures,  and  yet  sutler  tliem- 
selves  to  be  made  instruments  for  carrying  them  into 
execution.  A  bad  kino;  can  (Vsirc  notliinn'  more  than 
to  be  served  by  such  persons,  whose  opinions  he  will 
as  nuich  disregard  as  tlicir  inclinations,  but  whom  he 
will  always  find  his  tools  in  doing  the  work  of  niis- 

D 


74        INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


cliief,  because  they  become  the  more  at  the  monarch's 
mercy  in  proportion  as  they  have  surrendered  their 
principles  and  their  will  to  his."* 

These  remarks  contain  a  truth  equally  as  applica- 
ble under  our  republic  as  under  the  monarchy  of 
Great  Britain.  AVhen  a  minister  continues  to  hold 
his  place  after  he  finds  that  his  opinions  and  his  judg- 
ment are  at  variance  with  those  of  his  chief  on  the 
particular  concerns  of  his  own  department,  he  certainly 
gives  fair  ground  for  suspicion  that  he  is  actuated 
more  by  love  of  place  or  its  emoluments  than  by  love 
of  country.  When  a  man  surrenders  his  principles 
and  his  conscience  to  the  will  of  another,  he  disquali- 
fies himself  for  being  the  adviser  of  any  body,  much 
less  of  a  chief  magistrate,  and  becomes  at  once,  as 
Lord  Brougham  most  truly  remarks,  a  fit  tool  for  any 
mischievous  work  he  may  be  ordered  to  execute. 

In  the  most  Important  of  all  the  subjects  upon 
which  the  Pre.  ident  saw  fit  to  consult  his  heads  of 
departments,  we  have  seen  that  the  advice  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  V/ar — the  most  competent,  not  only  on  ac- 
count of  his  large  experience,  but  better  acquaintance, 
which  his  position  enabled  him  to  form,  with  the  offi- 
cers of  the  army,  to  give  advice — was  unheeded ;  but 
he  remained,  nevertheless,  to  carry  out  the  decision  of 
others,  and  to  subject  himself  to  criminations  which 
he  might,  by  immediate  resignation  of  liis  office,  have 
thrown  upon  those  who  more  deserved  them. 

None  will  deny,  we  presume,  that  there  was  no  mil- 


ts^-* 


I 

f 


*  Historical  Sketches  of  Statesmen  who  flotirishctl  in  the  Time  of 
Geor;_'c  III.,  tojiethor  with  Ilemurks  on  the  French  llevolution.  By 
Henry  Lord  Brougham,  T.  R.  S.,  vol.  i.,  j).  53. 


I 


IMPOKTANXK    OF   THE    NKW    DISTIUCT. 


75 


•S^j 


'Je 


itary  commancl  within  the  United  States,  considering 
all  the  circumstances,  of  higher  importance,  nor  one 
involving  more  t'earlLil  responsibilities  than  that  ot  vhe 
newly-created  district.  The  eyes  of  the  whole  nation 
Avould  naturally  be  in  an  especial  manner  fixed  upon 
the  individual  appointed  to  it,  since  it  embraced  that 
in  which  every  citizen  of  the  republic  felt  or  had  an 
equal  interest.  In  no  other  military  district  could  the 
consequences  of  success  or  defeat  be  so  widely  spread 
or  so  deeply  felt.  It  included  wi.ldn  its  narrow  lim- 
its the  lederal  City,  the  governmental  archives,  all 
that  belonged  to  the  people  in  common  as  a  nation. 
"With  these  were  closely  linked  the  dearest  sympathies 
of  the  patriot ;  and  every  man  who  had  the  interest  and 
lionor  of  his  country  at  heart  would  watch  with  crit- 
ical and  jealous  vigilance  every  movement,  every  word 
of  the  commander  to  whose  prudence,  and  prowess,  and 
skill  its  defence  was  intrusted. 

Under  these  considerations,  we  repeat,  there  was  no 
military  district  in  the  United  States  that  so  impera- 
tively recpiired  a  commander  of  acknowledged  ability 
and  tried  experience — one  in  whom  not  only  the  people 
generally,  but  the  troops  of  the  District  more  especial- 
ly, could  repose  the  most  undouLling  trust  and  confi- 
dence. These  consideration^^  appear  to  have  had  but 
little  weight  with  the  administration.  The  best  friends 
of  tlic  selected  commander  nuist  have  admitted  that 
there  was  nothino;  in  his  antecedent  career  to  recom- 
mend  him  particularly  to  the  preference  of  the  execu- 
tive. 

AVe  can  not  regard,  as  some  have  professed  to  do, 
the  acceptance  of  the  appointment  as  removing;  any 


76       INVASION   AND   CAPTIRK   OF   WASHINGTON. 

portion  of  the  burden  of  responsibility  from  the  shoul- 
ders of  the  President.  There  was,  probably,  not  oii'" 
man  in  a  million  -vvho  would,  or  who  could  properly, 
have  refused  to  receive  so  distinguished  a  mark  of  ex- 
ecutive conlidence,  so  high  and  honorable  a  testimo- 
nial of  merit.  To  one  in  the  vigor  of  manhood,  glow- 
ing with  the  aspirations  and  inijadses  of  an  honorable 
and  patriotic  ambition,  full  of  higli-mindcd  and  noble 
devotion  to  his  country's  service,  and  anxious  to  blot 
from  the  memory  of  his  fellow-citizens  the  misfortune 
which  had  attended  his  last  camj)aign  in  the  North, 
the  temptation  of  such  an  opportunity  was  too  strong 
to  Ije  resisted. 

General  Winder  had  but  recently  returned  from  a 
long  Imprisonment  in  Canada,  the  consequence  of  his 
capture  by  the  enemy  during  a  night  attack  on  our 
troops  under  General  Chandler  at  Stony  Creek  on  the 
od  of  June,  1813. 

General  Dearborn,  in  his  account  of  this  aifiiir  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  called  It  a  "strange  fatality." 
CJeneral  Chandler,  however,  who  vras  General  Winder's 
senior,  shared  the  same  fate,  and  ]\Iajor-general  Mor- 
gan Lewis,  who  succeeded  Dearborn  in  the  connnand, 
in  a  later  communication  to  the  War  Department, 
seems  to  exonerate  General  Winder  from  all  censure. 
He  says,  "  A  view  of  General  Chandler's  encampment 
will  be  sufficient  to  show  that  his  disaster  was  owing 
to  its  arrangement,  its  centre  being  its  weakest  point ; 
and  that,  being  discovered  by  the  enemy  in  the  even- 
ing, received  the  combined  attack  of  his  whole  force, 
and  his  line  was  completely  cut.  It  is  said,  though  I 
can  not  vouch  for  its  truth,  that  General  Winder  saw 


•i-t 


I 
I 


APPOINTMENT    OF   A   COM^rANDER. 


77 


^ 
il 


this  and  remonstrated  against  it.''*  And  Colonel  Bain, 
in  his  official  letter  to  the  commanding  general,  spcalvs 
of  it  as  "  the  unfortmiate  capture  of  Brigadier-generals 
Chandler  and  Winder,  who  were  taken  in  the  action, 
unknown  to  any  part  of  the  army,  and  hurried  hito 
the  enemy's  lines." 

General  Armstrong,  in  his  "  Notices, "f  referring  to 
the  errors  of  the  campaign  of  Washington,  says, 

"The  error  of  Hrst  occurrence  in  this  campaign  be- 
longs exclusively  to  the  administration,  and  will  be 
found  in  the  selection  made  of  a  commanding  general, 
not  on  the  ground  of  distinguished  professional  service 
or  knowledge,  but  simply  on  a  presumption  that,  '  be- 
ing a  native  of  Maryland,  and  a  relative  of  the  govern- 
or. Brigadier-general  AVinder  would  be  useful  in  miti- 
gating the  opposition  to  the  war,  and  in  giving  an  in- 
creased etlicicncy  to  the  national  measures  within  the 
limits  of  the  state;'  an  opinion  which,  tiiongh  some- 
what plausible,  was  wholly  unsustaincd  by  the  event." 

A.nd  he  adds  in  a  note, 

*'  The  person  recommended  by  the  Secretary  of  War 
for  this  appointment  was  J^rigadier-general  ]\los('s  Por- 
ter, then  at  Norfolk,  whose  whole  life  may  be  said  to 
have  been  military.  Entering  the  army  of  the  Revo- 
lution a  boy,  he  liad,  by  a  uniform  good  conduct,  risen 
tin-ough  every  rank,  from  that  of  a  })rivatc  to  the  com- 
mand of  a  brigiide.  No  objection  to  General  Winder, 
excepting  a  icant  uf  military  ej'jierienc(.\  cither  was  or 
could  be  made  ;  his  patriotism  and  conrage  h;id  already 
been  tested,  and  were  generally  acknowledged." 

*  Annals  of  Congress,  ut  aidea,  1st  ami  2(.l  Sessions  of  Uth  Con- 
gress, col  2372.  t  Vol.  ii.,  p.  140. 


78         INVASION   AND    CAPTCKE    OF    WASIIINOTON. 


General  Armstrong  could  luinlly  liavc  Leon  igno- 
rant of  llie  grounds  upon  which  General  Winder's  ap- 
pointment was  urged  and  determined  in  the  cabinet; 
and  we  can  not  believe  him  capable  of  making  a  false 
statement  in  such  positive,  precise,  and  un(|ualitied 
terms.  Vet,  in  spite  of  the  experience  wiiie.'i  we  have 
had  oftlu;  frailties  of  great  men  in  more  reeen^  times, 
it  seems  almost  incredible  that  statesmen  to  wliom  we 
look  back  with  so  mucli  reverence  as  ^ladison  and 
Mom-oe  should  have  been  governed,  in  a  matter  so  im- 
portant to  the  nation,  by  a  policy  so  shortsighted  and 
trivial,  indicating  rather  craft  than  the  broad  and  com- 
prehensive wisdom  for  whicli  history  has  iieretoforc 
given  them  credit.  Surely  the  most  effectual  mode  of 
"mitigating  the  opposition  to  the  war''  w'ould  have 
been  to  render  the  war  successful  and  glorious ;  and 
that  would  best  have  been  accomplished  by  selecting 
able  men  for  tlie  conduct  of  military  operations,  with- 
out reference  to  their  personal  relations  or  party  opin- 
ions, by  encouraging  capacity,  no  matter  from  what 
rank  or  class  of  life  it  sprung,  and  giving  it  the  means 
of  displayhig  itself  hi  a  way  "which  should  .idvance  tlic 
public  interests.  A  brilliant  victory  would  have  stop- 
ped the  clamor  of  thousands  against  the  war ;  an  ap- 
pointment could  conciliate  but  a  few,  and  might  create 
as  much  opposition  in  one  quarter  as  it  removed  in 
another. 

]\lr.  Ingersoll,  in  his  Historical  Sketch  of  tlic  "War 
of  1812,*  states  that  General  AVinder,  '^  beino;  a  rel- 
ativo  of  Levin  AVindcr,  the  Governor  of  Maryland, 
federal  governor  of  a  federal  state,  31r.  j\Iadison  ond 

♦  raycs  IG-t. 


k» 


MR.  MONROE  S    POLICY. 


79 


Mr.  Monroe  dcenied  it  politic  to  conciliate  opposition 
by  n})}»ointiiiL;'  liini  to  that  responsible  and  arduous 
connuand,"  etc.  ]}ut  the  administration  was  not  yet 
reduced  to  such  straits  as  to  l)C  conipclled  to  con- 
ciliate opposition  in  tliis  manner;  and  Mr.  ]\Iadison, 
being  now  in  tlie  second  and  closing  term  of  his  pres- 
idency, could  have  had  but  little  motive  on  liis  own 
account  to  resort  to  such  cx]jcdients.  A  more  ])roLa- 
ble  liypolliesis,  theretbre,  wovdd  be  that,  (iencral  Arm- 
stronij;  havin-j;  a  better  hold  of  the  Democratic  or  Kc- 
publican  party  than  ]\lr.  Monroe,  the  latter  was  compel- 
led to  rely  more  on  po])ularity  with  the  nation  at  large, 
and  had  already  commenced  tiiat  task  of  "extermina- 
ting the  monster  party  S})irit,*"  upon  the  accomplish- 
ment of  which  he  was  afterward  so  warndy  congratu- 
lated by  (Jeneral  Jackson.  If  this  hypothesis  be  cor- 
rect, the  disgrace  of  General  Armstrong  after  the  bat- 
tle of  l^ladensburg,  and  ^Ir.  ^Monroe's  elevation  to  the 
presidency  by  an  overwhelming  national  vote,  ju^ove 
that  the  Secretary  of  State,  so  far  as  his  own  interests 
were  concerned,  had  laid  his  plans  very  judiciously. 

Ikit  such  plans  were  not  very  conducive  to  tiie  glory 
and  wellare  of  the  nation.  With  an  administration 
and  cabinet  so  constituted  aiul  occupied,  one  nulitary 
as])irant  for  the  presidency  0})eiating  successtuUy  on 
the  atfections  of  the  chief  magistrate,  and  another  with 
partial  success  on  his  fears,  the  choice  of  a  command- 
ing general,  whose  proceedings  were  to  be  subject  to 
the  innninliatc  su])ervision  and  interference  of  both, 
wai?  a  matter  of  little  im})ortance  so  far  as  the  ]mblic 
was  concerned.  AVhoever  miirht  have  been  selected 
was  a  doomed  man,  unless  he  condjined  the  talents  of 


v! 


h'. 


h  ' 


80        INVASION    AND    CAI'TUKK    (JV    WASHINGTON. 

all  aljlc  wiioral  "with  tliosc  of  an  aLle  intriirucr  aiul 
courtier ;  for  cillior  one  of  llicsc  powerful  rivals  could 
have  (lone  niort;  in  an  hour  to  perplex  and  laflle  than 
the  otlier  could  have  done  in  a  week  to  assist  and  fa- 
cilitate his  plans. 

As  to  the  propriety  of  (lenoral  AYindcr's  accepting 
tlie.  command  conferred  on  liim,  circumstanced  as  he, 
^\•as,  wv.  take  the  liberty  of  adding  to  the  remarks  we 
have  already  made  on  this  suLject  the  explanation  of 
one  wlio  appears  to  have  known  him  intimately,  and 
regarded  him  with  high  esteem.  "The  appointment 
was  one,"  says  the  veteran  we  r^uote,  "  which,  as  he 
stood  at  tlie  head  of  the  general  stall",  lie  could  have 
consistently  declined:  and  if  he  had  possessed  more 
experience  he  would  have  done  so,  because  there  was 
not  a  shadow  ol  defensive  preparation,  and  the  attack 
of  the  enemy  might  he  daily  expected  ;  hut  profession- 
al ambition,  zeal  lor  the  service,  and  a  thirst  for  fame 
v.ill  always  prevail  over  sober  retlection  ;  indeed,  it  is 
rare  to  find  a  soldier  of  jjride  and  spirit,  sueli  as  (Jen- 
eral  AViiider  is  allowed  to  be,  who  Aveiglis  and  balances 
causes  and  eflects  in  the  scales  of  discretion.  Such 
phlegm  docs  not  comport  with  the  enterprise  of  the 
youthful  chief;  deliberation  is  the  province  of  the  vet- 
eran, who,  content  to  do  his  duty,  socks  not  adven- 
tures;  and  yet  I  sjicak  from  sad  conviction  when  I 
say  the  most  cxjicrienced  may  sometimes  be  beguiled 
by  fair  prospects  and  ministerial  pronused.'** 

*  Wilkinson,  vol.  i.,  \k  7."51. 


fev 


DIFFICULTIES    OF   THE    COMMANDER. 


81 


CHAPTER  V. 

Difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  Commanding  General. 

Let  us  now  take  a  brief  retrospect  of  the  obstacles 
and  difficulties  aG;ainst  which  the  new  commander  of 
tlie  new  niiUtary  district  was  called  upon  to  contend. 
General  Wilkinson  says,  "General  AVinder  accepted 
the  connnand  without  means,  and  without  time  to  cre- 
ate them.  He  found  the  District  without  magazines 
of  provisions  or  forage,  without  transport  tools  or  im- 
plements, without  a  conmiissariat  or  efficient  quarter- 
masters' department,  without  a  !2;eneral  staff,  and, 
linally,  without  troops.  ******  The  requisition  [on 
the  several  states,  issued  on  the  4th  of  'Tuly]  was  a 
mere  matter  of  form,  and  incapable  of  producing  the 
end  it  atVeetcd  to  embrace.  In  each  state  the  militia 
was  first  to  be  organized  and  equipped  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  rec^uisition,  and  yet  in  those  states 
there  existed  no  power  to  organize  .,''l  e(pii))  in  such 
form,  and,  until  special  organ i '.at ion  and  .((ui[)meut 
had  taken  place,  the  call  was  not  io  takf  })laoc :  bui 
when  tlie  exigency  arises,  the  general  is  to  .-j'portion 
his  call  to  tlie  occasion :  and,  instead  of  beinu"  author- 
ized  to  liavc  at  all  times  a  proporliort  of  at  least  two 
thirds  of  tlie  given  num])er  of  militia  trained  to  mili- 
tary duties  in  a  cam))  of  observation  and  exercise,  to 
await  the  expected  exigency,  around  which  the  re- 
mainder might  rally,  he  is,  when  danger  stares  him  in 
the  face,  to  the  utter  neglect  of  the  nwiny  innx-vtant 

i)  2 


•l    I 

'I  i 


;  t 


i"l 


■ 


I 

1 
1  ' 

I 

1  i 

:t 

i 

■ 

t 

;*«    i 


li, 


!i,i 


U  '' 


i  1 


82        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WlSfilXOTON. 

duties  pressing  on  liini,  obliged  to  devote  Iiis  time  to 
the  collection  of  and  tbrniation  of  a  Ijody  of  raw  yeo- 
manry, and  is  himself  trammeled  with  restrictions,  and 
left  with  scarcely  more  discretion  than  the  corporal  of  a 
picket  guard.*'* 

"  Winder's  was  an  arduous  perplexity :  to  arm  and 
fortify  a  military  district  witliout  magazines  or  troops, 
controlled  by  a  cabinet  of  older  soldiers  thnn  himself, 
wiioni  it  would  be  disrespectful  in  him  to  contradict, 
and  almost  insubordinate  to  overrule  ;  to  lead  undis- 
ciplined neighbors  to  battle,  in  whose  martial  prowess 
lie  could  not  conlide,  of  whose  blood  he  was  huTnanely 
sparing,  overlooked  by  several  superiors,  and  distracted 
by  a  host  of  advisers,  'f 

"  The  appointment  of  a  general,  unless  a  proper  mil- 
itary staff  is  furnished  him,  anil  cilicient  troo})s  given 
him,  is  a  very  unnecessary  ceremony.  There  were 
few  regular  troops  within  the  power  of  the  govern- 
ment; the  most  luimerous  body  which  had  recently 
been  within  or  near  the  District,  500  men  of  the  10th 
infantry,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Clinch,  a  body  of 
stout,  active  young  men  enlisted  in  North  Carolina, 
which  had  been  encamped  near  Washington  for  sever- 
al weeks,  were  marched  away  to  the  northern  frontiers 
on  the  I'Uli  of  June,  in  the  midst  of  the  alarm  of  an 
expected  attack.  In  strictness,  two  detachments  of 
the  'Mjth  and  38th  infantry,  and  a  small  detachmeiit  of 
artillery,  amounting  in  the  whole  to  JiJ^O  men,  were 
all  that  could  be  said  to  be  at  their  disposal  at  the 
time  that  the  10th  military  district  was  created,  nor 

*  Wilkinson,  vol.  i.,  p.  7r>t-7r»(>. 

t  Ingfi-soir^  Hi-tnr.  Sketch  i.f  tlic  Scronil  Wnr,  &c.,  p.  1(14,  10r>. 


COMPETENCY  OF  GENERAL  WINDER. 


83 


a 


was  this  great  deficiency  remedied  In  any  degree  betbrc 
the  troops  were  called  Into  action.  No  orders  were  is- 
sued by  the  War  De})artment  appointing  an  assistant 
adjutant-general,  assistant  inspector-general,  or  asslgn- 
iuf  to  duty  in  the  District  any  topographical  engineers; 
and  it  Is  well  known  that  General  AVInder's  greatest 
complaint  was,  that  he  had  not  the  aid  of  this  stal^', 
without  v.hlch  the  proper  organization,  equipment,  and 
efliciency  of  troops  is  impossible,  and  that  his  time  was 
occupied  by  an  oppressive  mass  of  detail,  when  he 
should  have  been  at  liberty  to  devote  it  to  duties  of  a 
very  dIfVeroil  characicr.'** 

How  far  General  AMndcr  proved  himself  competent 
to  suggest  the  merns  of  improving  the  organization  of 
his  district — for  to  suggest  was  all  that  he  had  author- 
ity or  power  to  do — will  be  seen  by  his  first  official  let- 
ter to  the  Secretary  of  War.  He  was  informed  "  with- 
in tlie  few  last  days  of  June,"  probably  inunediately 
after  his  arrival  in  Washington  with  General  Vv'Ilkin- 
son  on  the  2Gth  or  27th  of  that  month, f  that  it  was  in 
contemplation  to  create  another  military  district,  and 
that  the  President  intended  to  vest  in  him  the  connuand 
of  it.  He  very  soon  afterward  returned  to  l^altlmore, 
and  'about  the  4lli  or  oth  of  July"  he  received  a  let- 
ter from  the  secretary  requiring  his  presence  again  in 
Washington,  and  inclosing  the  order  constituting  thn 
lOthMihtary  District.  He  does  not  mention  whether 
this  letter  also  inclosed  his  commission :  but  as  ( Jenerai 
Willcinson  says  lie  did  not  receive  It  until  the  Gth,  it 

*  A  Skcti'ii  of  the  Evonts  which  proicdctl  the  Caiitiirc  of  Wnsh- 
injiton  In-  tin-  IJritish,  on  the  24tl)  of  August,  1K14,  p.  8,  9. 
t  Wilkinson,  voh  i..  ji.  7M. 


t 

i 


I  ' 


il! 

iiiii 


I. 


^  i 


l!    1 


^ 


i 


! 


iM  ;  ) 


» 


I 


1 


iH 

'•■^      SI 
I 


84        INVASION    AND    CAPTITKE   OF   WASIIINfJTON. 

may  have  been  liaiided  to  lihn  on  this  visit  to  A\'ashing- 
ton,  in  obedience  to  the  secretary's  orders.  It  was 
while  in  the  city  on  this  occasion  that  lie  held  the  con- 
versation with  that  functionary  alluded  to  in  a  letter 
which  he  wrote  innnediately  after  his  retiu'n  to  Balti- 
more. 'J.'he  great  importance  of  this  document  requires 
tliat  it  should  be  iiiven  to  our  readers  without  abridg- 
ment ;  and  Ave  iwo  disposed  to  believe  that  it  can  not 
be  perused  with  the  attention  it  deserves  without  leav- 
ing upon  the  mind  of  the  reader  tJic  conviction  tliat 
if  the  suggestions  contained  in  it  had  been  promptly 
adoj'.ted,  the  result  of  the  enemy's  visit  to  Washington 
won!  '  liave  been  very  dilferent.     It  is  as  follows: 

'•naltimorc,  July  0,  ISU. 

•sSt-.. — Tlie  objects  of  the  connnand  \vhich  has  lieen 
conf  ••  '  ',  on  me  have  consequently,  since  1  received  it, 
occupied  my  serious  consideration. 

"  The  utmost  ngular  force  which  it  is  probable  can, 
in  the  2)rcsent  state  of  allairs,  be  placed  at  my  com- 
mand, including  the  force  necessary  for  garrisoning  the 
several  forts,  will  not  exceed  1000  men,  and  some 
weeks  will  necessarily  elapse  before  the  detachments 
from  Virginia  and  Carlisle  will  reach  my  district. 
The  detachments  ^^f  the  .']Otli  and  38th  are,  therefore, 
the  only  troops  th;it  I  can  exj)ect  to  liave  in  the  mean 
time,  and  wlien  those  other  detachments  join,  the  ut- 
most force  will  l)e  from  700  t     SOu. 

''In  conversation  with  yri  at  "Washing. on,  I  un- 
derstood the  idea  at  present  entertained  relative  to  the 
auxiliary  militia  force  proposed  for  the  District  to  be, 
that  it  shall  l)e  drafte<l  and  desigiuited,  but  that  no 


1 


GENEIiAL    WINDEIi  S    LETTER. 


85 


part  of  it  is  to  be  called  into  the  iicld  until  the  hostile 
force  now  in  the  Chesapeake  shall  be  re-enforccd  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  render  it  probable  that  a  serious 
attack  is  contemplated. 

"  The  enemy's  fleet  has  now  spent  more  than  a 
twelvemonth  in  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake,  and 
during  that  tiinc  has  visited  almost  every  river  falling 
into  the  i5ay,  and  must  be  presumed  to  have  such  ac- 
curate inforniation  that  whatever  expedition  may  be 
destined  to  these  waters  will  iiave  a  delinite  object,  to 
the  execution  of  which,  on  its  arrival,  it  will  proceed 
■with  the  utmost  promptitude  and  dispatch.  Should 
Washington,  Baltimore,  or  Annapolis  be  their  ol/ject, 
what  possible  chance  will  there  be  of  collecting  a  force, 
after  the  arrival  of  the  enemy,  to  interpose  between 
them  and  either  of  those  places  ?  They  can  proceed, 
without  droi)})ing  anchor,  to  within  three  hours'  row- 
ing and  marching  of  Baltimore,  within  less  of  Annap- 
olis, and  upon  arriving  olf  South  liiver,  can  debariv. 
and  be  in  Washington  in  a  day  and  a  half.  This  ce- 
lerity of  movement,  on  their  part,  is  not  probable,  ow- 
ing to  adverse  weather  and  other  causes ;  but  if  the 
enemy  has  been  active,  while  in  our  waters,  to  acquire 
a  knowledge  of  our  country,  of  which  there  can  be  no 
doubt,  and  should  be  favored  with  weather  on  the  ar- 
rival of  rc-enforccmcnts,  he  can  be  in  Washington, 
Baltimore,  or  Annapolis  in  four  days  from  entering 
the  Capes.  But,  allowing  liberally  for  all  causes  of 
detention,  he  can  be  in  either  of  those  places  in  ten 
days  from  Jiis  arrival.  What  time  will  this  allow  us 
to  hear  of  his  arrival,  to  disseminate  through  tiie  intri- 
cate and  winding  channels  the  various  orders  to  the 


f 


\u 


, 


I, . , 

i;;! 


a 


I,,. 


86 


IKVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


militia  for  tlicm  to  assemble,  have  their  officers  desig- 
nated, tlicir  arms,  accoutrements,  and  amnmnition  de- 
livered, the  necessary  supplies  provided,  or  for  the 
commanding  officers  to  learn  the  diflcrcnt  corps  and 
dctaclnncnts,  so  as  to  issue  orders  witli  the  prompti- 
tude and  certainty  so  necessary  in  active  operations  ? 
If  the  enemy's  force  sliould  be  strong,  v/hich,  if  it  come 
at  all,  it  will  be,  sufficient  numbers  of  militia  could 
not  be  warned  and  run  together,  even  as  a  disorderly 
crowd,  without  arms,  ammunition,  or  organization,  be- 
fore the  enemy  would  already  have  given  his  blow. 

"  Would  it  not,  then,  be  expedient  to  increase  the 
force  of  my  connnand  by  immediately  calling  out  a 
portion  of  the  militia,  so  that,  by  previously  selecting 
the  best  positions  for  defence,  and  increasing  as  far  as 
possible  the  natural  advantages  of  these  positions,  the 
advance  of  the  enemy  might  be  retarded,  his  force  crip- 
pled, and  time  and  opportunity  thus  gained  for  draw- 
ing together  whatever  other  resources  of  defence  might 
be  competent  to  resist  the  enemy  ?  The  small  force 
of  regulars  will  be  incompetent  to  accomplish  any  ma- 
terial works  at  favorable  positions  for  strengthening 
the  defences,  and  to  supply  the  various  vedette  parties 
which  it  will  be  necessary  to  station  on  the  prominent 
points  of  the  Bay  to  watch  the  enemy,  and  communi- 
cate his  movements  with  the  greatest  possible  dis- 
patch. 

"Allow  me,  sir,  respectfully  to  propose  that  four 
thousand  militia  be  called  out  without  delay:  I  pro- 
pose to  station  these  in  equal  proportions  in  tlie  most 
eligible  positions  between  South  Hiver  and  Washing- 
ton, and  in  the  vicinity  of  Baltimore.     Baltimore  could 


, 


ii  i 
■i" 


hiL^. 


GENERAL    WINDER's    LETTER. 


87 


not  be  aided  by  a  force  stationed  between  South  River 
and  Washington  unless  a  force  were  on  the  ^pot  to 
retard  the  advance  of  the  enemy  until  it  could  arrive, 
and  so  with  respect  to  Washington.  Eacli  could  as- 
sist the  other  if  of  this  magnitude,  and  it  appears  to 
me  that,  with  materially  less  means  actually  in  the 
field  and  ready  for  instant  action,  no  hope  can  be  en- 
tertained of  opposing  the  enemy  in  assailing  either  of 
these  places. 

"I  shall  proceed  to  Annapolis  tc-inorrow,  and  have 
but  little  doubt  that  the  executive  of  ]\Iaryland  will 
cordially  co-operate  in  affording  such  meai  s  as  it  may 
be  deenied  advisable  to  call  lor;  and  I  beg  you  will 
permit  me  to  procure  this,  or  such  other  militia  force 
as  the  President  may  think  proper  innnediately  to  be 
called  out. 

"  I  sent  an  order  from  W^ashino-ton  for  the  detach- 
mcnt  of  the  3Gth  and  38th  to  move  up  to  the  head  of 
South  River,  where  I  propose  to  meet  them,  and  fix 
upon  the  most  eligible  spot  for  the  camp  intended  to 
defend  Washington. 

"  You  will  please,  therefore,  to  direct  any  commu- 
nications to  me  to  Annapolis,  which  will  enable  mc  to 
make  the  requisite  arrangements  with  the  execittivv. 
of  Maryland  at  once. 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect,  sir,  your 
obedient  servant,  W.  H.  Winder,* 

"Brigadier-general  commanding  the  10th 
"  Military  District. 

"  To  Hon.  John  Annstrong,  Secretary  of  War." 


To  this   im 


portant  letter  no  reply  whatever  was 

State  Papers,  tit  (tntcn,  p.  513. 


I 


v\ 


88        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


■N  '' 


!        I. 


!Sll 


\\  w 


t 
; 


i:' 


i;i 


ir 


I  I  >^i  , 


made,  or  none,  at  least,  of  wlilcli  any  record  can  Ibe 
found ;  nor  was  any  respect  paid  to  its  suggestions. 

The  secretary  and  the  general,  it  appears,  differed 
widely  as  to  the  necessity  of  training  militia  beroro 
tlicy  are  brought  into  battle.  General  Armstroiig,  it 
can  not  be  denied,  had  had  longer  experience  and  bet- 
ter opportunities  of  observing  the  character  of  militia; 
and  it  was  his  opinion,  founded  upon  numerous  in- 
stiinccs  in  the  iicvolutionary  war,  that  they  always 
acted  with  more  energy  and  spirit  if  called  to  the  licld 
of  battle  immediately  after  their  arrival  in  camp,  than 
when  they  had  been  previously  drilled  and  disciplined 
for  months.  In  the  latter  case,  they  have  lost  the 
jn-idc  which  raises  them,  in  their  own  estimation,  as 
citizens,  above  the  enlisted  soldiers  ;  have  become 
liome-sick,  careless,  indillerent,  slovenly,  and  spiritless ; 
while,  if  brought  into  action  in  the  freshness  of  their 
home-feelings,  in  the  })ride  of  their  independence  as 
citizens,  they  figlit  as  if  their  own  individual  rights 
wci-c  at  stukc  in  the  battle,  each  emulating  the  other  in 
the  courage  and  manliness  of  his  bearing. 

Now,  whether  this  theory  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
was  philoso])hie,  ciid  founded  on  a  more  correct  knowl- 
edge than  others  possess  of  human  nature,  or  purely 
chimerical,  it  may  serve  to  explain  much  of  the  appar- 
ent indilfcrence  imputed  to  liim  -when  called  upon  by 
anxious  and  impatient  citizens,  and  urged  to  adopt 
their  views  of  the  matter  rather  than  his  own.  For 
ourselves,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  express  our  preference 
of  t)ie  views  taken  by  the  commanding  general.  AVc 
believe  that  no  man  can  be  a  good  soldier  until  he  lias 
learned  something   of  disci})linc   and  subordination. 


I 


riiOMPTNESS   OF  THE    GOVERNOIl   OF   MAIiYLAND.     8D 


To  learn  these  requires  time;  and  the  authority  to 
briii'^'  all  the  force  allowed  him  into  the  tield  should 
have  been  contemporaneous  with  the  appointment  of 
IJrigadier-gcneral  A\'inder.  But  we  are  not  disposed 
altogether  to  blame  the  Secretary  of  War  that  this  was 
not  done,  llis  opinions,  wc  have  seen,  had  but  little 
weight  with  the  Presidtiit  and  his  cabinet  in  other 
matters,  and  wo  are  not  prepared  to  say  they  were 
adopted  in  tJiis. 

The  Governor  of  ]\Iaryla;.      it  can  not  be  doubted, 
did  all  that  could  have  been  ted' of  hhn  to  insure 

prompt  obedience  on  the  pari  of  his  militia  oflicers. 
The  general,  at  least,  does  not  seem  to  have  thought 
that  any  blame  for  delay  or  defective  exercise  of  pow- 
er could  be  justly  attached  to  his  relative.  In  his  let- 
ter to  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  2.'5d  of  July,  dated 
at  Upper  ^Marlborough,  he  says,  "  The  governor  has 
issued  orders  for  calling  out  three  thousand  of  the 
drafts  under  the  requisition  of  the  4th  of  July,  and 
at  my  suggestion  has  appointed  Bladensburgli  as  the 
place  of  rendezvous.'"*  From  Piscataway  he  writes  on 
the  27th,  "  The  governor  V6'  cdxrtuuj  hi msdf  io  collect 
a  force  at  Annapolis ;"  and  in  a  second  letter  of  the 
same  date,  from  the  same  place,  he  says,  "•  The  govern- 
or has  been  hi  vain  endeavoring  to  assemble  the  neigh- 
boring militia  at  Annapolis ;  he  had  called  on  Freder- 
ick County,  and  some  militia  were  coming  in  fn  ^.l 
thence  when  I  was  last  at  Annai)olis.  All  t/i  is  force 
is,  however,  called  out  h>j  the  authority  of  the  state, 
and  is  not  itnder  my  command  ;  but  they  do,  and  will, 
co-operate  toward  the  general  defence." 
*  State  Tapers,  ut  antca,  p.  G 10. 


IMAGE  EVALUATION 
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90 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


r" 


'I' 


M 


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tji 

1^ 


It  is  manifest  that  if  tlic  Governor  of  ^Maryland, 
clothed  with  all  the  power  of  the  .state,  was  unable  to 
colleet  a  small  force  from  the  neighhoring  militia  to 
protect  the  capital  of  the  state  itself,  he  would  be  much 
less  able  to  compel  obedience  to  his  orders  when  call- 
ing out  the  militia  for  purposes  in  which  they  felt  les3 
immediate  interest.  All  that  he  could  consistently  do 
was  to  order  them  out ;  if  they  did  not  choose  to  obey 
his  orders,  the  only  penalty  lie  could  inflict  would  be 
to  bring  officers  and  men  to  courts-martial,  a  process 
which  could  hardly  have  ])ecn  accomplished  in  time  to 
meet  the  wants  of  the  commanding  general.  The 
fault  was  evidently  in  the  militia  system  rather  than 
the  executive  of  the  state. 

On  the  13th  of  August,  General  Winder  writes 
thus  from  Baltimore:  "In  consequence  of  the  two 
regiments  which  were  drafted  from  General  Smith's 
division,  under  the  requisition  of  April  last,  being  ac- 
cepted as  a  part  of  the  quota  of  ^Maryland  under  the 
requisition  of  the  4th  of  July  last — of  the  impracticabil- 
ity, besides  impropriety,  of  calling  any  portion  of  those 
drafted  from  the  Eastern  Shore,  and  the  necessity  of 
leaving  all  the  men  immediately  upon  the  Bay  and  low 
down  upon  the  rivers  for  local  defence  on  the  Western 
Shore,  the  remaining  portion  of  the  ^laryland  drafts 
to  be  assembled  at  Bladensburgh,  instead  of  being 
three  thousand,  will  not  nuich  exceed  as  many  hund- 
red. I  shall  require  the  governor  to  order  out  all  the 
drafts  that  can  possibly  be  spared  from  the  three 
lower  brigades  on  the  Western  Shore ;  but,  since  the 
whole  number  drafted  on  the  Western  Shore,  ex- 
clusive of  those  drawn  from  General  Smith's  division, 


it^ 


THE    MARYLAND   QUOTA. 


91 


ij, 


do  not  aTiiGimt  to  fifteen  liundrecl,  I  nppreliend  that, 
after  all  ahaJl  he  assembled  under  this  second  order 
from  the  Governor  of  ]\Iaryhind,  they  will  not  exceed 
one  thousand  men.  The  most  convenient  and  imme- 
diate resource  to  supply  this  deticiency,  which  occurs 
to  nie,  will  be  to  take  the  militia  drawn  out  under  the 
state  authority,  and  now  assembled  at  Annapolis,  to 
the  amount  of  one  thousand  men,  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  call  on  the  Governor  of  Penn- 
svlvania  for  one  reo-imcnt.  This  would  make  the  mi- 
litia  force  (independent  of  two  reginients  near  this 
place)  under  my  eonnnand  between  two  and  three  thou- 
sand men,  and  would  complete  the  views  of  the  Presi- 
dent in  the  order  connnunicated  to  me  by  you  to  call 
for  not  more  than  three,  nor  less  'than  two  thousand 
over  and  above  the  two  regiments  here. 

"  The  objects  for  which  the  militia  were  called  to 
Annapolis  were  such  as  to  make  it  proper  that  the 
force  should  be  under  the  direction  of  the  commander 
of  the  loth  .Alilitary  District.  Home  force  ouirht  and 
must  be  kept  at  Annapolis  ;  and  if  it  should  be  deem- 
ed proper  to  authorize  me  to  accept  them,  I  should 
leave  them  there  until  some  necessity  occurred  requir- 
ing them  elsewhere,  and  the  trouble  and  expense  of 
advancins:  a  detachment  there  would  be  avoided. 

"  'J'hesc  men  are  only  called  out  for  sixty  days, 
which  may,  perhaps,  be  long  enough,  and  will,  at  all 
events,  afford  suflicient  time  to  ascertain  wh(>ther  a 
further  force  will  be  necessary.  1'hey  are  already  in 
the  field,  e(iuipjM'd  in  all  respects,  and  organi/cd.  A 
saving  of  their  equipments  w  11  be  gained  by  the  United 
States,  and  all  the  time  and  trouble  of  calling  a  force 
in  their  place." 


I 


I   in 


t :, 


t< 


n  ' 


92        INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

Here  wc  sec  that,  only  cleveii  days  before  tlic  enemy 
entered  Washington,  the  commanding  general  had  u>i- 
der  his  orders  but  little  more  than  a  thousand  men, 
which  force,  provided  the  President  would  allow  him 
to  accept  the  services  of  the  militia  at  Annapolis,  would 
make  his  whole  army,  exclusive  of  the  two  l^altimore 
regiments,  between  tico  and  three  thousand  men! 

Ill  his  letter  of  23d  of  July,  from  Upper  ]Marlbor- 
ough,  there  occurs  a  passage  which  no  reticcting  read- 
er can  peruse  without  a  feeling  of  astorisliment  and 
indignation  at  the  culpable  neglect  or  indiifercncc  with 
which  the  arduous  and  unremitted  labors  of  the  com- 
manding general  to  perfect  his  arrangements  for  the 
defence  of  his  district  were  treated  by  those  in  power. 
After  telling  the  Secretary  of  War  that  he  had  ap- 
pointed ]>ladensburg  as  the  place  of  rendezvous  for  the 
three  thousand  ^laryland  drafts  which  the  governor 
had  issued  orders  for  calling  out,  he  says,  "  It  will 
be  necessary  that  arms,  anmiunition,  accoutrements, 
tents,  and  camp  equipage  be  deposited  there  for  them. 
I  have  no  hiowledye  where  these  articles  are  in  store 
nearest  that  point,  nor  under  whose  charge  they  are. 
I  must  pray  you  to  give  the  necessary  orders  for  hav- 
ing the  rct^uisite  deposits  made  at  that  place." 

The  general  had  then  been  actively  engaged  in  the 
multifarious  duties  of  his  command  for  some  eighteen 
or  twenty  days,  and  had  not  been  inlbrmed  where  or 
in  whose  custody  his  n'' itary  stores  were  to  be  found  I 
The  fact  is  well-nigh  jdible,  and  yet,  coming  from 
the  commanding  general  himself,  wc  arc  constrained 
to  believe  it.  Surely,  as  wc  have  elsewhere  said,  some 
fatality  must  have  hung  over  every  thing  that  related 


THE    ACTIVITY    OF    CiEXERAL    WINDER. 


93 


'I 


to  the  defence  of  the  scat  of  government.  We  have 
seen  that  wlien  General  Winder  accepted  his  appoint- 
ment, his  district  was  destitute  of  every  requisite  to 
constitute  a  military  command.  Requisitions,  it  is 
true,  had  Leen  simultaneously  made  upon  the  three 
nearest  states  for  militia,  hut  these  were  merely  to  he 
held  in  readiness  and  placed  conditionally  under  his 
control.  lie  had  no  staff,  no  stores,  no  truops  ;  he 
was  left  to  the  necessity  of  being  his  own  commissary, 
his  own  secretary,  his  own  vedette,  and  to  he  himself 
his  own  express-rider.  It  is  only  necessary  to  look 
at  the  dates  and  places  of  his  letters  to  the  War  De- 
partment to  see  that  Let  ween  the  Dth  and  27th  of 
July,  an  interval  of  eighteen  days,  he  was  at  lialti- 
niorc,  Annapolis,  Upper  ]\Iarlborough,  the  Wood  Yard, 
Nottingham,  Piseataway,  AVarhurton,  Port  Tobacco, 
and  sometimes  twice  or  thrice  within  that  short  period 
at  the  same  place,  besides  being  several  times  at  Wash- 
ington, where,  of  course,  it  was  unnecessary  to  write 
letters.  If  we  take  into  consideration  the  various  dis- 
tances between  these  places,  and  the  state  of  the  roads 
forty  years  ago,  we  shall  be  compelled  to  acknowledge 
that  he  could  not  have  been  at  any  one  time  twenty- 
four  hours  at  rest. 

There  is,  perhaps,  no  instance  to  be  found  in  history 
of  a  commanding  general  so  disadvantageously  situa- 
ted. Appointed  to  take  command  of  an  army  of  "ten 
or  twelve  thousand"  men,  who,  he  is  told,  are  "  held 
in  readiness"  to  obey  his  orders,  he  enters  upon  his 
duties,  and  finds  that  he  has  not  even  a  corporal's 
guard.  In  liis  first  attempt  to  exercise  the  power 
vested  in  him  to  call  these  rernhj  men  into  service,  ho 


w 


It 


■i.A 


'i'l 


94        INVASION   AND   CAPTUEE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

finds  himself  tied  down  by  conditions  which  render 
his  power  a  nullity.  It  is  like  setting  a  man  down  to 
a  Barmecide's  feast — a  table  covered  with  empty  dish- 
es— and,  with  a  mockery  of  hospitality,  inviting  him 
to  help  himself. 

From  the  moment  of  General  Winder's  appointment 
to  the  command  of  the  10th  District  to  the  day  the 
enemy  entered  tlie  City  of  Washington,  there  is  noth- 
ing to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  between  him 
and  the  Secretary  of  War  from  which  it  can  be  infer- 
red that  the  latter  did  not  treat  him  with  the  utmost 
courtesy  and  confidence.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  in 
the  long  and  interesting  "  Narrative  of  General  Win- 
der," addressed  to  the  chairman  of  the  committee  of 
investigation,  that  can  lead  us  to  believe  he  desired  to 
cast  the  slightest  censure  upon  tlie  secretary  for  any 
imputed  want  of  respect  or  cordiality  in  their  inter- 
course with  each  other.  But  after  the  disastrous  is- 
sue of  llie  day,  when  irritated  and  goaded  by  the  clam- 
ors of  a  disappointed  and  excited  people,  who  resorted 
to  every  oft'ensive  mode  of  showing  tliat  they  attrib- 
uted to  him  the  unsuccessful  defence  of  the  city,  it  can 
not  be  thought  very  surprising  that  the  secretary  be- 
gan to  think  it  necessary,  for  his  own  reputation,  that 
the  blame  sliould  rest  upon  other  shoulders.  His  re- 
tirement from  the  AVar  De})artni(.'nt  and  from  Wash- 
ington a  few  days  after  the  unfortunate  24tli  of  Au- 
gust, and  while  the  juncture  of  affairs,  by  liis  own  ac- 
knowledgment, was  still  critical,  would,  if  left  without 
some  ^explanation,  very  naturally  be  taken  as  a  tacit 
admission  of  the  truth  of  the  charc-cs  which  had  been 
so  openly  made  against  him  by  the  militia  and  citi- 


^^ 


GENERAL  ARMSTKOXG   AND   GENERAL    WLNDER.      95 

i:ens  of  the  District.      General  Armstrong  v.-  is  well 
aware  oftiiis  ;  and,  accordingly,  on  the  5th  of  Septem- 
ber, three  days  after  his  departure  from  Washington, 
there  appeared  in  the  Baltimore  J\(triot  a  letter,  ad- 
dressed by  him  to  the  editors,  which,  as  it  is  the  only 
notice  that  he  condescended  to  take  of  the  many  se- 
vere criminations  fulminated  against  him,  we  deem  it 
proper   to  spread  before  the  reader  without  curtail- 
ment.    Justice  to  the  memory  of  one  of  the  distin- 
guished men  of  the  Revolution  demands  this  at  our 
hands.     The  only  liberty  wo  have  taken  with  it,  as  it 
appeared  in  the  Patriot,  has  been  to  italicize  the  par- 
ticular paragraph  which  led  us  to  infer  that  the  feel- 
higs  of  its  author  toward  the  commanding  general  ei- 
ther underwent  a  change  after  the  official  relation  be- 
tween them  had  ceased  to  exist,  or  had  previously  been 
well  dissembled. 


s\ 


i 


H 

i     ^ 

1 

i     ' 

1 
!      ■ 

, 

1 

1 

ij 


1*         I 


<f 


I  '       I 


''!' 


' 


96       INVASION   AND   CAPTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

General  Armstrong's  Letter  to  the  Editors  of  the  Baltimore  Patriot. 
— Comments  ujion  its  extraordinary  Disclosures. 

It  does  not  often  occur  that  tlic  public  are  permit- 
ted to  irdss  so  familiarly  behind  the  scenes  as  to  see 
what  passes  among  the  several  actors  before  they  have 
prepared  themselves  to  appear  on  the  stage  in  their  re- 
spective and  appropriate  disguises.  AVerc  such  to  be 
the  case  as  a  general  rule,  the  audience  would  soon 
lose  all  power  of  deluding  themselves  into  the  belief 
that  the  characters  before  them  were  really  what  they 
represented,  and  would  thus  be  deprived  of  the  princi- 
pal source  of  their  amusement,  and  the  sole  chance  of 
moral  instruction  from  what  they  heard.  From  the 
nature  of  our  government,  it  is  true,  there  can  be  but 
few  of  what  arc  called  "  state  secrets,"  but  there  nuist 
be,  in  all  governments,  some  individual,  personal  mat- 
ters, w^hich  a  sense  of  decorum  would  re(piire  to  be  kept 
private.  The  reader  will  probably  agree  with  us  after 
reading  the  following : 

"  It  may  be  due  to  myself,  and  is  certainly  due  to 
others,  that  the  reasons  under  which  I  retired  from  the 
direction  of  the  War  Department,  at  a  juncture  so 
critical  as  the  present,  should  be  fully  and  promptly 
known  to  the  public.  Tliese  reasons  will  be  found  in 
the  following  brief  exposition  of  facts  : 

"  On  the  evening  of  tlic  20th  ultimo  the  President 
called  at  my  lodgings,  and  stated  that  a  case  of  nmch 


3 


i 


GENERAL   ARMSTRONGS   STATEMENT. 


97 


delicacy  had  occiirrcd ;  that  a  high  degree  of  excite- 
ment had  been  raised  among  the  militia  of  the  Dis- 
trict ;  that  he  was  himself  an  object  of  their  suspicions 
and  menaces ;  that  an  officer  of  that  corps  had  given 
him  notice  that  they  would  no  longer  obey  any  orders 
coming  through  mc  as  Secretary  of  War  ;  and  that,  in 
the  urgency  of  the  case,  it  might  be  prudent  so  far  to 
yield  to  the  impulse  as  to  permit  some  other  person  to 
exercise  my  functions  in  relation  to  the  defence  of  the 
District. 

"  To  this  statcnvcnt  and  jDroposition  I  answered  sub- 
stantially as  follows  :  That  I  was  aware  of  the  excite- 
ment to  which  he  alluded  ;  that  I  knew  its  source  and 
had  marked  its  progress ;  that  the  present  was  not  a 
moment  to  examine  its  more  occult  causes,  objects, 
and  agents  ;  that  it  ostensibly  rested  on  charges  known 
to  himself  to  be  false ;  that  it  was  not  for  mc  to  de- 
termine how  far  the  supposed  urgency  of  the  case 
made  it  proper  for  him  to  yield  to  an  impulse  so  vile 
and  profligate,  so  injurious  to  truth,  and  so  destructive 
of  order;  but  that  for  myself. there  was  no  choice;  that 
I  could  never  surrender  a  part  of  my  legitimate  au- 
thority for  the  preservation  oi  'J '^  rest;  that  1  must 
exercise  it  wholly  or  not  at  all ;  that  I  came  into  office 
with  objects  exclusively  public ;  and  that  to  accom- 
modate my  principles  or  my  conduct  to  the  humors  of 
a  village  mob,  stimulated  by  faction  and  led  by  folly, 
was  not  the  way  to  promote  these  ;  and  that,  if  his  de- 
cision was  taken  in  conformity  to  the  suggestion  he 
had  made,  I  entreated  him  to  accept  my  resignation. 
This  he  declined  doing.  It  was  an  extent,  he  was 
pleased  to  say,  to  which  he  meant  not  to  go ;  that  he 

E 


»■  ''1 
ll 

M  l' 


I 


'./' 


II 


1    I 


I        I 


l\ 


I        I 


98        INVASION    AND   CAITCRE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

knew  the  excitement  was  limited,  as  well  with  regard 
to  time  as  to  place ;  tluit  he  was  now  and  had  always 
been  fully  sensible  of  the  general  zeal,  diligence,  and 
talent  which  I  had  })ut  into  the  discharge  of  my  duty, 
and  that  it  would  give  him  pleasure  were  I  to  take  time 
to  consider  his  jn'oposition.  I  renewed  the  assurance 
of  my  great  personal  respect,  and  my  readiness  to  con- 
form to  his  wishes  on  all  proper  occasions.  I  remark- 
ed that,  whatever  zeal,  diligence,  and  talent  I  possessed 
had  been  employed  freely  but  lirmly,  and  according  to 
my  best  views  of  the  public  good  ;  and  that,  as  long  as 
they  were  left  to  be  so  exerted,  they  were  at  the  serv- 
ice of  my  country  ;  but  that  the  moment  they  were 
made  to  bow  to  military  Tisvirpation  or  political  faction, 
there  should  be  an  end  of  their  public  exercise.  We 
now  parted  with  an  understanding  that  I  should  leave 
Washino'ton  the  foUowinir  morninc;. 

"  It  has  been  stated  to  me  as  a  fact,  to  whicli  I  give 
the  most  reluctant  belief,  that  on  the  mornino:  of  the 
29th,  and  before  my  arrival  in  the  city,  a  committee 
of  the  inhabitants  of  Georgetown,  of  wliom  Alexander 
C.  Hanson,  editor  of  the  Federal  Eepublican,  was  one, 
had  waited  on  the  President  bf/  deputation^  and  had 
obtained  from  him  a  promise  that  I  should  no  longer 
direct  the  militarv  defences  of  the  District.  On  this 
fact  all  commentary  is  unnecessary. 

"  It  but  remains  to  exhibit  and  answer  the  several 
charges  raised  against  me,  and  which  form  the  ground- 
work of  that  excitement  to  which  tlic  President  has 
deemed  it  prudent  to  sacrifice  his  authority  in  de- 
clining to  support  mine.      They  are  as  follows,  viz.  : 

"  1st.  That  (from  ill  will  to  the  District  of  Colum- 


Wil 


fj 


GENEILVL    ARMSTIIONGS   STATEMENT. 


99 


de- 


m 

4 


<"  'JESI 

li 


bia  and  a  design  to  remove  tlio  i^cal  of  government)  I 
PMV(!  or>k'r.s  tor  t!ie  rcireat  of  the  armv  i;i  tlie  affair  of 
the  24tli  Hit.,  under  circumstances  not  making  retreat 
necessary  or  proper. 

"•  'J'liis  i;!iarge  has  not  for  it.^  suj'port  the  shadow  of 
Irulh.  Th ;.  cummaiidin'--  general  will  do  me  the  jus- 
tii:c  to  ;sa\  iliat  1  L'iive  him  no  Biicii  onhr,  ;ind  tliat  ho 
wa;:.  io.id  li  \\\\de\  li.c  iipprcsio!!  tha!  li.-'  r  tc,;t  was 
ni:i(.l  ■  (■■  ri;ei  la.  n  I  liCiievcii  il  lo  lie  ])rop.  r.  To  the 
rri.i'i'iil  I  appeal  wheiiier  1  did  not  jsoin!  out  the 
disorder  and  rctical  oi'  a  p.irt  of  the  iirst  line  soon  ai'ter 
the  action  bejian,  and  slitcmatize  it  as  base  and  infa- 
mous. 

"  2d.  That,  in  despite  of  the  remonstrances  of  Gen- 
eral Winder,  and  hy  the  interposition  of  my  autliority, 
I  had  prevented  him  from  defending  the  capital. 

"  This  charge  contains  in  it  a  total  perversion  of 
the  truth.  When  the  head  of  the  retiring  column 
reached  tlic  capital,  it  was  halted  for  a  moment.  Gen- 
eral Winder  here  took  occasion  to  state  to  ]\Ir.  ]Monroe 
and  myself  that  he  was  not  in  condition  to  maintain 
another  conflict,  and  that  his  force  was  broken  down 
by  fatigue  and  dispersion.  Under  this  representation, 
we  united  in  opinion  that  he  should  proceed  to  occupy 
the  heights  of  Georgetown. 

"  3d.  That  I  had  withdrawn  the  covering  party 
from  the  rear  of  Fort  Washington,  and  had  ordered 
Captain  Dyson  to  blow  up  the  fort  without  firing  a 
gun. 

"  This  charge  is  utterly  devoid  of  truth.  The  cov- 
ering party  was  withdrawn  by  an  order  from  General 
Winder,  and  Captain  Dyson's  official  report   shows 


100     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


I 


II 

ii 


that  the  orders  under  which  he  acted  were  derived 
from  the  same  source,  though,  no  doubt,  mistaken  or 
misrepresented. 

"4th.  That  by  my  orders  the  navy-yard  had  been 
burned.  This,  like  its  predecessor,  is  a  positive  false- 
hood. 

"  Perceiving  that  no  order  was  made  for  apprising 
Commodore  Tingcy  of  the  retreat  of  the  army,  I  sent 
]\lajor  13ell  to  communicate  the  fact,  and  to  say  that 
the  navy-yard  could  no  longer  be  covered.  The  com- 
modore was,  of  course,  left  to  follow  the  suggestions 
of  his  own  mind,  or  to  obey  the  orders,  if  orders  had 
been  given,  of  the  Navy  Department. 

"5th.  And,  lastly,  that  means  had  not  been  taken 
to  collect  a  force  sufficient  for  the  occasion. 

"As  the  subject  of  this  charge  may  very  soon  be- 
come one  of  Congressional  inquiry,  I  shall  at  present 
make  b*ut  a  few  remarks  : 

"1st.  T/iat  no  means  xt^itJiin  reach  of  the  Wa?' 
Department  had  been  omitted  or  withheld ;  that  a 
sepa^'ate  military  district^  embracing  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment, had  been  created ;  that  an  officer  of  high 
rank  and  character  had  been  j^laced  in  charge  of  it ; 
that  to  him  was  given  full  authority  to  call  for  su^)- 
plies,  and  for  a  militia  force  o/"  fifteen  thousand  men ; 
that  to  this  force  ivas  added  the  36^A  regiment  of  the 
line,  a  battalion  of  the  38^/i,  detachments  of  the  12th, 
of  the  artillery,  and  of  the  dragoons,  the  7narine  corjps, 
and  the  creios  of  the  flotilla,  under  the  special  conn- 
Tnand  of  Commodore  Barney,  making  a  total  of 
16,300  ')nen. 

"  General  Winder's  official  report  of  the  engagement 


f 


1 
1 

i 

i 

i 
i 
1 

1 1 

, 

-    / 


i 
I 


-r^v 


GENERAL   ARMSTRONG  S   STATEMENT. 


101 


of  the  24tli  ult.  sliows  liow  iniicli  of  this*  force  had  been 
assembled,  and  tlie  causes  why  a  greater  portion  of  it 
had  not  been  got  together.  These  will  be  found  to 
have  been  altogether  extraneous  from  the  govenunent, 
and  entirely  beyond  its  control ;  and, 

"  2d.  That  from  what  is  now  known  of  the  enemy's 
force,  of  the  loss  he  sustained  in  the  enterprise,  of  the 
marks  of  panic  under  which  he  retreated,  &c.,  &c.,  it  is 
obvious  that  if  all  the  troops  assembled  at  Bladcns- 
burg  had  been  faithful  to  themselves  and  to  their  coun- 
try, the  enemy  would  have  been  beaten  and  the  capital 
saved.  (Signed),  JoiiN  Armstrong. 

"Baltimore,  Sept.  3,  1814." 

Either  we  have  grossly  erred  in  interpreting  the  im- 
port of  General  Armstrong's  language,  or  the  reader 
who  will  carefully  peru'se  that  portion  of  his  letter 
which  we  have  taken  the  liberty  to  italicize  must  con- 
cur with  us  in  the  inference  that  it  was  written  with 
a  full  consciousness  of  the  unfavorable  impression  it 
would  create  upon  the  public  mind  against  the  com- 
manding geneial.  AVe  have  certainly  understood  it 
as  designed  to  convey  the  idea  that  General  Winder 
had  neither  judiciously  exercised  the  "full  authority" 
vested  in  him,  nor  skilfully  used  the  ample  means 
placed  under  his  control  by  the  War  Department. 
The  "total  of  16,300  men"  makes  a  formidable  and 
imposing  show  on  paper,  and  "the  public,"  to  whose 
siipreme  tribunal  this  letter  was  an  avowed  appeal,  be- 
ing gravely  informed  that  the  commanding  general 
had  fall  authority  to  call  out  this  adequate  force, 
could  hardly  avoid  the  inference  that  this  officer  had 


•1     : 


n 


I 


;r.. 


I 


is 


II! 


il. 
li 


I! ; 


'  S: 


102     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

failed  in  the  proper  execution  of  liis  duty.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  next  paragraph  the  writer  refers  to  the  offi- 
cial report  of  General  AA'inder  to  show  how  much  of 
this  force  had  Ibcen  assemhied,  and  the  reasons  why  a 
greater  portion  of  it  had  not  been  (/at  together.  But 
many  of  those  to  whom  (General  Armstrong's  letter 
was  addressed  had  probably  never  seen,  or  would  have 
an  opportunity  of  seeing  General  AVindcr's  official  re- 
port ;  and  the  singular  expression  which  he  uses  in  re- 
ferring to  the  causes  why  a  larger  number  of  troops 
'*  had  not  been  got  together''''  leads  directly  to  the  in- 
ference that  something  had  been  omitted  on  the  part 
of  somebody  vdiich  ouo;ht  not  to  have  been  r:nittcd: 
and  upon  whom  could  the  blame  of  this  omission  fall 
but  upon  the  commandhig  general?  And  tliis  infer- 
ence is  strengtlicncd  by  what  is  afterward  said,  name- 
ly, that  the  causes  were  "  altogether  extraneous  from 
the  government,  and  entirely  beyond  its  control.*'  By 
the  government  the  writer  must  of  course  have  meant 
the  War  Department,  wliicli  had  been,  or  ought  to 
have  been,  entirely  under  his  own  management,  and 
the  wisdom,  jn-udence,  and  forethought  of  which  he 
was  tlieu  particularly  defending. 

From  these  considerations,  little  as  we  nre  disposed 
to  countenance  the  liigh-wrouglit  excitement  which 
lost  all  sense  of  piopriely  and  justk-e  in  Its  assaults 
upon  the  integrity  o)'(  Jrneral  Armstrong,  we  are  com- 
]iellcfl  to  believe  tliat,  in  his  fiinons  letter  to  the  pub- 
lie,  he  Inteufled  ih.'t  some,  at  le.asl.  ol'  the  L'eneral  in- 
diirnatlon  shouhl  be  Iran.-tevri^d  tVom  liim.-elf  to  (ien- 
cral  Winder  for  netileet  or  inefiieienev  In  matters  in 
whicli  that  officer  was  certainly  not  justly  chargeable 
with  any  fault  whatever. 


n 


W    iWliWiW 


THE    GEORGETOWN    COMMITTEE. 


103 


I 
I 


Tliorc  is  one  remarkable  statement  in  this  letter 
^vhicll  wc  feci  it  to  be  our  duty  to  bring  more  partic- 
ularly to  the  notice  of  the  reader,  not  only  because  we 
liappen  to  know  that  it  was  utterly  unfounded,  but  be- 
cause, even  had  it  been  true,  it  was  not  a  matter  whicli 
it  became  General  .Vrmstrong  to  introduce  in  an  ap- 
peal to  tliG  public.  We  allude  to  the  information 
which  he  savs  he  received  from  a  source  entitled  to  his 
coniidence,  that  "a  connnittce  of  tlie  inhabitants  of 
Georgetown,  of  whom  Alexander  C.  Hanson,  editor  of 
the  Federal  Itepublican,  was  one,  had  waited  on  the 
President,  by  deputation,  and  had  obtained  from  him 
a  proniise  that  [he]  should  no  longer  direct  the  mili- 
tary defences  of  the  District.*'  AVhatever  may  have 
been  the  source  from  which  the  writer  of  the  letter  de- 
rived his  information,  we  take  it  upon  us  to  say  that 
it  Avas  untrue  in  every  part  of  it.  Xo  such  connnit- 
tce from  Georgetown,  witli  or  without  ]Mr.  Hanson, 
ever  waited  on  the  President  for  any  such  jmmose. 
Even  the  ^  I'dnrhint  belief"  which  General  Armstrong 
yielded  to  the  statement  shows  that  he  was  more  ready 
to  put  fiith  in  the  veracity  of  his  informant  than  to 
believe  the  positive  dcchu-ation  of  the  i'resident.  In- 
deed, it  shows  that  he  did  not  even  allow  him  credit 
for  the  connnon  share  of  astuteness  which  a  very  little 
experience  gives  to  every  politician.  This  v.'ill  be 
niai  '♦'"St  upon  tlic  sliglitest  review  of  the  conversation, 
as  detailed  by  General  Armstrong  himself,  between 
him  and  the  l*resid(>nt.  "On  the  cvcnimj  ^ii  i\\Q,  29th 
uhimo,  the  Presitlent  caJIed  at  my  loibjlmis^^''  says  the 
retired  secretary,  and  after  stating  the  "delicacy"'  of 
the  situalion  in  which  he  had  been  placed  by  the  ex- 


i 


ill 


' 


Hi. 


\>\, 


11 


:;  ' 

h 

1             i  i 

1  i 

1 

ill 

1 

I  ! 


r 


ii 


iitl 


104     INVASION   AND  CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

citement  existing  among  the  militia  of  the  District,  told 
liim  frankly  "that  (Ui  ojjicer  of  that  corps  had  given  him 
notice  that  they  would  no  longer  ohey,"  &c.,  &c.  No^r 
if  "  a  committee  of  the  inhabitants  of  Georgetown" 
had  waited  on  him  for  that  purpose,  vras  it  not  more 
reasonable  to  suppose  tliat  the  President  would  have 
mentioned  that  circumstance  as  alfording  him  a  much 
stronger  justiilcation  for  pressing  upon  his  secretary  a 
compliance  with  his  wishes  than  the  plain  fact  that 
he  had  been  moved  to  it  by  the  information  received 
from  a  single  individual,  "cm  officer?''  Surely  his 
visit  at  so  unseasuuable  an  hour,  at  a  boarding-house 
where  the  secretary  lodged,  and  the  very  remarkable 
collorpiy  Avhicli  he  there  held  with  him,  would  have 
seemed  less  anomalous  and  more  excusable  if  he  had 
been  impelled  to  it  by  the  representations  of  a  "  depu- 
tation'' from  a  neighboring  city  than  by  a  simple  no- 
tice given  to  him  by  "an  officer"  of  the  militia,  partic- 
ularly when  that  officer  was  not  their  commander.  It 
is  marvelous  that  this  consideration  did  not  suG:Q;est  to 
General  Armstrong  the  want  of  verisimilitude  in  the 
statement  afterward  made  to  him,  however  willlno-  he 
mi<''ht  have  been  to  discredit  the  word  of  the  chief 

O 

magistrate.  It  can  only  be  explained  on  the  sujiposi- 
tion  that  he  saw  at  once  how  readily  such  a  state- 
ment, whether  true  or  false,  could  be  turned  to  his  ad- 
vantage in  the  appeal  he  was  making  to  the  pubhe,  by 
divcrtino;  their  attention  in  some  measure  from  too  crit- 
ical  an  inquiry  into  his  own  conduct,  and  fixing  it 
upon  this  evidence  of  culpable  weakness  in  the  Presi- 
dent. But  he  was  no  tyro  in  the  art  of  addressing 
the  people. 


'^ 


■fc; 


y 


THE    GEORGETOWN    COMJIITTEE. 


105 


'^ 


■••(€ 
I..1 


I 


The  "  officer'  alkuled  to  by  ]\Ir.  ]\ladisoii  in  the  con- 
versation detailed  by  General  Armstrong  happened  to 
be  the  author  of  tliis  work.  Beinii;  at  the  time  the' 
brigade  major  and  inspector  of  the  mihtia  under  the 
command  of  Brigadier-general  Walter  Smith,  he  was 
sent  by  that  officer,  accompanied  by  his  aid-de-camp, 
T.  L.  M'Kenney,  to  communicate  verbally  to  the  Pres- 
ident the  fact  that  his  brigade  had  held  a  meeting,  at 
whicii  they  had  passed  a  formal  and  unanimous  reso- 
lution that  they  would  no  longer  serve  under  the  orders 
or  military  administration  of  General  Armstrong,  whom 
they  denounced  in  no  measured  terms  as  having  been 
the  willing  cause  of  the  destruction  of  the  City  of 
Washington.  However  ready  the  bearer  of  this  ex- 
traordinary verbal  message  to  the  President  was,  in 
the  excitement  and  mortification  of  the  moment,  to 
sympathize  with  his  fellow-soldiers  in  their  indignant 
denunciation  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  to  partici- 
pate fully  in  their  desire  to  have  him  dismissed,  the 
snows  of  forty  winters  since  that  time  have  cooled 
his  passions  and  sobered  his  judgment  in  the  matter. 
Whatever  else  it  has  been  or  may  become  his  duty  to 
say  of  the  conduct  of  General  Armstrong,  in  relation 
to  tlie  delencc  of  the  District  of  Columbia,  in  the 
course  of  these  pages,  justice  to  the  memory  of  a  Rev- 
olutionary soldier  demands  the  concession  that  his 
faults  were  not  such  as  to  justify  the  grave  charge  al- 
leged against  him.  Tiiat  he  had  no  sympathies  in 
connnon  with  the  people  of  the  District,  and  would 
liave  been  gla""  to  see  the  seat  of  government  removed, 
he  was  not  at  all  solicitous  to  conceal ;  but  tluit  he 
would  have  been  willing  to  tarnish  the  honor  of  his 

E2 


%\ 


m 


tfi.. 


H 


HI 


^^w 


) 


i!! 
!i| 

III 

iiii 


lOG     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

country,  and  disgrace  himself  by  a  deliberate  act  of 
treachery  to  accomplish  his  wishes  in  that  respect, 
there  is  notliing  on  record  sufficient  to  authorize  a  be- 
lief. It  has  already  been  shown,  and  occasions  will 
occur  in  the  progress  of  this  volume  still  farther  to 
show,  that  he  was  culpable,  either  as  the  official  organ 
of  another  or  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  blinded  judg- 
ment, of  many  errors  of  omission  and  commission  in 
preparing  for  the  defence  of  the  seat  of  government ; 
but  the  strong  influence  of  heated  passions,  the  mad- 
ness of  disappointed  hopes  no  longer  exists  as  an  ex- 
cuse for  attributing  them  to  intentional  design. 

The  verbal  information  just  spoken  of  was  commu- 
nicated to  the  President  on  the  morning  of  the  29th 
of  August,  and,  as  the  letter  of  General  Armstrong 
states,  it  was  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  that  he 
called  at  the  lodgings  of  that  gentleman,  and  held  with 
him  the  conversation  which  is  repeated  with  such  cir- 
cumstantial minuteness  in  General  Armstrong's  ajopeal 
to  the  public.  That  the  President  was  influenced  to. 
make  that  visit,  and  to  say  what  is  reported  to  have 
been  said  by  him,  by  the  information  received  from  the 
officer  mentioned,  would  be  hardly  credible,  were  it  not 
that  he  himself,  according  to  General  Armstrong,  as- 
signed it  as  his  motive  for  urging  his  temporary  retire- 
ment from  the  War  Department.  We  will  not  pre- 
tend to  decide  whetlicr  in  this  the  President  acted  with 
the  dignity  becoming  his  higli  station — whether  he  per- 
mitted his  fears  to  be  too  easily  wrought  upon  by  in- 
adequate causes,  or  whether  he  was  glad  to  seize  upon 
any  pretext  to  get  rid  of  a  member  of  his  cabinet  in 
whom  he  was  determined  no  longer  to  conflde ;  but 


t 


\ 


w 


THE    GEORGETOWN    COMMITTEE. 


107 


lY- 


m 
Lit 


I 


I 


we  do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  our  republic  lias  had 
presidents  from  whom  the  otficer  who  bore  such  a  ver- 
bal message  would  n-^t  have  obtained  such  prompt  sat- 
istaction  Ibi  his  constituents. 

The  law  of  self-defence  certainly  authorizes  a  resort 
both  to  weapons  and  arguments,  which,  under  ordinary 
circumstances,  would  be  looked  upon  as  unmanly  and 
unjustifiable.  In  addition  to  the  jJublic  exposure  of  a 
conversation  manifestly  intended  to  be  private.  Gen- 
eral Armstrong  introduces  the  nane  of  the  "editor  of 
the  Federal  llepublican"'  as  one  of  the  advisers  of  the 
President.  This  was  the  "  unkindest  cut  of  all ;"  for, 
unless  the  President  were  the  weakest,  the  most  for- 
giving of  human  beings,  that  "  editor"  was  one  of  the 
last  men  in  the  community  who  could  have  moved  him 
to  the  "  promise*"  of  dismissing  one  of  his  cabinet. 
The  "  editor"  was  also  a  member  of  Congress,  and  no 
man  knew  better  than  (General  Armstrong  that  he  nev- 
er lost  an  opportunity,  in  cither  capacity,  of  uttering 
the  severest  sarcasms  against  the  President  and  his 
cabinet.  Standing  as  they  did  toward  each  otlicr,  it 
was  quite  as  incredible  that  the  one  should  volunteer 
his  advice,  as  that  the  other  should  be  governed  by  it 
in  so  important  a  matter  as  that  which  the  letter  dis- 
closes. But  it  suited  the  purposes  of  tlie  writer  to  give 
a  "  reluctant  belief"  to  the  story ;  and  at  a  moment 
wheu  the  class  of  politicians  to  which  the  "  editor  of 
the  Federal  Republican''  belonged  was  in  so  small  a 
minority,  it  must  be  confessed  that  the  introduction  of 
his  name  in  such  a  connection  was  a  stroke  of  policy 
worthy  of  the  writer  of  the  Xewburgh  Addresses,  and 
admirably  devised  to  have  its  ctiect  upon  *'  the  public." 


i 


1 1 


108     INVASION    AND    CArTi;RE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


M  ' 


P 


:'    1 


t|1 


li  .' 


V 


%' 


Sill 


I       lii  < 


v\ 


I  I 


iiii 


k. 

I  Ml 

liii 
'iii 


It  would  naturally  lead  a  great  many  persons  to  believe 
that  the  ex-secrctarv  had  Ibeen  the  innocent  victim  of 
'•'•fedcraV  pevsecutloa^  acting  through  the  amiahle 
weakness  and  credulity  of  the  chief  magistrate ;  and 
such,  indeed,  to  a  considerable  extent,  was  the  impres- 
sion it  made.  Whatever  other  faults  "  tlie  public"' 
might  be  disposed  to  attribute  to  General  Armstrong, 
they  knew  tiiat  his  j^oUtlcs  were  those  of  a  staunch 
Republican — one  of  the  overwhelming  majority — while 
"  Alexander  C.  Hanson"  was  quite  as  well  known 
to  be  a  fiery,  fearless  leader  among  the  antipodes  of 
the  ruling  party — one  of  that  class  of  Federalists  so 
violent  in  their  opposition  to  the  war.  He  was  far- 
ther known  to  "the  public"  of  Balthnore  as  having 
been,  in  times  past,  prominently  connected  with  the  fa- 
mous "  Charles  Street  Garrison,"  wliicli  first  excited 
and  then  defied  the  great  mob  which  left  its  bloody 
impress  so  deeply  stamjjcd  upon  that  city,  as,  for  a 
time,  even  to  give  it  another  name.  It  may  be  readily 
imagined,  then,  that  if  there  was  one  of  that  stamp  of 
Federalists  who  bore  a  larger  share  than  another  of  tlic 
hatred  and  malediction  of  the  mass  of  the  dominant 
party,  it  was  this  same  "editor  of  the  Federal  Repub- 
lican." A  pretext  for  the  introduction  of  his  name, 
therefore,  into  an  appeal  to  the  people,  was  readily 
seized  by  General  Armstrong.  He  proved  how  well 
he  knew  "the  public"  to  whom  he  was  addressing 
himself,  when  he  added,  "  on  this  fact  all  comment  is 
unnecessary ;"  and  it  proved,  too,  how  little  he  cared 
upon  whom  his  Parthian  arrow,  thus  shot  as  he  re- 
treated, should  light. 

It  is  not  our  purpose  to  impugn  the  veracity  of  Gen- 


St 


THE    GEOKGETOWN    COMMITTEE. 


109 


1'^ 


|1- 


eral  Armstrong  himself  in  relation  to  this  matter ;  on 
the  contrary,  we  are  ready  to  admit  not  only  that  such 
a  statement  was  made  to  him,  hut  that  he  believed  it 
to  he  true.     But,  inasmuch  as  the  character  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States  was  at  stake  on  the 
question  of  its  truth  or  falsehood,  we  think  it  must  he 
conceded  that,  before  he  ventured  to  make  the  state- 
ment public,  he  owed  it  not  less  to  his  own  self-respect 
than  to  the  previous  relation  between  himself  and  the 
chief  magistrate  to  have  ascertained  the  truth  of  it. 
lie  must  have  been  conscious  that  when  he  published 
the  fact  of  his  belief  in  the  statement,  however  reluc- 
tantly he  admitted  that  belief,  the  public  would  take  it 
for  granted  that  he  had  lost  every  lingering  renniant 
of  respect  he  entertained,  or  professed  to  entertain,  for 
the  man  who  had  bestowed  his  office  upon  him,  and 
that  this  would  produce  an  impression  more  or  less  in- 
jurious to  the  reputation  of  the  highest  functionary  of 
the  government.     It  would  be  difficult  for  the  most 
charitable  reader  to  resist  the  conviction  that  such  was 
the  intention  of  the  retirin<2:  secretary'.     Before  we  close 
our  comments  upon  this  very  remarkable  piece  of  his- 
tory— and  v.'c  trust  that  the  intimate  bearing  of  it  upon 
the  subject  in  hand  will  plead  our  excuse  for  dwelling 
upon  it  so  long — we  think  it  worthy  of  note  that  ^he 
appeal  of  General  Armstrong  to  the  public,  containing 
the  unfortunate  statement  referred  to,  was  copied  into 
the  "  Federal  liepublican"  of  the  8th  of  Seiitember 
without  a  single  lemark.      Its  editor  did  not  say  a 
word  in  contradiction  of  the  story  that  he  had  been 
one  of  the  ''deputation''  from  Georgetown  avIio  waited 
upon  the  President  to  insist  on  his  dismissal  of  tlie 


^ 


110     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


§• 


II 


',''>; 


iDi 


Secretary  of  War.  What  his  reasons  were  for  remain- 
ing silent  as  to  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  a  statement 
which  he  could  not  but  have  known  would  operate 
greatly  to  the  discredit  of  the  President,  and  in  so  far 
give  the  advantage  to  the  retired  Secretary  of  War,  we 
can  not  so  much  as  form  a  rational  conjecture,  unless 
it  were  that  he  regarded  it  as  a  matter  of  perfect  indif- 
ference to  him  which  of  the  two  great  men  "  the  pub- 
lic" miglit  choose  to  condemn.  The  columns  of  his 
paper  bear  witness  that  lie  held  them  both  in  contempt, 
if  such  a  sentiment  can  be  compatible  with  the  bitter- 
ness of  vituperation  which  he  continued  to  pour  out 
against  each  as  they  came  respectively  under  his  no- 
tice ;  and  if  the  result  of  the  statement  should  be  the 
public  reprobation  of  cither,  it  would  be  so  far  a  tri- 
umph to  his  own  influence.  The  National  Intelli- 
gencer, however,  the  official  paper  of  the  administra- 
tion, did  not  suffer  the  extraordinary  tale  to  pass  very 
long  without  contradiction.  On  the  13th  of  Septem- 
ber there  appeared  in  that  journal  the  following  short 
editorial  paragraph  :  "  3Iany  of  our  readers  will  be 
pleased  to  learn  that  General  Armstrong  was  misin- 
formed as  to  the  fact  that  '  Alexander  C.  Hanson,  ed- 
itor of  the  Federal  Republican,'  was  one  of  the  depu- 
tation which  he  states  to  have  waited  on  the  President 
of  the  United  States  from  Georgetown  on  the  morning 
of  the  29th  ultimo,  and,  indeed,  as  to  the  fact  that  any 
deputation  waited  on  the  J^resident  fro7)i  Georgetow7i 
on  that  occasion."  This  contradiction  the  editors,  no 
doubt,  received  from  the  lips  of  the  President  himself, 
with  whom  one  of  them  had  long  been  on  terms  of 
close  intimacy,  and  it  serves  to  confirm  what  has  been 


f 


n 


i      s 


THE   GEORGETOWN    COMMITTEE. 


Ill 


ah-eaJj  said  as  to  the  part  which  General  Smith's  bri- 
gade-major and  inspector  had  in  the  aflair.  The  words 
'■'-from  Georgetown'''  being  italicized,  as  we  have  given 
them,  in  the  National  Intelligencer,  would  seem  to  just- 
ity  the  hiference  that  a  deputation  did  in  reality  wait 
upon  the  President  from  some  other  place.  But  such 
an  occurrence  could  hardly  have  been  managed  with 
so  much  secrecy  as  to  keep  it  from  the  knowledge  of 
the  citizens  of  either  of  the  two  cities  ;  and  as  we  nev- 
er heard  of  such  a  deputation,  we  take  it  for  granted 
that  the  words  italicized  were  not  intended  to  lead  to 
that  inference.  General  Armstrong's  own  account  of 
the  conversation  held  between  the  President  and  him- 
self shows  that  the  former  urged  the  expediency  of  the 
secretary's  retirino;  for  a  time  from  the  duties  of  the 
War  Department  solely  upon  the  ground  of  the  infor- 
mation communicated  to  him  by  an  officer  of  the  mi- 
litia. This  paragraph  in  the  National  Intelligencer 
was  also  left  without  notice  of  any  kind  bv  t^e  person 
to  whom  it  referred. 


I 

I 


i 


w   ■ 


!!.     ! 


^i!l: 


iiil-: 


K 


'I, 


'I.      I 


112     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTER  YII. 

Mr.  Madison's  private  Opinion  of  the  Conduct  of  the  Secretary  of 

AViir. 


w 


the   subject  of  this  chapte 


th 


enter  ujjc 
some  reluctance,  m  tne  nrst  place,  the  ajoprehension 
that  our  readers  may  charge  us  with  a  deliberate  at- 
tempt to  test  the  extent  of  their  patience  by  continuing 
to  keep  before  them  a  subject  upon  which  so  much  has 
already  been  said,  and,  in  the  second  place,  an  indis- 
position to  accumulate  imputations  upon  the  memory 
of  one  who  can  no  longer  hear  or  rebut  them,  had,  by 
their  joint  influence,  almost  determined  us  at  one  time 
to  strike  out  the  last  chapter  altogether,  that  it  might 
not  impose  on  us  the  necessity  of  following  it  up  by 
such  an  exhibition  as  we  are  now  to  make.  We  be- 
lieved we  had  done  with  General  Armstrong's  letter 
to  the  Baltimore  Patriot ;  but,  after  we  had  written  our 
last  comments  upon  it,  we  became  aware,  for  the  first 
time,  by  mere  accident,  that  among  the  unpublished 
papers  of  Mr.  Madison,  in  the  possession  of  an  old 
friend,  there  was  a  memorandum  made  by  him  (JMr. 
Madison)  at  the  time  of  the  conversation  which  he  held 
with  the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  occasion  of  his  vis- 
iting him  at  his  lodgings  on  the  evening  of  the  29th 
of  August.  We  believed  it  to  be  our  duty  immediate- 
ly to  seek  permission  to  see  these  papers,  and,  if  pos- 
sible, to  obtain  a  copy  of  them  for  insertion  in  this 
history.     The  former  was  granted  to  us  without  he^i- 


I 


MR.  Madison's  statement 


113 


lesi- 


tation,Lut  the  permission  to  copy  them  ui  eMenso  was 
politely  but  peremptorily  declined,  with  the  kind  salvo, 
however,  that  wo  miglit  read  thcni  as  often  as  we 
pleased,  and  make  such  memoranda  from  them  as  might 
serve  to  impress  their  contents  upon  our  memory.  Wc 
were  entirely  satisfied  with  the  reasons  assigned  by 
our  friend  for  thus  limiting  the  permission  given,  and 
set  about  immediately  to  make  the  best  use  wc  could 
of  repeated  visits  to  the  precious  3ISS.  AVc  found  in 
them  much  to  elucidate  what  we  had  otherwise  been 
unable  to  comprehend  or  to  reconcile  with  the  rela- 
tions which  ouo-ht  to  have  subsisted  between  the  Pres- 
ident  and  his  secretary,  and  we  were  gratified  to  find 
in  them  full  confirmation  of  what  we  had  already  said 
as  to  the  state  of  those  relations  at  the  time  of  the 
cabinet  meeting  on  the  1st  of  July.  It  is  due  to  the 
memory  of  ]Mr.  Madison  that  his  version  of  tlie  inter- 
view with  General  Armstrong  should  be  known  as 
well  as  that  of  the  latter ;  and  we  feel  such  confidence 
in  our  recollection  of  the  memorandum,  that  we  have 
no  hesitation  in  pledging  ourselves  to  the  correctness 
of  the  compend  we  now  give ;  not  that  we  pretend  to 
remember  in  every  case  the  precise  language  of  ]\Ir. 
Madison,  but  that  we  adhere  accurately  to  the  sub- 
stance, the  meaning  as  he  intended  to  be  understood. 

There  is  little  or  no  difference  between  the  state- 
ments of  ]\Ir.  Madison  and  General  Armstrong  as  lo 
the  introductory  portion  of  the  conversation,  except 
that  the  President  mentioned  the  name  of  ]\[r.  ]\lonroe 
(who  had  performed  the  duties  of  Secretary  of  War 
during  the  temporary  absence  of  General  Armstrong), 
and  contrasted  the  alacrity  with  which  the  militia  offi- 


;    3 


114     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


!   !    i 


r'Hi 


m 


! 


1 1 1 


ccrs  had  obeyed  all  liis  suggestions  witli  the  spirit  of 
resistance  -which  liad  been  nianitcsted  bj  them  since 
the  return  of  (jleneral  Armstrong.  It  will  be  recollect- 
ed by  some  of  our  readers  that  the  latter  had  been  for 
some  days  at  Fredericktown,  the  appointed  place  of 
rendezvous  for  tlic  executive  oflicers  in  the  event  of 
the  occupation  of  the  city  by  the  enemy,  from  which 
place  he  liad  just  returned  a  few  hours  before  the  in- 
terview. It  was  probably  this  mention  of  3Ir.  3Ionroe, 
as  so  acceptable  to  the  militia,  which  excited  General 
Armstrong  to  use  the  harsh  terms  he  did  in  speaking 
of  the  citizens  of  the  District — terms,  however,  which 
it  does  not  appear  that  he  used  before  Mr.  ]\Iadison, 
but  only  in  his  letter  to  the  public.  His  reply  to  the 
President's  allusion  to  the  excitement  aji'ainst  them 
both,  was  dignified  and  manly.  He  acknowledged  that 
lie  was  fully  aware  of  the  bitter  feelings  against  him- 
self, but  he  knew  them  to  be  founded  on  the  most  pal- 
pable falsehoods,  and  limited  to  the  cities  of  Washing- 
ton and  Georgetown  ;  that  he  was  willing  to  give  up 
his  appointment  by  immediate  resignation,  or  to  retire 
from  the  scene  by  making  a  visit  to  his  family  in  the 
State  of  New  York.  To  this  the  President  responded 
that  a  resignation  under  such  circumstances  was  by  no 
means  desirable,  as  it  might  receive  constructions 
which  would  not  be  agreeable  either  in  a  public  or 
private  view ;  that  a  temporary  retirement,  as  he  sug- 
gested, tliough  equally  subject,  in  some  respects,  to 
unpleasant  comments,  was,  upon  the  whole,  less  ob- 
jectionable than  resignation,  and  would  be  a  relief 
from  existing  embarrassments,  without  precluding  any 
future  course  which  miirht  be  thouii'Iit  best.     General 


p 


MR.  MADISON  S   STATEMENT. 


115 


ArmstroTT^  repented  that  tlic  charges  against  him  "svcrc 
groundless,  and  limited  in  the  excitement  they  had 
})roduced,  and  atlirmed  th.at  liis  conduct  in  rehition  to 
the  defence  of  the  eity  had  proved  that  tlierc  had  been 
no  deliciciicy  on  his  part.  The  President  said  he 
knew  that  some  of  the  particuhir  charges  brought 
against  him  were  destitute  of  foundation,  and  that,  so 
far  as  the  discontents  were  produced  by  them,  they 
would,  of  course,  be  limited,  both  as  to  time  and  space  ; 
that  he  suspected  that  the  discontents  sprung,  in  a 
great  measure,  from  a  rooted  belief  that  he  had  not 
taken  a  sutHcicnt  interest  in  the  defence  of  the  city, 
nor  promoted  the  measures  for  it ;  and  that,  consider- 
ing the  heavy  calamity  that  had  fallen  on  the  place 
and  its  inhabitants,  it  was  natural  that  strong  feelings 
should  be  excited  on  the  spot ;  and,  as  the  place  was 
the  capital  of  the  nation,  the  same  feeling  would  ex- 
ist every  where  ;  and  he  added  that  it  would  not  be 
easy  to  satisfy  the  nation  that  the  event  was  without 
blame  somewhere,  and  he  could  not,  in  candor,  say  that 
all  had  been  done  that  ouu'ht  to  liave  been  done,  and 
at  the  2)roper  time.  The  secretary  again  returned  to 
an  exculpation  of  himself,  and  remarked  that  he  had 
omitted  no  preparations  whatever  for  the  safety  of  tlic 
city  which  had  h^en  enjoined  on  him.  To  this  the 
President  replied  that,  regarding  their  conversation 
as  a  frank  one,  he  could  not  admit  the  latter  justifica- 
tion;  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
not  only  to  crceffie  jdans  enjoined  on  hhn,  and  orders 
conwiittal  to  hiin,  but  to  deAi;~e  and  prej)are  such  as 
would,  in  !;l3  own  opinion,  be  necessary  and  proper; 
that  tliio  was  an  obvious  and  essential  part   of  his 


i 


\  ^ 


1     ' 

■•■I]! 


tl 
I 


I'll 

ii 


(I 


■    I 


III 


'"I..-! 


•ii;. 


116     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

cliarge,  and  that,  in  what  rehited  to  military  plans  and 
proceedings  elsewhere,  he  had  never  been  backward  or 
scrupulous  in  taking  such  a  course  ;  that  he  must  well 
know  that  he  had,  on  some  occasions,  taken  a  latitude 
in  this  respect  not  at  all  satisfactory.  The  President 
added  that  it  was  due  to  truth  and  to  himself  to  say, 
that  he — the  Secretary  of  AVar — had  never  appeared 
to  enter  into  a  just  view  either  of  the  danger  to  be  ap- 
prehended to  the  city,  or  of  the  consequences  of  its 
falling  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy ;  that  he  had  nev- 
er proposed  or  suggested  a  single  precaution  or  ar- 
rangement for  its  safety,  every  thing  done  on  that  sub- 
ject having  been  brought  forward  by  the  President ; 
and  that  the  apparent  difference  of  their  views  on  that 
subject  had  led  him — the  President — to  reduce  his  ar- 
ran2:ements  to  the  minimum,  in  order  to  obtrude  the 
less  on  a  reluctant  execution.  The  President  also  re- 
minded him  that  he  had  even  fallen  short  of  the  prep- 
arations decided  on  in  the  cabinet,  particularly  in  not 
having  arms  and  equipments  brought  to  convenient 
depots,  some  of  the  militia,  when  called  for  the  defence, 
being  obliged,  before  they  could  obey  the  call,  to  pro- 
cure those  indispensable  appurtenances  of  a  soldier 
from  Harper's  Ferry.  In  conclusion,  the  President  re- 
marked— as  if  willing  to  show  that  his  visit  had  not 
been  made  in  a  spirit  of  unkindness — that  it  was  not 
agreeable  to  speak  as  he  had  spoken,  nor  would  he 
have  done  so  on  any  less  urgent  occasion  ;  that  he  had 
selected  (Jeneral  .Vrmstrong  for  the  office  from  a  respect 
for  his  talents,  and  a  conlidencc  that  he  would  exert 
them  for  the  public  good :  that  he  had  always  treated 
him  with  friendship  and  conlidcnce ;  and  that,  as  his 


I: 


I 


GENERAL    ARMSTRONG. 


117 


3xcrt 
atorl 
his 


puLlic  career  would  in  a  little  while  be  closed,  his  great 
wish,  next  to  leaving  his  country  in  a  state  of  peace 
and  prosi^erity,  was,  that  he  might  be  able  to  preserve 
harmony  and  avoid  changes  in  his  political  family ; 
and  that,  as  the  secretary  well  knew,  he  had  for  that 
reason  acquiesced  in  many  things  to  which  no  other 
consideration  could  have  reconciled  him. 

The  reader  will  probably  recollect  the  opinions  and 
suggestions  said  by  General  Armstrong,  in  his  letter 
to  the  cliairman  of  the  committee  of  investigation,  to 
have  been  offered  by  him  in  reply  to  questions  sub- 
mitted by  the  President  to  the  heads  of  departments 
at  this  convocation  of  the  1st  of  July.  He  may  also 
recollect  that  no  other  member  of  the  cabinet,  all  of 
whom  had  been  called  upon  to  answer  the  same  inqui- 
ries of  the  conmiittcc,  had  in  his  statement  mentioned, 
or  even  made  the  sliditest  allusion  to  the  fact,  that  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  offered  any  opinions  or  sugges- 
tions whatever  to  the  meeting ;  that  not  one  of  them 
spoke  of  the  two  questions  put  by  the  President,  and 
to  whicli  General  Armstrong  said  he  replied.  This 
silence  of  all  General  Armstron2:'s  collea2;ues  as  to  his 
having  offered  any  opinions  or  made  any  suggestions 
on  the  subject  they  were  called  to  discuss  might  jus- 
tify a  surmise  tliat  he  had  probably  mistaken  his  con- 
sciousness of  what  he  ougiit  to  have  said  for  what  he 
actually  did  say.  ]\Ir.  ]\Ionroe,  jMr.  Jones,  and  IMr. 
Rush  all  limit  his  share  in  the  discussion  at  tliat  meet- 
ing to  a  bare  statement  of  the  forces  that  might  most 
readily  be  brought  together.  This  important  memo- 
randum of  Mr.  ^Madison,  the  substance  of  whicli,  at 
least,  wc  arc  coniidcnt  lias  been  correctly  given,  would 


I 


118     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

not  only  confirm  such  a  surmise,  iufcrved  from  their 
silence,  but  it  seems  directly  and  positively  to  contra- 
dict every  material  statement  made  by  General  Arm- 
strong, not  only  in  his  letk'r  to  the  eonnnittce,  but  in 
his  previous  attempt  to  exculpate  liiniself  before  the 
public.  It  is  here  asserted  by  Mr.  Mailisou  not  only 
that  he  ofUrcd  no  opinions  at  tiial  niceLnq'  <;f  lliC  c:,b 
inet,  but  that  he  had  never,  on  any  occasion.  p;-oj  o- -d 
or  sua'ii'e.stcd  a  sinsj-'e  ])!TC;;nii()n  ov  ar)-;niL!en!ent  foi 
the  safety  of  the  city,  and  that  he  liad  even  f.iii  it 
short  of  the  ])rcpar.itions  decided  on  In  the  ciib  n  ^. 
General  Armstrong,  on  the  contrary,  after  repealing  to 
the  committee  the  statements  and  opinions  which  he 
tells  them  were  offered  in  reply  to  the  President's 
(piestions,  makes  the  farther  assertion  that,  "■  confonn- 
abhj  to  these  02)inions,  an  order  was  taken  to  assemble 
a  corps  and  form  a  camp  at  such  point  between  the 
City  of  AVashington  and  Baltimore  as  might  be  se- 
lected by  the  commanding  general." 

AVc  shall  not  undertake  to  decide  which  of  these 
discordant  statements  is  most  worthy  of  credit.  That 
of  General  Armstrong,  it  is  true,  stands  alone,  unsup- 
ported by  a  single  corroborative  fact,  w'hile  that  of 
Mr.  ]\Iadison  is  indirectly  confirmed  by  the  silence  of 
all  the  members  of  his  cabinet  whose  letters  arc  men- 
tioned in  tlic  report  of  the  Congressional  eonnnittce. 
Yet  it  is  an  extravagant  supposition  that  General  Arm- 
strong would,  within  so  short  a  time  after  the  meeting 
of  the  cabinet  referred  to,  address  a  false  statement  to 
a  committee  of  Congress,  the  falsity  of  which  could  not 
fail  to  be  observed,  if  not  exposed,  by  his  former  col- 
leagues. 


MR.  MADISON    AND   GENERAL  ARMSTRONG.       119 


jting 

lit  to 
not 
I  col- 


There  is  another  portion  of  !Mr.  ^laclison's  statement 
which,  were  it  not  that  all  his  luipublislicd  papers  will 
sooner  or  kter  be  incorporated  with  the  history  of  his 
times,  we  should  certainly  refrain  from  speaking  of 
here  ;  but  it  belongs  essentially  to  the  subject  of  Gen- 
eral Armstrong's  fitness  for  the  post  he  occupied,  and 
seems  necessary  to  the  rightful  understanding  of  what 
we  had  attributed  to  the  weak  and  vacillating  policy 
of  3lr.  Madison  in  all  that  concerned  the  preparations 
for  the  defence  of  the  scat  of  u'overnnient.  Those  wlio 
are  at  all  acquainted  with  the  history  of  the  period  of 
which  we  are  now  speaking  can  not  but  Ivnow  tiiat  the 
apjiointment  of  General  ^irmstrong  to  the  War  De- 
partment occasioned  no  little  surprise.  Ilis  peculiar 
temper  and  turn  of  mind  were  supposed  to  be  entirely 
uncongenial  with  the  oflicial  and  confidential  relations 
in  which  he  must  necessarily  stand  with  the  President. 
He  was  known  to  be  cold  and  repulsive  in  his  manners, 
pertinacious  and  opinionated  ;  while  Mr.  ^Madison  pos- 
sessed a  suavity  of  temper,  a  courteous  amenity  of  de- 
portment, which  could  not  but  stand  in  disiigreeable 
contrast  with  the  impcriouG  temperament  of  a  subor- 
dinate older  thai,  himself.  If  at  any  time  a  difference 
of  opinion  should  arise  between  them  on  a  question  of 
grave  interest,  it  was  feared  that  the  President  would 
be  the  first  to  yield.  Such  objections  prevailed  to  so 
great  an  extent,  that  when  the  nomination  of  General 
Armstrong  was  sent  to  the  Senate  it  was  confirmed 
onb'  by  a  bare  majority.  The  President  was  fully 
aware  of  the  character  of  the  individual  and  of  the  ob- 
jections against  him  when  he  made  the  ajipointment ; 
but  after  the  resignation  of  Mr.  Eustis,  strange  as  it 


120     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


n 


K'  i 


U    I 


may  seem  in  these  altered  times,  when  office  is  so  ea- 
gerly sought  alter,  he  experienced  great  difficulty  in 
finding  any  one  willing  to  accxjpt.  Several  citizens, 
who  would  liave  been  eminently  acceptable  to  the  pub- 
lic and  to  the  army,  had  successively  declined  it,  and 
the  high  post  of  Secretary  of  War  was  literally  "  going 
a  begging."'  In  this  extraordinary  dilemma,  some 
friends  whom  the  President  highly  esteemed,  and  in 
whose  judgment  he  had  great  reliance,  urged  upon  him 
the  appointment  of  General  Armstrong.  Knowing  that 
lie  possessed  talents  fully  adequate  to  the  station,  and 
believing  tliat  his  military  knowledge  and  experience 
might  be  rendered  eminently  useful,  by  a  conciliatory 
confidence  and  tlie  judicious  interposition  of  a  control- 
ling power  on  his  own  part,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  sac- 
rifice his  own  objections  to  the  strong  recommenda- 
tions of  his  friends.  lie  was  probably  somewhat  in- 
fluenced, too,  by  tlie  hope  tliat  the  peculiarities  of 
temper  ascribed  to  the  individual  would  meet  with 
nothing  to  call  them  forth  in  the  new  associations  by 
whicli  he  would  be  surrounded,  and  that  his  own  love 
of  quiet  and  harmony  would  be  reflected  in  the  con- 
duct and  deportment  of  those  whom  he  distinguished 
by  selecting  them  as  his  daily  companions  and  coun- 
selors. 

It  may  be  admitted  that  tliese  considerations  were 
sufficient  to  justify  the  President  in  the  appointment 
of  General  Armstrong  to  the  AVar  Department,  but  we 
have  seen  from  liis  notes  of  the  memorable  interview 
just  recorded  that  his  generous  anticipations  and  liopes 
were  sadly  disappointed.  ( Jencral  Armstrong  had  been 
but  a  short  time  at  the  head  of  the  Department  of 


Mli.  MADlfeON    AND    GENERAL   ARMSTKONG.       121 


War  before  he  began  to  think,  as  it  appears,  that  he 
was  phiccd  there  to  command  and  control  by  his  own 
monocratic  will  rather  than  to  suggest  or  execute  un- 
der tlie  higher  power  of  another,     lie  soon  took  the 
liberty  of  acting  not  only  without  consultation  witli 
his  chief,  but  in  direct  opposition  to  his  expressed  will. 
It  is  not  every  one  who  would  excuse  the  President's 
forbearance  in  this  instance,  or  admit  the  force  of  his 
reasons  for  it.     If  the  disappointments  he  was  doomed 
to  experience  in  his  relation  with  the  Secretary  of  War 
had  concerned  himself  alone,  the  patience  he  evinced 
under  them  miglit  be  admired  as  the  commendable  ex- 
ercise of  a  Christian  virtue  ;  but,  unfortunately,  more 
important  considerations  than  those  that  touched  tlie 
personal  feelings  of  the  President  were  involved  in  the 
proper  or  improper  discharge  of  the  functions  of  the 
officer  at  the  head  of  the  War  Department.     That  the 
country  was  at  war,  so  far  from  its  being  a  satisfacto- 
ry reason  for  bearing  with  the  freaks  of  temper  which 
certainly  unfitted  the  incumbent  of  that  department 
for  the  prompt  and  efficient  discharge  of  his  duties, 
rather  than  encounter  again  the  difficulty  of  finding 
one  willing  and  qualified  to  take  it,  might  have  been 
regarded  by  others  than  the  President  as  a  circum- 
stance beyond  all  others  rendering  the  dismissal  nec- 
essary. 

From  the  time  at  which  the  President  was  made 
aware  of  the  state  of  aftairs  in  Europe — which,  from  a 
letter  found  among  his  papers,  we  are  enabled  to  state 
was  on  the  20th  of  ^lay,  while  at  his  country-seat  in 
Virginia — to  the  middle  of  July,  he  had  abundant  op- 
portunities of  knowing  that  the  Secretary  of  War  did 

F 


f 


I 


Jil 

I 


1 1*  Hi 

ill  SI 


% 


S.  'i 


t 


122     INVASION   AND    CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

not  participate  in  his  own  apprehensions  that  the  seat 
of  government  woukl  become  a  favorite  object  of  enter- 
prise to  the  enemy,  and  that  he,  in  truth,  treated  all 
the  suggestions  made  to  him  of  the  necessity  of  prep- 
arations for  defence  with  indiftercnce,  if  not  contempt- 
uous nea'lect.  That  the  President  was  sincere  in  these 
appreliensions  was  certainly  not  doubted  by  any  other 
member  of  his  cabinet,  for  they  all  testify  to  his  re- 
peated, and  urgent,  and  anxious  expressions  of  solici- 
tude, and  of  his  opinion  that  immediate  preparations 
ouQ-ht  to  be  made.  When  he  found  that  the  Secreta- 
ry  of  AYar  took  no  notice  of  his  hints  and  suggestions, 
and  that  even  after  the  cabinet  meeting  he  did  not  at- 
tempt to  carry  into  effect  the  decision  to  which  they 
had  come  until  peremptorily  ordered  to  do  so,  duty  to 
the  country  would  seem  to  have  required  him,  no  mat- 
ter what  personal  or  private  considerations  interposed 
objections  to  the  course,  to  have  made  the  change  in 
the  War  Department  so  evidently  demanded  by  his 
own  statements  of  the  case. 

It  will  not  be  thought,  we  trust,  that  we  are  dwell- 
ing too  long  or  too  minutely  on  the  antecedents  of  this 
i  xglorious  day.  In  all  preparatory  measures,  in  the 
provision  of  means  for  defence,  as  well  as  in  the  sub- 
sequent appliance  of  those  means,  it  behooves  to  seek 
for  the  causes  of  that  discomfiture.  From  the  result 
of  our  examination  of  the  official  records  and  reports, 
aided  b}  our  own  personal  knowledge  and  recollection 
of  the  state  of  things  at  tlic  period  of  which  we  are 
speaking,  we  have  l^een  forced  to  the  conclusion,  as 
the  reader  will  have  seen,  that  there  was  unrenr,ona- 
ble  delay  in  the  preparation  of  the  means  of  uol'cnce, 


k 


> 


I'ii""' 


RECAPITULATION. 


123 


Is 
le 

h 

It 


r 


u 


that  the  means  provided  were  inadequate,  and  that 
the  oruanizatiou  and  arrangements  of  the  forces  called 
into  service  v/ere  made  without,  and  in  some  instan- 
ces against,  the  advice  and  concurrence  of  the  com- 
manding general.  These  were  faults  which  no  histo- 
rian could  honestly  overlook,  and  the  only  question 
for  him  to  decide  was,  To  whom  were  they  to  he  as- 
cribed ?  Tlie  answer  could  not  he  fairly  given  with- 
out implicating  some  portion  of  the  executive  depart- 
ment of  the  government.  It  may  he  thought  by  many 
persons,  perhaps,  that  only  one  individual  of  that  de- 
partment could  be  held  officially  responsible  for  the 
unfortunate  consequences  of  these  faults.  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  according  to  the  opinion 
of  most  persons,  to  have  devised,  proposed,  and  recom- 
mended such  measures  of  preparation  as  his  presumed 
knowledge  and  experience  in  military  affairs  might 
suggest  to  his  mind  as  most  expedient  and  proper. 
This  is  undoubtedly  true  as  for  as  it  goes ;  but  if  his 
knowledge  and  experience  taught  him  to  believe  that 
there  was  no  danger  of  invasion,  and  therefore  no  ne- 
cessity for  preparation  against  it,  or  if,  for  any  other 
reason,  he  neglected  to  perform  the  duty  appertaining 
to  the  head  of  the  War  Department,  are  we  to  seek  no 
further  for  respon  Ibility  in  a  matter  in  which  the  whole 
nation  was  interested  ? 


p  'If 


1-- 


124     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

Landing  of  tlie  British  Troops  at  Benedict. — Uncertainty  as  to  their 
Destination. — Nature  and  Amount  of  the  American  Force. — Plan 
of  Operations  dictated  to  the  Commanding  General. 

The  predatory  warfare  carried  on  Ly  the  British 
during  the  years  1813  and  1814  on  the  shores  of  the 
Chesapeake  was  somewhat  in  contrast  with  the  "war 
of  the  Titans"  which  they  were  waging  at  the  same 
time  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  AYhile,  in  Eu- 
rope, military  operations  were  conducted  on  a  gigantic 
scale,  and  grand  armies  were  disputing  the  possession 
of  principalities,  kingdoms,  and  empires,  in  our  humble 
portion  of  the  glohe  the  armed  hosts  of  his  Britannic 
majesty  were  employed  in  robbing  hen-roosts  and  pig- 
styes.  Their  military  skill,  valor,  and  enterprise  were 
signalized  in  such  exploits  as  plundering  and  burning 
farm-houses ;  robbing  defenceless  men,  women,  and 
children  of  the  clothing  on  their  backs ;  in  breaking 
open  family  vaults,  searching  for  jewelry,  and  making 
prizes  of  fresh  winding-sheets  ;  carousing  in  churches ; 
stripping  old  men  naked,  pricking  them  with  bayonets, 
and  slapping  their  faces  in  sport ;  and,  in  order  to  in- 
spire horror  and  hatred,  as  well  as  contempt  and  de- 
testation, violating  females  in  the  presence  of  their  fa- 
thers and  husbands.* 

*  For  the  evidence  and  details  of  these  outrages,  see,  in  American 
State  rajjcrs,  Military  Attairs,  vol.  i..  j).  339-382,  the  report  made  to 
Congress,  July  31,  1813,  on  the  '*  ^>i)irit  and  Manner  in  which  the 


mm 


ts 


yi.il 


EKAR   ADMIRAL   COCKBURN. 


125 


1*71 


The  presiding  genius  of  tliis  species  of  warfare, 
which  would  have  disgraced  banditti,  and  which  sav- 
ao-es  would  have  recoiled  from,  wiis  U  ii  Admujal  Sir 
George  Cockburn  ;  and  he  appears  to  have  exer- 
cised his  vocation  eon  a?non\  with  a  za  1  and  energy 
which  showed  that  he  derived  amusement  as  well  as 
profit  from  his  labors,  and  that  he  even  enjoyed  the  in- 
famous notoriety  which  he  speedily  acquired  in  all  the 
country  washed  by  the  waters  of  the  Chesapeake.  Cer- 
tainly, in  this  line  of  business,  no  man  could  have  been 
a  more  valuable  and  faithful  servant  to  his  govern- 
ment, which  proved  its  sagacity  in  the  selection  of  him 
as  much  as  it  did  subsequently  in  the  choice  of  Sir 
Hudson  Lowe  as  a  jailer  for  Napoleon.*     Cockburn 

WiU-  is  wa.Lrcd  hy  the  Enemy."  Sec,  also,  Xiles's  Register,  vol.  vii., 
/tasshn. 

*  Coi'kbuni  was  selected  to  convey  Napoleon  to  St.  Helena,  n  duty 
wliicli  he  discharoied  with  tolerable  decencv,  not  insultin'j;  the  illus- 
trious  captive  more  than  once  or  twice  during  tlie  passage.  On  one 
occasion  he  sarcastically  remarked,  in  Napoleon's  presence,  that  the 
latter  had  not  "read  Chesterfield;"  from  which  it  would  seem  that 
Cockburn  regarded  Idnisclt'  as  a  disciple  of  that  philosoplicr.  NajK)- 
leon,  however,  after  he  had  had  the  oi)j)ortunity  to  contrast  Cock1)urn 
with  Sir  Hudson  Lowe,  spoke  favorably  of  the  admiral,  and  said  of 
him  to  O'Meara,  "  lie  is  not  a  man  of  a  bad  heart ;  on  the  contran,-, 
I  believe  him  to  be  capalde  of  a  generous  action ;  but  he  is  rough, 
overbearing,  vain,  choleric,  and  capricious  ;  never  consulting  any 
body  ;  jealous  of  his  authority  ;  caring  little  of  the  manner  in  which 
he  exercises  it,  and  sometimes  violent  without  dignity."  On  anoth- 
er occasion,  comparing  Cockburn  with  Lowe,  he  said,  "Cockburn  was 
at  least  straightforward  and  sincere.  He  was  a  man — an  English- 
man ;  but,  my  God  I  as  for  this  man  (Lowe),  nature  intended  him 
for  a  bad  hangman." 

It  seems,  according  to  O'Meara,  that  Cockburn,  on  visiting  Paris 
after  his  return  from  St.  Helena,  expressed  there  a  poor  opinion  of 
Na])olcon's  abilities,  and  said  that,  "on  the  score  of  talent,  he  was 
nn  ordinary  character ;"  which  being  repeated  by  O'Meara  to  Napo- 


4 

I 


126     INVASION   AND   CAPTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


I  I 


I     I 


possessed  a  fertile  and  inventive  genius,  indeiatigaLle 
energy,  a  daring  spirit  of  enterprise,  with  the  least  pos- 
sible modicum  of  decency  or  humanity ;  and  it  appears 
that,  like  other  distinguished  characters  who  have  been 
famous  for  house-breaking  and  highway  robbery,  he 
had  a  peculiar  talent  for  disguising  his  person.  He  is 
known  to  have  resided  some  time  in  Washington  pre- 
vious to  the  projected  attack  upon  the  city,  and  after 
its  capture  he  called  upon  his  landlady,  a  respectable 
widow,  with  whom  he  had  boarded,  and  found  some 
difficulty  in  persuading  her  of  his  identity,  so  complete 
had  been  the  disguise.  From  his  own  personal  ob- 
servation, and  from  information  communicated  by  spies, 
he  obtained  a  minute  and  accurate  knowledge  of  ihe 
topography  of  the  surrounding  country,  the  state  of  the 
defences  and  public  resources,  aiid  the  characters  of 
public  men. 

It  was  not  fully  known  until  after  the  battle  of  Bla- 
densburgh  that  the  mode  of  warfare  in  which  Cockburn 
took  so  much  delight  had  received  the  ;^anction  of  the 
British  government.  But  on  the  18th  of  August,  1814, 
after  tlie  arrival  of  Vice  Admiral  Cochrane  in  the  Patux- 
ent,  he  addressed  a  communication  to  ]\Ir.  ]Monroe,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  in  which  he  announced  that,  in  re- 
taliation for  the  "wanton  destruction''  committed  by 
the  American  army  in  Upper  Canada,  and  in  order  to 
compel  reparation  for  it,  he  had  been  ordered  "  to  de- 
stroy and  lay  waste  such  towns  and  districts  upon  the 
coast"  as  might  be  found  assailable. 

The  delivery  of  this  comnumication  was  delayed  un- 

Icoii,  the  latter  quietly  remarked  that  the  0])inion  "  ])aid  a  ])oor  com- 
pliment to  the  discernment  of  the  greatest  part  of  the  ^vorld." 


rfr< 


m  j 


LANDING  OF  THE  ENEMY  >r  KENET'  T.   127 


n* 


ni 


til  after  the  capture  of  Washingto  ,  oertai)i  not  1 
want  of  o})jiortuiiitics  to  transmit  it,  but  lest  tli- 
ccipt  of  it  should  induce  redoubled  and  eftcetual  < 
tions  to  save  the  seat  of  government  from  falling  n.h 
the  possession  of  an  enemy  who  openly  avowed  such 
infamous  principles  and  purposes.  The  pretext  put 
forth  in  Admiral  Cochrane's  letter  was  ably  refuted  in 
the  reply  addressed  to  him  by  j\Ir.  31onrce,  dated  Sep- 
tember 6,  1814.  The  real  motive,  elsewhere  avowed, 
for  resorting  ,o  a  "system  of  devastation"  which  was 
admitted  to  be  "  contrary  to  the  usages  of  civilized 
warfare,"  was  to  render  the  war  unpopular  in  that  sec- 
lion  of  the  country  which  was  supposed  to  have  been 
most  in  favor  of  it,  and  make  it  hateful  to  the  people 
by  bringing  its  horrors  home  to  their  hearths  and  fire- 
sides. 

The  larc-e  increase  of  British  force  which  arrived  in 
the  Chesape.ike  about  the  middle  of  August,  1814,  left 
no  shadow  of  doubt  that  an  enterprise  of  somewhat 
greater  magnitude  was  contemplated  than  the  petty 
depredations  hitiierto  committed.  On  the  morning  of 
the  16th  of  August,  twenty-two  sail  of  enemy's  ves- 
sels came  in  from  sea,  and  proceeded  up  the  Chesa- 
peake to  join  the  force  })reviously  stationed  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Patuxent.  The  whole  force  then  ascend- 
ed that  river,  and  on  tlie  lOtli  commenced  landing 
troops  at  the  old  village  of  Benedict,  situated  about 
forty  miles  southeast  of  Washington.  The  intelli- 
gence was  promptly  received  in  Washington,  and  the 
questions  at  once  arose,  What  is  the  object  of  the 
enemy  ?  "Which  is  the  contemplated  point  of  at- 
tack? 


I 


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I' I 
I' I 


128     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

Mr.  jMonroe,  in  his  letter  to  the  committee  of  inves- 
tigation, says : 

"  Calling  on  the  President  on  the  morning  of  the 
18th  of  August,  he  informed  me  that  the  enemy  had 
entered  the  Patuxent  in  considerahle  force,  and  were 
landing  at  Benedict.  I  remarked  that  this  city  [  Wash- 
ington] was  their  object,  lie  concurred  hi  the  opin- 
ion. I  oflcred  to  proceed  immediately  to  Benedict 
Avith  a  troop  of  horse  to  observe  their  force,  report  it, 
with  my  opinion  of  their  objects,  and,  should  they  ad- 
vance on  this  city,  to  retire  before  them,  communica- 
ting regularly  their  movements  to  the  government. 
This  proposal  was  acceded  to.  Captain  Thornton,  of 
Alexandria,  was  ordered  to  accompany  me  with  a  de- 
tachment of  twenty-live  or  thirty  of  tlie  dragoons  of 
the  District.  I  set  out  about  one  o'clock  P.]\I.  on 
the  19th,  and  arrived  at  ten  next  morning  in  sight  of 
the  enemy's  squadron  lying  before  Benedict,  and  con- 
tinued to  be  a  spectator  of  their  movements  until  after 
the  action  at  Bladensburg  on  the  24th." 

The  opinion  of  the  President  and  Mr.  Monroe  ap- 
pears to  have  been  a  reasonable  one ;  for,  in  reply  to 
a  suggestion  that  the  enemy's  destination  might  be 
either  Washington,  or  Annapolis,  or  Baltimore,  it  might 
be  asked,  Why  should  they  land  troops  at  Benedict,  to 
give  them  a  long  march  through  a  hostile  country  to 
either  of  the  two  last-mentioned  places,  when  they 
could  so  easily  transport  them  up  the  Chesapeake  and 
debark  them  within  a  few  miles  of  the  place  of  attack? 
The  land  route  from  Benedict  was  tlie  worst  that  they 
could  have  selected  to  Baltimore  or  Annapolis,  and  the 
best  and  shortest  to  Washington. 


DOUBTS    AS   TO   THE    POINT    OF    ATTACK. 


120 


r 


a 


Xevertlicless,  the  Secretary  of  War,  wliosc  o]iliiion 
was  of  tlic  most  importance,  as  well  from  his  position 
at  the  liead  of  that  department,  which  gave  him  the 
immediate  control  of  the  means  relied  on  to  repel  the 
enemy,  as  from  the  superior  military  knowledge  and 
acumen  which  he  was  supposed  to  possess,  derided  the 
notion  that  the  British  intended  a  visit  to  Washing- 
ton. In  the  statement  made  to  the  committee  by  Gen- 
eral \nn  Ness,  one  of  the  most  prominent  citizens  of 
Washington,  he  says : 

"At  length,  in  August  last,wdien  the  increased  and 
re-enforced  fleet,  with  the  troops,  ascended  the  Chesa- 
peake, and  -were  known  from  authentic  information  to 
have  entered  the  Patuxent,  I  called  on  Secretary  Arm- 
strong again,  and  expressed,  as  usual,  my  apprehen- 
sions, arising  from  want  of  means  and  preparations, 
adding  that,  from  the  known  naval  and  reputed  land 
force  of  the  enemy,  he  probably  meant  to  strike  a  se- 
rious blow.  His  reply  was,  '  Oh  yes  ;  by  G — d,  they 
would  not  come  with  such  a  fleet  without  meaning  to 
strike  somewdiere,  but  they  certainly  will  not  come 
here.  What  the  d — 1  will  they  do  here  V'  etc.  After 
remarking  that  I  differed  very  much  from  him  as  to 
the  probable  interest  they  felt  in  destroying  or  captur- 
ing our  seat  of  government,  and  that  I  believed  a  visit 
tc  this  place  would,  for  several  reasons,  be  a  favorite 
object  with  them,  ho  observed,  '  No,  no ;  Baltimore 
is  the  place,  sir;  that  is  of  so  much  more  consequence.'  " 

In  his  Notices  of  the  War  of  1812,*  General  Arm- 
strong persists  in  the  opinion  that  the  "first  and  great 
object"'  of  the  enemy  in  proceeding  to  Benedict  was 

*  Vol.  ii.,  p.  125,  126. 

F2 


t  r 


130      INVASION   AND    CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 


*'tlic  punishment  of  Barney  and  tlic  destruction  of  Iiis 
flotilla,"  and  that  the  visit  to  AVashington  was  a  cas- 
ual suggestion  subsequently  made  by  Cockburn  to 
General  lloss. 

(General  Winder  inehncd  from  the  first  to  the  belief 
that  the  enemy  intended  an  attack  on  Annapolis,  and 
the  reasons  which  he  states  in  his  narrative  for  this 
impression  are  not  wanting  in  force.      lie  says, 

"  It  brought  him  to  a  line  port,  where  his  ships 
could  lie  in  safety  ;  it  ailbrded  abundant  and  comfort- 
able quarters  for  his  men,  magazines  and  store-houses 
for  all  his  stores  and  munitions  of  every  description ; 
was  capable,  \vith  very  little  labor,  of  being  made  im- 
pregnable by  land,  and  he  commanded  the  water ;  it 
was  the  nearest  point  of  debarkation  to  the  City  of 
Washinirton  without  cntcrinc;  a  narrow  river  liable  to 
great  uncertainty  in  its  navigation  from  adverse  winds, 
and  was  at  hand  to  Baltimore,  equally  threatening 
these  two  great  points,  and  rendering  it  absolutely 
necessary  to  keep  a  force  doubly  sufhcient  to  resist 
him — one  for  the  protection  of  Washington,  the  other 
for  Baltimore.  Tiic  squadron  whicli  was  ascending 
the  Potomac,  and  had  now  passed  the  Kettle  Bottoms, 
the  only  obstruction  in  the  navigation  of  the  river, 
might  be  only  a  feint,  tlie  more  effectually  to  conceal 
their  intentions  against  Annapolis  ;  or,  what  was  more 
probable,  was  intended  to  unite  with  tlie  land  force, 
and  co-0])eratG  in  a  joint  attack  on  Washington.  It 
was,  therelbrc,  strongly  believed  that  the  land  force 
was  destined  to  proceed  and  take  Fort  "Washington  in 
the  rear.'' 

General  W-inder's  doubts  as  to  the  object  and  des- 


«^ 


t 


DOL'BTS   AS   TO   THE    POINT    OF    ATTACK. 


131 


tination  of  the  enemy  continued  from  the  time  of  the 
debarkcation  at  Benedict  on  the  18th  of  August,  until 
within  three  liours  of  the  commencement  of  the  battle 
at  Bladensburg  on  the  24t]i.  In  his  narrative,  refer- 
ring to  his  own  position  at  the  Eastern  Brancli  Bridge, 
near  the  Xavy-yard,  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock  of 
the  morning  of  the  battle,  he  says, 

"My  patrols  and  vedettes  not  having  yet  brought 
me  any  intelligence  of  a  movement  of  the  enemy  [tVom 
his  bivouac,  about  twelve  miles  from  Washington],  and 
being  still  doubtful  whether  he  might  not  move  upon 
Annapolis,  Fort  W'arburton  [Fort  Washington],  or  to- 
ward the  bridcie  ratiier  than  liladensbul-a:,  I  held  tlic 
position  near  the  bridge  as  that  which,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, would  enable  mc  best  to  act  against  the 
enemy  in  any  alternative." 

This  continual  uncertainty,  as  may  well  be  imag- 
ined, had  a  most  disastrous  cllect  upon  the  military 
operations  of  this  brief  camjiaign  of  live  days.  All 
the  force  which  could  be  assembled  was  considered  in- 
sulhcient  for  the  protection  of  one  point,  and  yet  it  was 
deemed  necessary  to  protect  three;  and  three  avenues 
of  approach  to  the  seat  of  guvermnent  were  to  be 
guarded — that  by  Bladensburg,  that  by  the  Eastern 
Brancli  Bridge,  and  an  appronch,  in  conjunction  with 
the  naval  force,  from  Fort  A\  ashington.  The  grer^t 
practical  problem  to  solve  was  how  to  dispose  of  a 
force  deemed  inadequate  for  the  protection  of  a  single 
one  of  these  aj^proaches,  so  as  to  leave  none  of  them 
unguarded;  and  the  ju'oblcm  was  rendered  more  ditli- 
cult  of  solution  by  the  t()j)Ogra])hy  of  the  country  ly- 
in^r  between  the  Eastern  Brancli  of  the  Potomac  and 


f 


.1  , 


132  INVASION  AND  CAPTURE  OF  "WASHINGTON. 

the  Patuxcnt  River,  wliich  is  generally  well  wooclccl, 
sparsely  peopled,  somewhat  hilly,  and  intersected  by 
numerous  roads  crossing  each  other,  and  leading  to  the 
different  points  which  were  supposed  to  be  threatened, 
and  which  it  was  thought  necessary  to  guard.  Tlie 
roads,  too,  were  then,  during  a  hot,  dry  spell  of  mid- 
summer wcatiier,  in  the  best  condition  for  marching, 
excepting  only  the  annoyance  of  dust.  A  point 
might,  after  careful  calculation  and  deliberation,  be  se- 
lected on  one  of  these  roads,  and  preparations  made  to 
receive  the  enemy,  and  it  would  be  suddenly  discov- 
ered, when  too  late,  that  lie  had  turned  into  another 
road,  one  cither  leading  him  a  little  circuitously  to  the 
point  which  he  appeared  to  menace,  or  directly  to  some 
other  point  erpially  in  need  of  protection. 

That  the  (>nemy  had  taken  care  to  be  well  informed 
of  the  topography  of  the  country  is  evident  from  the 
dispatcli*  of  Admiral  Cochrane  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Board  of  Admiralty,  dated  Tonnant,  on  the  Patuxcnt, 
September  2,  1814,  of  which  the  following  is  an  ex- 
tract : 

"My  letters  of  the  11th  of  August  will  have  ac- 
quainted their  lordships  of  my  waiting  in  the  Chesa- 
peake for  the  arrival  of  licar  Admiral  ]\lalcolm  with 
the  expedition  from  Bernuida. 

"  The  rear  admiral  joined  me  on  the  17th,  and  as  I 
had  gained  information  from  Hear  Admiral  Coekbnrn, 
whom  I  found  in  the  Potomac,  that  Commodore  Bar- 
ney, with  the  Baltimore  flotilla,  had  taken  shelter  at 
the  head  of  the  Patuxcnt,  this  afforded  a  pretext  for 
ascending  that  river  to  attack  him  near  its  source, 
•  Sco  Niles's  Register,  vol.  vii.,  Supplenieiit,  j).  Hij. 


f 


THE    I':NEMy   WELL    INFORMED. 


133 


1 


* 


above  Pi'p"  Point,  while  the  ultimate  destination  of  the 
combined  ibrcc  was  Washington,  should  it  be  found 
that  the  attempt  might  be  made  with  any  prospect  of 
success.  To  give  tlieir  lordships  a  more  correct  idea 
of  the  place  of  attack,  I  send  a  sketch  of  the  country, 
upon  which  the  movements  of  the  navy  and  army  are 
portrayed.  By  it  their  lordships  will  observe  that  the 
best  approach  to  Washington  is  by  Port  Tobacco, 
upon  tlie  Potomac,  and  Benedict,  upon  the  Patuxent, 
from  both  of  which  are  direct  and  good  roads  to  that 
city,  and  tlieir  distances  nearly  alike.  The  roads  from 
Benedict  divide  about  live  luiles  inland  ;  the  one  by 
Piscataway  and  Bladensburg,  the  other  following  the 
course  of  the  river,  although  at  some  distance  from  it, 
owing  to  the  creeks  that  run  up  tlie  country.  This 
last  pas.^es  through  the  towns  of  Nottingham  and 
]\Iarlborough  to  Bladensburg,  at  which  town  the  river 
called  the  Eastern  Jkancli,  that  bounds  Washington 
to  the  eastward,  is  fordable,  and  the  distance  is  about 
five  miles.  There  arc  two  bridges  over  this  river  at 
the  city,  but  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  enemy 
would  leave  them  accessible  to  an  invading  army. 

"  Previously  to  my  entering  the  Patuxent,  I  de- 
tached Captain  ({ordon,  of  his  majesty's  ship  Sea- 
horse, witii  that  sliip  and  the  ships  and  bombs  named 
in  the  margin,  up  the  Potomac  to  bombard  Fort  Wasli- 
ington  (which  is  situated  on  the  left  baidv  of  that  riv- 
er, about  ten  or  twelve  miles  below  the  city),  with  a 

free  com- 


i-oy 


)pening 


numicatlon  ahovc,  as  well  as  to  cover  tlie  retreat  of 
the  army,  should  its  return  by  the  lUadensburg  road 
be  found  loo  hazardous,  from  the  accession  of  strengtii 


i 


!>< 


134     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE    OF   ^yASHINGTON. 


'"!f 


I    ;i 


the  enemy  might  obtain  from  Baltimore ;  it  was  also 
reasonable  to  expect  that  the  militia  from  the  coun- 
try to  the  northward  and  westward  would  flock  in  as 
soon  as  it  should  be  known  that  their  capital  was 
threatened. 

*'  Captain  Sir  Peter  Parker,  in  the  ]\Ienelaus,  with 
some  small  vessels,  was  sent  up  the  Chesapeake  above 
Baltimore,  to  divert  the  attention  of  the  enemy  in  that 
quarter,  and  I  proceeded,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
naval  force  and  the  troops,  up  this  river,  and  landed 
the  army  upon  the  19th  and  20th  at  Benedict." 

From  this  it  appears  that  the  expedition  to  Wash- 
ington had  been  concerted  and  determined  upon,  and 
even  provision  made  "  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army, 
should  its  return  by  the  Bladensburg  road  be  found 
too  hazardous,*'  before  Admiral  Cochrane  entered  the 
Patuxent,  and  that  the  destruction  of  Barney's  flotilla 
was  merely  the  pretext  for  ascending  that  river,  instead 
of  being  tbe  "first  and  great  object."  No  doubt  tlie 
real  purpose  in  ascending  the  Patuxent  with  so  large 
a  force  was  carefully  concealed  from  the  subordinates 
of  the  expedition  as  long  as  practicable,  lest  it  should, 
by  their  indiscretion,  become  known  to  us. 

We  shall  now  take  a  view  of  the  means  which  Gen- 
eral AVinder  possessed  of  repelling  or  operating  against 
•  the  enemy,  whose  strength  was  as  little  known  as  his 
determination  and  purposes. 

The  followino;  is  a  statement,  whicli  we  have  endeav- 
ored  to  render  as  accurate  as  possible,  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  force  which,  if  the  officers  of  the  general 
government  had  done  their  duty,  might  have  been  con- 
centrated in  good  order  and  condition  at  Bladensburg 


•til 

Mill 


ACCOUNT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  FORCES. 


135 


or  the  City  of  Washington  on  the  morning  of  the  24th 
of  August.  We  have  attempted  a  chissitication  and 
brief  description  of  the  troops,  and  have  noted  the 
times  at  which  the  several  corps  were  placed  at  the 
disposal  of  General  Winder,  or  became  available  for 
the  dci'ence  of  the  seat  of  government.  The  detail  is 
rather  uninteresting  in  itself,  but  we  ask  the  reader's 
attention  to  it  now,  in  order  to  obviate  the  necessity  of 
tedious  interruptions  or  repetitions  in  the  subscfj^uent 
course  of  our  narrative. 

1.  We  shall  mention  the  District  troops  first,  as 
they  ought  to  have  been,  and  in  fact  wej:c,  the  first  to 
be  confronted  with  the  enemy.  They  comprised  the 
militia  and  volunteer  companies  of  Washington  and 
Georgetown,  formed  into  two  regiments,  the  1st  com- 
manded by  Colonel  ]\Iagruder,  the  2d  by  Colonel  Will- 
iam Brent.  The  brigade  was  commanded  by  Gen- 
eral Walter  Smith,  of  Georgetown,  and  included  two 
companies  of  fight  artillery,  having  each  six  six-pound- 
ers, and  commanded  rcsjiectivcly  by  ]\lajor  George 
Peter,  who  had  obtained  a  higli  reputation  as  an  officer 
of  experience  and  ability  in  the  regular  service,  and 
Captain  l^enjaniin  Burch,  a  soldier  of  tlic  Revolution. 
It  also  included  two  companies,  under  Captains  Dough- 
ty and  vStull,  called  riflemen,  but  armed  with  muskets, 
the  Secretary  of  War  having,  according  to  General 
Smith's  statement,  "declined  or  refused  to  furnish 
rifles.'**     These  troops  were  well  disciplined,  and  com- 


ff 


*  This  fact  is  well  remcmberecl  by  the  author,  for  on  its  hciri}? 
made  known,  when  Ca])tain  Stall's  conipany  were  about  l)einj;  nius- 
tcrcil  into  service,  they  at  fir.-t  iierenii)torily  refused  to  mareh  unless 
furnished  with  the  proper  arms. 


if 


-i 


A 


ij  ■' 


1  ! 


( 

i 


■■I 


136     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

prised,  officers  and  men,  sonic  of  the  most  respecta- 
ble inhabitants  of  the  District.  Tlic  brigade  marched 
from  Washington  on  the  20th  of  August,  and  on  the 
following  morning  was  found  to  muster  about  1070 
men. 

Another  brigade  of  District  militia,  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Robert  Young,  consisted  of  militia 
and  volunteer  companies  from  Alexandria  and  its  vi- 
cinity. It  included  a  company  of  cavalry,  under  Cap- 
tain Thornton,  which  acted  as  an  escort  to  Colonel 
IMonroe,  and  a  company  of  artillery,  with  two  brass 
six-pounders  and  one  brass  four-pounder,  commanded 
by  Captain  Marsteller.  The  brigade  mustered  about 
500  men,  and  General  Young,  in  his  letter  to  the  com- 
mittee, spei.ks  in  high  terms  of  their  efficiency.  They 
were  encamped  and  reported  to  General  Winder  on  the 
18tli  of  August.  The  only  use  made  of  them  was  to 
defend  the  approach  to  Fort  Washington,  and  they 
were,  consec[uently,  not  present  at  the  battle  of  Bla- 
densburg. 

2.  The  troops  from  the  city  of  Baltimore  and  its 
vicinity  consisted  of  two  regiments  of  militia,  one  of 
550  men,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Ragan  (late  cap- 
tain United  States  Hiiles),  and  another  of  803  men, 
under  Lieutenant-colonel  Schutz.  comprising  the  brig- 
ade commanded  by  General  Stansbury ;  the  5tli  regi- 
ment under  Lieutenant-colonel  Joseph  Stcrett,  con- 
sisting of  volunteers  from  the  city  of  Baltimore ;  two 
companies  of  volunteer  artillery  from  the  same  city, 
under  Captains  IMycr  and  IMagruder,  ^vitli  six  six- 
pounders  ;  and  a  battalion  of  volunteer  riflemen  from 
Baltimore,  under  the  command  of  the  celebrated  Will- 


ACCOUNT   OF   THE    A^[ERICAN    FORCES. 


137 


iam  Pinkney,  previously  attorney-general  and  minis- 
ter to  England,  and  subsequently  senator. 

The  brigade  commanded  by  General  Stansbury  ar- 
rived at  Bladensburg  from  Baltimore  on  the  evening 
of  the  22d  of  August.  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett's 
regiment,  500  strong,  the  artillery,  150,  and  the  rifle 
battalion,  150,  reached  Bladensburg  about  sunset  on 
the  evening  before  the  battle.  Tiie  whole  force, 
amounting  to  about  2200,  was  placed  by  General 
Winder  under  the  command  of  General  Stansbury. 

3.  A'^arious  detachments  of  ^Maryland  militia,  com- 
prising a  portion  of  two  regiments,  750  Strong,  under 
the  connnand  of  Colonel  William  D.  Beall,  an  officer 
of  the  Revolution,  and  Colonel  llood,  which  Iiad  march- 
ed sixteen  miles  on  the  morning  of  the  day  of  battle, 
and  entered  Bladensburg  about  thirty  minutes  before 
the  enemy  ;  detachments  of  militia,  under  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Kramer,  consisting  of  240  men  ;  and  two  bat- 
talions, under  3Iajors  AVaring  and  Maynard,  of  150 
each. 

4.  A  regiment  of  Virginia  militia,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  George  ]\Iinor,  consisting  of  about 
600  infantry  and  100  cavalry.  These  troops  arrived 
in  Washington  on  the  evening  of  the  23d  of  August, 
but,  owing  to  some  mismanagement,*  did  not  receive 
their  complement  of  arms  until  the  next  day,  too  lato 
to  be  present  at  the  battle. 

5.  The  regular  infantry,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  William  Scott,  consisting  of  de- 
tachments from  the  3(jth  and  38tli  regiments,  about 
300  men,  who  were  available  from  the  commencement 


*  w 


ec  Colonel  Minor's  letter.  Appendix. 


I 


im 


!l  i 


138     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

of  the  campaign,  and  a  company  of  80  from  the  12th 
regiment,  under  tlie  command  of  Captain  ]\lorgan,  who 
joined  tlie  army  at  the  Old  Fields  on  the  evening  of 
the  22d  of  August. 

6.  The  sailors  of  Barney's  flotilla,  400,  and  the  ma- 
rines from  Washington,  120  in  number,  with  two 
eighteen-pounders  and  three  twelve-pounders,  joined 
General  Winder  at  the  Wood  Yard  on  the  morning  of 
the  22d  of  Au2;ust. 

7.  The  cavalry  consisted  of  a  squadron  of  United 
States  dragoons,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Laval,  125  in  number,  recruits  on  untrained 
horses,  who  arrived  in  Washington  on  the  morning  of 
the  20th  of  August ;  and  various  companies  of  volun- 
teer cavalry  from  the  District,  j\Iaryland,  and  Virginia, 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman, 
i\Iajor  Otlio  IT.  Williams,  and  ]\Iajor  Charles  Sterett 
Ridgley — altogether  about  300  in  number,  who  were 
available  at  an  early  period  of  the  campaign. 

The  whole  would  liave  constituted  a  force  of  about 
7000  men,  of  which  900,  including  the  seamen,  ma- 
rines, and  Laval's  cavalrv,  were  enlisted  men.  The 
cavalry  amounted  altogether  to  more  than  400,  a  part 
of  it  very  efficient.  There  were  in  all  2G  pieces  of  ar- 
tillery, including  2  eighteen-pounders,  3  twelves,  and 
20  six-pounders. 

With  such  a  force,  notwithstanding  the  unpromis- 
ing aspect  of  a  portion  of  it,  a  skilful  and  experienced 
commander,  if  left  unshackled,  might  have  effected 
something  creditable  to  himself  and  to  his  country, 
even  against  an  army  as  numerous  and  well  appointed 
as  that  of  the  enemy  wns  supposed  to  be ;  but  in  ad- 


THE   COMMANDER   HAMPERED. 


139 


dition  to  the  perplexing  uncertainty  as  to  the  enemy's 
destination  and  strength,  it  is  particularly  necessary 
to  bear  also  in  mind,  in  forming  a  judgment  of  the  pre- 
liminary as  ■"'  .i  as  the  closing  operations  of  this  cam- 
paign, that  these  operations  lacked  the  great  essential 
of  all  military  movements,  that  of  being  governed  by 
a  single  Avill  or  mind.  The  President  of  the  United 
States  is,  by  the  highest  law  of  the  land,  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  and  President  Madison 
was  actually  in  the  field  and  exercising  command.* 
The  Secretary  of  War  is  the  channel  of  .communica- 
tion from  the  President  to  all  ofiicers  of  the  army,  high 
or  low,  and  any  suggestion  or  request  from  him  is 
equivalent  to  an  order.  Secretary  Armstrong  was 
also  in  the  field,  and  in  addition  to  the  authority  of 
his  official  position,  he  was  considered  by  many,  and 
certainly  considered  himself,  to  possess  profound  mili- 
tary science,  as  well  as  some  military  experience. 
Colonel  j\Ionroe,  the  Secretary  of  State,  from  the  out- 
set took  an  active  interest  and  share  in  the  practical 
operations  of  the  campaign.  General  Winder  was 
under  the  immediate  personal  supervision  of  these  high 
functionaries,  all  much  older  men  than  himself,  and  he, 
instead  of  having  the  ^^;y'5^/^6'  of  a  high  military  repu- 
tation to  support  him  in  case  of  difference  of  opinion, 
had  yet  a  reputation  to  achieve. 

This  difficulty  in  the  situation  of  General  Winder 
is  referred  to  in  expressive  terms  by  General  Wilkin- 

*  "  Tlie  President  of  the  United  States  was  not  only  active  during 
tlie  enu^a;j;oinent  wliieli  took  place  with  tiie  enemy,  but  had  been  ex- 
ertini!;  hiniscU"  for  two  or  three  days  jirevious,  and  has  been  person- 
ally active  ev  r  since.  Every  one  joins  in  attributing^  to  him  the 
greatest  merit." — Xalional  Intcltijcncer,  August  30,  1811. 


140  INVASION  AND  CAPTURE  OF  WASHINGTON. 


I 


•  1  * 


son,  when  i^ipoaklng  of  tlie  position  of  General  Winder's 
forces  on  the  night  of  tlie  23d  of  August,      lie  says, 

"There  can  he  no  doubt  that  this  was  an  injudi- 
cious disposition  of  the  American  forces  ;  but  is  Gen- 
eral Winder  to  be  condemned  for  it  ?  I  think  not, 
because  President  ]Madison,  by  urging  a  concentration 
of  his  corps  when  so  recently  in  camp  at  the  Long  Old 
Fields,  had  clearly  indicated  his  determination  to  try 
tlie  issue  of  a  general  action,  and  the  general  appears 
to  have  exerted  every  nerve  to  give  effect  to  his  plan ; 
and  in  circumstances  at  once  perplexing  and  equivocal, 
no7ie  but  a  soldier^  habituated  to  subordination.)  can 
feel  the  influence  of  an  intimation  from  a  siqyerior, 
or  interpret  the  force  of  his  ojyinion.''' 

It  is  true  that  General  Winder,  in  his  narrative, 
makes  no  attempt  to  evade  responsibility  by  throwing 
it  upon  his  advisers  or  supervisors,  and  even  indirect- 
ly assumes  blame,  which,  from  the  testimony  of  others, 
does  not  appear  to  belong  to  him.  And  General  Arm- 
strong, in  his  "  Notices,"  labors  to  throw  upon  Gen- 
eral Winder  the  whole  responsibility  of  the  manage- 
ment of  the  campaign,  with  the  exception  of  that  part 
which  he  attributes  to  his  fellow-member  of  the  cabi- 
net, Colonel  ^lonroe,  whom  he  contemptuously  terms 
a  "  busy  and  blundering  tactician."  Yet,  even  from  so 
unfavorable  a  Avitness  as  General  Armstrono;,  enouQ-h 
can  be  gathered  to  show  that  General  Winder  was  the 
commanding  general  in  little  more  than  name,  and  that 
his  movements  were  influenced,  if  not  actually  dictated, 
by  his  supervisors,  who  were  neither  in  liarmony  among 
themselves,  nor  consistent  any  one  with  himself,  and 
one  of  whom.  General  ^Vrmstrong,  was  not  likely,  from 


i  \ 


\\   -^ 


GENERAL   ARMSTRONG  S    ADVICE. 


141 


his  self-willed  and  resentful  disposition,  to  be  over-zeal- 
ous in  his  eftbrts  to  produce  a  result  which  would  jus- 
tify j\Ir.  Madison's  selection  of  General  Winder  instead 
of  General  Porter  as  the  commanding  general. 

In  his  statement  to  the  committee  of  investigation, 
General  Armstrong  says : 

"On  the  —  of  August  was  received  the  iirst  notice 
of  the  arrival  of  Admiral  Cocln-anc  in  the  Bay,  and  on 
the  same  day  advices  were  brought  that  he  was  enter- 
ing; and  ascendinii;  the  Patuxcnt.  These  facts  were 
connnunicated  to  the  general,  and  he  was  instructed  to 
take  a  position  near  the  enemy.  On  the  22d  he  was 
advised  to  hang  on  their  rear  and  flank  a  heavy  corps, 
while  he  opposed  to  them  another  hi  their  front.  ]\Iy 
reasons  for  tlius  advisino-  him  were  tlu'ce  :  if  Baltimore 
was  the  object  of  the  enemy,  this  disposition  interposed 
a  corps  between  them  and  that  city  ;  if  they  aimed  at 
Washington,  it  menaced  their  communication  with  their 
fleet,  and  the  security  of  their  return,  and  was,  there- 
fore, most  likely  to  hold  them  in  cheek  ;  and,  lastly,  it 
did  not  forbid  a  concentration  of  force  in  their  front  at 
a  later  period  and  by  a  forced  march.  On  the  even- 
ing of  the  22d  I  repaired  to  the  army,  and  found  it  at 
tlie  Old  Fields,  six  or  eight  miles  distant  from  the  en- 
emy. A  part  of  the  corps  contemplated  for  the  serv- 
ice mentioned  in  the  preceding  article  had  joined  Gen- 
eral Winder,  and  of  the  other  part  (under  General 
Stansburv)  no  correct  account  could  be  given.  I  took 
this  occasion  to  urge  the  necessity  of  a  speedy  concen- 
tration of  our  force,  and  of  the  usefulness  of  pushing 
our  pickets  frequently  and  freely  upon  those  of  the  en- 
emy, as  the  best  means  of  circumscribing  his  supplies, 


f 


•M 


INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINCcTON. 

of  gaining  a  knowledge  of  his  strength  (of  Avhich  the 
accounts  Vvcre  various),  and  of  preventing  a  stolen 
march,  wliich  was  to  be  suspected.  I  was  glad  to  find 
the  general  entertained  similar  views,  and  that  they 
were  in  a  train  of  execution.  In  the  afternoon  of  the 
2od  I  returned  to  Washington." 

This  statement  of  General  Armstrong;  shows  that  the 
commanding  general  was,  in  the  outset,  "instructed  to 
lake  a  jjosition  near  the  enemy."  An  instruction  from 
a  military  superior  is  nothing  more  nor  less  than  or- 
der, which  no  ofticer,  unless  in  extreme  circumstances, 
would  hesitate  to  obey  or  venture  to  criticise.  Then 
the  Secretary  of  War  remains  a  whole  day  in  the  iield 
or  at  the  general's  head-quarters,  "  advising"  and  "urg- 
ing the  necessity"  of  certain  specific  movements.  What 
was  this  but  taking  out  of  his  hands  the  direction  of 
the  campaign  ? 

But  this  was  not  all  the  advice  or  dictation  which 
emanated  from  the  same  high  quarter.  In  the  Appen- 
dix to  the  second  volume  of  his  "  Notices"  General 
Armstrong  publishes,  in  his  own  justification,  what  he 
styles  "  Colonel  Allen  M'Clane's  Journal  of  the  Cam- 
paign." Colonel  M'Clane,  it  seems,  acted  as  a  volun- 
teer aid  to  General  Winder,  to  whom  he  had  been  rec- 
ommended by  General  Armstrong,  and  the  following 
is  the  entry  in  his  journal  for  the  19th  of  August: 

'  19th.  Reports  of  yesterday  confirmed,  with  the 
addition  that  the  fleet  had  entered  the  Patuxent ;  was 
preparing  armed  boats  for  going  np  the  river  and  land- 
ing troops  at  Benedict.  Accompanied  General  Winder 
to  the  War-office.  The  general  asked  the  secretary's 
opinion  of  the  enemy's  object;  the  latter  replied  'that 


GENEUAL    AKMSTRONCr's    ADVICi:. 


I  13 


1 


I 


the  niinilDcrs,  equipments,  and  movements  of  an  enemy 
best  iiulicatcd  liis  object ;  of  tliese,  in  the  present  case, 
we  know  loo  litth;  to  speak  with  any  degree  of  assur- 
ance. With  the  exception  of  hinding  troops  at  Jiene- 
dict,  ]iis  great  naval  force,  and  the  direction  given  to 
tlie  movement,  would  indicate  Baltimore  ;  but,  whether 
it  be  Baltimore,  the  flotilla,  or  AVashington,  our  course 
is  a  plain  one :  assemble  as  large  a  force  as  wc  can  ; 
])lace  it  speedily  at  Nottingham,  or  other  point  on  the 
Patuxcnt ;  clear  the  road  between  that  and  Benedict 
of  horses  and  cattle  ;  break  down  bridges  ;  abbatis  the 
route,  when  leading  tiirough  woods  :  SQlect  strong- 
points  for  defence ;  and,  as  soon  as  his  movement  be- 
gins, harass  his  front  and  Hanks  by  small  attacks  made 
by  night  and  by  day,  while  Stuart  operates  in  the 
same  way  on  his  rear.  A  plan  of  this  kind,  strictly 
pursued,  will  soon  enable  you  to  judge  of  the  enemy's 
strength,  equipment,  and  objects.  If  the  first  be  small 
and  the  second  scanty,  his  objects  can  not  be  great  nor 
many — probably  confined  to  an  attack  on  Barney's  flo- 
tilla. If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  shows  a  respectable 
park  of  artillery,  wuth  baggage  and  provision  train,  his 
object  may  be  Baltimore  or  Washington.' " 

The  secretary's  opinion  of  the  "objects"  of  the  en- 
emy was  somewhat  in  the  style  of  the  Delphic  oracle 
or  of  Captain  Jack  Bunsby :  the  value  of  it  consisted 
in  the  immense  difficulty  of  making  any  thing  out  of 
it.  But,  whatever  the  enemy's  objects  might  be,  the 
advice  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued  was  minute  and 
particular.  Tlie  mode  of  proceeding  was  to  be  an  of- 
fensive one.  The  general  was  to  march  in  pursuit  of 
the  enemy,  let  the  disparity  of  force  be  what  it  might, 


i 


4 


i'.:i!i 


-: 


;■, 


'<'{ 
^ 


144     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


and  "  harass  his  front  and  flanks  hy  small  attacks 
made  hy  niglit  and  hy  day." 

But,  hetween  the  19th  and  23d,  tlie  secretary's  opin- 
ion of  the  ctiicacy  of  offensive  operations  aj^pears  to 
have  undergone  a  material  change.  In  his  journal  for 
the  23d,  Colonel  M '•Chine  says  : 

*'  23d.  At  sunrise,  the  general  and  31'CJane  visited 
the  President.  The  ordinary  compliments  passed,  the 
Secretary  of  "War  asked  the  general  for  such  informa- 
tion as  he  had  been  able  to  procure  Avith  regard  to  the 
numbers  and  equipment  of  the  enemy  ;  to  which  he  re- 
plied that  Mr.  ^lonroe  and  Colonel  Beall,  with  the  same 
means  of  observation,  made  very  different  estimates — 
the  former  making  them  7000  men,  the  latter  but  4000  ; 
that  they  came  without  cannon,  cavalry,  baggage,  or 
provision  train ;  that  they  had  a  few  rocket-men,  and 
a  few  (two  or  three)  guns  called  grasshoppers,  dragged 
by  seamen  ;  that  their  whole  force,  naval  and  military, 
was  yet  at  IMarlborough,  plundering  the  tobacco  ware- 
houses ;  and  from  accounts  received  of  the  Potomac 
fleet,  it  was  his  opinion  tliat  they  would  not  move  till 
that  fleet  had  approached  I'ort  AVashington,  M'hen  Iloss 
would  move  to  the  rear  of  the  fort  and  co-operate  in 
taking  it.  Without  noticing  this  opinion,  the  secre- 
tary replied  tliat  'the  facts  he  had  stated  abundantly 
proved  that  hitherto  Ross's  movement  had  no  object 
but  that  of  covering  and  aiding  the  armed  vessels  des- 
tined to  tlic  attack  of  the  flotilla ;  and  that,  should  he 
make  a  movement  directed  on  AVashington,  it  will  nec- 
essarily be  a  mere  Cossack  hurrah,  a  rapid  march  and 
hasty  retreat,  coming,  as  he  does,  wliolly  un])repared 
for  siege  and  investment.     To  meet  an  attack  of  this 


t 
i 

1 


GENERAL   ARMSTRONG  S   ADVICE. 


145 


I 


■I 

4 


kind,  two  modes  of  proceeding  may  be  suggested,  the 
one  strictly  offensive,  the  other  decidedly  defensive : 
the  former  will  consist  of  multiplied  attacks,  made  si- 
multaneously or  in  succession,  on  the  front,  flank,  and 
rear  of  an  enemy's  march  throughout  its  whole  extent. 
Such  was  the  well-known  affair  of  Lexington,  in  the 
war  of  the  llevolution,  in  which  1800  of  the  Brit  is!  i 
elite  were  so  beaten,  disheartened,  and  exhausted,  that, 
had  they  not,  at  sunset,  found  armed  vessels  to  pro- 
tect, and  an  intrenched  camp  to  receive  them,  not  ;i 
man  would  have  escaped  capture  or  death.  To  this 
plan,  however,  serious  objections  may  be  made,  arising 
from  the  subdivision  of  force  and  nniltitude  of  com- 
manders it  makes  necessary.  The  second,  or  defens- 
ive plan,  is  entirely  free  from  these  or  any  other  objec- 
tions of  importance,  and  is  precisely  what,  were  I  in 
your  place,  I  would  do.  Assemble  my  force  in  his 
front,  fall  quietly  back  to  the  Capitol,  giving  only  that 
degree  of  resistance  that  invites  a  pursuit.  When  ar- 
rived in  its  front,  I  would  innncdiately  put  in  battery 
my  twenty  pieces  of  artillery,  give  the  direction  and 
management  of  these  to  Barney  and  Peter,  fill  the  U})- 
per  part  of  the  house  and  the  adjacent  buildings  with 
infantry,  regulars  and  militia,  amounting  to  5000  men, 
while  my  300  cavalry  held  themselves  in  reserve  for  a 
cliarge  the  moment  a  recoil  appeared  in  the  British  col- 
umns of  attack.  On  the  success  of  this  plan  against 
the  best-executed  coup  de  main  I  would  pledge  both 
life  and  reputation,  and  earnestly  rcconnncnd  it  to  your 
adoption.'  Witli  tliis  advice  of  tlie  secretary,  so  obvi- 
ously right  of  itself,  and  reju'csentcd  so  clearly  and 
conclusively,  the  general  ai)pearcd  to  be  pleased." 

a 


146     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 


From  this  it  appears  that  on  the  19th,  when  the  ene- 
my's numbers  and  equipments  were  unknown,  but  eon- 
sidered  very  formidable,  the  secretary  advised  an  ad- 
vance against  him,  and  small  attacks,  by  night  and  by 
day,  on  Iiis  front  and  Hanks ;  and  on  the  23d,  when  it 
was  ascertained  that  he  was  without  cannon  or  caval- 
ry, and  therefore  more  easily  assailable,  the  secretary 
objected  to  nmlti2)lied  attacks,  on  account  of  the  sub- 
division of  force  and  multitude  of  commanders  wlilch 
would  be  necessary,  and  was  ready  to  stake  his  life 
and  reputation  upon  a  Vvholiy  dilferent  plan. 

The  plan  advised  by  Cfcneral  Armstrong  on  the 
19th  was  similar  to  the  course  which  (.iencral  Wilkin- 
son says  that  lie  would  have  adopted.  lie  was  in 
Washington,  under  suspension,  at  the  time  of  the  ar- 
rival of  the  enemy  in  the  Patuxcnt,  and  on  receiving  a 
note  from  Mr.  ]\Ionroc  in  reference  to  the  threateniuG; 
aspect  of  affairs,  he  addressed  him  a  letter,  stating  that 
if  his  arrest  could  be  suspended,  and  his  sword  restored 
for  a  short  period,  he  would  take  the  command  of  the 
militia,  and  save  the  city  or  forfeit  his  life,     lie  says  :* 

*'  This  was  an  offer  of  dire  responsibility  at  so  late 
an  hour ;  but  I  preferred  death  to  inaction  at  such  a 
crisis,  and  did  believe  that  by  covering  the  roads  in 
front  of  the  enemy  with  Avorking-partics,  to  obstruct 
them  by  all  practicable  means,  and  at  the  same  time 
falling  on  their  rear  by  the  new  road  to  Zakiali  Swamp, 
or  that  by  St.  Paul's  Cliurcli,  witli  Peter's  artillery, 
Stull's,  Davidson's,  and  Doughty's  riflemen  and  in- 
fantry, and  fifty  dragoons,  while  sinuiltaneous  attacks 
were  made  on  his  front  and  left  flank,  at  every  exposed 
*  ^Vilkillson,  vol.  i.,  j).  7G1. 


i 


.'»^ 


GENERAL    WILKINSON  8    PLAN. 


147 


'; 


point  and  diflicult  defile,  by  flyi'ig  parties  of  four  or 
iivc  liiindrod  infantry,  so  stationed  ad  to  relieve  eaeh 
oilier  as  the  enemy  advaneed — I  repeat,  it  was  then, 
and  is  still  my  opinion,  that  by  suea  attaeks,  judieious- 
Iv  eonduetcd  and  vigorously  pushed,  if  tlie  enemy  had 
not  retraced  their  r4ep.<,  tliey  would  have  crossed  the 
ratii.\ci:t  itt  Xotlingham  or  Pi;;-  Point,  and  returned  to 
ihcir  shippiii^^ ;  or.  if  tJiey  h.;d  };er;-e\<'n.'d  iii  tiieir 
J';;ir«'h  .i^raiu.-t  ih'  eqiiuil,  ih  :r  bu,;;s  mi  !il  ha\'>*  breii 
dc!.7iroycd,  a:;.!  i.;e'u' ictn-at  cut  oii',  (,r  rew  e/cd  a  sjoie 
of  eariiaLi'C.  To  lia\e  as.-urcd  this  i.--sue,  it  v.'.;s  oidv 
ncces.-ary  to  post  tlie  P)allimore  troops  and  tlie  corps 
from  Annapolis  at  some  convenient  point  on  tlie  route 
between  Queen  Anne  and  the  Governor's  Bridge,  with 
orders  to  push  heavy  parties  of  observation  to  the 
verge  of  the  enemy's  camp  in  ^larlborough,  and  to  hohl 
themselves  in  readiness  to  harass  their  rear  in  what- 
ever direction  they  might  march.  And  here  it  may  be 
proper  to  remark  tliat  the  niaxim,  '//t'  icAo  divides  /as 
force  v:ill  he  beaten  in  detail^''  must  be  received  with 
qualification,  as  the  art  of  war  depends  on  an  infinity 
of  unforeseen  contingencies,  and  therefore  is  not  reduc- 
ible to  specific  rules.  It  will  apply  to  armies  nearly 
on  ail  equality,  which  are  mancruvring  for  advantages, 
but  never  to  an  inferior  force,  which,  though  competent 
to  harass  its  adversary,  dare  not  hazard  a  general  en- 
gagement. But  President  j\[adison  preferred  to  sig- 
naliv^e  himself  in  a  pitched  battle,  and,  as  he  scorned 
the  idea  of  taking  any  advantage  of  his  antagonist,  he 
permitted  him  an  undisturbed  march  to  the  theatre  of 
combat.*' 

There  is,  no  doubt,  much  force  in  General  Wilkin- 


f 


A 


148     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


m     i 


hi 


son's  remark,  that  "tlic  art  of  war  depends  upon  an 
inrinity  of  unforeseen  contingencies."  It  is  easy  to 
construct  a  theory  of  strategy  or  a  body  of  miUtary 
maxims,  and,  like  Captain  Bobadil  in  the  play,  in- 
vent ingenious  and  infallible  plans  for  annihilating  an 
enemy.  The  Baron  Jomini,  with  Avhose  works  Gen- 
eral Armstrong  appears  to  have  been  much  smitten, 
was  tlie  greatest  of  strategists  in  tlieory,  yet  the  Km- 
jDcror  Napoleon,  one  of  the  greatest  of  practical  strate- 
gists, had  but  a  poor  opinion  of  Jomini's,  or  any  otlier 
theory  of  war,  no  doubt  I'or  the  reason  assigned  by 
General  AVilkinson.  The  Count  de  Segur*'  relates, 
that  in  the  commencement  of  Napoleon's  campaign  in 
Russia,  an  envoy  from  the  Czar  presented  himself  at 
the  l^'rcnch  advanced  posts  with  a  flag  of  truce.  In 
the  course  of  conversation  with  him.  Napoleon  re- 
marked, "  \ou  all  believe  yourselves  to  understand 
the  art  of  war  because  you  have  read  Jomini;  but  if 
his  book  could  have  taught  you  any  thing,  do  you  think 
that  I  would  have  allowed  it  to  be  published  ?" 

There  is  no  treatise  on  strategy  which  can  provide 
for  all  the  circumstances  of  a  general's  position,  and 
no  one  lias  acknowledged  this  more  fully  and  frankly 
than  Jomini  himself.  There  certainly  is  none  which 
has  imagined  rules  or  maxims  for  a  position  so  ex- 
traordinary as  General  Winder's.  His  situation,  as 
General  AVilkinson  remarks,  "was  more  than  enough 
to  have  embarrassed  an  olH<^cr  of  forty  campaigns,  and 
it  Avas  his  fortune  to  have  served  but  two." 

Nevertheless,  the  art  of  war  has  been  reduced  to 
certain   lixed  rules,  and   there   is   such  a  science  as 

*  History  of  the  Exitcdition  to  Kussia,  book  iv.,  chap.  v. 


GUERRILLA    WARFARE. 

149 

strategy, 

the  principles 

of  whicli  are 

not  to  be 

despised 

because 

they 

are   not 

infallible. 

And  the 

plan   of 

,." 

ma  IK [11  (tie 

IS 

h 

rrolmhlN 
with  18- 

Gcncr 

d 

veulent 

(jui  chcr 

0 

thmos,  e 
The  / 

s 

r 

theory. 

harassing  the  enemy  recommended  by  General  Arm- 
strong and  General  AVilkinson,  though  it  made  de- 
tachments necessary,  so  far  from  being  against  the 
principles  of  tlic  art  of  war,  was  in  perfect  conformity 
with  thern.  Writers  on  the  art  of  war  recommend, 
and  common  sense  dictates,  that  the  weaker  of  two 
belligerents  should,  as  a  general  rule,  resort  to  a  har- 
assing guerrilla  warfare  rather  than  to  pitched  battles, 
more  particularly  against  an  invading  enemy.* 

But,  admitting  the  correctness  of  this  plan  in  the 
abstract,  and  admitting  that  General  Winder  had  been 
permitted  to  adhere  for  a  reasonable  length  of  time  to 
any  plan  of  action,  whether  of  his  own  or  any  one 
else's  suggestion,  he  had  not  the  means  of  pursuing 
the  proposed  course  of  hanging  on  the  enemy's  rear 
and  Hank,  and  harassing  him  by  nuiltiplicd  attacks. 
Neither  his  men  nor  their  officers  were  fitted  for  it. 
Such  a  plan  of  war  requires  experienced  troops,  or,  at 

*  This  is  the  j)lan  cm])hati('!illy  dictated  l>y  Lloyd,  wliom  Jomini 
seeins  disposed  to  ro;iard  as  the  father  of  modorii  stratc;j:y ;  hut  ho 
says  tliat  ii;j;ht  troops  arc  iiidisjieusahje  for  tlie  })uri)osf',  "//  n'lj  a 
que  fir  troupes  IvylrvA  qui  pitisscut  roiijJir  vet  ohjvt  ;"  and  they  must  bo 
well-trained  liifht  troops,  not  like  some,  of  which  he  says,  "AVA'.s* 
it  ciiticreiiinit  (ractin'te,  et  li'avn'ipnt  rien  da  Ic'i/rr  que  le.  noiii.** 
he  would  not  have  considered  either  raw  militia  or  sailors 


pounders  as  fidlillin^  the  necessarv  conditi 


on. 


d  I 


u  uo^nni; 


says,  "  Les  bons  ])rincipes  de  la  -luerre  di'fonsive 
qn'au  lieu  de  s'opjioser  de  front  \i  une  arnic'e  envalii<santo 
die  11  ]ieiie'trer  dans  rinterietir  d'lin  ])ays,  on  se  place  sur  scs 
tc." — Consldrnttioiis  sur  Pint  de  h  i/uenr,  chap,  iv, 
H'fifc  tpii rr\  thiTcfore,  reconinicndcil  by  (n'iicr;d  Annstroii'^ 
iicral  Wilkiuison,  appears  to  be  in  perfect  tunfurmity  with 


i\. 


' 


,ii  V 


I  . 


'    s 


ill 


ifiii  \i 


i      ! 


150     INVASION   AND   CAPTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

least,  men  accustomed  to  the  use  of  arms,  to  clanger, 
and  fatigue. 

Militia  troops  have  the  same  names  as  regular  troops ; 
they  are  called  light  infantry,  liglit  dragoons,  light  ar- 
tillery, riflemen,  grenadiers,  etc.;  but  as  a  cowl  does 
not  make  a  monk,  to  dress  and  equip  a  body  of  men 
as  light  infantry  or  dragoons  docs  not  make  them  what 
they  are  called.  They  must  be  disciplined,  and  have 
some  experience  in  the  peculiar  duties,  before  tliey 
arc  entitled  to  tlic  name.  A  company  of  cavalry, 
formed  in  the  heart  of  a  large  commercial  city,  might 
choose  to  assume  the  name  of  "  Cossacks,"  and  pro- 
vide tliemselves  with  lances  and  other  suitable  equip- 
ments, but  they  would  remain,  in  reality,  just  what 
they  were  before,  a  parcel  of  inoffensive  clerks  or  jour- 
neymen mcclianics. 

The  militia  troops  under  General  "Winder  were  most- 
ly witliout  any  training  or  discipline  whatever — men 
drafted  from  peaceable  walks  of  life,  in  a  peaceable 
section  of  country,  habituated  to  comforts  and  conven- 
iences, to  regular  hours  and  good  living,  instead  of 
being  inured  to  danger  or  privation.  They  were  un- 
accustomed to  subordination,  and  disposed  to  treat 
their  commanding  officers  as  associates  and  equals. 
Whatever  their  ca])acities  might  have  been,  there  was 
no  time  to  draw  them  out;  and  whatever  the  qualifi- 
cations  of  thrir  ofiicors,  they  Avere,  v.ith  but  few  ex- 
ceptions, wholly  uidinown  to  the  connnanding  gener- 
al, who  w.is  therefore  nnal'le  to  de^^ignate,  for  the  per- 
forni.'v  (•'■  of"  aiiv  particular  diitv,  those  who  miMit  have 
been  cajjaMo  ol'  performing  it.  lie  could  not  be  sure 
that  any  order  would  be  promptly  executed  or  any 


li 


LNDISCIPLIXED   TROOPS. 


151 


duty  properly  performed.  To  attempt  strategic  move- 
ments with  such  troops,  or — with  a  "multitude  of  com- 
manders" no  better  skilled  in  military  matters  than 
their  men — to  make  "  multiplied  attacks''  on  the  "front, 
flanks,  and  rear"  of  the  enemy,  was  a  waste  of  time, 
at  least,  and  time  in  war  is  a  jewel  of  inestimable 
value.  Experience,  in  our  own  and  otiier  countries, 
seems  to  have  demonstrated  that  the  only  reliable 
moc^e  of  "  jilting  such  troops  is  behind  defensive  works 
or  ..  strc-  natural  posilioi  ,  where  they  will  not  be 
required  to  execute  manoeuvres,  and  will  have  as  little 
as  possible  to  apprehend  from  the  manoeuvres  of  the 
enemy. 

Militia,  or  newly  levied  and  undisciplined  troops, 
have  been  so  little  used  in  the  wars  of  Europe,  that 
military  maxims  or  rules  of  strategy  borrowed  from 
that  quarter  of  the  world  require  some  alteration  to  be 
adapted  to  our  country.  In  the  early  wars  of  the 
French  Revolution  necessity  compelled  a  resort  to  new 
levies,  and  the  results  were  occasionally  somewhat 
astounding  to  the  generals  who  had  the  fortune  to 
command  them.  During  the  retreat  of  General  Du- 
mourier  from  the  ArG;onne  Forest  in  1792,  his  rear 
guard,  consisting  of  ten  thousand  men,  was  attacked 
by  iifteen  liundred  Prussian  hussars  and  four  pieces 
of  liglit  artillery.  The  French  troops  instantly  took 
to  flight,  disbanded  themselves,  and  many  of  them  did 
not  stop  until  they  reached  Paris.  Dumourier,  find- 
ing that  so  little  reliance  was  to  be  placed  on  his  un- 
disciplined levies  when  perlbrming  manoeuvres  in  the 
presence  of  trained  and  cx])erienecd  troops,  resolved  to 
make  the  war  ojic  of  positions,  and  inspire  his  troo])s 


f; 


HI  ii ! 


)i,,  t 


i; 


W'  it! 


152     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

witli   confidence  by  placing   them  behind  intrcnch- 
nients.* 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  feeling  of  contempt  ha- 
bitually entertained  by  officers  of  the  "  regular  army" 
for  militia  may  be  carried  too  far.  The  test  of  genius 
and  capacity  is  to  achieve  great  results  with  apparent- 
ly inadequate  means  ;  and  as  a  good  workman,  if  com- 
pelled to  ojjcratc,  will  not  stop  to  ([uarrel  with  his 
tools,  but  proceed  at  once  to  make  the  best  use  of 
them,  so  a  good  general  will  make  the  best  use  he  can 
of  indifferent  troops,  if  he  can  not  get  better.  Human 
nature  is  pretty  much  the  same  whether  in  or  out  of 
a  military  garb,  and  is  plastic  in  the  hands  of  those 
who  know  how  to  mould  it,  who  are  born  with  a  tal- 
ent for  command,  and  who  can  inspire  confidence  and 
infuse  their  own  spirit  into  their  followers.  The 
troops  Avith  which  Napoleon  gained  his  first  victories, 
over  the  most  skillful  generals  and  best-disciplined  ar- 
mies, were  composed  of  the  same  materials  as  those 
who  were  attacked  with  panic  under  Dumourier.  The 
history  of  our  own  country  is  enriched  with  the  ex- 
ploits of  militia,  from  the  battle  of  Bunker's  Hill  to 
that  of  New  Orleans. 

Confidence  of  troops  in  their  leader  appears  to  be 
the  main  clement  of  victory.  But  how  was  it  possi- 
ble for  General  Winder's  troops,  having  little  or  no 
personal  knowledge  of  him,  to  feel  this  confidence, 
when  they  found  that  those  who  knew  him  best,  the 
leading  men  of  the  nation,  were  unwilling  to  trust  to 
his  capacity ;  kept  him  in  a  state  of  supervision  and 
pupilage  from  the  outset ;  instructed,  advised,  and 
*  Alison's  Histoiy  of  Europe,  vol.  i.,  chap.  viii. 


-t! 


GENEKAL   STANSBUKY    DISOBEDIENT. 


153 


urged  him  to  do  this  and  to  do  that,  a  id,  finally,  with- 
out consulting  him,  posted  his  troopj  for  him  on  the 
day  of  battle  ? 

As  a  specimen  of  this  want  of  confidence  in  General 
"Winder,  or  of  respect  for  his  autliority  as  command- 
ing general,  exhibited  by  some  of  the  highest  officers 
under  his  command,  and  to  show  how  little  he  could 
expect  to  succeed  in  operations,  not  under  his  immedi- 
ate supervision,  which  required  a  "  subdivision  of  force 
and  multitude  of  commanders,"  we  shall  anticipate  our 
narrative  by  advertino;  to  the  conduct  of  General  Stans- 
bury  on  the  morning  of  the  battle,  as  frankly  stated  by 
himself  in  his  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  committee 
of  investigation.  Early  on  that  morning,  being  then 
in  Bladcnsburg,  he  received  an  order  from  General 
Winder,  directing  him.  if  the  enemy  should  move 
against  him,  to  resist  as  .ong  as  possible.  Instead  of 
making  up  his  mind  at  once  to  obey  the  order,  or  at 
least  make  an  attempt  to  obey,  liv:  "  instantly,"  as  he 
says,  held  a  council  of  w^ar,  consisting  of  Colonels  Ra- 
gan,  Scliutz,  and  Sterett,  and  jMajor  Pinkney,  submit- 
ted the  order  to  them,  and  by  their  unanimous  advice 
retreated  from  Bladensburg  toward  Washington,  in 
order  to  "take  a  position"  which  he  could  defend. 
While  looking  for  this  position,  which  he  would  prob- 
ably have  had  some  difficulty  in  finding,  he  again  re- 
ceived an  order  by  an  express  from  General  Winder, 
directing  him,  if  the  enemy  should  attempt  a  passage 
by  the  way  of  Bladensburg,  to  oppose  him  as  long  as 
he  could.  Upon  the  receipt  of  this  reiterated  order,  he 
again  summoned  his  council  of  war,  and  by  their  ad- 
vice again  refused  obedience,  as  "no  good  could  result 

G2 


W 
if! 

i'  { 


Ml; 


'«!    ll 


I  111] . 


♦i« : 


'  III 


I         )»  ' 


II 
i 


154     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASIIIN  ^Tt   ', 

therefrom ;"  and  it  was  not  until  the  receipt  Oi  .  third 
order  that  he  coukl  be  induced  to  retrace  his  steps  to 
Bladcnsburg.  General  Winder,  in  his  narrative,  speaks 
of  tlie  mortitication  which  he  felt  on  learning  of  this 
proceeding  of  Stansbury,  and  leniently  attributes  it  to 
*'  misunderstanding  or  some  other  cause."  General 
Wilkinson,  in  adverting  to  the  affair,  intimates  that  it 
must  have  been  the  result  of  an  order  from  a  high  quar- 
ter, given  to  General  Stansbury  without  the  knowl- 
edge of  General  Winder,  and  he  says  "  the  fiict  may 
be  fairly  presumed,  because,  if  General  Stansbury  had 
deserted  his  post  under  such  circumstances,  he  surely 
would  have  been  arrested."* 

This  incident  in  itself,  occurring  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  was  enough  wholly  to  disconcert  and  frustrate 
the  plans  of  any  general  who  had  a  plan.  Bladcns- 
burg was  the  most  defensible  position  that  General 
Stansbury  could  have  found,  if  that  was  all  that  he 
was  in  search  of,  and  a  stand  there  miglit  have  altered 
the  whole  fortunes  of  the  day  by  checking  the  advance 
of  the  enemy,  and  giving  time  to  bring  up  and  post 
the  main  body  of  the  army.f 

*  Vol.  i.,  p.  777. 

+  The  British  took  it  for  granted  that  Bladcnsburg  was  occupied; 
and  the  reasons  why  it  should  have  been,  as  General  Winder  appears 
to  have  intended  it  to  be,  arc  clearly  stated  by  one  of  their  writers, 
the  author  of  "/I  Subaltern  in  America,"  whose  work  Avas  republished 
in  the  Port  Folio  in  September  and  October,  1827.     lie  says : 

"  It  is  a  place  of  inconsiderable  size,  not  capable,  I  should  con- 
ceive, of  containing  more  than  1000  or  1500  inhabitants;  but  the 
houses  are,  for  the  most  i)art,  composed  of  brick,  and  thrre  is  a  mound 
on  the  right  of  the  entrance  very  well  adapted  to  hold  a  light  field- 
piece  or  two  for  the  jjurjjose  of  sweeping  the  road.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances, we  naturally  concluded  that  an  American  force  must  be 


I 


(11 


COUNCIL    OF    WAR. 


155 


Frederick  the  Great,  in  his  military  instructions  to 
his  gencrfil^,  tjuotes  and  endorses  a  saying  of  Prince 
Euo-ene,  tliat  a  general  who  wishes  to  avoid  a  battle 
need  only  call  a  council  of  war.  This  uniformity  of 
precedent  may  have  excused  General  Stansbury's 
council  of  war,  but  the  idea  of  holding  such  a  council 
to  debate  the  expediency  of  obeying  a  reiterated  order 
of  the  commander-in-chief  could  have  occurred  to  a 
militia  general  oidy.  The  night  preceding.  General 
Stansbury  had  been  urged  by  Colonel  ]\Ionroe  ''  to  fall 
forthwith  on  the  enemy's  rear,*'*  and  had  excused  him- 
self by  saying  that  he  had  been  ordered  to  take  post 
at  Bladensburg,  and  did  not  think  himself  at  liberty 
to  leave  it.  It  seems  strange  that  a  few  hours  should 
have  wrought  sucli  a  change  in  his  notions  of  duty  and 
subordination.  xVnd  what  2;ives  the  more  color  to  Gen- 
eral  Wilkinson's  supposition  that  General  Stansbury, 
in  this  direct  breach  of  orders,  committed  with  perfect 
impunity,  had  the  sanction  of  high  authority,  is  the 
fact  that  the  President  had,  the  night  before,  passed 
through  Bladensburg  on  his  return  to  Washington 
from  the  Old  Fields. f  Now  it  is  very  possible,  as  the 
President  appears  to  have  been  alarmed  at  the  divided 
position  of  the  army,  and  anxious  to  concentrate  it, 

here.  Though  out  of  the  rcjrular  line,  it  was  not  so  far  advanced  but 
that  it  mip;ht  have  been  maintained,  if  not  to  the  last,  at  all  events 
for  many  hours,  while  the  means  of  retreat,  so  soon  as  the  garrison 
should  he  fairly  overpowered,  were  dir^^t  and  easy.  Our  surprise, 
therefore,  was  not  less  ])alpable  than  our  satisfaction,  when,  on  reach- 
ing the  town,  we  found  that  it  was  empty." 

*  This  is  mentioned  by  Mr.  Monroe  in  his  statement  to  the  com- 
mittee, but  not  by  General  Stansbmy. 

+  See  Mr.  Kush's  Statement,  close  of  chap.  xiv. 


U' 


J' 


I 


K 

^ 


tMlSi. 


'i'' 


II 


;»i! 


i  ;' 


i!!i 


156     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE  OF  WASHINGTON. 

and  as  General  Armstrong  Iiad  that  morning  suggest- 
ed, in  his  presence,  to  General  Winder,  the  plan  of 
making  the  Capitol  the  point  of  defence,  tlie  President 
may  have  taken  an  opportmiity  to  intimate  to  General 
Stansbiny  the  expediency  of  drawing  nearer  to  Wash- 
ington, without  actually  directing  him  to  do  so. 


I 

f  I 

11 


If 


1 1' ' 

ii  I 


it" 


MR.  MONKOE   A   llECONNOITRER. 


157 


1)  'I 


t  i 


CHAPTER  IX. 

Results  of  the  Reconnoitring  Expedition  under  Mr.  Monroe. — Ad- 
vance of  the  Enemy  from  Benedict. — General  Winder  marches 
to  meet  him,  and  retreats  to  the  City. 

The  reconnoitring  expedition  of  Mv.  ]\Ionroe  to 
Ikncclict,  under  tlic  escort  of  a  body  of  t^\  .'nty-fivc  or 
thirty  dragoons,  resulted  in  no  useful  or  reliable  in- 
formation as  to  the  enemy's  nunibcrs  or  objects,  al- 
though he  arrived,  as  he  states,  at  10  o'clo  ;iv  on  the 
morning  of  the  20th  of  August,  "  in  sighi  of  the  ene- 
my's squadron  lying  before  Benedict,  and  continue  ■.  to 
be  a  spectator  of  their  movements  until  after  the  ac- 
tion at  Bladcnsburg  on  the  24th." 

In  fact,  ]\Ir.  IMonroe  could  hardly  have  advanced 
far  on  his  way  to  Benedict  when  the  idea  must  have 
struck  him  with  considerable  force  that  it  would  be 
imprudent  in  him  to  give  the  enemy  a  chance  of  boast- 
ing that  they  had  made  the  American  Secretary  of 
State  a  prisoner.  This  consideration  ought  to  have 
prevented  him  from  engap,'  irr  at  all  in  the  lirst  recon- 
noitring party,  whicli  was  the  most  important,  and 
from  which  the  others  probably  took  their  hue.  It 
should  have  been  intrusted  to  some  active,  enterpris- 
ing, and  intelligent  subordinate  officer,  to  whom  the 
commanding  general  could  have  given  his  orders  and 
instructions  freely,  who  would  have  felt  pride  in  re- 
turning with  prompt  and  useful  intelligence,  and  some 
chagrin  in  returning  without  any.     The  only  definite 


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it:; 

lit 


1/38     INVASION    AND    CAPTURK   OF    WASHINGTON. 

intelligence  which  ]Mr.  ]\Ionroe  appears  to  have  com- 
nmnicatcd  was  contained  in  a  brief  and  apparently  hur- 
ried dispatch  to  the  President,  the  exact  date  of  which 
does  not  appear,  but  which  General  Armstrong  says 
was  transmitted  to  him  bv  the  President  durinci:  the 
night  of  the  23d.     It  is  in  the  Ibllowing  words; 

"  The  enemy  arc  advanced  six  miles  on  the  road  to 
the  Wood  Yard,  and  our  troops  are  retiring.  Our 
troops  were  on  the  march  to  meet  them,  but  in  too 
small  a  body  to  engage.  General  Winder  proposes  to 
retire  till  he  can  collect  them  in  a  body.  The  enemy 
are  in  full  march  for  Washington.  Have  the  materi- 
als prepared  to  destroy  the  bridges. 

"J.  Monroe. 

"  You  had  better  remove  the  records." 

The  tone  of  this  dispatch  was  certainly  well  calcu- 
lated to  create  a  panic — to  raise  the  hair  on  the  heads 
of  all  to  whom  its  awful  import  was  whispered — as 
much  so  as  if  it  had  been  briefly  conveyed  in  the  four 
words,  "  Run  for  your  lives  I" 

The  oidy  individuals  who  appear  to  have  formed  a 
sober  and  judicious  estimate  of  the  number  of  the  en- 
emy were  the  revolutionary  veteran  Colonel  Beall, 
whom  we  have  already  mentioned,  and  Dr.  Hanson 
Catlett,  a  surgeon  of  the  regular  army,  who  was  at- 
tached to  General  Winder's  suite  as  statf  surgeon. 
Colonel  Beall  had  an  early  0})portunity  of  observing 
the  enemy's  colunm  in  march,  and  estimated  tlieir  num- 
ber at  4000,  which  the  event  verified.*     Dr.  Catlett 

*  Dr.  Catlett,  in  his  statcnu>nt  to  the  <iiiiiiuittoc,  says  that  he 
"  had  a  better  o')l)<>rtmiitv  of  obsei-vation  after  the  battle  tluiii  niiv 


•! 


ESTIMATES    OF    THE    ENEMY's    FORCE.  159 

says,  in  his  statement,  that  when  lie  returned  to  Wash- 
ington on  the  evening  of  the  2;kl  of  August,  lie  found 
that  "the  enemy  were  pertinaciously  represented  to  be 
at  least  9000,  and  many  were  supposed  to  believe 
their  number  greater;"'  but  that  he  had  examined,  with 
all  the  address  he  could,  several  prisoners  who  had 
been  taken  by  our  cavalry,  and  they  "  could  only  enu- 
merate four  regiments,  and  name  but  one  general  and 
one  colonel  actinix  as  brigadier ;"'  and  the  doctor  states 

o  CD  ' 

that  he  would  have  risked  his  life  upon  the  enemy's 
"almost  entire  want  of  artillery  and  waht  of  cavalry.'' 
The  opinion  of  Colonel  licall  ought  to  have  had  some 
weight,  on  account  of  his  military  experience;  that  of 
the  doctor,  founded  on  information  obtained  from  ig- 
norant or  iVightencd  prisoners,  was  naturally  little  re- 
garded, and,  at  all  events,  did  not  act  as  an  anodyne. 

other  of  our  ufliccrs,"  and  from  his  own  observation,  "  corrohoratcd 
in  the  agjjtre^atc  by  the  best  intorniatiun"  lie  "  couUl  j^et  from  the 
surgeons,  sergeants,  and  men  left  in  hospital,"  he  estimates  the  wholo 
number  of  the  Rritisli  at  ;5">40. 

The  following  statement  of  the  IJritish  force  laiuled  was  published 
in  Xiles's  Kegister.  vol.  vii.,  \).  11 : 

21st  liegiment KM);}  men. 

•Ith       do.  1st  battalion 800     " 

44th       do.  do iVAO     " 

85th      do.  do :r>0     '♦ 

Artillerists 90     " 

Marines  under  Admiral  Coekburn  I'lOO     " 

Seamen       do.  do.  3'»0     " 

'»1'.'.'?  men. 
A  portion  of  the  force  was  left  at  Marlborough,  and  jirobably  else- 
where, 

Glei.'.  the  autliorof  the  Campaign  at  Washington,  states  the  num- 
ber ut  1500;  the  Subaltern  in  Amoricu  savs  4000. 


If' 


li 


i%t 


\\. 


ii 
Ii 


160     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

In  a  statement*  attributed  to  Major  Thomas  L. 
McKenncy,  afterward  Superintendent  of  Indian  Af- 
fairs, who  is  referred  to  in  Cleneral  Winder's  narrative 
as  a  volunteer  aid  to  General  Smith,  it  is  said  that  on 
the  night  preceding  the  battle  the  intelligence  received 
"went  to  confirm  the  belief  that  the  enemy  were 
10,000  strong."  The  writer  refers  to  "the  most  iin- 
jparalldtd  dearth  of  correct  information  which  exist- 
ed," and  to  its  effects  upon  General  Winder's  move- 
ments, and  says : 

"AVitli  the  troops  myself  from  the  connnencement 
of  their  march  from  W^ashington,  from  the  nature  of 
my  office  a  good  deal  with  (ieneral  Winder,  I  consider 
myself  as  having  possessed  opportunities  of  judging  of 
the  quantity  of  praise  or  blame  that  should  justly  at- 
tach to  him  at  least  equal  to  those  of  any  other  officer 
not  attached  to  his  military  family. 

**  If  an  assurance  of  unremitted  zeal  and  activity 
will  rescue  him  from  any  portion  of  blame,  lie  pos- 
sessed them  to  an  extreme.  If  a  constant  use  of  the 
means  he  commanded  to  obtain  correct  information  of 
the  position,  and  numbers,  and  movements  of  the  ene- 
my will  rescue  him,  then  is  he  blameless.  lie  used 
them ;  but  they  were  cither  too  timid  to  approach  the 
enemy's  lines,  too  indifferent,  or  both  tlicse  together, 
to  furnish  him  with  the  information  wauled,  lie  de- 
pended ui)Oii  them,  as  he  could  not  help  doing,  thougli 
their  reports  wer(  ottnn  contradictory.  If  a  manifestly 
deep  interest,  night  watching,  and  great  personal  ac- 
tivity and  labor  will  restore  whatever  good  opinions 

*  Wo  fnul  this  stiitcnu'iit  in  the  I'ortici",  a  iiciiodioul  niuguzine 
pubUnheil  »t  B;iltiii<ort'  i'l  IHHJ,  vol.  v.,  ]>.  Mt;? , 


(  I 


I    ' 


SCANTY    INFOKMATION. 


161 


lie  may  liave  lost,  then  ought  he  to  be  reinstated  in 
those  good  opinions.  That  his  orders  were  given  and 
recalled  -with  a  suddenness  that  would  sometimes  sur- 
prise his  troops,  is  certain,  hut  they  were  founded 
upon  tlie  information  he  received  from  his  vedettes. 
In  fine,  his  misfortune  is  attributable  more  to  the  de- 
scription of  his  command,  its  general  rawness  and  un- 
fitness for  such  a  fight  as  he  saw  awaited  him  from 
tried  and  veteran  troops,  tlian  from  any  defect  in  his 
abilities  as  a  general.  He  was  hurried  in  among  his 
troops,  and  his  troops  in  upon  him,  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  lie  saw  his  forces,  and  he  saw  their  quality. 
Their  numbers  not  half  equal  to  those  he  was  destined 
to  oppose ;  for  such  was  his  information,  and  under 
this  belief  he  acted." 

At  5  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2l^d  of  .Vugust, 
according  to  (jJeneral  A\'inder*s  narrative,  the  enemy's 
force  "was  very  imperfectly  known,  the  opinions  and 
representations  varying  from  four  to  twelve  thousand;"' 
and  nothiiiLi'  occurred  between  that  time  and  the  battle 
to  tln'ow  any  additional  liglit  U})oii  the  subject. 

This  extraordinary  dearth  of  information,  and  the 
utier  barrenness  of  the  numerous  reconnoissances,  con- 
thuied  for  more  than  three  days,  would  be  incredible 
but  for  tlie  indisputable  and  cumulative  evidence  of 
the  fact;  and  it  is  the  more  astonishing,  because  tho 
enemy,  from  tlie  first,  gave  no  indications  of  havi?  g 
either  artillery  or  cavalry,  and  therefore  the  vcd(  ttes 
could  have  \cntuied  nearer  to  him.  Ft  was  most  un- 
fortunate that  correct  information  couUl  not  be,  or  was 
not  obtained,  as  it  wouhl  have  prevented  the  depress- 
ing effects  which  the  exaggerated  accounts  must  have 


4 

i 


f 


-rll 


M 


I 


162     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

had  upon  the  spirits  of  the  men.  A  knowledge  of  the 
enemy's  real  strength,  a  reduction  of  one  half  its  sup- 
posed number,  would  have  been  as  inspiriting  in  its 
effects  as  a  re-enforcement  on  our  side  to  tlie  same  ex- 
tent. General  Stansbury  might  have  been  willing  to 
await  at  J^ladensburg  tlie  approach  of  lour  thousand 
men,  though  he  naturally  hesitated  to  oppose  an  army 
of  eight  or  ten  thousand  disciplined  troops  with  a 
body  of  two  tliousand  inexperienced,  fatigued,  and  dis- 
pirited militia-men. 

The  absence  of  such  important  information  is  a  suf- 
ficient proof  that  the  enemy,  in  his  progress,  was  not 
only  not  harassed  or  molested,  but  not  watched,  and 
therefore  we  must  depend  pretty  much  on  their  own 
reports  for  an  account  of  their  movements. 

According  to  the  dispatches  of  Ross  and  Cockburn 
to  their  govcrnn^.ent,*  the  army  landed  at  Benedict  on 
the  19th  of  August  without  opposition,  and  on  the 
next  day  connnenced  its  march  toward  Xottiiigham, 
a  small  town  on  the  Patuxent,  about  fifteen  miles  north 
of  Benedict.  On  the  21st,  at  noon,  the  army  had  pro- 
ceeded no  farther  than  Lower  Marlborough,  nearly 
midway  betwM:!en  Benedict  and  Nottinsiham,  where  it 
halted  for  some  hours,  and  where  Cockburn,  who  had 
kept  his  boats  and  tenders  as  nearly  as  possible  abreast 
of  the  army,  anchored  for  the  purpose  of  communicat- 
ing witii  Ross.  The  army  then  resumed  its  march  lo 
Nottingliam,  and  Cockburn  jiroceeded  on  to  the  same 
place  with  the  boats.  "On  approaching  that  town," 
says  Cockburn,  "a  lew  shots  were  exchanged  between 

*  Thesii  dispatches  will  bo  found  in  Xilcs's  Kcgistcr,  vol.  vii.,  and 
also  in  the  Apjicndix  to  vol.  i.  of  Wilkinson's  Mcniuirs. 


THE   FLOTILLA   BLOWN   UP. 


163 


the  leading  boats  and  some  of  the  enemy's  cavalry, 
but  the  appearance  of  our  army  caused  them  to  retire 
with  precipitation." 

During  tiie  night  of  the  21st  the  enemy  remained  at 
Nottingham,  and  the  boats  and  tenders  were  anchored 
off  it ;  and  the  next  day,  soon  after  daybreak,  the 
whole  moved  forward  again. 

So  far  the  invaders  were  certainly  proceeding  very 
leisurely.  In  three  days  they  had  advanced  not  more 
than  fifteen  miles  from  the  place  of  debarkation,  had 
rested  quietly  each  night,  and  had  time  to  amuse  them- 
selves during  the  day  by  plundering  the  country  bor- 
dering on  their  line  of  march,  and  to  regale  themselves 
on  the  summer  fruits  and  melons. 

On  leaving  Nottingham,  tlie  enemy's  land  and  naval 
forces  no  longer  continued  to  move  parallel  with  each 
other.  Cockburn,  with  his  boats,  proceeded  up  the 
river  in  search  of  l^arney's  flotilla,  whicii  was  then  ly- 
ing near  ]\Iount  Pleasant,  about  nine  miles  from  Not- 
tingham. On  his  way  he  landed  some  marines  at  Pig 
Point,  where  they  found  a  large  quantity  of  tobacco, 
whi(!h  they  afterward  carried  off.  On  nearing  the  ilo- 
tilla,  he  savs,  the  sloop  bearino;  Commodore  Jiarnev's 
broad  })eiinant  was  found  to  be  on  tire,  and  soon  after- 
ward blew  u]\  "I  now  saw  clearly,"  he  continues, 
"that  they  were  all  abandoned  and  on  fire,  with  trains 
to  their  maf'-.izines  ;  and  out  of  the  seventeen  vessels 
which  composed  tliis  formidable  flotilla,  sixteen  were 


111  (|nu'k  succession  blown  to  atoms,  and  the  seven- 
teentli  (in  which  the  iire  had  not  taken)  we  cajifnred.*' 
The  tlotill.i  had  in  fact  been  abandoned  the  day  before 
(the  21st)  by  Cummodore  Barney,  under  orders  from 


"i 


v.f 


:iii 


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i 


;;i 


i,. 


164     INVASION   AND   CAPTIJKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

the  Secrctaiy  of  the  Navy,  a  few  men  being  left  in 
caeli  barge  to  destroy  tlieni  on  the  appearance  of  the 
enemy  in  force,  while  the  commodore  proceeded  with 
the  main  body  of  his  men  to  join  the  army  under  Gen- 
eral Winder. 

In  the  mean  time,  Ross,  on  leaving  Nottingham,  had 
taken  what  is  called  the  Chapel  Road  to  Upper  ]\Iarl- 
borough.  This  road  diverges  from  the  river,  and,  at 
a  few  miles  distance  from  Nottingham,  forks,  one 
branch  running  northward  to  j\Iarlborough,  and  the 
other  westward  to  Washington.  At  this  fork  or  junc- 
tion, a  movement  or  manoeuvre  took  place  on  Ross's 
part,  which  appears  to  have  been  a  source  of  great  em- 
barrassment to  General  W^inder,  whose  jn-oceedings, 
during  Ross's  march  from  Benedict,  we  sludl  now  take 
a  view  of. 

It  has  been  seen  that,  according  to  General  Arm- 
strong's statement,  on  the  day  that  advice  was  received 
in  W^ashington  that  the  enemy  was  ascending  the  Pa- 
tuxent.  General  Winder  was  instructed  "to  take  a  po- 
sition near  the  enemy,"  and  "on  the  22d  he  was  ad- 
vised to  hang  on  their  rear  and  flank  a  heavy  corps, 
while  he  opposed  to  them  another  in  their  front."  On 
the  19th  of  August,  according  to  M'Clane's  statement, 
published  by  Armstrong,  the  latter  advised  General 
Winder  to  'dissemble  as  larcfd  a  force"  as  possible, 
and  "  place  it  speedily  at  Nottinghrm,  or  other  point 
on  the  Patuxent." 

In  order  to  appreciate  tlie  tendency  of  the  course 
thus  advised  or  eommandiid,  it  will  be  necessary  to  re- 
cur to  the  leading  principles  of  the  art  of  war.  One 
of  the  fundamental  maxims  of  the  art  is  the  proverbial 


PlllNClPLi:«    OF    STRATEGY. 


16;j 


precept,  "  Divide  and  conquer"' — Divide  ct  imjjera — 
u  maxim  which  applies  in  other  matters  as  well  as  in 
war,  and  is  older  than  any  theory  of  strategy.  The 
talent  of  a  great  captain,  said  Frederick,  consists  in 
inducing  the  enemy  to  divide  his  forces.  Anotiier  mil- 
itary maxim,  the  crowning  principle  of  all  theories  of 
strategy,  is,  that  the  oLject  of  all  strategic  movements 
or  mana^ivres  should  he  "to  operate  a  combined  eftbrt 
with  the  greatest  possible  mass  of  force  upon  the  de- 
cisive p    lit."' 

*'  AVliat  is  war  ?"'  cried  Xapoleon.  "  .V  trade  of  l)ar- 
barians,  the  whole  art  of  which  consists  in  being  the 
strongest  on  a  given  point!*** 

It  must  also  be  Itorne  in  mind  that  there  are  two 
kinds  of  war  :  tlic  one  a  war  of  sieges  and  pitched  bat- 
tles, the  other  a  sort  of  guerrilla  warfare,  or  war  of  skir- 
mishes and  "small  attacks.*'  The  latter  is  the  resort 
chiefly  of  a  belligerent  who  is  too  weak  to  encounter 
his  enemy  in  a  pitched  battle.  It  rerpiires  a  particu- 
lar kind  of  troops,  hardy,  active,  and  enterprising ;  a 
subdivision  of  forces,  and  "a  multitude  of  command- 
ers," who  must  be  qualified  each  to  advise  himself,  to 
judge  of  the  advantages  of  time  and  position,  and  bo 
prompt  and  skilful  in  availing  themselves  of  them. 
It  is,  of  course,  the  kind  of  war  least  adapted  to  newly 
levied,  undisciplined  troops,  and  inexperienced  com- 
manders, habituated  only  to  the  routine  and  comforts 
of  a  peaceful  life. 

All  the  movements  of  the  government  prior  to  the 
canq)ai<?'n  show  that  they  had  it  in  contemplation  to 
meet  the  enemy  at  some  time  a;   '     ' 


V 


V 


Tlic  Count  dc  IScgnr's  Canii)ai<^n  in  Kussin,  book  vii.,  dm]),  viii. 


A 


!ii 


1 


■I   i; 


i 


166     TNVASION    AND    CAPTUKE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

battle.  General  Armstrong  himself,  in  his  statement 
of  the  opinions  whicii  lie  says  that  he  submitted  to  the 
cabinet  on  the  1st  of  July,  refers  to  a  "  main  battle" 
as  a  matter  of  course.  The  troops  "svhich  were  assem- 
bling in  dillercnt  quarters  were,  sooner  or  later,  to  be 
drawn  together  and  concentrated  at  some  ]!oiiit,  tiiough 
that  point  was  yet  undetermined.  No  one  iheamcd 
that  tlic  chief  reliance,  if  indeed  anv  rrllancc,  was  lo 
be  placed  on  a  guerrilla  warfare,  ibr  which  the  tioo})i5 
were  whoKy  unlit  ted. 

General  Winder,  therefore,  if  left  t(  '  im^ell",  m  uuld 
probably  have  been  governed  by  the  leading  principles 
of  stratea'v  wiiich  we  have  cited.  He  would  have  en- 
deavored,  particularly  as  his  Ibrcc  was  at  least  of  very 
doubtful  adequacy,  both  in  numbers  and  character,  to 
keep  his  own  army  united,  and,  if  possible,  to  divide 
that  of  the  enemy,  so  that  he  might  have  a  chance  of 
meeting  him  at  some  point  with  an  overpowering  force. 

The  course  which  General  xVrmstrong  instructed  him 
to  pursue  was  just  the  opposite  of  this,  and  was,  in 
fact,  playing  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  If  Ross, 
after  landing  at  Benedict,  had  been  informed  that  a 
large  force  was  preparing  to  meet  him,  but  that  it  was 
as  yet  divided,  one  moiety  of  it  being  at  Washington, 
and  the  other  at  Baltimore  or  its  vicinity,  his  proper 
course  Avould  have  been  to  hurry  his  movements  for 
the  purpose  of  encountering  and  overwhelming  one  or 
the  other  moiety  before  they  could  effect  a  junction. 
General  Armstrong's  plan  would  have  saved  Ross  the 
trouble  of  hurrying  liimself.  It  would  have  dispatched 
one  half  of  General  Winder's  army  by  a  forced  march 
to  Nottingham,  to  encounter  an  enemy  actually  more 


r 


I        ir 
I, 


GREAT    STRATEGIC    RULE    VIOLATED. 


167 


i 


f. 


than  twice  as  strong  in  numbers  alone,  leaving  disci- 
pline and  experience  out  of  the  question,  but  which 
was  supposed  to  be  four  or  five  times  as  numerous. 
The  result  must  necessarily  have  been  a  complete  de- 
feat or  a  hasty  retreat,  which,  in  its  ultimate  conse- 
quences, would  be  as  bad  as  a  defeat. 

The  event  in  this  case  was,  as  will  be  seen,  a  strik- 
ing exemplification  of  the  truth  of  the  great  strategic 
maxim,  and  of  the  folly  of  atlenq)ting  (o  ap})ly  other 
strategic  rules,  equally  sound  wlicn  avcH  applied,  to  a 
case  which  did  not  admit  of  their  np}»licntion.  The 
large  body  of  troo})s  which  General  Winder  was  di- 
rected to  dispatch  to  Xottingliam  was  not  a  body  of 
light  troops,  or  a  partisa'i  corps,  whicli  could  act  inde- 
pendently of  a  main  army  and  as  auxiliary  to  it,  but 
it  was  nearly  half  of  the  army  upon  which  he  was  to 
rely  for  the  defence  of  the  capital.  The  consequence 
was,  that  when,  after  much  trouble  and  fatigue,  it  had 
been  brought  within  striking  distance  o'  tlic  enemy, 
common  sense  dictated  the  necessity  of  a  retreat. 

It  w^as  most  unfortunate  that  (General  Winder  should 
have  been  persuaded  or  compelled  oven  to  attempt  a 
compliance  with  the  policy  dictated  to  him  by  Gener- 
al Armstrong.  But  had  he  been  inclined  to  pursue  a 
different  course,  it  is  probable  that  he  would  not  have 
been  permitted  to  adhere  to  it.  The  mass  of  mankind 
are  not  disposed  to  tolerate  a  Fabian  policy  or  "  mas- 
terly inactivity,"  ana  very  naturally,  because  it  is  much 
more  likely  to  be  the  result  of  sluggishness  or  timidity 
than  of  sagacious  foresight  and  calculation.  They  love 
and  admire  promptness,  energy,  and  determination. 
The  vicinity  of  danger,  too,  occasions  a  kind  of  excite- 


1 


$\ 


il  i 


ill 

'I 


k  I 


I  ii 


168      INVASION    AND   CAPTIKE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

ment  which  almost  irresistibly  impels  men  to  run  into 
it  if  they  can  not  run  away  from  it,  and  to  do  any  thing 
but  calmly  await  its  approacli.  Even  the  great  Na- 
poleon, who  enjoyed  so  fully  the  enthusiastic  confi- 
dence of  his  followers,  excited  distrust  and  clamor 
among  his  oldest  generals  when,  at  liorodino,  he  paused 
in  the  midst  of  victory  to  consider  consequences,  and 
expressed  a  desire  to  "see  a  little  further  on  the  chess- 
board 1)1  lore  he  hazarded  a  move."*  And  if  is  a  well- 
known  fact  that  Captain  Hull,  during  the  engagement 
between  the  Constitution  and  Cluerriere,  had  some  dif- 
ficulty in  repressing  an  almost  mutinous  s})irit  of  dis- 
content amonsr  his  officers  and  crew  because  he  chose 
to  reserve  his  fire,  while  the  enemy  was  pouring  broad- 
side after  broadside  into  his  vessel. 

Held  ( leneral  Winder  manifested  a  disinclination  to 
m.Tch  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  he  probably  would 
have  been  compelled  by  popular  clamor  to  resign  his 
command,  as  General  .Vrmstrong  wns  afterward  com- 
pelled, by  just  indignation  against  his  culpable  inac- 
tivity, to  resign  his  secretaryship.  No  one  censured 
General  AVinder's  advance  against  the  enemy,  which 
Avas  unnecessary,  and  pregnant  with  disastrous  conse- 
quences, but  all  M'erc  disposed  to  censure  his  retreat, 
which  was  unavoidable. 

It  will  be  unnecessary  to  take  more  than  a  cursory 
review  of  this  advance  and  retreat  to  show  how  bar- 
ren they  were  of  any  useful  or  interesting  result,  and 
of  how  little  importance  a  more  detailed  narrative  of 
them  would  be. 

The  brigade  of  District  militia  under  General  Smith 
*  The  Count  dc  Scgur. 


1 


I 


ADVANCE   OF  THE   AMEKICANS. 


WJ 


lac- 

•ccl 

licli 


ory 

)ar- 

aiid 

of 

ith 


left  the  Capitol  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2()(Ji  ot' August, 
takin-i-  the  road  for  Xottino-ham,  and  Iialt'd  for  the 
niii'ht   about   four  miles    from    the   Ka.st(?rn   liranch. 

CD 

*' They  Avere  here,"  says  General  Hmitli,  ''overtaken 
bv  their  ]ja2:2;a":c,  when  it  was  ascertained  there  was  a 
great  deficiency  of  necessary  camp  equipage,  the  pub- 
lic stores  being  exhausted  ;  many  of  tlic  troops  were 
compelled  to  lie  out  in  the  open  iield ;  and  of  the  es- 
sential article  of  Hints,  up(  a  requisition  of  one  thou- 
sand, only  two  hundred  could  be  had.  Means  were 
immediately  ado})ted  to  supply  the  latter  defect  from 
private  resources :  the  former  was  never  acconq)lislied." 
The  next  day,  Sunday,  "after  a  hot  and  fatiguing 
march,''  they  arrived  and  encanqied  at  the  Wood  Yard, 
about  tiftccn  miles  from  Washing-ton  and  twelve  from 
Jsottiiigliam,  wliere  they  Ibund  the  n^gulars  under 
Lieutenant-colonel  William  Scott,  and  other  troops, 
assembled,  in  all  about  iifteen  hundred  men. 

General  AVinder  also,  on  the  20th,  di.-patchcd  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Tilghman  with  his  squadron  of  dragoons, 
by  the  way  of  the  "\A''ood  Yard,  "  to  fall  down  upon 
the  enemy,  to  annoy,  harass,  and  impede  their  march 
by  every  possible  means,"  and  gain  intelligence,  and 
another  troop  of  volunteer  cavalry,  from  the  Gity  of 
Washington,  was  sent  for  the  same  purpose  toward 
Benedict  by  the  way  of  Piscataway,  it  being  uncer- 
tain which  way  the  enemy  would  take  if  he  intended 
to  advance  upon  Washington. 

On  Sunday,  the  2Lst,  Cieneral  Winder  joined  the 
force  at  the  Wood  Y'ard,  and  the  next  day,  about  sun- 
rise, he  ordered  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott's  command, 
Laval's  cavalry,  ^lajor  l\u>r's  artillery,  and  StuU  and 

11 


I 

J- 


f,] 


Mi:ii  :i 


!,  I 


■I 


170     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASTIINGTON. 

Davidson's  companies,  in  all  al)Out  800  o[  Jio  l)est 
troops  at  his  disposal,  to  proceed  ininicdiateh  to  Not- 
tinfj-Jiam  to  meet  the  encinv,  the  rest  of  the  force  beiiisr 
directed  to  follow  and  support  them.  General  Winder 
himself  proceeded  in  advance  of  the  first  Lody,  accom- 
panied by  his  staff  and  by  Colonel  ^lonroe,  and  upon 
arriving  within  half  a  mile  of  the  phiee  where,  as  wc 
have  said,  the  road  from  Xotting-ham  forks,  tliey  re- 
ceived intelligence  that  the  enemy  was  moving  in  force 
toward  the  junction.  They  continued  on  for  tiic  pur- 
pose of  gaining  an  observation  until  they  came  within 
view  of  the  enemy's  advance,  or  within  three  or  four 
Iiundrcd  yards  of  it.*  At  this  time  the  detachment 
under  Scott  and  Peter  was  about  two  miles  distant 
from  the  junction,  and  it  being  considered  impossible 
for  them  to  reach  it  before  the  enemy,  General  Winder 
dispatched  orders  to  them  to  retire,  post  themselves  in 
the  most  advantageous  position  tliey  could  fmd,  and 
wait  for  him.  In  the  mean  time,  the  troops  under 
General  Smith  had  arrived  within  tAvo  miles  oi'  the  ad- 
vance, and  the  whole  American  force,  then  within  four 
or  five  miles  of  the  enemy,  consisted,  including  Bar- 
ney's seamen  and  the  marines  from  the  Washington 
navy-yard,  with  five  pieces  of  heavy  artillery,  of  about 
2500  men. 

Eoss,  on  arriving  at  the  junction,  turned  into  the 
road  to  the  Wood  Yard  as  if  to  advance  upon  our 
troops,  and  proceeded  some  distance  upon  it ;  and  it 
must  have  been  at  this  time  that  Mr.  Monroe  addressed 
the  hurried  dispatch  to  the  President,  advising  him 
that  the  enemy  was  in  full  march  for  Washington,  and 

*  Dr.  Catlett's  statement. 


1 


? 


RETREAT. 


171 


)ur 

it 

icd 

Lim 

lid 


General  Winder  retiring  before  him.  Hut  Hosh,  after 
lialtiiiLT  an  hour  or  more  on  the  road  to  the  Wood 
Yard,  altered  the  direetion  of  liis  column,  and  turned 
into  the  road  to  ^Marlborough,  thus  renewing  General 
Winder's  uncertainty  as  to  his  purposes.  In  conse- 
quence, an  order  was  given  for  the  wliolc  force  to  re- 
tire, on  the  same  road  by  wliich  tliey  had  advanced,  to 
a  place  called  tiie  Long  or  Battalion  Old  Fields,  about 
ei2;ht  miles  from  Washincton. 

Tiiis  movement  in  advance,  theretbre,  resulted  in 
notiiiiiLi'  but  the  fatici-ue  and  discouragement  of  the 
troops.  It  "svas  judicious  in  General  Winder  to  avoid 
an  engaj2:ement,  because  his  force  Avas  wholly  insulli- 
cient.  But  that  was  known  before  the  movement  be- 
gan; and  if  it  was  wise  to  retire,  it  certainly  was  un- 
wise to  have  advanced.  In  reference  to  this  retrograde 
movement  Cieneral  Wilkinson  savs  : 

"  This  was  the  lirst  occasion  which  presented  for  a 
collision  of  arms,  and  ( Jcneral  A\'inder  was  present 
with  the  American  troops  ;  but,  if  a  fault  was  then 
committed,  he  sliould  not  be  held  responsible,  because 
he  was  attended  by  a  minister  of  the  cabinet  [Mr.  ]Mon- 
roe],  an  older  soldier,  by  whose  advice  he  was  doubt- 
less influenced  :  nor  is  he  to  be  blamed  for  fallinc:  back 
on  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  because  it  was  not  his 
policy  to  indulge  the  l^ritish  commander  in  a  general 
action  which  he  sought ;  indeed,  that  was  the  last 
great  error  of  President  Madison.  But  General  Win- 
der should,  in  my  judgment,  have  ordered  his  main 
body,  then  commanded  by  General  Smitli,  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia,  which  was  under  arms  near  the 
Wood   Yard   readv   for  combat,  to   have   c:ained   the 


I? 


•!     'i 


172      INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

heights  on  the  left  of  Charles's  Creek,  and,  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  had  resinned  th(,'ir  march  and  passed  Oden's, 
he  should  have  followed  them,  and  fallen  on  their  rear 
at  the  time  General  8iuitii  engaged  their  front,  or  when 
their  centre  had  passed  the  Creek  ;  bat  the  enemy  gave 
liim  a  more  favorable  opportunity  by  turning  to  their 
right  soon  after  they  had  passed  Bishop  Claggett's,  in 
order  to  communicate  with  the  flolillu  at  ]\lount  Cal- 
vert, on  a  road  so  Hanked  by  hills  and  ravines  that,  by 
a  viji'orous  attack,  their  rear  micj-ht  have  l)cen  broken 
and  cut  up  before  they  could  have  made  front  to  sup- 
port It.  Pent  up  in  such  narrow,  dilHcult  grounds,  and 
pressed  in  front  and  rear,  the  eflect  of  CJencral  Koss's 
discipline  and  numbers  would  have  been  impaired,  and 
he  must  have  been  crippled  before  he  could  have  ex- 
tricated himself,  while  the  iVmerican  corps,  with  the 
country  0})cn  behind  them,  could  have  wiMidrawn  at 
discretion,  and,  altliou2;h  the  cnemv  miu'ht  have  c;ain- 
ed  U})pcr  ^Marlborough,  it  wouhl  have  terminated  their 
advance.  This  is  speculation,  but,  whatever  may  be 
its  merits,  1  know.thc  corps  of  Scott  and  I'ctcr  pant- 
ed for  action,  and  they  siiouhl  have  been  indulged;  in 
such  circumstances,  blood  judiciously  expended  excites 
emulation  and  inspires  courage. 

"But  (}eneral  Winder  fell  back  on  his  main  body 
near  the  Wood  Yard,  from  whence  he  retired  to  en- 
camp at  the  Long  Old  Fields,  and,  like  all  retrograde 
movements  in  the  face  of  an  enemy,  this  disheartened 
his  men  and  oflicers.'' 

In  indulging  in  tliese  speculations,  General  "Wilkin- 
son does  not  seem  to  have  recollected  tiie  anecdote 
with  which,  in  another  part  of  his  book,  he  satirizes  a 


•** 


(;i:ni:ral  winders  policy  nisfrssEi). 


IT'? 


<•> 


)0(ly 
en- 
ado 
iK'd 


speculation  of  Secretary  Armstrong  "  in  his  caLiiiet 
at  a  thousand  miles'  distance."  ''  1  think,"'  said  the 
minister  to  Eugene,  "you  might  have  crossed  the  riv- 
er at  this  point,"'  tracing  the  route  on  a  map  with  his 
fiiTT-er.  "  Yes,  my  lord,  it'  your  iinger  had  been  a 
bridge." 

If  Cleneral  Winder  could  have  known  that  the  ene- 
my would  turn  to  the  right  after  passing  Bishop  Clag- 
gett's,  and  that  he  would  then  be  certain  to  catch  them 
in  a  delilc  where  they  could  be  "  pressed  in  front  and 
rear,"  and  cripi)led,  not  to  say  cat  to  pieces,"  before  they 
could  extricate  themselves,  it  would  have  been  inex- 
cusable in  him  not  t(j  avail  himself  of  the  opportuidty. 
But  if,  as  Ciencral  Wilkinson  admits,  it  was  not  Cien- 
eral  Winder's  policy  to  indulge  the  British  connnand- 
cr  in  a  general  action,  it  was  not  his  policy  to  run  the 
risk  of  being  forced  into  a  general  action  by  following 
the  enemy,  and  still  less  his  policy  to  divide  the  small 
force  under  his  connnand,  in  the  vain  hope  of  being 
able  to  make  a  successful  sinudtaneous  attack  on  the 
cnemv's  front  and  rear. 

It  is  very  true  that  an  enemy  on  his  mareli  may 
be  greatly  harassed  and  eri])pled  l)y  smaller  numbers. 
But  this  can  be  safely  attempted  oidy  when  the  small- 
er nmnbers  are  suitable  for  the  purpose,  can  be  spared, 
and  are  not  needed  for  ulterior  operations.  If  (ieneral 
Winder  had  known  the  nunjbers  and  cfjuipnient  of  the 
cncmv,  and  been  furnished,  instead  of  volunteer  city  ri- 
flemen,  armed  with  muskets,  with  three  hundred  West- 
ern ritlenuMi,  accustomed  to  busli-tighting,  as  many 
well-trained  and  CAperieneed  dragoc^ns,  and  Peter's  ar- 
tillery, these  alone  might  have  enabU'd  him,  in  such  a 


s 


)«' 


f 

/I 


ttt% 


-»«M 


i 


174      INVASION    AND   CAPTUKi:    OF    "WASHINGTON. 

country,  to  drive  the  British  back  to  their  shipping  at 
Benedict.  There  would  probably  have  been  no  need 
of  any  other  army,  lint  he  no  more  had  these  means 
than  Prince  Eugene  had  the  bridge  at  the  spot  pointed, 
out  by  the  minister. 

Still,  it  does  not  appear  that,  on  this  occasion,  Gen- 
eral \\'indcr  Avas  determined  to  avoid  a  collision,  or 
that  he  retreated  from  a  pursuing  enemy.  It  was  nec- 
essary, in  order  to  give  his  troops  any  chance  of  mak- 
ing a  successful  stand,  that  they  sliould  retire  to  a 
suitable  position,  and  tlicy  were  not  ordered  to  aban- 
don that  position,  and  fall  back  still  farther,  until  it 
was  ascertained  that  the  cncmv  was  not  advancini>:  to- 
ward  them,  but  had  taken  the  road  to  ]\larlborou'jh. 

o 

lioss  arrived  v.t  ^MarlborouL'h  about  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  of  the  -2d,  and  renuiined  there  until  tho 
same  hour  the  next  da} ,  having,  of  course,  abundant 
time  to  rest  and  refresh  his  troops,  and  being  perfectly 
unmolested.  Tiiey  employed  themselves  in  securing 
and  sending  off  tobacco  and  other  plunder.  On  tlio 
mornini-'*  of  the  2^5(1  Cockburn  crossed  from  Pin:  Point 
to  3Iarlborou!j;h,  to  meet  and  confer  with  Koss  as  to 
farther  ojiorations,  and  they  were  not  long,  he  says,  in 
ngr(H'ing  on  the  propriety  of  making  an  innnediate  at- 
tejiipt  on  Wasliington.  The  marines,  marine  artillery, 
and  scNiuKMi  wiM'c  l)r()Ught  over  from  I'ig  Point,  and  it 
was  arranged  that  the  marines  siiould  remain  and  keej) 
possession  of  Marlborongh,  whih'  the  marine  artillery 
and  seamen  aecompanieil  the  army. 

(Jeneral  Winder,  wlio  h;id  been  aelivelv  emploved 
witli  the  eaviilrv,  near  Marlborough,  in  observation  of 
the  enemy,  retired,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  22d,  to 


'i 


DISORDER   OF   THE   CAMP. 


175 


10 


the  Long  Old  Fields,  where  his  troops  were  encamped. 
Soon  atu-r  his  arrival,  he  was  iulbnncd  that  the  Pres- 
ident and  heads  ot'd('})artments  had  arrived  at  a  house 
about  a  inilu  in  the  rear  of  t lie  camp,  and  he  detached 
a  ca})tain's  guard  to  their  quarters,  but  was  himself 
too  much  overwhelmed  with  bu.siness  to  wait  upon  tlic 
President  until  next  morning,      lie  says: 

"  .Vltcr  having  waded  through  the  intinitc  applica- 
tions, consultations,  and  calls  necessarily  arising  from 
a  body  of  -500  men,  not  three  days  from  their  homes, 
without  organization,  or  any  practical  knowledge  of 
service  on  the  part  of  their  otlicers,  and  being  obliged 
to  listen  to  the  ollicious  but  well-intended  intbrmation 
and  advice  of  tiie  crowd,  who,  at  such  a  time,  would  be 
full  of  both,  I  lav  down  to  snatch  a  momcur  of  rest." 

(ieneral  AVilkinson  (juotes  from  an  unnamed  oflicor, 
who  pa.^.-ed  the  night  of  the  22d  at  the  Old  Fields, 
the  iuUowing  account  of  the  camp: 

"  The  camp  was  as  open  all  night  as  a  race-field, 
and  the  sailors  and  militia  were  as  noisy  as  if  at  a  fair; 
vou  miciht  hear  the  countersiiTa  iifty  vards  when  a  sen- 
try  challenged.  1  nuide  U[)  :;  v  mind  that  if  Koss, 
whose  camp  I  had  reconnoitre  i  in  t!ie  evening,  was  a 
man  of  enterpri.-c,  he  ^^ou!d  be  upon  us  in  the  course 
of  the  night,  and,  being  detTPibicd  ti  lie  like  a  troop- 
er's horse,  I  slept  with  n>}  shoes  on."' 

The  desperate  frame  of  mind  which  would  induce  a 
man  to  sleep  with  his  shoes  on  is  not  liivoiable  to  cool 
retlectioii ;  but  even  Ciencral  A\'ilkinson,  writing  coolly 
in  iiis  closet,  alter  rel'erring  to  the  "■extraordinary  m*'.- 
langc"  encamped  at  the  Old  Fields,  says  that,  "  with 
this  disorganized  body,  (^icneral  AVindcr  rashly  kept 


1 


Iflf 


'.>» 


r 


17G     INVASION   AND    CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

lii.s  position  during  the  niglit,  within  eiglit  miles  of 
4000  or  5000  veteran  troops,  who  oiiglit  to  have  niarch- 
ccl  upon  and  routed  him.*'  Yet  CJcncral  Wilkinson 
would  have  had  CJencral  AVinder  attack  the  same  body 
of  veteran  troops  with  little  more  than  halt'  the  num- 
ber of  men  which  he  had  at  the  C)ld  Fields.  (Icucral 
Winder,  it  seems,  was  not  adventurous  cnougli  hi  the 
morning,  and  too  rash  at  night,  «''.nd  vice  vernd  with 
CJencral  ]{oss.  A  military  critic  is  the  Iiardest  of  all 
critics  to  satisfy.  Perhaps  (Jeucral  Winder,  with  pa- 
trols out  in  every  direction;  and  the  enemy  with  none, 
cntertainc<l  no  serious  apprehensions  of  a  night  attack 
from  troops  eight  miles  distant. 

To  add  to  the  fati<2:uc  and  discourawmcnt  of  the 
army  at  the  Old  l"'ields,  the  troops  were  roused  about 
2  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  2i>d  by  a  false  alarm 
from  a  sentinel,  were  formed  in  order  of  battle,  and 
when  dismissed,  were  ordered  to  hold  themselves  ready 
for  their  posts  at  a  moment's  warning.  This  was  the 
second  successive  night  that  they  had  l^een  needlessly 
deprived  of  their  rest.  Shortly  after  daybreak  orders 
were  jriven  to  strike  the  tents,  load  the  bafrii'ajje-wai;- 
ons,  and  have  all  in  readiness  to  move  hi  llie  course 
of  an  hour.  The  troops  were  then  got  under  ar?ns, 
and  Avere  reviewed  by  llie  J^resident  and  suite. 

At  I)  o'clock  A.  ]M.,  it  being  ascertained  that  the 
enemy  was  still  stationary,  and  gave  no  indications  of 
a  move  in  any  direction  from  Alarlborougii,  (icneral 
Winder  formed  the  resolution  to  concentrate  near  ^larl- 
borough  all  the  troops  vvithin  his  r(>aeh.  lie  therefore 
sent  ordrrs  to  ( Jeneral  Stansliury,  who,  as  we  have  seen, 
had  arrived  a*  Uladcnsburg  the  iiight  before,  to  march 


I 


f 


MOVEMENTS    OF   THE    TUoOPS. 


177 


his  Lriii'aclc,  logcther  \villi  the  troops  under  Licutcn- 
anl-coloiiel  Stcrctt,  if  iIkt  luul  joined  Jiiin,  slowly 
toward  .Marlborough,  aud  take  a  position  in  the  road 
at  a  point  seven  miles  from  that  plaec  and  four  from 
the  Old  Fields.  The  same  direetion  was  to  he  given 
to  the  troops  arriving  i'roni  Annapolis  under  Licuten- 
ant-eolonel  Beall,  so  soon  as  he  eould  be  conmuini- 

eated  with.     A  detaehnicnt  Irom  (ienenil  Smith's  Itriir- 

o 

ade,  under  ]\Iajor  Peter,  eomposcd  of  the  same  coni})a- 
nies  as  the  detaehment  of  the  preeeding  day,  was 
ordered  to  move  in  the  direction  of  ^Mavlborough,  re- 
connoitre the  enemy,  approach  him  as  near  as  possi- 
ble without  running  too  much  risk,  and  annoy  him 
whether  lie  should  be  stationary  or  in  motion. 

General  Winder  himself,  about  noon,  with  a  troop 
of  LaNal's  ca\alry,  proceeded  toward  JUadensburg  for 
the  purpose  of  having  an  interview  with  Stansbury, 
but  Avhen  within  four  or  tivc  miles  from  that  place, 
which  is  about  ten  miles  from  the  Old  Fields,  was 
overtaken  by  ^lajor  MeKenncy,  with  intelligenec  that 
Major  I'cter  had  skirmished  with  the  enemv,  who  had 
driven  him  back,  and  Avas  then  halted  within  three 
miles  of  the  C)ld  Fields;  that  CJeneral  Suiiih  had, 
agreeably  to  orders,  sent  oft'  the  baggaae  across  the 
Eastern  l>ranch,  and  his  troops,  togetlier  with  Com- 
modore Barney's  men,  were  drawn  up  ready  to  receive 
the  enemy,  should  he  make  an  attack. 

Upon  receiving  this  intelligence,  (icneral  Winder 
sent  orders  to  General  Stansbury  to  I'all  back,  take  the 
best  position  he  could  with  Sterett  in  front  of  Bhi- 
densburg,  resist  as  long  as  possible  if  attacked,  and,  if 
driven  from  his  position,  to  retreat  toward  the  city. 

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178     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

lie  then  retraced  his  steps  to  tlic  Old  Fields,  wliicli 
he  reached  about  5  P.M.,  and,  as  he  says,  found  Smith 
and  Barney  judiciously  posted,  awaiting  the  enemy. 
They  continued  in  this  position  till  near  sundown, 
when  it  was  determined  to  retire  across  the  Eastern 
Branch  Bridge.  The  reasons  for  this  move  are  thus 
stated  by  General  Winder : 

"  31y  reason  for  not  remaining  at  the  Old  Fields 
during  the  night  was,  that,  if  an  attack  should  be  made 
in  the  night,  our  own  superiority,  which  lay  in  artil- 
lery, was  lost,  and  the  inexperience  of  the  troops  would 
subject  them  to  certain,  infallible,  and  irremediable 
disorder,  and  probably  destruction,  and  theicby  occa- 
sion the  loss  of  a  full  half  of  the  force  which  I  could 
hope  to  oppose,  under  more  favorable  circumstances, 
to  the  enemy. 

"The  reasons  for  retiring  by  the  Eastern  Branch 
bridge  were  the  absolute  security  it  gave  to  that  pass, 
the  greater  facility  of  joining  (iencral  Young  and  aid- 
ing in  the  protection  of  Fort  AVashington,  the  greater 
facility  of  pursuing  the  enemy  should  he  recede  and 
proceed  to  Annapolis,  and  the  certainty  that  1  could 
draw  General  Stansbury  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Ster- 
ctt  to  me  if  the  enemy  advanced  too  rapidly  for  me  to 
advance,  and  unite  to  support  them." 

It  a]it)ears  that  this  retrograde  movement,  however 
judiciously  resolved  on,  was  somewhat  precipitately 
executed.  My.  Jr'  n  J  w,  a  respectable  citizen  of 
Washington,  says,  lu  his  statcmevt  to  the  committee, 

"Although  our  ;i:,irch  in  the  retreat  was  extremely 
rapid,  yet  orders  were  occasionally  given  to  the  ca])- 
tains  of  companies  to  hurry  on  their  men.     The  march, 


! 


. 


HARDSHIPS. 


170 


therefore,  literally  became  a  run  of  eight  miles ;  and  the 
proprietv  of  this  rapid  movement,  which  unnecessarily 
fatigued  and  dispirited  the  men,  nu\y  be  tested  by  tlic 
fact  that  the  main  body  of  tiie  enemy  bivouacked  that 
niirht  on  the  3Ielwood  estate,  more  than  three  miles 
distant  from  the  ground  we  had  left." 

General  tSmith  says  that  the  troops,  "much  wea- 
ried and  exhausted,  encamped  late  at  night''  witlnn  the 
city   and  continues : 

"  Thus  t(M'niinated  the  four  days  of  service  of  the 
troops  of  this  District  preceding  tlie  afl'air  at  IMadens- 
burg.  Tlioy  had  been  under  arms,  with  but  little  in- 
termission, the  whole  of  the  time,  botli  niglit  and  day; 
had  traveled,  during  their  different  marches  in  advance 
and  retreat,  a  considerable  tract  of  country,  exposed  to 
the  burning  heat  of  a  sultry  sun  by  day,  and  many 
of  them  to  the  cold  dews  of  the  night,  uncovered. 
They  had,  in  this  period,  drawn  but  two  rations,  the 
requisition  therefor,  in  the  first  instance,  being  but 
partially  complied  with,  and  it  being  afterward  al- 
most impossible  to  procure  the  means  of  transporta- 
tion, the  wagons  em])loyed  by  our  quarter-master  for 
that  purpose  being  constantly  impressed  by  the  gov- 
ernment agents  for  the  purpose  of  removing  tiic  pub- 
lic records,  when  the  enemy's  approach  was  known, 
and  some  of  them  thus  seized  while  proceeding  to  take 
in  provisions  for  the  nriny. 

*'  Those  hardships  and  ])r' vat  ions  could  not  but  bo 
severely  distressing  to  men,  tiic  greater  part  of  whom 
possessed  and  enjoyed  at  lionie  the  means  of  comfort- 
able living,  and  from  their  usual  habits  and  pursuits 
in  life  but  ill  qualified  to  endure  them.      They,  how- 


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180       INVASION   AND    CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

ever,  submitted  without  murmuring,  evincing  by  their 
patience,  their  zeal,  and  tlie  promptitude  with  wliich 
they  obeyed  every  order,  a  magnanimity  highly  hon- 
orable to  their  character.  Great  as  was  their  merit 
in  this  respect,  it  was  no  less  so  in  the  spirit  mani- 
fested whenever  an  order  was  given  to  march  to  meet 
tlic  foe;  and  at  the  'Long  Old  Fields,'  where  his  at- 
tack was  momently  expected  in  overwhelming  force, 
they  displayed,  in  presence  of  many  spectators,  al- 
though scarce  any  of  them  had  ever  been  in  action,  a 
firnmess,  a  resolution,  and  an  intrepidity  which,  what- 
ever might  have  been  the  result,  did  honor  to  their 
country." 

The  troops  under  General  Stansbury,  at  Bladens- 
burg,  on  the  night  of  the  23d  and  morning  of  the  24th, 
were  in  no  better  condition  than  those  who  had  retired 
from  the  Old  Fields.  Stansbury  represents  them  as 
"worn  down  with  hunger  and  fatigue."  They  were 
under  arms  the  whole  night,  with  the  exception  of 
aboiit  an  hour,  their  only  provision  salt  beef  of  an  in- 
ferior (piality,  and  old  and  nmsty  flour,  and  no  time  to 
cook  that. 

Laval^  represents  his  cavalry  as  having  been  on  con- 
stant duty,  in  reconnoitring,  patrolling,  and  escorting, 
from  the  afternoon  of  the  21st  until  11  at  night  of  the 
23d,  when  they  reached  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge, 
*'  both  men  and  horses  hunfirv  and  harassed  with  fa- 
tigue,"  and  remained  in  that  condition  until  10  o'clock 
the  next  morning.  Tlicy  then  succeeded  in  procuring 
a  stack  of  hay,  and  the  men  were  in  the  act  of  fetch- 
ing it  on  their  heads  to  feed  their  famished  horses, 
*  StHtonient  to  the  comniittco. 


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CONDITION    OF    INVADING    TROOrS. 


181 


i 


wlien  the  trumpet  sounded,  and  they  were  compelled 
to  drop  it  and  mount,  a  number  of  the  horses  being 
unable  to  proceed. 

Such  was  the  sovry  Ji  nale  of  the  strategic  move- 
ments of  the  four  days  preceding  the  battle  of  Bladens- 
burg,  the  useful  results  being  about  the  same  as  those 
of  the  exploit  of  the  King  of  France,  who, 

'•with  twenty  tliousand  men, 
Marched  up  a  lull,  and  tlu'ii  niarched  down  aifain." 

The  British  writers,  in  their  account  of  this  cam- 
paign, enormously  exaggerate  the  diliiculties  and  dan- 
gers which  they  encountered,  in  order,  of  com-se,  to  en- 
hance the  glory  of  their  achievement.  But,  up  to  the 
moment  of  the  battle,  they  specify  no  dangers  or  difficul- 
ties, and,  as  we  have  seen,  they  could  have  encounter- 
ed none.  They  complain  of  the  exhausting  eftects  of 
the  intense  heat  upon  men  who  had  been  enervated  by 
long  confinement  on  shipboard.  There  was,  no  doubt, 
some  truth  in  this  ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  release 
from  such  confinement  tended  to  refresh  and  strength- 
en them,  notwithstanding  temporary  suflering,  and  it 
is  so  stated  by  one  of  their  writers.*  He  says  that, 
to  the  army,  "  the  prospect  of  a  few  days'  sojourn  upon 
their  own  clement  was  in  the  highest  degree  animat- 
ing and  delightful,*'  and  he  represents  the  men,  after 
landing  at  Benedict,  some  ''lying  at  full  Icn-^th  upon 
the  grass,  basking  in  the  beams  of  a  sultry  sun,  and 
apparently  made  ha})py  by  the  very  feeling  of  the 
green  sod  under  them.  Others  were  running  and 
leaping  about,  giving  exercise  to  the  limbs  which  had 
so  long  been  cramped  and  confined  on  board  ship." 

*  Tlu>  Suliidteni  in  Amorica. 


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182      INVASION    AND    CAPTl'RE   OF   WASHlA'GTaN. 

After  tlie  night  spent  at  ^larl borough,  he  says,"  Fresh, 
and  in  excellent  spirits,  we  rose  next  morning,  and, 
having  stood  the  usual  time  with  our  men,  bt'L  an  to 
consider  how  we  should  most  profitably  and  agreeably 
spend  the  day."  They  were  abundantly  suppl;  :d  with 
provisions.  He  says,  "  The  attacks  wliicli  they  from 
time  to  time  made  upon  farm-}ards  and  pig-styes  were, 
to  a  certain  degree  at  least,  allowable  enough.  It 
would  have  been  unreasonable  to  expect  tha!  hungry 
soldiers,  in  an  enemy's  country,  would  sit  down  to  di- 
gest their  hunger,  while  flocks  of  poultry  and  herds  of 
swine  wore  within  their  reach.  And  then,""  he  con- 
tinues, "with  respect  to  tobacco,  that  principal  delica- 
cy of  soldiers  u])on  active  service,  there  was  no  reason- 
able cause  for  scarcity  or  complaint.  ....  To  sum  up 
all,  the  quarter-master  arriving  soon  after  the  halt  with 
stores  of  bread  and  rum,  an  additional  allowance  of 
both  was  served  out,  as  well  to  the  men  as  to  the  of- 
icers. 

Accordin'.!;  to  their  own  account,  they  rested  all  night 
bet\\e<"n  Benedict  and  Nottingham,  all  night  at  Not- 
tingham, all  night  at  Marlborough,  and  all  night  at 
their  bivouac  near  the  Long  Old  Fields,  with  nothing 
to  disturb  their  repose  or  self-complacency  at  cither 
place ;  so  that,  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  they  ought 
to  have  been,  and  no  doubt  were,  fresh,  alert,  and  buoy- 
ant in  spirit,  while  o'lr  troops  were  just  the  reverse. 

Such  were  the  ridiculous  and  mischievous  results  of 
the  attempt  to  apply  abstract,  theoretic  principles  of 
warfiire,  without  considering  the  circumstances  under 
which  they  were  to  be  applied,  and  of  attempting  to 
guard  half  a  dozen  avenues  of  approach  with  a  force 


REFLECTIONS. 


183 


» 


insufficient  to  guard  one.  Why  not  have  made  a 
choice  of  evils,  it'  necessary,  and  selected  sonic  one 
jjoint  which,  under  all  the  circumstances,  might  prom- 
ise the  most  advantages,  if  they  were  but  few,  concen- 
trated the  troojjs  upon  that,  and,  instead  of  harassing 
them  with  fruitless  forced  marches  and  countermarch- 
es, husbanded  their  strength,  attended  to  their  wants, 
and  employed  every  moment  to  improve  their  eflicien- 
cy?  Surely  some  posi'  '>n  miglit  have  been  found 
within  so  limited  a  the-Hj-e  of  operations  which  the  en- 
cmv,  whatever  his  dcsii  ■.  would  have  been  afraid  to 
leave  gathering  streni;,..  on  his  rear  or  flanks,  and 
which  he  would  have  been  compelled  to  attack  under 
disadvantages,  or  abandon  his  object. 


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184     INVASION   AND    CArTL'KE   OF    WASHINGTON. 


CHAPTEE  X. 

Cabinet  Council  at  General  AVinder's  Head-quarters  at  the  Eastern 
Brancli  IJrid;j;c. — The  Secretary  of  War  has  no  Advice  or  Plan  to 
ofler. — The  (Secretary  of  State  undertakes  to  arrange  the  Order  of 
Battle. 

It  might  be  sujDposcd  that  on  the  24th  of  August, 
if  not  before,  the  danger  of  the  capture  of  the  city  was 
sufficiently  imminent  to  stimulate  to  the  utmost  the 
patriotism  and  intelligence  of  the  high  officers  of  the 
government,  and  induce  them  to  lay  aside,  for  a  time 
at  least,  their  petty  jealousies  and  rivalries,  and  co-op- 
erate cordially  and  energetically  for  the  sake  of  avert- 
ing a  disaster  which  would  implicate  all. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Mr.  Campbell,  in  his 
letter  to  the  connnittee,  says  that  the  retreat  of  Gen- 
eral Winder  to  the  city  "  occasioned,  as  may  be  read- 
ily supposed,  considerable  agitation  in  the  minds  of 
the  citizens."  And  well  it  might.  The  enemy  was 
within  three  hours'  march  of  the  city;  his  force  was 
estimated  at  nine  or  ten  thousand  men,  wliile  ours  con- 
sisted of  only  half  that  number  ;  his  troops  were  ex- 
perienced and  well-disciplined  regulars,  ours  militia- 
men and  raw  recruits ;  they  were  united  in  a  single 
body,  wliile  ours  were  divided  into  two  corps,  suffi- 
ciently distant  from  each  otlier,  and  yet  each  sufficient- 
ly near  the  enemy  to  make  it  highly  perilous  to  delay 
their  junction  a  moment  longer,  and  yet  it  was  uncer- 


ADVANTAGES  OF  THE  ENEMY. 


185 


tain  at  what  point  the  juncLion  ought  to  take  phice. 
The  enemy,  free  from  all  doubt  as  to  his  own  destina- 
tion, had  been  steadily  advancing,  concentrated  and 
governed  by  a  single  will;  our  army  had  been  retreat- 
ing, was  disunited,  and  its  movements  evidently  sub- 
ject to  the  control  of  several  discordant  minds,  or  some 
one  unsettled  and  capricious  mind.  They  were  stim- 
ulated by  the  hope  of  a  victory  which  would  redound 
to  their  fame  throughout  Euro2)e,  and  their  licentious 
soldiery  looking  eagerly  forward  to  a  gratiiication  of 
brutal  propensities,  in  which  it  was  apprehended  that 
their  ofhccrs  would  rather  encourage  than  check  them; 
our  troops  were  depressed  by  the  presentiment  of  a 
defeat  whicli  would  bring  shame,  merited  or  unmerit- 
ed, both  upon  themselves  and  tlieir  country,  would  ex- 
pose their  property  to  pillage  and  destruction,  and, 
worse  than  all,  their  wives  and  sisters  to  insult  and 


outra2;e. 


The  protracted  and  unavailing  bodily  fatigue  and 
anxiety  of  mind  which  General  Winder  had  under- 
gone during  the  preceding  week  would  have  unfitted 
most  men  for  further  mental  or  physical  exertion,  and, 
to  add  to  his  ditiiculties,  he  had,  during  the  night  of 
the  23d,  received  a  severe  fall  while  engaged  in  the 
performance  of  necessary  and  urgent  duties. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th  lie  addressed  the  fol- 
lowing note  to  the  Secretary  of  War : 

*'  Ilcail  quarters,  Comhs',  ncnr  the  Eastcrvj  I^randi  nriil;;o,\ 
Wednesday  inoniiii^',  24tli  of  Au^riist,  1814.  ) 

"  Sir, — r  have  found  it  necessary  to  ostabHsIi  my 
hcad-(juarters  here,  the  most  advanced  position  conven- 
ient to  the  troops  and  nearest  information.      I  shall 


r 


186  INVASION  AND  CAPTURE  OF  WASHINGTON. 

remain  stationary  as  much  as  possible,  that  I  may  be 
the  more  readilv  found,  to  issue  orders  and  collect 
together  the  various  detachments  of  militia,  and  give 
them  as  rapid  a  consolidation  and  organization  as  pos- 
sible. 

"  With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

"  Wm.  H.  Winder, 
"  Brig. -gen.  commanding  10th  Mil.  Dist. 
"The  Hon.  Secretary  of  AVar. 

"P.S. — The  news  up  the  river  is  very  threatening. 
Barney's  or  some  other  force  should  occupy  the  bat- 
teries at  Grcenleaf's  Point  and  the  Navy-yard.  I 
should  be  glad  of  the  assistance  of  counsel  from  your- 
self and  the  government.  If  more  convenient,  I  should 
make  an  exertion  to  go  to  you  the  first  oi)portunity." 

On  the  back  of  this  letter,  according  to  the  report 
of  the  committee,  the  following  memorandum  was  en- 
dorsed in  the  handwriting  of  Secretary  Armstrong : 

*' Went  to  General  Winder;  found  there  the  Pres- 
ident ;  i\Ir.  Monroe  had  also  been  there,  but  had  set  out 
to  Bladensburg  to  arrange  the  troops  and  give  them  an 
order  of  battle,  as  I  understood ;  saw  no  necessitv  for 
ordering  Barney  to  Greenleaf's  Point  or  Navy-yard. 
Advised  the  commodore  to  join  the  army  at  Bladens- 
burg,  and  ordered  ]\Iinor's  regiment  to  that  place.  Ad- 
vised General  AVinder  to  leave  Barney  and  the  Balti- 
more brigade  upon  the  enemy's  ''oar  and  right  flank, 
while  he  put  himself  in  front  '  all  the  rest  of  his 
force.  Repeated  this  idea  in  my  letter  to  him  of  the 
22d." 

When  General  Winder's  note  was  written,  he  was 


GENERAL   ARMSTRONG  S   ADVICE. 


187 


not  aware  that  the  enemy  was  moving  to  Bladensburg, 
and  lie  was  evidently  preoccupied  with  the  idea  that 
the  attack  was  to  be  made,  if  made  at  all  on  Wash- 
ington, in  conjunction  with  the  naval  force  then  mov- 
ing up  the  river.  When  Secretary  Armstrong  ans^\er- 
ed  the  note  in  person,  Mr.  Monroe,  he  says,  had  already 
set  out  to  prepare  the  troops  to  meet  the  enemy  at 
Bladensburg.  It  therefore  required  no  inordinate  de- 
gree of  shrewdness  or  military  skill  to  advise  the  com- 
modore to  join  the  army  at  Bladensburg.  But  the 
rest  of  the  advice  appears  to  involve  a  strategic  riddle 
which  none  but  the  initiated  can  understand,  and  we 
shall  therefore  not  attempt  to  criticise  it. 

It  might  be  supposed  that  General  Winder  had  now 
had  enough  of  the  counsel  of  the  secretary  and  of  the 
government,  and  would  have  endeavored  to  avoid  an- 
other infliction  of  it  instead  of  inviting  it.  But  in  the 
strait  in  which  he  now  found  himself,  there  was  noth- 
ina:  else  left  for  him.  Those  who  had  involved  him 
in  the  lab^.rinth  of  difficulties  might  very  properly  be 
asked  to  furnish  the  clew  to  it.  And  he  must  have 
been  perfectly  aware  that,  whether  he  asked  for  the  ad- 
vice or  not,  he  would  get  it,  and  therefore  he  might  as 
well  pay  the  government  the  compliment  of  deferring 
to  their  superior  wisdom. 

From  the  endorsement  of  General  Armstrong,  it 
would  seem  that  he  had  entirely  forgotten  the  plan 
whicli,  according  to  the  evidence  of  his  witness  M'Clane, 
he  h.id  so  earnestly  urged  the  day  before,  upon  the 
success  of  wliich  he  was  ready  to  stake  his  life,  and 
with  which  the  connnanding  general  is  stated  to  have 
been  well  pleased.     Instead  of  retiring  and  concentra- 


8'r 


; 


188     INVASION   AND   CAPTUliE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

ting  the  troops  at  the  Capitol,  and  forming  a  battciy 
there,  which  might  now  have  hcen  the  best  pkn,  he 
advises  another  movement  in  advance,  and  still  harps 
upon  the  enemy's  rear,  and  flanks,  and  front.  Such 
rapid  changes  of  plan  appear  wholly  irreconcilable 
with  mature  and  sagacious  deliberation. 

From  the  evidence  adduced  by  General  Armstrong, 
and,  indeed,  from  other  evidence,  it  would  not  appear 
that  he  had  hitherto  been  niggardly  of  advice,  however 
he  mi2:ht  have  been  of  substantial  aid.  On  the  morn- 
ing  of  the  24th  he  is  still  prompt  with  his  counsel  to 
operate  on  the  enemy's  flank,  rear,  and  front.  But 
such  was  now  the  emergency  of  the  occasion,  and  the 
impatience  and  alarm  which  existed  among  all  classes, 
that  the  resources  of  the  secretary's  mind  did  not 
seem  to  be  unlocked  fast  enough. 

Mr.  Campbell,  in  his  letter  to  the  committee,  says : 
"  AVIien  it  was  known,  on  the  evening  of  the  23d 
of  August,  that  the  troops  under  General  Winder  had 
retired  across  the  Eastern  Bri^nch,  and  encamped  in 
the  city,  it  occasioned,  as  may  be  readily  supposed, 
considerable  agitation  in  the  minds  of  the  citizens.  It 
appeared  to  have  been  expected  that,  in  case  our  force 
was  not  considered  sufficient  to  meet  and  repulse  the 
enemy  on  his  landing,  his  advance  would  be  opposed, 
and  his  progress,  at  least,  retarded,  as  fiir  as  practica- 
ble, by  harassing  him  on  his  march,  erecting  defensive 
works  at  suitable  positions,  and  throwing  such  other 
obstructions  in  his  way  as  was  best  calculated  to  check 
his  movements  ;  for  all  which  operations  the  nature  of 
the  country  througli  whicli  he  nuist  pass  was  said  to 
be  favorable.     When,  therefore,  it  was  stated  that  he 


ETIQUETTE. 


189 


was  near  the  city,  without  such  means  having  been 
either  at  all,  or  but  partially  resorted  to,  it  produced 
some  surprise,  as  well  as  inquiry  into  the  causes  that 
led  to  such  a  result.  Falling  in  conversation  with  the 
Secretary  of  War  on  this  subject,  I  expressed  my  ap- 
prehensions that  suffering  the  enemy  to  approach  so 
near  (if  his  progress  could  by  any  possible  means  have 
been  checked)  as  to  make  the  ftxte  of  the  city  depend 
on  a  single  battle,  to  be  maintained,  on  our  part,  prin- 
cipally by  raw,  inexperienced  troops,  was  hazarding 
too  much.  lie  appeared  to  concur  in  this  opinion. 
And  when  I  inquired  whether  tlic  late  movements  of 
the  troops  were  made  pursuant  to  his  advice  or  with 
his  approbation,  and  what  plan  of  operations  was  de- 
termined on  to  oppose  the  further  progress  of  the  ene- 
my, and  also  whether  our  army  would  have  the  benefit 
of  his  suggestions  and  advice  in  directing  its  future 
movements,  he  gave  me  to  understand  that  the  move- 
ments v.diich  had  taken  place  were  not  in  pursuance  of 
any  plan  or  advice  given  by  him;  that  (Jencral  Win- 
der having  been  appointed  to  take  command  of  the  Dis- 
trict, including  the  city,  and  the  means  assigned  for 
its  defence  placed  at  his  disposal,  he  Avas  considered 
as  having  the  direction  of  their  application,  and  it  was 
to  be  presumed  he  had  formed  such  plans  for  defend- 
ing the  city  as  he  deemed  best  suited  to  the  emergen- 
cy and  the  means  he  possessed ;  and  that  interposing 
his  oj^inion  might  be  considered  indelicate,  and  per- 
haps improper,  unless  he  had  the  approbation  of  the 
Executive  for  so  doing,  in  whicli  case  any  assistance 
that  his  suggestions  or  advice  could  render  should  be 
afforded. 


i 


1        1  ,s 


190     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

"  It  appeared  to  mc  an  occasion  so  highly  important 
and  critical  dcnuinded  the  united  efforts  of  all  tlie  mil- 
itary skill  and  ability  witliin  the  reacli  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  that  feelings  of  delicacy,  if  their  cause  could 
be  removed,  should  not  be  allowed  to  come  into  colli- 
sion with  the  public  interest;  and,  I  believe,  I  so  ex- 
pressed myself  to  General  Armstrong." 

It  ap})ears  wholly  impossible  to  reconcile  this  asser- 
tion of  General  Armstrong,  that  he  had  been  withheld 
by  feelings  of  delicacy  from  offering  his  suggestions  or 
advice  to  General  Winder,  with  tiie  evidence  which  we 
have  already  adduced  that  such  suggestions  and  advice 
had  been  freely  offered.  On  none  of  the  occasions 
where  the  advice  was  given  does  he  state  that  he  was 
directed  or  authorized  by  the  President  to  give  it,  and 
on  one  occasion  he  expressly  says,"J7)/  reasons  for  ad- 
vising him  [General  Winder]  were,"  &e.  To  repel  a 
charge  of  having  been  inert,  lukewarm,  indifferent  to 
the  result  of  the  campaign,  he  brings  abundant  evi- 
dence to  show  what  pains  lie  had  taken  to  ""instruct," 
"advise,"  and  "urge"  the  conunanding  genc-ral ;  to 
meet  another  complaint,  that  the  military  operations 
had  been  such  as  to  place  the  city  in  imminent  peril, 
he  does  not  merely  deny  that  General  Winder  had  act- 
ed in  conformity  with  his  advice,  but  states  the  reason 
which  deterred  him  from  offering  advice. 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th,  after  the  meeting  of  the 
President  and  his  cabinet  at  General  Winder's  head- 
quarters had  broken  up,  and  the  troops  were  on  their 
way  to  Bladensburg,  ]\Ir.  Campbell  took  an  opportu- 
nity of  stating  to  the  President  General  Armstrong's 
scruples,  and  the  necessity  of  having  the  aid  of  his 


ll'l      ' 
M      1 


THE  PKESIDENT  AND  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR.  191 

military  skill  and  ability.  The  President  replied  that 
he  would  speak  to  the  secretary  on  the  subject ;  and 
subsequently,  Mr.  Campbell  says,  "  the  President  join- 
ed the  secretary,  and  some  conversation  took  place  be- 
tween them,  the  purport  of  which  I  did  not  hear." 

The  manuscript  papers  of  Mr.  Madison,  to  which  we 
have  already  been  indebted,  give  in  substance,  if  not 
literally,  the  following  account  of  this  remarkable  con- 
versation between  tlie  President  and  his  Secretary  of 
War : 

"The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  wdio,  though  in  a 
very  languid  state,  turned  out  to  join  us,  observed  to 
me  privately  that  he  was  grieved  to  see  the  great  re- 
serve of  the  Secretary  of  AVar  [he  lodged  in  the  same 
house  with  him],  who  was  taking  no  part  on  so  criti- 
cal an  occasion ;  that  he  found  him  under  the  impres- 
sion that,  as  the  means  of  defending  the  District  had 
been  committed  to  General  Winder,  it  might  not  be 
delicate  to  intimate  his  opinions  without  the  approba- 
tion of  the  President,  though,  with  that  approbation, 
he  was  ready  to  give  any  aid  he  could.  Mr.  Campbell 
said  that,  notwithstanding  his  just  confidence  in  Gen- 
eral Winder,  he  thought,  in  the  present  .  i*;te  of  things, 
which  called  for  all  the  military  skill  poss/ble,  the  mil- 
itary knowledge  and  experience  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  ought  to  be  availed  of,  and  that  no  consideration 
of  delicacy  ought  to  jeopard  the  public  safety.  With 
these  impressions,  he  said,  he  thought  it  his  duty  to 
make  the  communication,  and  was  very  anxious  that  I 
should  take  some  proper  steps  in  the  case.  I  told  him 
I  could  scarcely  conceive  it  possible  that  General  Arm- 
strong could  have  so  misconstrued  his  functions  and 


» 


192     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OP   WASHINGTON. 


I    <\ 


duty  as  Secretary  of  War ;  that  he  could  not  but  know 
that  any  proper  directions  from  him  would  receive  any 
sanction  that  might  be  necessary  from  the  executive, 
nor  doubt  that  any  suggestions  or  advice  from  him  to 
General  Winder  would  be  duly  attended  to  [in  this 
case  it  had  been  requested  in  writing].  I  told  Mr.  C. 
that  I  would  speak  to  the  Secretary  of  War  explicitly 
on  the  subject,  and  accordingly,  turning  my  horse  to 
him,  expressed  to  him  my  concern  and  surprise  at  the 
reserve  he  showed  at  the  present  crisis,  and  at  the 
scruples  I  understood  he  had  at  offering  his  advice  or 
opinion ;  that  I  hoped  he  had  not  construed  the  paper 
of  instructions  given  him  some  time  before  [sec  paper 
of  August  13th,  1814]  so  as  to  restrain  him  in  any  re- 
spect from  the  exercise  of  functions  belonging  to  his 
office;  that,  at  such  a  juncture,  it  was  to  be  expected 
that  he  should  omit  nothing  within  the  proper  agency 
of  Secretary  of  War  toward  the  public  defence ;  and 
that  I  thought  it  proper  particularly  that  he  should  pro- 
ceed to  Bladensburg  and  give  any  aid  to  General  Win- 
der that  ho  could  ;  observing  that,  if  any  difficulty  on 
the  score  of  authority  should  arise,  which  was  not  like- 
ly, I  should  bo  near  at  hand  to  remove  it  (it  was  my 
purpose,  in  case  there  should  be  time,  to  have  the  mem- 
bers of  the  cabinet  to<2;ether  in  Bladen sburo;,  where  it 
was  expected  General  Winder  would  be,  and  in  con- 
sultation with  him  to  decide  on  the  arrangements  suit- 
ed to  the  posture  of  things).  He  said,  in  reply,  that 
he  had  put  no  such  construction  on  the  paper  of  in- 
structions as  was  alluded  to,  and  that,  as  I  thought  it 
proper,  he  would  proceed  to  Bladensburg,"  &c. 

This  statement  of  Mr.  Madison  points  very  plainly 


ar* 


DilSCOliD. 


195 


at  the  true  cause  of  the  national  disaster  at  BUidens- 
burg — want  of  cordiality  between  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  War,  and  between  the  latter  and  the  coni- 
nianding  general.  It  is  true  that  wc  might  go  back 
and  trace  this  want  of  cordiality  to  a  still  more  remote 
cause,  one  all  prolilic  in  every  species  of  public  evil, 
and  whicli  threatens  us  with  still  worse  disasters  tlian 
the  battle  of  l^ladensburg — we  mean  rival  aspirations 
for  the  chief  magistracy.  But,  as  this  cause  is  not  so 
susceptible  of  indisputable  demonstration,  and,  if  it 
were,  is  one  which,  in  the  abstract,  seems  to  be  Avith- 
out  any  other  peaceable  remedy  than  A'oluntary  self- 
reformation  by  the  people,  we  shall  not  task  our  pow- 
ers of  causation  any  farther  than  the  facts  stated  by 
Mr.  ]\Iadison  himself.  That  he  did  not  believe  in  the 
sincerity  of  General  Armstrong's  scruples  is  evident 
from  the  strong  terms  in  which  he  expresses  his  "  sur- 
prise"— he  "could  scarcely  conceive  it  possible."  That 
General  Armstrong's  scruples  were  not  sincere  is  proved 
by  the  evidence  which  he  himself  furnishes  of  the  re- 
peated advice  and  instructions  given  by  him  to  Gener- 
al Winder.  lie  must,  therefore,  have  had  some  other 
motive,  easier  for  others  to  guess  at  than  for  himself 
to  confess,  for  withholding  his  advice  at  the  moment 
when  it  was  most  needed. 

In  justice  to  General  Armstrong,  we  must  give  hi.s 
own  account  of  this  last  solemn  appeal  to  his  pntiiot- 
ism  and  military  skill.     He  says : 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  24tli  I  received  a  note  from 
General  Winder  informing  me  of  his  retreat  and  of 
the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  asking  counsel  from 

This  letter  was  late  in 
i 


me  or  from  the  government. 


if 


M 


"i 


194     INVASION   AND   CAPTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

reaching  me.  It  had  been  opened  and  ])assed  through 
other  hands.  The  moment  I  received  it,  I  hastened, 
with  the  late  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  the  gcner- 
aFs  quarters.  We  found  there  the  President,  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Navy,  and  the  Attorney-general.  Gen- 
eral Winder  was  on  the  jioint  of  joining  the  troops  at 
Bladensburg,  whither,  it  was  now  understood,  the  ene- 
my was  also  marching.  I  took  for  granted  that  he  had 
received  the  counsel  lie  required,  for  to  me  he  neither 
stated  doubt  nor  difficulty,  nor  plan  of  attack  or  of  de- 
ibnce.  This  state  of  things  gave  occasion  to  a  con- 
versation, principally  conducted  by  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  which  terminated  in  an 
understanding  that  I  should  repair  to  the  troops,  and 
give  such  directions  as  were  required  by  tlie  urgency 
of  the  case.  I  lost  not  a  moment  in  fultillinfr  this  in- 
tention,  and  had  barely  time  to  reconnoitre  the  march 
of  the  enemy,  or  to  inform  myself  of  our  own  arrange- 
ments, when  I  again  met  tlie  President,  who  told  me 
[hat  he  had  come  to  a  new  determination,  and  that  the 
)iiilitary  functionaries  should  he  left  to  the  discharge 
of  their  own  duties^  on  their  own  res])onsihilities.  I 
now  became,  of  course,  a  mere  spectator  of  the  com- 
bat." 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  w^ithin  an  hour  or  two  of 
the  commencement  of  the  battle,  the  Secretary  of  War 
was  called  upon  to  act  as  a  tutor  to  the  commanding 
general ;  not  to  dictate  the  outline  and  principal  oper- 
ations of  a  campaign,  but  to  direct  or  superintend  the 
manoeuvres  of  troops  on  a  field  of  battle.  It  appears, 
too,  that  the  commanding  general  himself  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  this  arrangement,  for  provision  was  made  for 


'^ii'* 


AIDING    THE   COMMANDER. 


195 


a^t** 


^» 


any  objection  on  his  part  on  the  score  of  autiiority. 
Mr.  Kiish,  in  his  letter  to  the  connnittee  of  xsovember 
3,  says,  "  Wlien  the  President  expressed  his  intention 
of  going  to  Bladensburg,  he  obserN'ed,  while  on  the 
road,  that  one  motive  with  him  was,  that,  as  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  who  had  just  gone  on,  might  be  able  to 
render  useful  assistance  toward  arrangements  in  the 
field,  it  would  be  best  that  the  requisite  sanction  to  it 
should  be  at  hand,  preventing  thereby,  at  a  moment  so 
important,  any  possible  embarrassment  arising  from 
the  claims  or  duties  of  the  connnanding  general.*'  In 
other  words,  the  secretary  was  to  issue  orders,  and  if 
the  commanding  general  should  demur  to  the  execution 
of  any  one  of  them,  in  order  to  prevent  any  possible 
embarrassment  arising  from  //is  claims,  the  President 
was  to  be  "at  hand"  to  give  the  "requisite  sanction." 
The  Secretary  of  War  was  to  waive  all  delicacy  to- 
ward tiie  commanding  general,  but  the  President  liim- 
self  was  to  be  indulged  in  preserving  it  as  long  as  pos- 
sible, and  until  a  conflict  of  authority  should  actually 
take  place.  There  is  an  apparent  w^ant  of  dignity  and 
of  plain-dealing  in  an  arrangement  of  this  kind  for 
W'hich  its  ingenuity  can  hardly  atone,  though  an  ex- 
cuse for  it  may  perliaps  be  found  in  the  importance  of 
the  crisis,  and  the  very  natural  anxiety  of  the  Presi- 
dent to  avert  a  public  calamity.  But  pos^iuly,  even 
in  so  great  an  emergency  as  this,  plain  dealing  miglit 
have  proved  the  best  policy.  At  all  events,  if  it  had 
not  led  to  better  results,  it  certainly  could  not  have 
produced  worse. 

With  all  possible  respect  for  the  memory  of  Mr. 
Madison,  we  must  venture  to  suggest  the  opinion  that, 


I 

^■('.i 


196     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


however  equitable  it  might  he,  as  a  measure  of  poeti- 
cal justice,  to  throw  upon  the  Secretary  of  War,  liter- 
ally at  the  eleventh  hour,  all  the  responsibility  of  the 
finale  of  a  campaign,  to  the  success  of  which  he  had 
appeared  systematically  to  refrain  from  lending  any 
assistance,  nevertheless  it  Avas  not  General  Armstrong, 
but  the  President  himself,  who,  on  this  occasion,  mis- 
construed tlie  functions  and  duty  of  a  Secretary  of 
War.  According  to  Mr.  jMadison's  conception  of  the 
duties  of  a  Secretary  of  War,  as  developed  in  tlie  ex- 
tracts which  wc  have  been  enabled  to  give  from  his 
manuscript  papers,  that  office  of  the  government  should 
necessarily  be  filled  by  a  practical  military  man,  and 
one  of  surpassing  skill  and  ability,  competent  not  only 
to  trace  out  the  plan  of  a  campaign,  and  dictate  grand 
strategical  operations,  but  to  instruct  officers  in  the 
minutia3  of  their  profession.  Yet  this  has  not  been 
the  general  understanding,  any  more  than  that  the  of- 
fice of  Secretary  of  the  Navy  should  be  filled  by  a 
practical  seaman,  able  to  navigate  a  ship  and  to  direct 
the  evolutions  of  a  squadron.  Such  an  extent  and  mi- 
nuteness of  professional  knowledge,  united  to  sufficient 
political  and  other  information  to  enable  a  man  to  give 
counsel  in  affiiirs  of  state,  would  be  a  rare  combination 
indeed.  There  is  some  inconsistency,  too,  between 
these  views  of  oMr.  l\Iadison  and  his  taunting  remark 
to  General  Armstrong  on  the  29th  of  August,  that 
the  secretary  had  on  other  occasions  never  been  back- 
ward or  scrupulous  in  his  interferenca,  and  that  he  had 
.sometimes  taken  a  latitude  in  this  respect  not  at  ail 
satisfactory,  unless  ]\[r.  ^ladison  meant  that  a  Secre- 
tary of  War  should  conline  his  interference  to  the  dc- 


^t 


i 


TROVINCE   OF  A   MINISTER    OF   WAI!. 


197 


latfi 


tails  of  military  operations,  sucli  as  drilling  and  ma- 
noeuvring troops,  and  posting  them  in  order  of  battle, 
and  leave  strategic  operations  to  be  determined  by  the 
President  in  cabinet,  aided  by  lights  derived  from  Gro- 
tins  and  PufFendorf,  instead  of  Lloyd,  Tempelhoff,  and 
Jomini. 

These  conversations,  as  detailed  by  Mr.  JMadison* 
himself,  suggest  the  idea  that,  feeling  himself  backed 
by  the  popular  clamor  against  General  Armstrong,  who 
was  now  in  a  fair  way  to  have  "  no  friends,"  he  had 
Tentured  to  seize  the  opportunity  to  settle  "old  scores" 
with  the  latter,  and  was  not  very  particular  how  he 
adjusted  the  account.  Certainly  it  is  more  within  the 
province  of  a  minister  of  state,  presiding  over  the  AVar 
Department,  to  select  a  commanding  general,  than  to 
instruct  him  after  he  had  been  selected,  against  his 
wishes  and  recommendations,  by  others. 

jMr.  Rush,  in  his  letter  to  the  committee  dated  Oc- 
tober 15,  1S14,  gives  the  following  statement  of  what 
occurred  while  he  was  present  at  General  AMuder's 
hcad-fiuarters  on  the  morning  of  the  24th  of  August : 

"  I  there  found  the  President,  General  Winder,  Com- 
modore Tingey,  nnd  two  or  tln-ec  military  olliccrs. 
Tlie  Secretary  of  State,  I  understood,  hnd  previously 
been  there,  but  had  gone  on  to  Bladensburg.  The 
Secretary  of  tlie  Xavy  came  into  the  room  not  long  aft- 
erward. v>f  Commodore  Tingey *s  presence  I  am  not 
certain.  The  conversation  turned  upon  the  route  by 
which  it  was  tliouglit  most  likely  tlio  enemy  would 
make  his  approacli.  It  was  interrupted  by  drasi'oons, 
who  had  been  on  scouts,  coming  in  every  few  minutes 
with  their  reports.     The  preponderance  of  opinion,  at 


i 


i 


m 

I'll 


'  I 


fli 


!!' 


198     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

this  period,  I  took  to  be,  that  he  would  he  most  likely 
to  move  ill  a  direction  toward  the  Potomac,  with  a  view 
to  possess  himselt'  of  Fort  Warburtoii  [Fort  AVashing- 
ton]  in  the  iirst  instance.  By  this  course  he  would 
secure  the  passage  of  his  ships,  then  supposed  to  be  in 
the  river  below,  and  thus  their  ulterior  co-operation, 
whetlier  in  the  attack  or  retreat  of  his  land  troops. 
This  way  of  thinking  induced,  as  I  supposed,  General 
Winder  to  retain  a  large  portion  of  his  force  in  the 
iieighborliood  of  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge,  in  prefer- 
ence to  moving  it  on,  unfhjr  the  existing  state  of  intel- 
ligence, toward  Bhidcnsburg.  In  anticipation  of  suc- 
cess to  tlie  enemy's  attempts  by  water  or  land,  or  botli, 
some  conversation  was  had  as  to  the  proper  precau- 
tions for  blowing  up,  or  otherwise  rendering  useless, 
the  vessels  and  public  property  at  tlie  navy-yard. 
After  the  la})se  of  probably  an  hour  from  tlie  time  I 
reached  head-quarters,  an  express  arrived  from  CJcner- 
al  Stansbury,  commanding  the  Baltimore  troops  at 
Bladcnsburg,  rendering  it  at  length  certain  that  the 
British  army  was  advancing  in  that  direction.  Gen- 
eral AVindcr  immediately  put  his  troops  in  motion, 
and  marched  off  with  them  for  Bladcnsburg. 

"When  he  had  left  the  house,  the  Secretarv  of  War, 
in  company  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  ar- 
rived there.  The  President  mentioned  to  the  former 
the  information  which  lind  just  been  received,  at  the 
Fame  time  asking  him  whether,  as  it  was  probable  a 
battle  would  soon  be  broutiht  on,  he  had  any  advice 
or  plan  to  offer  upon  the  occasion.  lie  replied  that  he 
had  not.  lie  added  that,  as  it  was  to  be  between 
regulars  and  militia,  the  latter  would  be  beaten.     All 


■mr-t 


THE   SECRETARY   HAS   NO   PLAN. 


199 


M^ 


who  were  in  the  house  then  came  out,  the  Secretary 
of  War  getting  on  his  horse  to  go  to  Blaclenshurg." 

It  appears,  therefore,  that  General  Armsti'ong  went, 
or  rather  was  carried,  to  Bhidensburg  for  the  purpose 
of  making  exertions  to  falsify  his  own  prediction  as  to 
the  result.  He  had  to  choose  between  endeavorino:  to 
save  his  reputation  as  n  military  man  and  liis  credit 
as  a  prophet,  and  the  latter  was  certainly  the  easier 
task  of  the  two.  In  fact,  at  this  critical  moment,  this 
*'  disciple  of  Jomini,''  as  General  AVilkinson  terms  him, 
hitherto  so  full  of  strategic  lore  and  replete  with  the 
finest  military  maxims,  and  who  could,  in  theory  or  on 
paper,  have  won  a  battle  against  almost  any  odds,  was 
cither  like  tlie  bird  that  could  sing  and  would  not 
sing,  or  else,  like  some  of  Don  Quixote's  models  of 
chivalry,  had  fallen  into  the  power  of  a  malignant  en- 
chanter, and  been  suddenly  bereft  of  all  Iiis  military 
knowledge  and  resources.  lie  had  not  *'  any  advice 
or  plan  to  oiler."     The  oracle  was  dumb. 

A(;cording  to  the  following  account,  which  General 
AVilkinson  says  was  communicated  to  him  by  "an 
officer  of  character,  rank,  and  intelligence,"  Avho  was 
present  at  CJcneral  Winder's  head-rpiartcrs  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th,  the  Secretary  of  War,  at  this 
juncture,  so  far  from  being  in  a  condition  to  instruct 
others,  was  sorely  in  need  of  instruction  himself.  The 
narrator  says : 

"During  tlie  morning  of  the  24t]i  I  was  repeatedly 
in  the  tent  of  General  Winder,  near  the  lower  bridge 
on  the  Eastern  ^b-anch,  where  I  found  the  President, 
the  Secretaries  of  AVar  and  of  the  Navy,  and  the  At- 
tornev-creneral  assembled,  to  deliberate  on  the  state  of 


Hi 


"    I 


'Si 


•) 


.1 ' 


2()0     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE  OF   WASHINGTON. 

tilings  and  aid  the  general  with  their  counsel.  Of  this 
I  Avas  ignorant  at  the  time;  and  ohserving  no  privacy 
in  their  deliberations,  the  interest  I  took  in  the  public 
welfare  promptetl  me  to  obtrude  some  of  my  own  ideas, 
more  especially  as  a  palpably  erroneous  opinion  ap- 
peared to  prevail  that  the  enemy  would  approach  by 
that  bridge,  and  that  the  troops  ought  therefore  to  be 
detained  where  they  were  to  defend  it.  I  fclt  anxious 
they  should  move  to  Bladensburg  early,  and  unite  with 
the  militia  which  had  arrived  from  Baltimore,  because 
it  would  require  a  great  deal  of  time  to  post  the  men 
advantageously,  and  to  communicate  the  orders  and  in- 
structions how  to  act,  according  to  the  various  chances 
and  events  of  battle.  It  seemed  mere  folly  to  expect 
tlie  enemy  l)y  the  way  of  the  bridge,  where  a  dozen 
men,  with  half  an  hour's  notice,  by  destroying  it,  might 
arrest  tlieir  progre,-?s.  (General  Armstrong  suggested 
they  might  lay  a  bridge  of  pontoons ;  I  answered,  it 
was  impossible;  to  which  he  replied,  with  a  sneer,  that 
tiic  word  impossible  was  not  to  be  found  in  tlie  mili- 
tary vocabulary.  TJic  mere  belief  that  an  army,  cer- 
tainly short  of  7  or  8000  men,  destitute,  as  we  knew 
them  to  be,  of  horses  to  transport  their  artillery  and 
baggage,  could,  notwithstanding,  contrive  to  carry  an 
equipage  of  pontoons  sufficient  for  laying  a  bridge 
across  a  river  nearly  half  a  mile  wide,  demonstrated 
that  General  Armstrong's  knowledge  of  pontoon  bridg- 
es extended  not  much  beyond  the  name. 

"The  conversation  at  (Jeneral  AVinder's  quarters 
during  the  morning  was  rather  desultory ;  first  one 
suggestion  was  made  and  commented  on,  and  then  an- 
other; no  idea  seemed  to  bo  entertained  that  it  was 


*-< 


THE    SECRETAKY  S    ARGUMENTS. 


201 


*!» 


necessary  to  come  Instantly  to  a  decision  how  we 
should  act,  and  to  set  immediately  about  it.  When  I 
mentioned  the  certai.ity  of  the  enemy  approaching  by 
the  route  of  Bladensburg  in  preference  to  the  bridge, 
and  the  expediency  of  taking  post  there  without  fur- 
ther delay,  I  observed  my  opinion  to  produce  some 
etfect  on  the  mind  of  the  President ;  by  the  others  it 
was  not  mucli  regarded." 

There  seems  to  be  no  lack  of  concurrent  evidence  to 
show  that  General  Armstrong  \\,  <,  notwithstanding  his 
affectation  of  delicacy,  not  a  very  agreeable  person  to 
hold  a  discussion  with,  his  arsenal  of  arguments  con- 
sisting in  too  great  part  of  oaths,  sneers,  and  sardonic 
smiles.  Any  man  w'ith  the  ordinary  punctilio  of  a 
gentleman,  who  was  subject  to  the  authority  of  a  su- 
perior so  opinionated,  rude,  and  disdainful,  would  nat- 
urally, independently  of  the  dictates  of  military  subor- 
dination, defer  a  collision  of  opinion  with  him  as  long 
as  practicable,  and  more  particularly  as  his  assumption 
of  military  science  and  experience  was  hitherto  little, 
if  at  all  questioned. 

The  officer  whose  statement  we  have  just  given  was, 
perhaps,  like  other  men  who  are  in  advance  of  their 
age  and  generation,  too  wise  for  the  precise  period  of 
time  when  his  wisdom  was  exhibited.  His  opinions 
as  to  the  improbability  of  the  enemy's  being  provided 
with  pontoons,  or  attempting  the  passage  of  the  East- 
ern Branch  Bridge,  showed  good  conmion  sense  as  well 
as  military  tact.  But  probably  he  was  not  the  only 
intelligent  person  then  present  at  the  general's  head- 
quarters ;  and  if,  as  Mr.  Rush  states,  the  preponder- 
ant o})inion  there  was  that  the  enemy  would  move  in 

12 


P 


a*' 

I 


I 


202     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

the  first  instance  toward  Fort  "Washington,  there  must 
have  been  reasonable  ground  for  the  opinion,  and  there- 
fore for  General  Winder's  not  yet  changing  his  posi- 
tion. Among  other  reasons  which  may  have  led  to 
the  preponderant  opinion  were  the  very  natural  inier- 
ence  that  the  enemy's  land  and  naval  forces  were  in- 
tended to  co-operate  with  each  other,  the  fact  that  his 
army  had  not  taken  the  direct  route  from  JMarlborough 
to  Bladensburg,  and  the  fact  that  night  signals  by 
rockets  had  been  exchanged  between  the  army  and  the 
ships.  So  soon  as  it  was  ascertained  that  tlie  enemy 
was  on  the  route  to  Bladensburg,  there  ceased  to  be 
any  delay  at  the  bridge. 

But  the  grand  cabinet  council  at  the  bridge,  not- 
withstanding the  admission  of  amateurs  to  its  deliber- 
ations, proved,  upon  the  whole,  about  as  decided  a  fail- 
ure as  any  similar  council  since  the  days  of  the  Abder- 
ites.  At  the  close  of  it  there  was  still  as  nnicli  con- 
sternation and  perplexity  as  if  Ross  had  that  morning 
dropped  suddenly  with  his  army  from  the  clouds,  in- 
stead of  having  been,  as  we  are  assured,  watched  at 
every  step  of  his  leisurely  progress  for  four  days. 

Ross,  as  we  have  seen,  bivouacked  on  the  night  of 
the  23d  at  a  place  called  j\Iclwood,  about  three  miles 
from  the  Old  Fields,  and  some  ten  or  twelve  miles  from 
Washington.  lie  appears  to  have  been  astir  very 
early  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  for  at  four  o'clock 
that  morning*  he  passed  the  Old  Fields.  An  advance 
of  two  miles  farther  brought  him  to  a  fork  of  the  road, 
one  branch  of  which  runs  northward  thence  to  Bla- 
densburg, distant  about  ten  miles,  and  the  other  west- 

*  fJi'iu'i'iil  Wilkin  on.  vol.!..  p.  775, 


I 


OUli   TKOOPS   ASSEMBLE    AT   BLADENSBURG.     203 


(* 


ward  to  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge,  distant  seven  or 
eight  miles.  Here  he  practiced  the  same  ruse  as  at 
tlie  fork  of  the  road  from  Nottingham  to  Upper  ]Marl- 
borough.  He  took  the  road  leading  to  the  Eastern 
Branch  Bridge,  and  continued  in  it  until  his  last  col- 
umn had  G;ot  into  it,''"  then  suddenly  reversed  his  front 
and  marched  rapidly  to  Bladensburg. 

Intelliirence  of  this  last  movement  was  not  received 
by  General  Winder  until  10  A.M.  or  after,  and  he  then 
ordered  General  Smith,  with  the  whole  of  the  troops 
under  his  command,  to  proceed  to  Bladensburg,  and 
Commodore  Barney,  with  the  seamen  and  marines,  was 
soon  afterward  ordered  to  proceed  to  the  same  place 
with  all  dispatch. 

]Mr.  jMonroc,  who  was  at  General  Winder's  quarters 
with  the  President  when  the  inielligence  was  recei\ed 
that  the  enemy  was  on  his  way  to  Bladensburg,  oftcred 
his  services  to  proceed  to  that  place  and  join  General 
Stansbury,  and  both  the  President  and  General  AVindcr 
expressing  a  wish  that  he  would  do  so,  he  "lost  not  a 
moment  in  complying  with  their  desiro,*'  and  between 
11  and  12  o'clock  joined  CJeneral  Stansbury,  who  had, 
in  obedience  to  the  reiterated  order  of  General  Winder, 
moved  his  troops  back  to  the  vicinity  of  Bladensburg. 
Mr.  ]Monroe  was  soon  followed  by  General  Winder, 
then  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  then  by  the  Pres- 
ident and  Attorney-general.  When  ]\Ir.  ^lonroe  arrived 
on  the  field,  the  enemy  was  about  three  miles  distant 
from  Bladensburg.  jMr.  llush  states  that,  before  the 
President  and  himself  "could  roach  the  town,  the  forces 
of  the  enemy  had  possession  of  it." 

*  Sec,  letter  of  Mr.  liusli,  close  of  chap.  xiv. 


204     INVASION    AND   CAFrURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

The  object  of  Mr.  Monroe  in  joining  General  Stans- 
bury — that  of  assisting  him  to  post  his  troops  to  the 
best  advantage — does  not  seem  to  have  been  made 
known  to  that  officer,  who  expresses  no  gratitude  for 
any  services  rendered  to  him  by  ]\Ir.  JMonroe  on  the 
occasion,  but,  as  we  shall  sec,  rather  intimates  that 
somebody,  he  does  not  know  who,  disarranged  his  order 
of  battle  without  consulting  him.  This,  if  true,  was 
doing  him  no  trifling  wrong ;  for  it  is  said  by  a  military 
writer  that  "orders  of  battle  are  the  sublime  of  war, 
and  it  is  in  their  application  that  the  talents  and  gen- 
ius of  the  general  shine  pre-eminent." 


r 


Ml 


} 


TOPOUKAl'IlY. 


205 


t 


CHAPTER  XL 

The  Order  of  Battle. 

The  village  of  Bladensburg  is  about  six  miles  north- 
east of  Washington,  from  which  city  it  is  approached 
by  a  good  turnpike-road,  formerly  the  mail-road  to 
Baltimore.  North  of  this  road  is  another  old  road, 
which,  before  the  City  of  Washington  was  founded,  was 
the  route  from  Georgetown  to  Blopdcnsburg.  These 
roads  meet,  at  an  angle  of  about  forty-five  degrees, 
some  sixty  or  eighty  yards  from  the  river  at  Bladens- 
burg. From  the  junction  the  turnpike-road  continues 
on  to  the  river,  not  abutting,  however,  immediately  at 
the  bridge,  but  curving  for  a  short  distance  to  the  south 
and  east  along  the  margin  of  the  stream,  and  following 
a  sort  of  causeway,  which,  at  the  time  we  speak  of,  was 
bordered  on  the  west  side  by  thickets  o+'  ^^..lall  trees 
and  bushes,  and  which  led  to  the  bridge.  The  bridge 
is  somewhat  less  than  thirty  yards  in  length,  and 
about  four  in  breadth,  and  the  stream,  a  few  rods  above 
or  north  of  the  bridge,  is  every  where  fordable. 

General  Stansbury's  troops,  after  his  countermarch 
to  Bladensburg,  occupied  the  triangular  field  formed 
by  the  roads  which  we  have  mentioned,  near  their 
junction.  In  this  field,  on  the  Georgetown  road,  and 
about  a  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  junction  of 
the  roads,  there  stood  and  still  stands  a  large  wooden 
barn  or  tobacco-house,  and  between  the  barn  and  the 
Washington  turnpike  there  was  and  is  an  orchard, 


Ill 


-1  i 

'1- 

: 

"1 

'} 

1  ' 

,  1 1 

.,          ! 

g 

206     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

wliicli  commences  at  the  barn  and  extends  more  than 
half  way  across  the  iicld,  or  about  a  hundred  and 
twenty  or  thirty  yards  toward  the  turnpike.  In  front 
of  the  barn,  looking  toward  the  river,  the  ground  has 
a  gentle  descent,  and  upon  the  brow  of  the  declivity, 
near  the  Georgetown  road,  and  some  thirty  or  forty 
yards  in  advance  of  the  barn,  had  been  hastily  con- 
stmcted  a  barbette  battery  of  earthwork,  intended  for 
heavy  ordnance.  This  battery  was  distant  about  three 
hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  bridge  at  Bladens- 
burg,  nearly  west  of  it,  and  commanded  it  by  an  ob- 
lique and  not  enfilading  fire. 

In  the  battery  were  stationed  the  two  companies  of 
volunteer  artillery  from  the  city  of  Baltimore,  com- 
manded by  Captains  Myer  and  Magruder,  mustering 
together  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  men,  with  six 
six-pounders.  The  parapet  being  too  high  for  these 
guns,  and  there  being  no  time  now  to  reduce  it,  the 
artillerymen  were  employed,  with  such  tools  as  they 
could  get,  in  cutting  embrasures  and  masking  them 
with  brushwood,  The  battalion  of  riflemen,  com- 
manded by  Major  Pinkney,  was  placed  on  the  right 
of  the  battery,  the  men  being  distributed  in  such  po- 
sitions among  the  bushes  on  the  low  ground,  near 
the  junction  of  the  roads,  as  might  best  enable  them 
to  annoy  the  enemy  on  his  approach,  sliould  he  suc- 
ceed in  crossing  the  bridge  or  fording  the  stream. 
Two  companies  of  Stansbury's  militiii,  commanded  by 
Captains  Ducker  and  Gorsuch,  acting  as  riflemen,  but 
principally  armed  with  muskets,  were  stationed  in  the 
rear  of  tlie  left  of  the  battery,  near  the  barn,  and  pro- 
tected by  it,  to  assist  in  defending  any  approach  of  tlie 
ciicmv  bv  tltc  GeoTfretown  rond. 


ORDEll    OF   BATTLE. 


207 


The  5th  rogimcnt  of  Baltimore  volunteers,  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett,  had  heen  halted 
about  iifty  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  position  now  occu- 
pied by  Major  Pinkney's  riflemen,  and  General  Stans- 
bury  says  that  it  wa?  his  intention  to  have  formed  it 
with  its  left  resting  on  the  right  of  Pinkney's  battal- 
ion and  fronting  the  road,  along  ^vhich  ran  a  fence; 
while  Colonels  Ra^-an  and  Schutz's  rc2:iments  were  to 
be  drawn  up  in  echelon,  their  right  resting  on  tlie  left 
of  Duckcr  and  Gorsuch's  companies,  and  connnanding 
any  approach  by  the  Georgetown  road.  By  this  pro- 
posed disposition  of  Sterett's  regiment?  the  troops  from 
the  city  of  Baltimore  would  have  been  stationed  so  as 
to  support  and  give  conlidence  to  each  other;  and  as 
tliey  were  well  disciplined  and  reliable  troops,  and 
some  of  them  were  necessarily  to  encounter  tlie  first 
shock  of  the  contest,  Stansbury's  intended  order  was 
not  the  worst  that  could  have  been  adopted,  and  at 
least  had  the  merit  of  placing  all  parts  of  his  lines 
within  supporting  distance  of  each  other. 

But  he  states  that,  after  the  enemy  came  in  sight, 
while  he  was  engaged  in  giving  some  directions  to  the 
artillery,  Schutz  and  Ragan's  regiments  were  moved 
from  where  he  had  stationed  them,  marched  up  the 
rising  ground  in  the  rear  of  the  orchard,  and  formed  in 
order  of  battle  about  500  yards,  or  more  than  a  quar- 
ter of  a  mile,  in  the  rear  of  the  artillery  and  riflemen, 
their  right,  Schutz's  regiment,  resting  on  the  Wash- 
ington turnpike.  On  riding  up  the  hill  to  ascertain 
who  had  ordered  this  movement,  he  was  informed  that 
General  Winder  was  on  the  ground.  lie  then  imme- 
diately rode  to  the  spot  where  General  Winder  was, 


tv: 


'A 


,i*    H' 


208     INVASION   AND    CAPTl'EE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

found  him  engaged  in  reconnoitring  the  enemy,  and 
while  conversing  with  him  lie  discovered  that  the  5th 
regiment  was  also  moved  from  its  position,  marched 
up  the  hill,  and  formed  on  the  left  of  the  two  other 
regiments,  the  whole  being  so  placed  that  their  situa- 
tion and  numbers  could  be  clearly  seen  by  the  enemy, 
within  reach  of  his  rockets,  without  any  cover,  and  at 
such  a  distance  from  the  artillery  and  riflemen  as  to 
be  able  to  give  the  latter  no  support,  leaving  them  to 
contend  with  the  whole  British  force.  "  Whose  plan 
this  was,"  he  says,  "  I  know  not ;  it  was  not  mine, 
nor  did  it  meet  with  my  approbation ;  but,  finding  a 
superior  officer  on  the  ground,  I  concluded  he  had  or- 
dered it,  consequently  did  not  interfere." 

]\Iajor  Pinkney,  in  his  statement  to  the  committee, 
also  complains  of  this  alteration,  or  "new  order  of 
battle,"'  as  he  terms  it.  "  The  5th  regiment,"  he  says, 
*'  had  now,  to  the  great  disparagement  of  my  compa- 
nies and  of  the  artillery,  been  made  to  retire  to  a  hill 
several  hundred  yards  in  our  rear,  but  visible,  never- 
theless, to  the  enemy,  where  it  could  do  little  more 
than  display  its  gallantry." 

Mr.  i\Ionroe  states  that  the  removal  of  the  5tli  Balti- 
more regiment,  "  at  a  late  period,"  from  the  rear  of 
the  battery  to  the  left  of  the  line,  was  "a  measure 
taken  with  reluctance  and  in  haste ;"  and  after  finish- 
ing his  account  of  the  final  disposition  of  Stansbury's 
troops  in  order  of  battle,  he  says,  "  after  General 
Stansbury  had  made  this  disposition,"  General  Win- 
der arrived  on  the  ground,  and,  "  on  taking  a  view  of 
the  order  which  had  been  formed,  he  approved  of  it. 
This  was  the  more  satisfactory,  because  it  had  then 


ORDER    OF    BATTLE. 


209 


^\ 


Ijccomc  impossible  to  make  any  essential  change.  *' 
This  leaves  it  to  be  interretl  tliat  the  whole  arrange- 
ment was  matle  by  General  Stansbmy,  or  at  least  had 
his  concurrence. 

General  Armstrong,  in  his  "Notices,"  adverts  to 
this  unlucky  arrangement  and  its  effects  on  the  prog- 
ress and  issue  of  the  combat,  and  fc>ays  that  it  is  only 
in  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterctt's  report  that  "we  are 
made  acquainted  with  this  busy  and  blundering  tac- 
tician, whom  Stansbury  does  not  know  and  whom  Pink- 
ney  would  not  name ;"  and  he  then  quotes  Sterett's 
statement  that  "  the  5t]i  regiment  was  formed  under 
the  direction  of  Colonel  Monroe  on  the  left  and  in  line 
with  Stansbury's  brigade."  But  he  omits  any  refer- 
ence to  the  subsequent  part  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Ster- 
ett's  statement,  in  which  he  says,  "  I  ought  to  notice 
that  the  first  line  formed  on  the  battle-ground  was 
changed  under  the  direction  of  Colonel  ]Monroe.  On 
this  occasion  he  observed  to  me,  '-AltJtourjh  you  see  I 
am  active^  you  loill  pleam  hear  in  muid  that  this  is 
not  my  plan,''  or  words  to  this  effect." 

There  are  discrepancies  in  these  statements  which  it 
is  impossible  now  to  reconcile,  and  which  are  the  more 
singular  because  the  statements  were  prepared  for  the 
information  of  a  committee  of  Congress  but  a  fevr 
weeks  after  the  battle.  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett 
could  hardly  have  dreamed  or  imagined  the  emphaf"j 
declaration  made  to  him  by  Mr.  Monroe  at  the  X\mo.  of 
changing  the  position  of  the  5th  regiment ;  ]\Ir.  }.Ion- 
roe  himself  states  that  the  change  was  made  with  re- 
luctance, yet  he  directed  it,  and  docs  not  say  that  it 
had  been  suggested  to  him  by  any  one  else. 


i 

1.1 

t 


n 


f 


4\' 


IP 


210     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

AYe  have  dwelt  particularly  upon  this  matter,  not 
only  to  ilJustrate  the  confusion  existing  at  the  time  of 
forming  the  order  of  battle,  owing  to  the  near  vicinity 
of  the  enemy  and  the  number  of  persons  exercising 
independent  authority,  but  in  justice  to  the  troops  of 
Stausbury's  line,  the  only  troops  who  can  be  said  to 
have  fled.  For  although  it  is  true,  as  General  Win- 
der states  in  his  narrative,  that  "no  advantage  of  po- 
sition is  proof  against  groundless  panic,  and  a  total 
want  of  discipline,  skill,  and  experience,'"  still,  ad- 
vantage of  position  must  help  in  some  degree  to  pre- 
vent a  panic ;  and  if  the  troops  arc  wanting  in  skill, 
discipline,  and  experience,  it  is  the  more  important  to 
profit  as  nnich  as  possible  by  all  advantages  of  position. 

[t  was  hardly  reasonable  to  expect  that  raw  militia- 
men would  remain  firm  in  the  position  in  which  Stans- 
bury's  troops  were  placed,  considering  the  force  which 
they  believed  to  be  advancing  against  them,  and  the 
alarm  created  by  the  rockets,  a  species  of  weapon  whol- 
ly unknown  to  them,  and  apparently  of  the  most  for- 
midable description.  The  orchard  would  have  served 
as  a  cover  to  them,  and,  if  permitted  to  remain  in  it, 
they  might  have  been  encouraged  by  the  shelter  which 
it  afforded,  by  the  steadiness  'which  the  troops  in  their 
front  displayed  under  the  advance  of  the  enemy,  and 
even  by  the  excitement  attending  an  opportunity  of 
iunnediate  action. 

General  AVinder  himself,  it  a})pears,  had  no  time  to 
remedy,  and  hardly  to  observe,  any  defects  in  the  ar- 
rangement of  Stansbury's  troops,  lie  says  that  upon 
his  arrival  on  the  field  he  rode  U})  to  the  battery,  and 
continno?^ : 


>i 


ORDER   OF   BATTLE. 


211 


>•« 


"Upon  iiiquiiy,  I  learned  that  General  Stansbiny 
•was  on  a  rising  groniul  npon  the  left  of  his  line.  I 
rotlc  immediately  tiiitlier,  and  found  him  and  Colonel 
Monroe  together.  The  latter  gentleman  informed  me 
tJiat  he  had  been  aiding  Cieneral  Stansbiny  to  post  his 
command,  and  wished  mc  to  proceed  to  examine  it  with 
them,  to  sec  how  far  I  approved  of  it.  Wc  were  just 
proceeding  with  this  view,  when  some  person  rode  up 
and  stated  that  news  had  just  been  received  of  a  sig- 
nal victory  obtained  by  General  Izard  over  the  enemy, 
in  Avhich  one  thousand  of  tiie  enemy.  Avcre  slain  and 
many  prisoners  taken.  I  ordered  the  news  to  be  im- 
mediately eonnnunicated  to  the  troops,  for  the  purj)Osc 
of  giving  additional  impulse  to  their  sjiirits  and  cour- 
age. The  column  of  the  enemy  at  this  moment  ap- 
peared in  view,  about  a  mile  distant,  moving  u])  the 
Eastern  Branch,  parallel  to  our  position.  From  the 
left,  where  I  was,  I  perceived  that,  if  the  position  of 
the  advanced  artillery  were  forced,  two  or  three  pieces 
ujion  the  left  of  Stansbury  would  be  necessary  to  scour 
an  orchard  wliieh  lay  between  his  line  and  his  artille- 
ry,  and  for  another  rifle  company  to  increase  the  sup- 
port of  this  artillery.  These  were  promptly  sent  for- 
ward by  General  Smith  and  posted  as  hastily  as  pos- 
sible, and  it  was  barely  accomplished  before  I  was 
obliged  to  give  orders  to  the  advanced  artillery  to  open 
upon  the  enemy,  who  was  descending  the  street  toward 
the  bridge.  All  further  examination  or  movement  was 
now  im])ossil)le." 

'^riie  artillery  which  (Jcneral  AVindd*  directed  to  be 
placed  on  the  left  of  Stansbury's  line  was  a  part  of 
Captain   Ihircli's  volunteer  artillery  from  the  City  of 


^' 


r 


i 


'«< 


212     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

Wasliiiigton,  with  three  six-pounders.  The  addition- 
al rifle  company  Lroiight  np  to  support  tlie  Ijahiniorc 
artillery  was  Captain  Doughty's  company,  called  rifle- 
men, but  armed  with  muskets.  General  Winder  also 
directed  one  of  jMajor  Pinkney's  rifle  companies  to  he 
withdrawn  from  the  right  of  thchattery  and  placed  on 
the  left  of  it. 

Two  pieces  of  Bureli's  artillery,  with  a  part  of  his 
comjjany,  were  placed  on  the  main  road,  near  the  riglit 
of  Stan.sbury's  line.  And  ]\Iajor  Pinkney  states  that, 
at  his  instance,  a  militia  company,  armed  with  mus- 
kets, hut  acting  as  riflemen,  was  placed  on  his  riglit, 
near  tlie  main  road,  under  cover  of  some  Lushes  and  a 
fence.  By  a  mistake,  which  he  afterward  jiublicly 
acknowledged,  he  represents  this  company  as  having 
been  connnanded  by  Captain  Doughty. 

This  completes  the  arrangement  of  what  has  been 
called  tiie  first  line,  composed  jn'incipally  of  the  troops 
from  the  city  of  Baltimore  and  its  vicinity. 

The  cavahy,  whose  history  we  may  as  well  dispose 
of  at  once,  seem  to  have  been  considered  as  a  part  of 
the  first  line.  ]\Ir.  ]\Ionroc  states  that  they  "  were 
placed  to  tlie  left,  somewhat  in  the  rear  of  the  line." 
Xo  use  was  attempted  to  be  made  of  them  during  the 
action.  Th(>y  were  under  separate  and  independent 
conunanders,  and  amounted  altoa'ctlier  to  about  1580. 
The  regular  portion  of  them,  under  IJeutenant-eolonel 
Laval,  a  Frenchman  and  an  oflicer  of  some  experience, 
were  less  disciplined  and  efiieient  than  the  volunteers. 
They  were  unabh^  to  make  a  cliarge,  the  men,  from  fa- 
tigue and  hunger,  hardly  able  to  sit  tiieir  horses,  or  the 
horses  to  move;   and  tluy  were  routed,  according  to 


'»    ! 


ORDER   OF    iJATlLK. 


213 


Laval's  account,  not  by  the  onciii}',  but  by  our  own 
troops,  "crushed  clown,  horses  and  all,''  hi  the  tumult 
of  the  flight,  one  artillery  company  bursting  through  a 
crate  and  drivino-  ri^'ht  through  them. 

The  second  line  was  composed,  with  the  exception 
of  the  body  of  ^Maryland  militia  under  the  connnand 
of  Colonel  Bcall,  of  the  troops  -which  CJcnoral  Winder 
had  with  him  at  the  Battalion  Old  Fields,  and  which 
had  been  hurriedly  marched  from  the  Eastern  Branch 
Bridge  between  11  and  12  o'clock  in  the  mornina*  of 
the  battle.  They  had  barely  time,  on  arriving  on  the 
ground,  to  make  a  hasty  selection  of  position. 

Connnodore  Barney's  men  and  the  marines  were 
halted  on  the  turnpike  about  a  mile  Iron,  the  stream 
at  Bladensburg.  The  two  eighteen-poiuiders  were 
planted  in  the  road,  forming  the  left  of  his  line,  and 
the  three  twelve-pounders  immediately  on  the  right  of 
them,  a  portion  of  his  seamen  acting  as  artillerists,  and 
the  rest,  with  the  marines,  supporting  them  as  infant- 
ry. In  front  of  his  position  the  road  descends  to  a 
ravine,  crossed  by  a  small  bridge  about  oOO  yards  dis- 
tant. North  of  the  brid<j;e  the  ravine  is  wide  and  shal- 
low,  the  bottom  of  it  })roducing  grass,  and  terminating 
in  a  somewhat  abrupt  acclivity  or  blufl'  about  150 
yards  from  th*^.  road.  On  this  acclivity  the  companies 
commanded  by  Captains  Stull  and  Davidson  were 
posted ;  and  on  an  eminence  a  short  distance  west  of 
it  Major  Peter's  battery  of  six  guns  was  placed,  so  as 
to  command  the  main  road  near  the  bridge  ovvr  the 
ravine,  and  also  a  ])art  of  the  space  in  the  rear  of 
Stiuisbury's  line.  I.ieutenant-colonel  Scott,  with  the 
regular  troops,  Colonel  Brent,  with  the  2d  regiment  of 


! 


I 


J' 


I, 


214     INYAHION    AND    CAFfURE   OF    WASHINGTON. 


General  Smith's  brigade,  and  Major  AVaring,  with  the 
battalion  of  ^Maryland  militia,  were  posted  in  the  rear 
of  Major  Peter's  battery,  the  regular  troops  being  on 
the  left.  The  1st  regiment  of  General  Smith's  brig- 
ade, commanded  by  Colonel  ]\Iagruder,  was  immediate- 
ly on  the  left  of  Barney's  men,  its  right  resting  on  the 
road. 

The  militia  under  Colonel  Beall,  who  had  arrived 
from  iVnnapolis  about  half  an  hour  before  the  battle 
began,  were  plaeed  on  tlie  right  of  the  seamen  and  ma- 
rines, on  an  eminence  about  250  yards  from  the  road; 
and  on  the  same  side  of  the  road,  about  150  yards  in 
front  of  Colonel  Beall's  position,  was  Kramer's  battal- 
ion of  ^Maryland  militia. 

Xothiiig  is  more  easy  than  to  criticise  the  order  of 
battle  of  a  defeated  army.  In  fact,  the  defeat  itself 
exposes  errors  which  wovdd  not  otherwise  have  been 
observed.  And  in  orders  of  battle  formed  Avith  such 
jirecipitation  as  these  were,  under  the  direction  of  a 
variety  oi  inexperienced  heads,  it  would  be  strange  if 
errors  did  not  exist  which  the  merest  tyro  might  point 
out,  and  whicli  none  but  a  tyro  would  exult  in  detect- 
ing. Nevertheless,  in  order  to  show  the  defects  whicli 
here  existed,  and  the  little  credit  due  to  the  enemy  for 
their  victory  over  troops  so  disadvantageously  posted, 
we  shall  iirst  quote  Geneual  "Winder's  remarks  on  tlie 
subject,  and  tlien  those  of  tlie  veteran  General  Wil- 
kinson, wlio  appears  to  liavc  carefully  and  minutely 
studied  the  history  of  this  campaign,  and  who  was 
well  acquainted  with  all  the  localities  in  which  the 
events  of  it  occurred. 

General  Winder  says: 


i 


■  ( 


* 


OIIDEK    UF    BATTLE. 


215 


"It"  I  had  had  longer  thne,  or  to  repeat  the  action 
of  Bladensburg,  I  could  correct  several  errors  which 
might  materially  have  affected  the  issue  of  that  battle. 
The  advanced  force  ought  to  have  been  nearer  to  the 
creek,  along  the  edge  of  the  low  ground,  wdiere  they 
would  have  been  skirted  with  bushes,  and  have  avoid- 
ed the  inconvenience  of  the  cover  which  the  orchard 
afforded  to  the  enemy.  The  edge  of  the  low  grounds 
on  the  right  of  the  road  ought  to  have  been  lined  with 
musketry,  and  a  battery  of  cannon  also  planted  on  the 
lield,  on  the  riglit  of  tlic  road,  directly  fronting  the 
bridge ;  and  if  Connnodore  Barney's  heavy  artillery, 
with  his  more  expert  artillerists,  had  occupied  the  po- 
sition which  tlie  advanced  artillerists  did,  and  these 
posts  been  obstinately  defended,  the  enemy  would  not 
have  crossed  the  river  at  that  point,  but  would  have 
been  obliged  to  make  a  circuit  round  to  his  right,  and 
have  crossed  above,  and  at  the  upper  end  of  the  town ; 
or,  if  the  whole  force  had  been  posted  at  the  position 
of  the  second  line,  with  all  the  advantage  which  it  af- 
forded, and  had  acted  with  tolerable  firmness  and 
courage,  the  event  might  have  been  different." 

From  these  remarks  of  Cieneral  Winder,  he  was  evi- 
dently of  the  o})inion  that  "  if  the  whole  force  had 
been  posted  at  the  position  of  the  second  line,"  or  at 
the  position  of  the  lirst  line,  the  result  might  have 
been  different;  in  other  words,  that  the  main  defect 
of  the  arrangement  of  the  troops  was  their  being  out 
of  supporting  distance  of  each  other. 

General  Wilkinson  says : 

"  It  is  in  vain  that  ])rofessional  men  shall  search  for 
the  excellences  of  this   disposition  of  the  American 


,k/' 


i 


21G      INVASION    AND    CAITUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


army  in  the  parts  or  in  the  v.'holc,  in  the  advantages 
of  a  single  point  or  in  the  combination  of  all,  whether 
viewed  in  respeet  to  the  principles  and  maxims  of  war, 
ancient  or  modern,  or  with  reference  to  the  incidents 
of  desultory  warl'are,  ^\  liich  are  not  reducible  to  iixed 
rules  ;  it  is  void  of  plan  or  proportion  ;  and  the  naked 
truth  is  the  best  apology  for  it,  that  is,  it  was  formed 
on  the  spur  of  the  occasion,  by  pieces,  and  under  the 
direction  of  many  diil^crent  chiefs,  without  preconcert, 
principle,  or  design.  Shall  I  expose  the  particular 
faults  of  this  disposition?  It  would  not  reward  the 
pains  ;  a  few  remarks  will  suifice.  If  the  enemy  had 
been  obliged  to  pass  the  bridge,  and  it  could  not  have 
been  removed  or  ohstructed^  then  the  greatest  force 
should  have  been  brouglit  to  oppose  them  in  debouch- 
ing from  the  detile ;  but  the  disposition  actually  made 
served  only  to  expose  the  artillery  to  capture,  or,  by  its 
sudden  flight,  and  that  of  its  light  covering  party,  to 
increase  the  confidence  of  the  enemy  and  depress  the 
spirits  of  the  American  front.  But,  as  the  Eastern 
Branch  was  every  where  fordable,  and  a  considerate, 
j"dicious  antagonist  would  have  crossed  the  creek  at 
the  forks,  and  turned  the  left  llaidc  of  what  Avas  called 
the  iirst  line,  the  disposition  was  feeble,  injudicious, 
and  ineffectual.  It  is  true,  tlic  temerity  of  the  enemy, 
and  his  contempt  for  his  antagonist,  gave  this  dispo- 
sition a  different  character;  but  then  it  was  too  remote 
from  the  defile  to  command  it,  too  remote  from  the 
advanced  battery  to  support  it ;  intrinsically  too  f(;eblc 
to  resist  the  shock  of  the  enemy's  whole  force,  and  too 
distant  from  what  was  called  the  second  line  i*.  be 
seasonably  supported  by  it." 


I 


CRITICISMS. 


217 


notc 

the 

'cblc 

Itoo 

.  be 


J 


This  criticism  of  General  AVilkinsoii  is  too  lull  of 
generalities  and  epithets,  but  in  substance  is  pretty 
much  the  same  as  General  AVinder's.  The  defile  or 
bridge  at  Bladensburg  should  have  been  better  defend- 
ed, if  defended  at  all ;  and  the  troops  were  not  within 
supporting  distance  of  each  other. 

General  Armstrong  does  not  venture  to  criticise  the 
order  of  battle  except  by  innuendo,  by  sneering  at ''  this 
busy  and  blundering  tactician,"  31r.  Monroe,  and  at 
General  "Winder  for  assiQ-nino'  to  ^Ir.  ]\Ionroe  the  duty 
"  of  forming  his  order  of  battle  I"  He  could  not  forget 
that  to  himself  had  been  assigned  the  duty  of  revising 
and  correcting  the  errors  of  all,  and  that  therefore  to 
particularize  errors  which  he  did  not  advert  to  and  cor- 
rect at  the  time  would  have  been  to  condemn  himself. 

The  disadvantages  of  the  order  of  battle,  and  of  the 
distance  of  the  two  lines  from  each  other,  were  made 
worse  by  the  fact  that  the  troops  of  the  first  line  were 
generally  ignorant  that  there  was  a  second  line,  or  any 
troops  in  their  rear  to  sujDport  them,  or  on  which  they 
could  fall  back.  They  were  under  the  impression  that 
they  were  to  fight  the  battle  unassisted,  against  a  force 
four  or  five  times  as  numerous  as  their  own.  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Sterett  says  that  he  "knew  nothing  of  any 
second  line  or  rescr-  ;  being  formed  to  support"  them. 
]\Iajor  Pinkney  states  that  he  "  did  not  know  that 
Brigadier-general  Hmith's  brigade  was  in  or  near  the 
field  until  the  action  had  ceased,''  nor  that  Barney's 
artillery  was  on  the  field.  General  Stansbury  states 
that  "before  and  during  the  action"  he  "did  not  see 
any  of  the  force"  he  "was  led  to  expect  would  su})- 
port"  him.     This  statement  is  contradicted  bv  General 

K 


i! 


1^' 


it 


m 


•'•*" '  ""-'-^-T-T- 


218     INVASION   AND    CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

Smith's ;  but  whatever  information  General  Stanshurjr 
may  have  had  on  the  subject  was  of  no  use  to  him, 
and  was  not  communicated  by  him  to  his  officers. 
Nor  does  any  rallying-point  seem  to  have  been  determ- 
ined on.  These  and  other  omissions  are  to  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  shortness  of  the  time  allowed  for 
preparation,  the  hurry  and  excitement  occasioned  by 
tlie  near  approach  of  the  enemy,  the  number  of  com- 
manders acting  without  concert  with  each  other,  and 
the  host  of  volunteer  aides-de-camp  and  amateur  ad- 
visers. 

The  British  reports  of  the  battle  not  only  exagger- 
ate the  strength  of  our  position  and  the  numbers  op- 
posed to  them,  but  invent  strength  for  the  position 
which  did  not  exist.  Eoss,  in  his  official  report  of  the 
victory,  says,  "The  enemy  was  discovered  strongly 
posted  on  very  commanding  heights,  his  advance  oc- 
cupying a  fortified  house,  wliich,  with  artillery,  covered 
the  bridge  over  the  3']astern  Branch,  across  which  the 
British  troops  had  to  pass."  There  was,  it  is  true,  a 
Iiousc  partially  fortified,  which  commanded  the  pass 
by  tlie  bridge,  but  it  was  not  occupied,  and  therefore 
must  have  been  ratlxer  a  convenience  than  an  obstacle 
to  tlie  advance  of  the  British. 

Cockburn  says,  "The  enemy,  8000 strong,  on  ground 
he  had  chosen  as  best  adapted  for  him  to  defend,  where 
he  had  time  to  erect  his  batteries  and  concert  all  his 
measures,  was  dislodged  as  soon  as  reached,"  etc. 
The  advancvid  troops,  under  Major Pinkney  and  others, 
who  encountered  the  first  shock  of  the  British  army, 
did  not  amount  to  more  than  600  men.  The  regiments 
under  Sterett,  Schutz,  and  Ragan,  too  far  in  the  rear 


BKITISH    EXAGGERATION. 


219 


;  oc- 

ered 

the 


etc. 
liers, 
rmy, 
lents 

rear 


1 


to  support  the  advanced  troops,  mustered  about  1800 
men.  The  rest  of  the  army,  amounting  to  about  2700 
men,  was  more  than  a  mile  from  Bladen,  rg,  and  did 
not  change  its  position  until  ordered  to  retreat.  The 
British,  therefore,  instead  of  encountering  an  "  enemy 
8000  strong,"  had  to  deal  with  an  army  altogether  of 
little  more  than  half  that  number,  and  did  not  encoun- 
ter, at  any  one  time,  more  than  a  third  of  the  num- 
ber. 

Gleig,  a  lieutenant  of  the  85th  regiment,  who  was 
present  in  the  action,  says  that  our  position  was  "one 
of  great  strength  and  commanding  attitude ;"  that  our 
"  cavalry  showed  itself  in  one  mass,"  and  our  force 
amounted  to  9000  men,  a  number  "exactly  doubling" 
their  own,  and  waiting  their  approach  in  "a  formidable 
posture."  He  describes  the  passage  of  the  bridge  at 
Bladensburg  as  if  it  were  another  Lodi,  and  says  that 
our  battery  opened  "with  tremendous  effect,  for  at  the 
first  discharge  almost  an  entire  company  was  swept 
down."  But  tlie  "Subaltern  in  America,"  who  exag- 
gerates in  other  matters,  states  that  by  the  first  dis- 
charge of  our  artillery  they  had  one  man  only  killed 
and  two  dreadfully  wounded,  and  that  by  the  first  fire 
on  the  bridge  "seven  men  were  swept  down,"  but  he 
does  not  state  how  many  of  the  seven  men  were  killed. 
In  point  of  fact,  the  bridge  was  a  convenience  to  the 
enemy,  and  if  it  had  not  been,  there  was  no  necessity 
for  their  crossing  it,  as  the  stream  above  was  fordable, 
and  Avas  forded  by  parties  of  their  men. 

The  statement  of  the  British  historian,  Alison,*  is 
more  exaggerated  than  any,  and  inexcusably  so,  be- 

'"  Ili-tory  of  Kurope,  cliaj).  l\xvi. 


1.*' 


lis 


it 


I    I  ' 


1 1 


t    ! 


'    !    ' 


220     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

cause  it  is  not  justified  by  the  official  dispatches  to  his 
government,  to  which  he  refers.  He  says  that  the 
American  general  had  6500  bayonets,  300  horse,  and 
600  seamen  to  work  his  guns,  of  which  he  had  twen- 
ty-six to  the  British  two,  "  and  with  this  force,  about 
double  that  of  the  British,  he  took  post  at  Bladens- 
burg,  a  small  village  on  tlie  left  bank  of  tlie  Potomac, 
and  commanding  the  only  bridge  by  wliich  that  river 
could  be  crossed.  The  great  road  ran  straight  through 
tlie  centre  of  his  position,  and  the  artillerij  was  placed 
so  as  to  enfilade  all  the  a2}2^roaches  to  the  bridge,'''' 
A  column  of  the  British,  he  says,  "advanced  in  double- 
quick  time,  in  the  finest  order,  through  the  fire  of  the 
guns,  dashed  across  the  bridge,  carried  a  fortified  house 
at  the  other  end,  which  was  Gccvjncd  and  loojy-holed, 
and,  being  quickly  followed  by  the  other  division, 
spread  out  their  sharp-shooters  on  either  flank,  and 
moved  direct  against  the  American  batteries.  So  vig- 
orous was  the  attack  and  so  feeble  the  defence,  that 
they  were  all  carried,  and  the  first  liiJt;  thrown  back  in 
confusion  on  tlic  second  by  the  first  division  alone,  not 
more  than  fifteen  hundred  strong,  aided  by  the  fire  of 
a  few  rockets,  before  the  second  could  get  across  the 
bridge.  Ten  guns  were  taken,  and  the  whole  army, 
totally  routed,  took  to  flight."  According  to  this  mod- 
est account,  1500  British  soldiers  crossed  a  bridge  en- 
filaded by  26  guns,  stormed  a  fortified  house  at  the 
other  end,  and  routed  an  army  of  more  than  7000 
Americans. 


> 


t  t  \ 

I    '   ! 


THE    ATTACK. 


991 

M  *rf    I. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

The  Battle. 

We  shall  not  invoke  cither  the  muse  of  History  or 
the  shade  of  Cervantes  to  assist  us  in  cleseribing  the 
battle  of  Bladensburg,  but  restrict  ourselves,  saving  an 
occasional  comment,  to  the  prosaic  statements  of  those 
M'ho  shared  in  the  fatigues  and  dangers  of  the  day. 

As  the  eminent  civilian,  orator,  senator,  and  diplo- 
mat, the  lion.  A\'  illiam  Pinkney,  was  the  superior  of- 
ficer of  the  advanced  troops,  and  as  he  possessed  great 
intelligence  as  well  as  cool  bravery,  and  his  station  on 
the  field  was  on  an  eminence  where,  he  says,  there  was 
notliing  to  interrupt  his  view  of  the  advancing  enemy, 
we  shall  adopt  his  account  of  the  commencement  of 
the  action.      He  says  : 

'•The  enemy,  having  reached  Bladen sburg,  descend- 
ed the  hill,  about  12  o'clock,  in  a  very  fine  style,  and 
soon  showed  his  intention  to  force  his  way  by  the 
bridge.  Assisted  by  some  discliarges  of  rockets  (which 
were  afterward  industriously  continued),  he  made  an 
effort  to  throw  across  the  bridge  a  strong  body  of  in- 
fantry, but  he  was  driven  back  at  the  very  commence- 
ment of  it,  with  evident  loss,  by  the  artillery  in  the 
battery,  which  principally  acted  upon  the  street  or  road 
near  the  bridge,  and  he  literally  disappeared  behind 
the  houses.  Tiie  effort  was  not  inunediately  repeated, 
but  the  artillery  continued  to  fire  with  a  view,  as  it 


I 


f 


f 


I  ( 


■  \l 


1    l> 
If 


222     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

seemed,  to  interrupt  the  discharge  of  rockets,  as  in 
some  degree  it  did,  and  otherwise  to  check  the  enemy's 
operations. 

"After  a  long  pause,  during  wliich  I  conjectured  (er- 
roneously, as  I  have  since  been  told)  that  the  enemy, 
less  confident  than  before  of  the  passage  of  the  bridge, 
detached  a  corps  of  some  strength  to  make  its  way  by 
the  ford  in  the  old  Baltimore  road,  a  second  attempt 
was  made  to  cross  the  bridge,  with  increased  numbers 
and  greater  celerity  of  movement.  This,  too,  was  en- 
countered by  the  artillery  in  the  battery,  but  not  with 
its  former  success,  although  it  was  served  with  great 
spirit,  and.  commanded  by  officers  of  acknowledged  skill 
and  courage.  In  consequence,  a  large  column  of  the 
enemy,  which  was  every  moment  re-enforced,  either  by 
the  way  of  the  bridge  or  by  the  ford  immediately  above 
it,  was  able  to  form  on  the  Washington  side,  and  to 
menace  the  battery  and  the  inadequate  force  by  which 
it  was  to  be  supported.  While  the  enemy  was  yet  at 
a  distance,  the  company  on  our  right  (commanded  by 
Captain  Doughty)  discharged  their  pieces  and  fled,  al- 
though he  appeared  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  restrain 
them,  as  I  myself  did." 

As  Mr.  Pinkney  here  shows  a  disposition  to  become 
personal  in  his  remarks,  and  to  speak  ill  of  liis  neigh- 
bors, we  shall  take  leave  of  him.  The  company  to 
which  he  refers  as  having  been  so  eminently  prompt 
in  its  movements  was  not  commanded  by  Captain 
Doughty,  as  JMr.  Pinkney  afterward  acknowledged  in 
a  communication  to  the  National  Intelliirencer,  drawn 
out  by  a  letter  from  Captain  Doughty,  backed  by  one 
from  Walter  Jones,  Esq.,  of  Washington.     Captain 


I 


.    it 


i 


THE   ATTACK. 


223 


*6^» 


Doughty,  as  wc  have  stated,  was  in  a  different  part 
of  the  Held,  and  did  great  service.  ^,Vo  have  been 
unable,  after  much  inquiry,  to  ascertain  what  compa- 
ny it  was  that  was  so  eager  to  deliver  its  volley,  fulfill 
its  mission,  and  depart. 

"We  were  at  first  somewhat  at  a  loss  to  understand 
]\lr.  Pinkncy's  meaning  in  saying  that  the  enemy  ''^lit- 
erally  disappeared  behind  the  houses."  There  can 
not  be  much  difference  in  an  optical  point  of  view  be- 
tween a  literal  and  an  apparent  disappearance ;  and  il" 
a  thing  is  not  to  be  seen,  it  is  of  little  importance 
which  species  of  invisibility  it  may  lay  claim  to,  liter- 
al or  figurative.  But  the  author  of  the  "  Subaltern  in 
America,"  who  states  that  he  was  with  the  advanced 
guard  of  the  British  on  their  approach  to  Bladensburg, 
thus  explains  the  phenomenon  of  the  "  literal"  disap- 
pearance of  their  troops : 

"  The  very  first  shot  cost  us  three  men — one  killed, 
and  the  other  two  dreadfully  wounded,  and  the  second 
would  have  been,  in  all  probability,  not  less  fatal,  had 
we  not  very  wisely  avoided  it.  AVe  inclined  at  once 
to  the  right  and  left  of  the  road,  and,  winding  round 
the  houses,  made  our  way  witliout  any  further  loss  as 
fur  as  tlie  last  range,  when  we  were  commanded  to  lie 
down  and  wait  for  the  column. 

"  In  the  mean  while,  the  main  body,  being  informed 
how  matters  stood  \i.  c,  that  Bladensburg  was  not  oc- 
cupied by  the  American  troops],  resumed  its  march 
and  approached  the  town.  It  was  saluted,  as  we  had 
been  saluted,  by  a  heavy  and  well-directed  cannonade ; 
but,  being  warned  by  some  of  our  people  where  the 
danger  lay,  it  so  tnr  avoided  it  as  to  close  up  its  ranks. 


Hi 


t 


\ 


J 


I'sr 


224     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


I   Ml 


and  cfTcct  all  the  arrangements  necessary  for  the  as- 
sault under  cover  of  the  green  mound." 

The  "  2;recn  mound"  referred  to  is  Lowndes'  Hill, 
wlichis  seen  on  the  right  of  BladensLurgin  approach- 
ing the  village  hy  the  turnpike  from  Washington,  and 
the  literal  disappearance  and  "  long  pause"  of  which 
Mr.  Pinkney  speaks  were  occasioned  by  the  British 
troops  taking  refuge  bcliind  Lowndes'  Hill  and  the 
houses  of  the  village  until  they  liad  made  their  final 
arrangements  for  the  assault  and  completed  their  toilet. 

General  AVinder's  position  also  gave  him  an  unin- 
terrupted view  of  the  Held  of  hat  tie  ;  and  as  he  must 
have  Leen  anxiously  interested  in  the  result,  we  nat- 
urally look  witli  curiosity  to  his  account  of  what  pass- 
ed.    He  says : 

"  The  lire  of  our  ad^'anced  artillery  occasioned  the 
enemy,  who  were  advancing,  and  who  were  light  troops, 
to  leave  the  street,  and  they  crept  down  under  the  cov- 
er of  houses  and  trees  in  loose  order,  so  as  not  to  ex- 
pose them  to  risk  iVom  the  shot.  It  was  tliereforc 
only  occasionally  that  an  object  presented  at  which 
the  artillery  could  tire. 

"  In  this  sort  of  suspension  the  enemy  began  to 
throw  his  rockets,  and  his  light  troops  began  to  accu- 
mulate down  in  the  lower  parts  of  tlie  town  and  near 
tlie  bridge,  but  principally  covered  from  view  by  tlie 
houses.  Their  ligiit  troops,  liowevrr,  soon  began  to 
issue  out  and  press  across  the  creek,  whicli  was  every 
where  fordable,  and  in  most  cases  lined  witli  bushes 
or  trees,  which  were  sufllcient,  however,  to  conceal  the 
movements  of  liglit  troops  who  act  in  the  manner  of 
theirs,  singly.     Tlie  advanced  riflemen  now  began  to 


i 


THE   FIRST   LINE    BROKEN. 


225 


fire,  and  continued  it  for  half  a  dozen  rounds,  wlien  I 
observed  them  to  run  back  to  the  skirts  of  the  orchard 
on  tlic  left,  where  they  became  visible,  tlie  boughs  of 
the  orchard-trees  concealing  their  original  position,  as 
also  that  of  the  artillery,  from  view.     A  retreat  of 
twenty  or  thirty  yards  from  their  original  position  to- 
ward the  left  brought  them  in  view  on  the  edge  of  the 
orchard.     They  halted  there,  and  seemed  for  a  moment 
returning  to  their  position,  but  in  a  few  minutes  en- 
tirely broke  and  retired  to  the  left  of  Stansbury's  line. 
I  immediately  ordered  the  tiftli  Baltimore  regiment, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Sterctt,  being  the  left  of  Stansbu- 
ry's line,  to  advance  and  sustain  the  artillery.     They 
promptly  commenced  this  movement ;  but  the  rockets, 
•which  had,  for  the  first  three  or  four,  passed  very  high 
above  the  heads  of  the  line,  now  received  a  more  hori- 
zontal direction,  and  passed  A-evy  close  above  the  heads 
of  Shut/zs  and  Ilagan's  regiments,  composing  the  cen- 
tre and  left  [right]  of  Stansbury's  line.      ^V  universal 
flight  of  tlicse  two  regiments  was   the   consequence. 
This  leaving  the  right  of  the  iifth  wholly  unsupported, 
I  ordered  it  to  halt,  rode  swiftly  across  the  field  toward 
those  who  had  so   shamefully  fled,  and  exerted  my 
voice  to  the  utmost  to  arrest  them.     Thev  halted,  be- 
gnu  to  collect,  and  seemed  to  be   returning  to  their 
places.      \\\   ill-founded  reliance    that   their   ofiicers 
would  succeed  in  rallying  them  when  I  had  thus  suc- 
ceeded in  sto]»ping  the  greatest  part  of  them  induced 
mc  immediately  to  return  to  the  iil'th,  the  situation  of 
which  was  likely  to  become  very  critical,  and  that  po- 
pition  gave  mc  the  best  connnand  of  view.     To  my 
astonishment  and  mortification,  however,  when  I  had 

K  2 


I 


4i! 


ii 


f 


I' 


'«<! 


ii 


ft     W' 


in. 


■>n 


i! 


226     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

regained  my  position,  I  found  tlic  whole  of  these  regi- 
ments (except  a  few  of  Ragan's,  not  more  than  forty, 
rallied  by  himself,  and  as  many,  perhaps,  of  Shutz's, 

rallied,  1  learn,  by  Captain  Shower  and  Captain , 

whose  name  I  do  not  recollect)  Avere  flying  in  the  ut- 
most precipitation  and  disorder. 

"  The  advanced  artillery  had  immediately  followed 
the  riflemen,  and  retired  by  the  left  of  the  flfth.  I 
directed  them  to  take  post  on  a  rising  ground  which  I 
pointed  out  in  the  rear.  The  fifth,  and  the  artillery 
on  its  left,  still  remained,  and  I  hoped  that  their  fire, 
notwithstanding:  the  obstruction  of  the  boua-hs  of  the 
orchard,  which,  being  below,  covered  the  enemy,  would 
have  been  enabled  to  scour  this  approach  and  prevent 
his  advance.  The  enemy's  light  troops,  by  single  men, 
showed  themselves  on  the  lower  edge  of  the  left  of  the 
orchard,  and  received  the  fire  of  this  artillery  and  the 
fiftli,  wliicli  made  them  draw  back.  The  cover  to  them 
was,  however,  so  complete,  that  they  were  enabled  to 
advance  singly  and  take  positions  from  which  their  lire 
annoyed  the  fiftli  considerably,  without  citlier  that  reg- 
iment or  the  artillery  being  able  to  return  tlic  fire  with 
any  probability  of  eftcct.  In  this  situation,  I  had  act- 
ually given  an  order  to  tlie  fifth  and  artillery  to  retire 
up  the  hill  toward  a  wood  more  to  the  left  and  a  little 
to  the  rear,  for  tlie  purpose  of  drawing  thcni  farther 
from  the  orchard  and  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  firo 
while  he  was  slieltcred  by  the  orchard.  An  aversion, 
however,  to  rourc  before  the  necessity  became  stron- 
ger, and  the  hope  tliat  the  enemy  would  issue  in  a 
body  from  the  left  of  the  orchard  and  enable  us  to  act 
upon  him  on  terms  of  equality,  and  the  fear  that  a 


ii 


ROUT. 


iU  M    < 


1 


n 


movement  of  retreat  might,  in  raw  troops,  produce 
some  confusion  and  lose  us  this  chance,  induced  mc  to 
countermand  the  order,  and  direct  the  artillery  to  lire 
into  a  wooden  barn  on  the  lower  end  of  the  orchard, 
behind  which  I  supposed  the  enemy  might  be  shelter- 
ed in  considerable  numbers.  The  tire  of  tlic  enemy 
now  began,  however,  to  annoy  the  fifth  still  more  in 
wounding  several  of  them,  and  a  strong  column  of  the 
enemy  having  passed  up  the  road  as  high  as  the  right 
of  the  liftli,  and  beginning  to  deploy  into  the  lield  to 
take  them  in  front,  I  directed  the  artillery  to  retire  to 
the  hill  to  which  I  had  directed  the  Baltimore  artillery 
to  proceed,  and  halt,  and  ordered  the  fifth  regiment 
also  to  retire.  This  corps,  which  had  heretofore  acted 
so  firmly,  evinced  the  usual  incapacity  of  raw  troops 
to  make  orderly  movements  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
and  their  retreat  in  a  very  few  moments  became  a  flight 
of  absolute  and  total  disorder." 

This  statement  of  General  Winder  shows  very  clear- 
ly the  value  of  the  orchard  and  barn  as  a  military  po- 
sition, the  advantage  which  its  possession  gave  to  the 
enemy,  and  the  difhculty  whicli  they  probably  would 
have  experienced  in  driving  back  our  troops  if  they 
had  been  sulVered  to  remain  near  and  in  it,  as  General 
Stansbury  intended ;  but  a  mere  militia  general  could 
not  be  supposed  to  have  any  judgment  or  tact  what- 
ever in  military  matters,  or  to  be  right  even  by  acci- 
dent. 

Cicneral  Stansbury  says : 

"The  artillery,  under  the  command  of  Captains  My- 
er  and  Magrudcr,  and  tlie  riilemon,  the  wliole  under 
the  connuand  of  .Major  Pinkney,  behaved  in  the  most 


iii 

1i 

'I  I 

m 

i! 


mi 


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if 


1  ;  . 


i    *1 


1^ 


!■  ( 


ili 


lltl' 


"I 


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I      fitt 


ll,: 


ii:^ 


i. 

(; 


.r-J 


228     INVASION    AND   CAITUKE    OF    WASIIINaXON. 

gallant  manner  (this  gallant  officer,  in  tlie  course  of 
tlic  action,  was  severely  wounded)  ;  but  the  superior 
force  of  the  enemy,  and  the  rapidity  with  which  he 
moved,  compelled  them  to  retire.  But  one  of  tlie  pieces 
was  lost,  and  that  was  rendered  harmless  before  it  was 
abandoned. 

"  The  enemy  took  every  advantage  of  the  cover  af- 
forded them  by  the  trees  of  the  orchard,  and  their  light 
troops  from  thence  kept  up  a  galling  iire  on  our  line. 
On  this  party,  when  advanced  nearer,  tlie  5th  regiment, 
under  Colonel  ^Sterett,  opened  a  steady  and  well-di- 
rected fu'c,  whicli  was  followed  by  the  tire  from  the 
right,  and  ultimately  from  our  centre,  when  the  firing 
on  both  sides  became  general.  After  a  few  rounds  the 
troops  on  the  right  began  to  break.  I  rode  along  the 
lines,  and  gave  orders  to  the  officers  to  cut  down  those 
who  attempted  to  fly,  and  suffer  no  mnn  to  leave  tlie 
lines.  On  arrivino*  at  the  left  of  the  centre  reG:imeiit, 
I  found  Licntenant-colonel  Shutz's  nien  giving  way, 
rnd  that  brave  officer,  with  [Major  Kemp,  (dded  by  my 
aid-de-camp,  ]\[ajor  Woodycar,  exerting  themselves  in 
rallying  and  forming  them  again.  Captain  Cralloway's 
company,  and  part  of  Captains  Randall's  and  Show- 
er's companies,  were  rallied  and  formed  again,  and  be- 
haved aallaiitly.  The  rest  of  Colonels  Shutz's  and 
Racran's  rcp-imcnts  ficd  in  disorder,  notwithstandincj 
the  extraordinary  exertions  of  their  officers  to  prevent 
it.  On  the  left,  I  soon  after  discovered  a  part  of  the 
otli  regiment  giving  way,  and  that  excellent  officer, 
Lieutenant-colonel  Stcrctt,  witli  those  under  him,  most 
actively  eniraged  forming  them  again.  Soon  after,  the 
retreat  became  general,  and  all  attempts  to  rally  them 


THE    FIFTH    KEGIMENT. 


229 


; 


5 


and  make  a  second  stand  were  fruitless.  With  a  body 
of  United  States  cavalry,  I  endeavored  to  protect  the 
rear  and  right  of  the  retreating  men,  so  as  to  prevent 
their  falhng  into  the  enemy's  possession. 

"TIic  men  under  my  command  were  ,vorn  down 
and  nearly  exhausted  from  long  and  forced  marches, 
want  of  food,  and  watching.  They  had  been,  with  very 
little  intermission,  under  arms  and  marching  from  the 
time  of  their  departure  from  Baltimore,  with  but  little 
sleep,  bad  provisions,  and  but  little  opportunity  to 
cook.  They  certainly  were  not  in  a  situation  to  go 
into  battle." 

Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett,  the  commander  of  the 
5th  regiment,  is  very  brief  in  his  account  of  the  action. 
At  the  conclusion  of  it  he  says  : 

"  The  imposing  front  of  the  enemy  was  never  dis- 
concerted by  the  lire  of  the  artillery  or  riflemen,  and 
tlie  brigade  of  General  Stansbury  was  seen  to  fly  as 
soon  as  the  action  became  serious.  No  second  line 
or  reserve  appeared  to  advance  or  support  us,  and  we 
were  outflanked  and  defeated  in  as  short  a  time  as 
such  an  operation  could  well  be  performed." 

This  statement  of  Colonel  Sterett  hardly  docs  justice 
to  his  own  countrvmen  and  fellow-soldiers.  All  ac- 
counts  show  that  the  imposing  front  of  the  enemy  was 
disconcerted  by  the  artillery  on  his  advance  to  the 
bridge — enough  so  to  induce  him  to  waive  dignity  for 
safety,  and  take  refuG;c  behind  the  houses  and  Lowndes' 
Hill.  The  British  accounts  alone  arc  not  to  be  relied 
on,  because  some  of  them  exaggerate  the  resistance  in 
order  to  mnji-nifv  their  own  valor  in  overcomin";  it. 
But  on  rom]iaring  all  accounts,  American  and  British, 


I 


r 

I 


i 


r^ 


if 


'X 


I 


'    |!!1' 


|li 


230     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

it  is  evident  that  even  Stansbuiy's  brigade  stood  its 
ground  long  enough  to  show  that,  under  different  aus- 
pices, it  woukl  have  performed  its  part  welh  Gleig, 
the  writer  of  the  "  Campaign  at  Wasliington,"  states 
that  the  precipitate  retreat  upon  it  of  our  riflemen 
"threw  it  into  disorder  before  it  had  fired  a  shot."' 
Stansbury  says  that  before  his  brigade  broke  "the  fir- 
ing on  both  sides  became  general,"  and  that  "after  a 
few  rounds  the  troojDS  on  the  right  began  to  break." 

Sterett  says  that  Stansbury's  brigade  "was  seen  to 
fly  as  soon  as  the  action  became  serious."  Probably 
amona;  tlic  circumstances  which  induced  the  men  to 
think  that  matters  were  taking  a  serious  turn  were 
these :  the  shower  of  rockets  among  them ;  the  hur- 
ried retreat  of  the  riflemen  upon  them ;  the  galling  fire 
from  the  orchard ;  the  continued  advance  of  fresh  troops 
of  the  enemy,  amounting,  as  they  had  been  informed, 
to  eight  or  ten  thousand  veterans ;  no  knowledge  that 
any  reserved  troops  were  in  their  rear;  and  the  con- 
viction which  every  man  of  common  sense  among  them 
must  have  felt,  that,  under  these  circumstances,  to  con- 
tinue longer  on  the  field  would  expose  tliem  to  the 
danger  of  being  cut  to  pieces.  It  is  difficult  to  un- 
derstand the  motive  for  placing  or  keeping  them  in 
such  a  position.  It  was  not  a  position  to  be  defend- 
ed at  all  hazards  and  at  any  cost  of  life,  in  order  to 
gain  time.  What  was  the  time  wanted  for?  The 
troops  in  the  rear  were  not  advancing,  nor  does  it  ap- 
pear that  there  was  any  design  that  they  should  ad- 
vance. Further  continuance  in  such  a  position  could 
be  only  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  experiment 
whether  a  body  of  raw  militia-men,  in  an  open  fickl, 


i 


i 


DURATION    OF   THE    CONFLICT. 


2,-31 


and  in  pitched  battle,  could  defeat  four  or  five  times 
their  number  of  regular  and  veteran  troops. 

It  does  not  appear  how  long  the  action  with  the  first 
line  lasted.  Lieutenant-colonel  Stcrett's  assertion  that 
the  line  was  "outflanked  and  defeated  in  as  short  a  time 
as  such  an  operation  could  well  be  performed,"  is  alto- 
gether vague,  and  as  he  was  a  militia  oflicer,  probably 
never  in  action  before,  he  could  hardly  have  known  the 
average  time  required,  in  general,  to  perform  the  oper- 
ation of  outflankino;  and  defeatimi;  an  armv.  ]Mr.  John 
Law,  whose  statement  we  have  already  referred  to, 
says  that  the  Baltimore  artillery  tired  about  ten  rounds 
before  it  retreated ;  and  the  last  discharges  of  the  ar- 
tillery, which  arc  usually  the  most  destructive,  were 
in  this  case  the  least  so,  as  none  of  the  advanced  artil- 
lery was  furnished  with  any  other  than  round  shot ; 
and  Mr.  Pinkney  states  that  the  half-formed  embrasures 
of  the  work  in  which  the  Baltimore  artillery  was 
placed  rendered  it  "  difficult,  if  not  impracticable,  to 
depress  the  guns  in  those  embrasures  (the  ground  of 
the  battery  being  considerably  elevated)  so  as  to  touch 
the  enemy  after  his  near  approach."' 

Cockburn  states  in  his  official  dispatch  that  our 
army,  8000 strong,  was  "dislodged  as  soon  as  reached" 
by  a  division  of  the  British  army  "  not  amounting  to 
more  than  1500  men.*'  Admitting — and  the  admis- 
sion is  certainly  a  charitable  one — that  he  does  not  mis- 
state the  numbers  on  both  sides,  diminishing  the  one 
as  much  as  he  exaggerates  the  other,  and  that  not  more 
than  1500  of  the  British  army  had  time  to  reach  the 
field  before  the  first  line  was  defeated,  still,  in  point 
of  fact,  those  1500  had  to  contend  with  not  more  than 


i! 


1^ 


m 


232     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE    OF   "SVASIIINGTON. 


1* 


1.1 


f! 


700  of  our  own  troops.  They  were  protected  by  the 
orchard  and  barn,  and  by  distance,  from  the  fire  of  the 
5th  regiment  and  Stansbury's  brigade.  The  only  part 
of  the  line,  exclusive  of  the  advanced  troops,  which 
could  have  done  them  any  damage,  was  Burch's  bat- 
tery of  three  pieces,  and  Captain  Doughty's  company, 
which  was  thrown  forward,  in  crotchet  form,  on  the  left 
of  Stansbury's  line,  and  which  opened  an  effective  fire 
upon  them  while  they  were  near  the  barn. 

The  British  accounts  describe  but  one  battle.  There 
were,  in  fact,  two,  as  distinct  as  if  they  had  taken 
place  on  diftercnt  days  and  with  different  armies.  The 
second  line  of  the  American  army  was  nearly  a  mile  in 
the  rear  of  the  first,  and  there  had  been  no  communi- 
cation between  them,  no  re-enforcement  from  one  to  the 
other,  except  that  before  the  appearance  of  the  enemy  at 
Bladensburg  Captain  Doughty's  company  and  Burch's 
company  of  artillery  had  been  advanced  from  the  sec- 
ond to  the  first  line.  Xonc  of  the  troops  of  the  first 
line,  after  its  defeat,  retreated  to  or  rallied  upon  the 
second  line,  which  was  left,  therefore,  to  encounter  the 
full  force  of  an  enemy  inspirited  by  its  victory  over 
the  first  line  and  outnumbering  the  second  nearly  two 
to  one. 

The  enemy  proceeded  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack 
on  both  flanks  of  the  second  line,  as  they  had  upon  the 
first,  their  right  wing  led  by  Colonel  Brooke,  of  the 
44th  regiment,  continuing  up  the  old  Georgetown  road 
in  pursuit  of  the  routed  troops,  and  their  left,  under 
Colonel  Thornton,  advancing  along  the  turnpike  to  the 
attack  of  Barney's  battery.  The  reception  which  the 
commodore   gave  his  visitors  upon  this  occasion  we 


1 


i 


N. 


ATTACK  ON  THE  SECOND  LINE. 


by  the 
3  of  the 
fily  part 
,  which 
[I's  bat- 
mpany, 

the  left 
tive  fire 

There 
L  taken 
1.    The 
mile  in 
nmuni- 
3  to  the 
emy  at 
Jurch's 
le  sec- 
le  first 
)n  the 
ter  the 
Y  over 
ly  two 

attack 
)n  the 
)f  the 
I  road 
under 

to  illQ 

h  the 
n  we 


' 


1 


shall  leave  him  to  relate  in  his  own  language,  upon 
w^hich  v.-e  sliall  afterward  make  a  few  comments.  Aft- 
er speaking  of  the  heat  of  the  weather,  the  crippled 
condition  of  his  men  from  the  severe  marches  they  had 
experienced  the  '^-^ys  before,  many  of  them  being  with- 
out slioes,  and  the  hurried  manner  in  which  he  had 
been  compelled  to  take  a  position,  he  says : 

"  At  length  the  enemy  made  his  appearance  or  the 
main  road  in  force,  and  in  front  of  my  battery,  and  on 
seeino;  us  made  a  halt.  I  reserved  our  fire.  In  a  few 
moments  the  enemy  again  advanced,  when  I  ordered 
an  eighteen -pounder  to  be  fired,  which  completely 
cleared  the  road ;  shortly  after,  a  second  and  a  third 
attempt  was  made  by  the  enemy  to  come  forward,  but 
all  were  destroyed.  They  then  crosbed  over  into  an 
open  field,  and  attempted  to  flank  our  right :  he  was 
there  met  by  three  twelve-pounders,  the  marines  under 
Captain  ]\Iiller,  and  my  men  acting  as  infantry,  and 
again  was  totally  cut  up.  By  this  time  not  a  vestige  of 
the  American  army  remained,  except  a  body  of  five  or 
six  hundred  posted  on  a  height  on  my  right,  from  whom 
I  expected  much  support  from  their  fine  situation. 

"  Tlie  enemy  from  this  period  never  appeared  in 
force  in  front  of  us ;  they  pushed  forward  their  shai-p- 
shooters,  one  of  whom  shot  my  horse  under  me,  who 
fell  dead  between  two  of  my  guns.  The  enemy,  who 
had  been  kept  in  check  by  our  fire  for  nearly  half  r;i 
hour,  now  bcG;an  to  outflank  us  on  the  rinlit.  ( )ur 
guns  were  turned  that  way.  lie  pushed  up  the  hill 
about  two  or  three  hundred  toward  the  corps  of  Amer- 
icans stationed  as  above  described,  who,  to  my  great 
mortification,  made  no  resistance,  giving  a  fire  or  two, 


I 

I 


J! 


A 


234     INVASION   AND    CAPTURE   OF   AVASHINGTON. 


and  retired.  In  this  situation  wc  had  the  whole  army 
to  contend  with.  Our  ammunition  was  expended, 
and,  unfortunately,  the  drivers  of  our  ammunition  wag- 
ons had  gone  off  in  the  general  panic." 

The  commodore  himself  was  severely  wounded,  and 
while  lying  in  that  condition  on  the  ground,  Ross  and 
Cockburn  came  up  to  him,  behaved  to  him  "  with  the 
most  marked  attention,  respect,  and  politeness,"  had  a 
surgeon  brought  and  his  wound  dressed  immediately. 
He  says  :  "  Captain  Wainwright,  first  captain  to  Ad- 
miral Cochrane,  remained  with  me  and  behaved  to  me 
as  if  I  were  a  brother.  During  the  stay  of  the  enemy 
at  Bladensburg  I  received  every  marked  attention  pos- 
sible from  the  officers  of  the  navy  and  army." 

But  these  polite  attentions  did  not  prevent  the  com- 
modore from  afterward  denouncing  Ross  for  the  mis- 
statements contained  in  his  official  dispatch.  I^  a 
communication  to  the  National  Intelligencer  in  rela- 
tion to  that  disjDatch,  the  commodore  says : 

"  The  general  then  goes  on  to  state  how  his  troops 
advanced,  and  by  the  irresistible  attack  of  the  bayonet 
the  enemy  got  into  confusion  and  fled.  It  would  have 
been  more  to  the  honor  of  the  general  if  he  had  told 
that  his  men  never  had  it  in  their  power  to  use  the 
bayonet  but  once,  and  then  declined  it ;  for,  after  ev- 
ery attempt  was  made  by  his  men  to  advance  on  the 
main  road,  and  were  driven  by  the  artillery  under  my 
command  into  the  field,  they  were  rallied  and  again 
led  on  by  Colonel  Thornton,  who  advanced  to  within 
fifty  yards  of  our  position,  where  he  was  met  by  the 
marines  under  Captains  Miller  and  Sevier,  with  the 
flotilla  men.  Colonel  Thornton  fell  dangerously  wound- 


1 


)^» 


BARNEY   AND   ROSS. 


235 


ed.  Captain  Hamilton  and  Lieutenant  Codd  wore  kill- 
ed. Lieutenant  Stevely,  of  the  'King's  Own,'  also 
severely  wounded.  The  veterans  of  the  eighty-fifth 
and  fourth,  or  '  King's  Own,'  gave  way.  So  far  from 
using  the  bayonet,  they  fled  before  our  men,  who  pur- 
sued them,  the  sailors  crying  out  to  'board'  them. 
Nor  did  the  enemy  rally  until  they  got  into  a  ravine 
covered  with  woods,  leaving  their  officers  in  our  pow- 
er. Then  our  men  returned  to  their  station.  General 
Ross,  in  person,  was  obliged  to  take  command,  but 
dared  not  lead  them  on  in  front,  but  pushed  out  on 
our  flank.  Our  ammunition  being  expended,  we  were 
necessitated  to  retire." 

I'rom  this  statement  of  Commodore  Barney  himself, 
it  appears  that  his  men  did  not,  as  others  have  assert- 
ed, stand  by  their  guns  until  several  of  them  were 
bayoneted.  lie,  however,  makes  the  most  of  the  part 
played  by  the  men  under  his  command,  which  was  suf- 
ficiently creditable  to  them  to  render  it  unnecessary  to 
enhance  their  merit  by  the  reflections  and  innuendoes 
to  the  disparagement  of  others  contained  in  his  asser- 
tion that  "  by  this  time  not  a  vestige  of  the  American 
army  remained,  except  a  body  of  five  or  six  hundred 
posted"  on  his  right,  which  body,  to  his  "  great  mor- 
tification, made  no  resistance,  giving  a  fire  or  two,  and 
retiring."  The  truth  is,  that  none  of  the  troops  on 
his  right  or  left  retired  until  they  had  been  ordered  to 
retreat  by  the  general-in-ehief. 

From  Commodore  Barney's  statements  it  woi.ld  ap- 
pear that  none  of  the  troops  of  the  second  line  per- 
formed any  service  except  those  under  his  command. 
But  the  light  brigade  of  the  enemy,  in  advancing 


II 


^ 


i-' 


i 


I 


.!;i    ■ 


I     , 


^f 


^     I 


23G     INVASION    AND    CAPTURE    OF   WASHINGTON. 

through  the  cleiilc  near  the  bridge  over  tlie  ravine, 
came  within  range  of  Peter's  battery,  whicli  opened  a 
cross  fire  upon  tliem  with  considerable  effect.  After 
the  first  discharge  from  Barney's  battery,  the  British 
eighty-fifth  regiment  was  thrown  out  on  its  right  with 
a  view  to  carry  the  left  flank  of  tliat  battery  ;  and  liav- 
ing  advanced  within  range  of  IMagruder's  regiment,  met 
a  reception  which  caused  it  to  retrograde ;  and  cross- 
ing the  road  in  open  order,  it  united  with  the  fourth, 
which  had  deployed  on  the  left  on  the  margin  of  the 
ravine,  coming  in  conflict  there  with  Kramer's  com- 
mand, which,  after  a  spirited  resistance,  fell  back  to  the 
right  of  the  line.  Tlic  Subaltern  in  America  speaks 
jDarticularly  of  the  severity  of  the  fire  from  every  part 
of  the  American  line  commandino;  the  defile  until  the 
right  of  the  line  was  flanked.  The  loss  sustained  here 
by  the  British,  as  well  from  the  murderous  discliarge 
of  grape  from  Barney's  battery,  which  mowed  down 
whole  companies,  as  from  the  cross  fire  of  Peter's  bat- 
tery and  the  discharge  of  musketry,  exceeded,  accord- 
ing to  the  accounts  of  the  British  officers  who  were 
present,  that  of  any  battle  in  whicli  they  had  ever  been 
engaged,  considering  the  numbers  of  the  contending 
forces. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  right  wing  of  the  British,  un- 
der Colonel  Brook,  was  approaching  the  left  of  Peter's 
battery,  which,  for  want  of  sufficient  support,  must 
ijoon  have  been  carried.  At  this  crisis,  General  Win- 
der, who  had  been  vainly  endeavoring  to  arrest  or  direct 
the  flight  of  his  first  line,  arrived  upon  the  gi'ound,  and 
perceiving  his  right  flank  in  the  act  of  being  turned, 
and  his  left  nearly  in  the  same  predicament,  gave  or- 


RETREAT    OF    THE    A:MER1CANS. 


237 


•) 


dcrs  for  the  line  to  retreat.  The  manner  in  wiiich  the 
order  was  executed  by  General  Smith  wo,  shall  state 
in  his  own  words  : 

"  The  order  to  retreat  was  executed  by  regiments 
and  corps  as  they  had  been  formed,  and  with  as  mucli 
order  as  the  nature  of  the  ease  would  permit.  The 
lirst  and  second  regiments  halted  and  formed,  after  re- 
treating five  or  six  hundred  paces,  but  Avore  again  or- 
dered by  General  Winder  to  retire.  At  this  moment 
I  fell  in  with  Orcncral  Winder,  and,  after  a  short  con- 
ference with  him,  was  directed  to  move  on,  and  collect 
the  troops,  and  prepare  to  make  a  stand  on  the  heights 
westward  of  the  turnpike  gate.  This  was  done  as  fast 
as  the  troops  came  up.  X  front  vva.^  again  presented 
toward  the  enemy,  consisting  principa  ly  of  the  troops 
of  this  District,  a  part  of  those  who  h.'xl  been  attached 
to  them  in  the  action,  and  a  Virginia  rc^^'iment  of  about 
four  hundred  men,  under  Colonel  jMiner,  which  met 
us  at  this  place.  While  the  line  was  yet  forming,  I 
received  orders  from  General  Winder  to  fall  back  to 
the  Capitol,  and  there  form  for  battle.  I  took  the  lib- 
erty of  suggesting  my  impression  of  the  preferable  sit- 
uation we  then  occupied  ;  but,  expecting  that  he  might 
be  joined  there  by  some  of  his  dispersed  troops  of  the 
front  line,  he  chose  to  make  the  stand  there.  Ap- 
proaching the  Capitol,  I  halted  the  troops,  and  request- 
ed his  orders  as  to  the  formation  of  the  line.  We 
found  no  auxiliaries  there.  He  then  conferred  for  a 
few  moments  with  General  Armstrong,  who  was  a  short 
distance  from  us,  and  then  gave  orders  that  the  whole 
should  retreat  through  Washington  and  Georgetown. 
It  is  impossible  to  do  justice  to  the  anguish  evinced 


II 


-1" 


ii^\ 


'if 


238     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

bj  the  troops  of  Washington  and  Georgetown  on  tlie 
receiving  of  this  order.  The  idea  of  leaving  tlieir  fom- 
ilies,  their  houses,  and  their  homes  at  the  mercy  of  an 
enraged  enemy  was  insupportable.  To  preserve  that 
order  which  was  maintained  during  the  retreat  was  now 
no  longer  practicable." 

We  can  add  our  own  testipiony,  as  an  eye-witness, 
to  General  Smith's  statement  of  the  effect  which  the 
final  order  to  retreat  had  upon  the  troops  under  his 
command.  Some  shed  tears,  others  uttered  impreca- 
tions, and  all  evinced  the  utmost  astonishment  and  in- 
dignation ;  for  it  was  impossible  for  them  to  compre- 
hend why  troops  who  were  willing  to  risk  an  encounter 
with  the  enemy  should  be  denied  the  opporturdty. 

Tlie  official  dispatch  of  General  Ross  states  that  the 
number  of  his  killed  on  the  24th  w^as  56,  and  wound- 
ed 185,  including  officers  and  men,  but  his  real  loss 
was  more  than  double  that  number.  Dr.  Catlett,  Gen- 
eral Winder's  staff-surgeon,  who  was  permitted  by  the 
enemy  to  proceed  to  Bladensburg  on  the  day  after  the 
battle  to  attend  to  some  of  our  wounded,  states  that 
one  of  the  British  surgeons  there  informed  him  that 
they  had  that  day  buried  about  one  hundred  of  their 
men  on  the  field ;  and,  after  the  retreat  of  the  British, 
fifty  or  sixty  were  found  and  buried  by  our  own  men. 
Tlicir  wounded  Catlett  estimates  a-t  "three  or  four 
hundred,  besides  forty  or  fifty  left  in  tliis  city." 

The  loss  on  our  side  was  20  killed  and  51  wounded. 


UNMEIilTED  CHARGES   AGAINST  THE   TROOPS.    239 


CHAPTER  Xlir. 

Remarks  on  the  Buttle  and  Ketreat. 

At  the  conclusion  of  his  letter  to  the  chairman  of 
the  coniinittce  of  investigation,  General  Smith,  the  com- 
mander of  the  District  militia,  says  : 

"The  troops  of  Washington  and  Georgetown  have 
been  assailed  in  the  public  prints  and  elsewlicre  with 
calmnnies  as  unmerited  as  they  are  cruel  and  wanton. 
Tiiey  have  heard  of  them  with  indignant  astonishment. 
Conscious  that  in  no  instance  have  they  been  want- 
ing in  the  duty  they  owed  to  their  country  or  to  them- 
selves, but,  on  the  contrary,  in  obedience  to  the  call  of 
their  government,  have  with  alacrity  obeyed  its  orders, 
and  intrepidly  fronted  an  enemy  vastly  their  superior 
in  force,  and  never  yielded  the  ground  to  him  but  by 
orders  emanating  from  superior  authority,  they  can  not 
restrain  tlie  feelings  excited  by  such  manifest,  such 
unprovoked  injustice." 

It  is  not  difficult  to  account  for  tliis  burden  of  cal- 
umny thrown  upon  the  District  troops.  In  tlie  first 
place,  a  defeated  party  is  always  in  t!ie  wrong,  and  may 
be  blamed  with  impunity  by  all  the  world.  In  the 
next  place,  there  is  always  a  multitude  of  intrepid 
spirits  so  overburdened  with  untried  valor  themselves 
that  they  arc  wholly  unable  to  sympathize  with  any 
want  of  it  in  others,  and  arc  prodigiously  indignant 
ut  those  who  will  not  light  for  their  country  to  the  last 


>t»l 


u\ 


H 


w 


240     INVASION    AND   CAPTUllE   OF    WASHINGTON. 

extremity  against  any  conceivable  odds,  and  even 
against  orders.  Thirdly,  the  defence  of  the  city  was 
peculiarly  the  business  of  the  District  troops ;  they 
were — if  we  may  venture  to  use  language  so  unsuited 
to  the  dignity  of  history  —  "lighting  on  their  own 
dunghill ;"  and  the  fact  that  so  many  of  them  retreat- 
ed without  giving  or  receiving  a  scratch  was  strong 
prima  facie  proof  that  they  had  "  sliown  tlie  white 
feather."  Even  Stansbury's  men,  no  doubt,  excused 
themselves  to  their  neighbors,  after  their  return  home, 
by  saying,  "  How  could  we  be  expected  to  light  when 
we  were  not  supported  by  those  cowardly  District 
troops  ?" 

But  the  most  potent  cause  of  all  is,  that  the  great 
functionaries  of  government,  knowing  that  the  blame 
of  the  capture  of  the  city  must  rest  either  on  them- 
selves or  on  the  troops,  were  determined  to  throw  it 
upon  the  latter,  and  their  position  and  influence  ena- 
bled them  to  do  it  so  effectually,  that  the  imputation 
cast  from  this  high  source  has  become  lixcd  in  history 
and  tradition  "like  a  fly  in  amber." 

General  Armstrong,  in  his  letter  to  tlie  chairman  of 
the  committee,  speaking  of  "  the  disasters  of  the  day," 
says,  "Without  all  doubt  the  determining  cause  of 
these  is  to  be  found  in  tliat  love  of  life  which,  in  many 
of  the  corps,  predominated  over  a  love  of  country  and 
of  honor ;"  tlic  meaning  of  which  paraphrase  is,  in 
plain  Knglish,  that  the  main  cause  of  the  defeat  was 
the  cowardice  of  tlie  troops. 

The  Court  of  Inquiry,  of  wliich  General  Scott  was 
president,  convened  for  tlie  purpose  of  examining  into 
and  reporting  upon  the  conduct  of  Cicncral  Winder, 


I 


ATTEMPT   TO    SHIFT   THE    BLAME. 


241 


even 

was 
they 
uited 

own 
trcat- 
itrong 
white 
cused 
home, 

when 
istrict 

5  great 
Uainc 
thcni- 
irow  it 
;c  cna- 
iitation 
listory 

I  an  of 
day," 

iuse  of 
many 

.ry  and 
is,  in 

;at  was 

)tt  was 
iig  into 
Vlnder, 


gave  it  as  their  unanimous  opinion  that  no  censure  was 
attributable  to  him,  but  that,  "  on  the  contrary,"  he 
was  "  entitled  to  no  little  commendation."  This,  by 
implication,  unexplained,  threw  all  the  blame  upon  the 
troops ;  and  the  implication  was  strengthened  by  the 
remark  of  the  court  that  all  of  the  troops,  "excepting 
400,  were  militia." 

General  Winder  himself,  in  his  narrative,  when 
speaking  of  the  defects  in  the  order  of  battle,  inti- 
mates, as  wc  have  seen,  that  "■groundless  panic"  was 
the  main  cause  of  the  defeat.  lie  refers  to  tiie  "in- 
capacity of  raw  troops  to  make  orderly  movements  in 
tlie  lace  of  the  enemy;"  states  that  Colonel  Ikall's 
detachment  "  lied,"  abandoning  their  "  commanding 
position"  to  the  enemy,  and  is  sparing  of  any  com- 
mendation except  upon  Barney's  connuand,  though 
none  could  testify  better  than  himself  to  the  patience 
under  fatigue  and  privation,  the  readiness  to  encoun- 
ter danger,  and  the  firnmess  in  its  presence,  displayed 
l)y  the  great  majority  of  hi.s  troops,  militia  as  tliey 
were. 

There  seems  to  have  been  a  tacit  understanding 
among  all  the  leading  men,  and  the  friends  of  all  the 
leading  men,  whose  own  conduct  might  by  any  possi- 
bility 1)0  called  in  (question,  that  it  would  be  much 
more  prudent  to  let  the  obloquy  rest  upon  the  troops 
than  to  undertake  seriously  to  assail  each  other ;  and 
tiierefore,  without  appointing  any  Congressional  com- 
mittee, or  any  court  of  inquiry,  to  investigate  the  &pc- 
cific  allegation  of  cowardice  made  against  tlie  troo})s, 
they  were  convicted  of  the  charge  by  a  sort  of  accla- 
mation, in  which  many  were  good-humored  enougli  to 

L 


1 
I 


i 


♦  •  I 

r' 

i 

I? 


r 


M  '' 


242     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

join  themselves,  and  rally  eacli  other  on  the  "Bladens- 
l)urg  Races."  Yet,  as  even  this  joke — encouraged  for 
a  serious  purpose  by  some — has  left  a  stigma,  not  only 
upon  the  character  of  the  District  troops,  but  upon  that 
of  the  American  people,  and  upon  the  efficiency  of  mi- 
litia troops  generally,  justice  to  all  requires  it  to  be 
stated  that  there  is  not  a  particle  of  evidence  to  convict 
any  portion  of  the  troops  assembled  at  Bladensburg, 
Stansbury's  brigade  excepted,  of  want  of  courage,  want 
of  subordination,  or  want  of  any  other  soldierly  quality. 
In  all  other  cases  the  retreat  of  the  troops  was  in  con- 
sequence of  orders  from  the  commanding  general,  which 
it  was  sometimes  found  necessary  to  reiterate,  from  the 
reluctance  of  tiic  troops  to  obey  them. 

The  repeated  orders  to  retire  given  to  the  advanced 
troops  between  the  ^Vood  Yard  and  Nottingham  were, 
according  to  j\Injor  Peter's  statement  and  to  our  own 
personal  knowledge,  very  unwillingly  obeyed.  At  the 
Old  Fields,  on  the  23d  of  August,  the  troops  showed 
no  signs  of  unwillingness  for  tlie  encounter,  great  as 
they  sujjposed  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy 
to  be.  At  Bladensburg,  it  was  witli  the  utmost  re- 
luctance that  General  Smitli's  troops  obeyed  the  or- 
der to  retreat.  As  he  states,  "  The  first  and  second 
regiments,  after  retreating  five  or  six  lumdred  yards, 
halted  and  formed,  but  were  again  ordered  by  General 
Winder  to  retire." 

Willi  respect  to  the  regular  troops  under  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Scott,  we  have  been  informed  by  the  Hon- 
orable William  1).  l^Ierrick,  of  3Iaryland,  who  was  the 
adjutant  of  the  connnand,  that  on  the  ajiproach  of  the 
right  column  of  the  enemy,  after  the  dclbat  of  the  first 


J 


COLONEL  BEALL  S  OPINION. 


243 


H 


t  rc- 


.3 


\i 


■'i 


'.';" 
T  i 


line,  Scott's  command  changed  front  in  order  to  meet 
them,  and  received  the  fire  of  the  British  advance, 
which  killed  and  wounded  five  or  six  of  the  men. 
While  the  troops  were  in  the  act  of  returning  the  fire. 
General  Winder  rode  up  to  them  and  gave  the  order 
to  retreat  to  Washington.  On  being  asked  hy  Adju- 
tant Merrick,  who  was  on  horseback,  whether  the  troops 
might  not  be  allowed  to  return  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 
General  Winder  demanded  to  know  who  commanded 
the  regiment.  The  adjutant  pointed  to  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Scott,  who  was  then  on  foot,  his  horse  liaving 
been  killed,  when  General  Winder  repeated  the  order, 
directing  him  to  retire  inmicdiately. 

The  veteran  Colonel  Beall,  whose  command  appears 
to  such  little  advantage  in  the  narrative  of  General 
Winder  and  report  of  Commodore  Barney,  in  his  brief 
and  modest  letter  to  the  chairman  of  the  committee 
makes  no  other  excuse  for  his  men  than  to  state  that 
they  were  fatigued  and  exhausted  from  their  march  of 
sixteen  miles  that  morning  before  the  battle,  and  that, 
according  to  his  own  impression,  they  did  not  give  way 
"as  early  as  is  represented  by  some."  In  a  letter 
published  by  General  Wilkinson  in  his  ^lemoirs,* 
Colonel  Beall  says :  "  I  do  not  say  some  of  my  men 
did  not  retreat  too  soon,  but  what  number  they  were 
I  know  not.  The  men  Avho  buried  the  dead  of  the  en- 
emy say  that  near  the  ground  I  occupied  sixteen  were 
killed,  and  I  think  my  loss  was  four.  The  adjutant 
of  the  first  i-egimcnt  of  the  Columbian  Brigade  says 
the  flotilla-men  and  his  regiment  retreated  to  the  city 
together,!  and  lie  returned  and  met  me  at  the  turn- 
♦  Vol.  i.,  p.  785.         t  This  is  well  remembered  by  the  author. 


I*! 


0 


r 

ij.  i: 


Ih^ 


i  I' 


^u> 


1) 


l 
fi 

>l 

t' 


'.      II 


244    INVASION   AND   CAPTUllE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

pike  gate."  General  Wilkinson  also  publishes  ex- 
tracts from  two  letters  addressed  to  Colonel  Beall  a 
few  weeks  after  the  battle  by  John  E.  Howard,  Esq., 
of  jMaryland,  a  son  of  the  hero  of  the  Cowpens.  In 
the  lirst  letter,  Mr.  Howard,  after  adverting  to  Commo- 
dore Barney's  report,  says,  "I  was  the  person  who  de- 
livered to  you  the  order  from  General  AVindcr  to  re- 
treat, to  avoid  being  outflanked  and  cut  oft'.  I  acted 
as  an  aid  to  the  general."  In  the  second  letter  he 
states,  "I  apprehended  that  the  order  I  delivered  to 
you  was  the  first  you  had  to  retreat,  and  I  perfectly 
recollect  your  reply,  *  Does  General  AVinder  order  mc 
to  retreat  before  we  have  fired  a  shot,  and  the  men  in 
perfect  order  ?'  and  while  repeating  the  order,  the  ene- 
my began  to  fire  from  the  wood  which  was  in  front  of 
your  right  wing."  "  I  feel  prompted  to  address  you," 
says  Mr.  Howard,  in  his  first  letter,  "from  accidental- 
ly witnessing  your  conduct  in  the  rear  of  the  retreat- 
ing army,  when  you  drew  a  line  across  the  road,  and 
rallied,  and  formed  your  men  in  regular  order  before 
they  were  permitted  to  march  on." 

The  most  that  can  be  expected  of  raw  troops,  or  in- 
deed of  any  troops,  is,  that  they  will  obey  orders,  and 
not  retreat  until  ordered  to  do  so.  If  they  satisfy 
these  requirements,  all  the  blame  attending  their  move- 
ments must  fall  elsewhere.  It  is  preposterous  to  ex- 
pect that  any  troops,  in  their  anxiety  to  fight,  would 
mutinously  disobey  an  order  to  retreat,  and  yet  not  a 
few  of  the  "  BJadcnsburg  heroes"  were  on  the  point 
of  doing  this. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no  ground  for  attribu- 
ting any  motive  to  General  Winder  in  giving  these  or- 


J 


COURAGE   OF   GENERAL   WINDER. 


245 


1» 


■  'J 


clers  to  retreat  other  tlian  the  humane  one  of  prevent- 
ing' a  useless  sacrifice  of  the  Uves  of  men  who  were 
not  mere  worthless,  vagabond  mercenaries,  Lut  gener- 
ally respectable  citizens,  many  with  families,  wives, 
mothers,  or  sisters  dependent  on  them,  or  anxiously 
waitino;  their  return  from  dancer.  There  is  an  abun- 
dance  of  concurrent  and  spontaneous  testimony  as  to 
the  personal  gallantry,  zeal,  and  energy  which  General 
Winder  himself  displayed  in  the  field  of  battle.  By 
cort.  i\  he  contest  he  mi^-^'^^  hc've  hoped  still  to  re- 
trieve a  Vi^vOry,  which  woulu  be  the  more  creditable 
from  its  being  unexpected,  and  achieved  under  despe- 
rate circumstances.  A  less  scrupulous  commander 
would  not  have  hesitated  to  risk  the  lives  of  his  men 
on  such  a  chance.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  therefore, 
that  his  motives  in  ordering  the  retreat  w^ere  credita- 
ble to  him,  and  no  question  can  arise  except  as  to  the 
necessity  or  propriety  of  the  retreat  in  a  military  point 
of  view. 

Upon  this  subject  General  Wdkinson  says: 
"Wlien  (Jeneral  Winder  saw  the  first  line  so  easily 
routed,  without  adverting  to  the  primary  cause,  the  ex- 
ample of  the  President,  and  believing  the  whole  force 
of  the  enemy  had  been  brought  into  action,  it  was  nat- 
ural he  should  become  solicitous  for  the  safety  of  his 
rear ;  yet  I  consider  the  order  for  retreat  unfortunate, 
because  of  my  confidence  in  the  materials  which  com- 
posed what  was  called  the  second  line ;  ]\Iajor  Peter's 
command,  consisting  of  a  company  of  well-trained  ar- 
tillery, with  StulTs  and  Davidson's  eonipanios  of  in- 
fantry, would  have  breasted  any  equal  mimljcr,  no 
matter  of  what  country  or  corps ;  and  if  this  detach- 


j! 


Si 


;.! 


!^ 


.1 


ill 


i, 


"    II 


jli 


'!' 


<!, 


^1 


I     h 


246    INVASION  AND  CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

ment  had  been  joined  to  tlie  regular  troops  under  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Scott,  who  impatiently  expected  the  en- 
emy, having  changed  his  front  and  advanced  to  meet 
them,  the  exhausted  Britons  must  have  surrendered  in 
a  few  minutes,  or  been  dispersed  and  captured ;  and 
if  Magruder's  regiment  had  been  pushed  forward,  pass- 
ed Commodore  Barney's  battery,  wheeled  to  the  riglit, 
and  taken  Colonel  Thornton  in  flank  and  rear,  he 
would  have  shared  the  fate  of  the  right  wing,  while 
Colonel  Brent's  regiment,  lield  in  reserve,  could  have 
co-operated  to  the  right  or  left,  if  necessary." 

But  General  Wilkinson,  in  his  desire  to  show  in 
how  few  minutes  he  could  have  disposed  of  "  the  ex- 
hausted Britons,"  forgets  again  the  very  first  princi- 
ples of  the  art  of  war,  or  else  underrates  the  true 
strength  of  the  enemy,  not  known  till  after  the  battle, 
as  much  as  it  was  overrated  by  others  before. 

It  requires  no  study  of  the  science  of  war  to  under- 
stand the  simple  proposition,  truism,  or  axiom  upon 
which  all  strategy  is  based,  that  of  two  bodies  of  men 
engaged  in  battle  with  each  other,  if  all  other  things 
be  equal,  the  most  numerous  body  will  conquer. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  anticipate  victory  for  the  less 
numerous  body,  we  must  be  able  to  reckon  ujjon  some 
odds  in  their  favor. 

What  odds  had  the  second  line  in  its  favor  to  coun- 
terbalance a  disparity  of  numbers  against  them  of  near- 
ly two  to  one  ? 

As  to  the  advantage  in  artillery,  that  might  serve  to 
encourage  raw  troops,  but  could  not  intimidate  veter- 
ans. Every  military  man  knows  that  the  value  of  ar- 
tillery depends  on  its  position,  and  that  it  is  of  but 


I  ! 


!   I 


RETREAT   DNAVOIDABLE. 


247 


if 


little  avail  ia  an  open  field  against  a  decided  superior- 
ity in  other  arms,  unless  it  be  light  artillery,  well  man- 
aged, and  on  ground  adapted  for  it.  Barney's  artillery 
was  as  well  managed  as  it  could  be,  but  it  became  use- 
less as  soon  as  the  enemy's  superiority  in  infantry  en- 
abled him  to  outflank  the  line ;  and  the  destruction 
which  it  previously  occasioned  was  owing  less  to  its 
position  and  management  than  to  the  ordinary  Britisli 
mode  of  fighting,  which  is  that  of  "  taking  the  bull  by 
the  horns,*'  and  depending  more  on  sheer  courage  than 


manoeuvring. 


As  to  discipline  and  experience,  the  advantage  was 
undeniably  and  greatly  on  the  side  of  the  British.  As 
to  the  exhaustion  of  their  troops,  even  if  not  exagger- 
ated, it  was  then  unknown,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  from 
the  undisturbed  repose  which  they  enjoyed  every  night, 
their  leisurely  marches,  and  sufiiciency  of  food,  their 
exhaustion  must  have  ueen  rather  the  temporary  re- 
sult of  hasty  and  violent  exertion,  while  that  of  our 
troops  was  the  cficct  of  protracted  fatigue  and  priva- 
tion. As  to  courage,  the  British  troops  are  by  no 
means  deficient  in  that  requisite,  as  their  whole  history 
proves  ;  and  the  most  frantic  valor  in  the  field  is  of  no 
avail  against  science,  discipline,  and  numbers  com- 
bined, backed  by  the  ordinary  courage  of  experienced 
troops.  If  it  were  otherwise,  there  could  be  no  such 
thing  as  the  art  of  war  or  the  science  of  strategy. 

The  supposition  that  General  Winder,  with  only 
half  his  army,  and  that  half  outflanked,  could  win  a 
victory  which  it  was  calculated  that  twice  his  army 
would  be  barely  enough  to  achieve,  is  preposterous. 
General  Winder,  if  possessing  any  knowledge  whatev- 


I 


ij 


n 


in 


if! 


if 


248     INVASION   AND   CArTURE   OF   WAb  'TNGTON. 

er,  must  have  known  this,  and  must  also  lu  ■»  v  ':no"\vn 
that  to  dchiy  his  retreat  until  his  men  were  .^tually 
driven  Lack  hy  the  bayonet  would  entail  upon  them 
the  slaughter  which  always  attends  a  retreat  under 
such  circumstances. 

Tlie  danger  of  pitched  battles — the  policy  of  avoid- 
ing them  as  long  as  possible  when  an  adversary  seeks 
them,  which  all  military  writers  inculcate  without  ex- 
ception, and  most  particularly  in  defensive  warfare, 
consists  in  the  fact  that,  when  an  army  is  routed — 
above  all,  an  army  of  militia-men — there  is  an  end,  for 
a  time  at  least,  of  that  army  as  an  organized  body.  It 
is  easy  to  speculate  in  the  closet  on  what  might  be 
done  under  desperate  circumstances  by  desperate  ex- 
ertions. Napoleon  might  have  been  told,  after  the 
battle  of  Waterloo,  by  some  "disciple  of  Jomini,"  you 
still  have  some  thousands  of  men  left,  some  guns,  and 
cavalry  :  fall  on  the  enemy's  tlank,  harass  him  by  small 
attacks,  etc.  But,  as  Xapoleon  himself  prophetically 
said  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Leipsic,  '•^Eiitre  uiie 
hataillc  j)crduG  ct  une  hataille  cjagnee  la  distance  est 
hmnense^  il  y  a  des  cmjnres.''' 

We  shall,  therefore,  not  stop  to  criticise  the  proceed- 
ings of  General  Winder  after  the  battle,  or  to  review 
the  means  and  opportunities  which  may  have  existed 
for  destroying  or  damaging  the  enemy  on  his  retreat 
from  the  city,  or  during  his  march  back  to  his  ship- 
ping. Itoss  and  Cockburn,  no  doubt,  made  their  cal- 
culations as  to  the  time  for  which  it  would  be  safe  for 
them  to  remain.  They  knew,  as  experienced  military 
men,  how  little  v/as  to  be  apprehended  from  a  routed 
army,  or  from  a  population  unaccustomed  to  w'ar,  when 


THE   SOLITARY   SENTINEL. 


249 


ip- 

jal- 
for 


lien 


I 

7 

1^ 


overawed  by  a  victorious  army.  A  rcmarkaLlc  fact 
in  illustration  of  tliis  is  mentioned  by  General  \\i\- 
kinson,*  \vli0  states  that  the  enemy  iirst  entered  the 
city  with  about  200  men,  "and  so  complete  was  the 
conquest,  that  when  this  party  withdrew  to  their  camp 
at  two  miles'  distance,  a  single  sentinel,  who  liad  been 
accidentally  left  on  post  near  the  ofiicc  of  the  National 
Intelligencer,  kept  undisturbed  possession  of  the  cen- 
tral part  of  the  metropolis  until  the  next  morning,  of 
which  there  arc  several  living  witnesses."  It  can  be 
no  reproach,  however,  to  the  citizens  of  Washington 
that  they  did  not  draw  down  upon  themselves  the 
vengeance  of  the  enemy  by  the  slaughter  of  this  soli- 
tary sentinel.  Xot  even  the  troops,  and  still  less  the 
unarmed  citizens,  could  be  justly  blamed  or  ridiculed 
for  exhibiting  still  greater  and  more  unquestionable  ev- 
idences of  a  panic,  wdiich  the  principal  officers  of  the 
government  were  the  first  to  set  the  example  of,  which 
they  almost  created,  and  did  nothing  to  allay. 

We  have  adverted  to  the  opinion  of  the  court  of  in- 
quiry in  General  Winder's  case  not  oidy  completely 
exonerating  him  from  blame,  but  awarding  to  him  "no 
little  commendation."  The  court,  therefore,  notwith- 
standing the  disposition  of  military  men  to  criticise 
the  professional  conduct  of  each  other,  could  have  per- 
ceived none  of  the  errors  which  General  Armstrong, 
General  Wilkinson,  and  others  have  pretended  to  dis- 
cover in  the  management  of  the  campaign,  or  else  did 
not  consider  General  Winder  responsible  for  them. 
They  could  not  even  have  discerned,  or  considered  as 
attributable   to  General  Winder,  the   several    errors 

*  Vol.  i.,  p.  701. 
L2 


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ii 


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250     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

which  he  himself  acknowledges  "  might  materially 
have  affected  the  issue"  of  the  battle,  and  which,  if  ho 
"  had  had  longer  time,  or  to  repeat  the  action  at  Bla- 
densburg,"  he  could  ^  ave  corrected ;  nor  the  retreat  on 
the  evening  of  the  23d  from  the  Old  Fields  "to  the 
bridge  instead  of  Bladensburg,"  which  General  Win- 
der himself  seemed  to  think  was  an  error,  though  "  of 
that  sort"  which  is  "only  found  to  be  an  error  by  ex- 
perience;" nor  the  omission  to  designate  a  rallying- 
point. 

The  court  no  doubt  considered,  and  very  properly, 
that  General  Winder  was  relieved  from  all  responsibil- 
ity for  the  management  of  the  campaign  by  the  inter- 
ference of  the  President  and  cabinet,  which  interference 
was  a  matter  of  notoriety.  It  would  have  been  more 
frank  and  soldierlike,  and  more  just  to  the  nation  at 
large,  as  well  as  the  troops  engaged,  to  have  said  so  in 
plain  terms.  But  the  stern  sense  of  justice  and  inde- 
pendence of  feeling  which  would  have  prompted  such 
a  course  is  more  suited  to  the  early  and  "  green"  days 
of  the  ancient  republics,  or  to  an  imaginary  Utopia, 
than  to  the  atmosphere  of  what  is  now  called  a  "  Re- 
publican court,"  where  servility  is  sometimes  as  rife 
and  rank,  and  as  well  rewarded,  as  in  the  court  of  an 
autocrat.  The  court  were  sensible,  no  doubt,  of  the 
reception  such  a  candid  opinion  would  have  met  with 
from  a  President  and  administration  who,  in  order  to 
gloss  over  their  own  mismanagement  and  imbecility, 
descended  to  the  expedient  of  introducing  statements  in 
a  solermn  proclamation  addressed  to  the  people  which 
were  not  warranted  by  the  facts. 

The  Presidenl's  proclamation  of  the  1st  of  Septem- 


THE   PRKSIDENTS    PROCLAMATION. 


251 


1 


"bcr,  1814,  declares  that  the  enemy,  "by  a  sudden  in- 
cursion," had  succeeded  in  invading  the  capital  of  the 
nation,  defended  at  the  moment  by  troops  less  numer- 
ous than  their  own.  If  it  could  be  demonstrated  that 
there  was  no  reason  to  expect  that  the  enemy  would 
invade  the  capital  until  10  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 
the  24th  of  August,  when  it  was  ascertained  that  he 
had  taken  the  route  to  Bladensburg,  then  the  incursion 
might  be  called  "sudden;''  but  the  term  could  not, 
with  any  degree  of  reason  or  truth,  be  applied  to  an 
event  which  had  been  apprelicndcd  for  months,  and  the 
actual  progress  of  which  hn  1  been  \Yatcht  d  for  nearly 
a  week.  And  if  the  "moment"  when  our  troops  were 
less  numerous  applies  to  the  specific  instants  of  time 
when  the  two  lines  at  Bladensburg  were  r  'spectively 
and  successively  assailed  by  the  British  !  oice,  then  of 
each  specific  instant  it  might  be  r.Id  that  the  c;.;  ital 
was  "  defended  at  the  moment  hy  troops  less  numer- 
ous*' than  those  of  the  enemy. 

The  proclamation  also  states  that  "advantage  was 
taken  of  the  loss  of  a  fort  more  immediately  guarding 
the  neighboring  town  of  Alcxand.'ia  to  place  the  town 
within  the  range  of  a  naval  force,"  and  that  thereupon 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town  "  had  inconsiderately  cast 
themselves  upon  the  justice  and  generosity  of  the  vic- 
tor." There  arc  two  i?viiroct  assertions  here,  both  of 
which  arc  incorrect.  First,  that  the  fort  referred  to  was 
sufficient  to  have  pr'^vented  the  ascent  of  the  British 
squadron  to  Alex  vhdria ;  and,  secondly,  that  although 
the  town  was  thus  brought  "within  the  range  of  a 
naval  forae,"  the  inhabitants  were  not  compelled  to 
"cast  themselves  upon  the  justice  and  generosity  of 


M 


^ 


I 


ii. 


252     INVASION   AND   CArTUKE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

the  victor,"  and  therefore  were  ineonsiderate  in  dointr 
.so.  AVe  shall  presently  examine  more  particularly 
into  the  truth  of  these  assertions.  The  ouject  of  them 
was  to  prejudice  and  forestall  public  opinion  in  a  mat- 
ter where  the  administration  was  particularly  liahlc  to 
censm-e  for  its  neglect.  The  lirst  suggestions  of  Gen- 
eral AVlndor,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of 
AVar  on  the  lOtli  of  August,  the  day  on  which  the 
news  of  the  landing  at  J  Benedict  was  received,  were, 
that  vessels  should  be  sunk  in  the  Potomac  at  Fort 
AVashington  to  obstruct  the  navigation,  and  that  the 
garrison  should  be  rc-cnforced;  but  neither  was  done. 
Tlie  ovcr-anxicty  of  the  administration  to  relieve 
themselves  from  censure  is  in  itself  an  evidence  of  their 
consciousness  of  liaving  deserved  it.  If  they  had  been 
conscious  of  having  done  their  duty  to  their  country 
in  the  hrst  instance,  and  selected  a  commanding  gen- 
eral exclusively  on  the  ground  of  his  iitncss,  and  com- 
plied with  his  reasonable  demands  so  far  as  they  had 
the  power,  there  would  have  been  no  necessity  for  their 
showing  any  extraordinary  anxiety  as  to  the  result. 
They  liiiglit  have  gone  to  bed  and  slept  soundly,  or, 
at  all  events,  have  maintained  a  decent  composure, 
without  fearing  that  the  nation  would  rebuke  them  for 
not  rendering  military  services  cither  as  vedettes,  aides- 
de-camp,  or  instructors  in  strategy  and  tactics.  ]}ut 
believing  or  fearing  that  they  had  committed  one  great 
error,  and  alarmed  at  the  impending  conscMjuences,  they 
lost  their  self-i)osscssion,  and  were  hurried  into  a  still 
greater  mistake,  Avliicli  rendered  the  catastrophe  inevi- 
talile.  ]]y  incessant  interference  in  the  most  dedicate 
an(l  important  duties  of  the  commanding  general,  they 


at. 

7 
ill 


r 


TJIliUWlNG   THE    BLAME   ON   THE   TJiOOrS.        253 

paralyzed  his  powers,  but,  at  tlic  same  time,  relieved 
liim  from  all  responsibility  and  assumed  it  themselves. 
When  the  time  came  for  the  people  to  inquire  ^\]io  ^vas 
answerable  for  the  stigma  cast  upon  the  nation,  tliey 
had  no  alternative  but  a  frank  confession  of  neglect  of 
duty  on  their  part,  or  a  resort  to  evasion,  leaving  the 
blame  to  fall  on  others.  Hence  the  unjuf-^t  innuen- 
does in  the  proclamation  and  the  whitewashing  re- 
port of  the  Congressional  connnittce  of  investigation, 
the  intention  of  both  of  wliieli  was  to  convey  the  im- 
pression that  no  blame  for  the  disaster  at  lUadensl>urg 
could  rest  any  where  but  on  the  people  themselves, 
the  troops,  and  subordinate  oflieers.  To  assist  in  fix- 
ing this  im})ression  on  the  public  mind,  and  1o  show 
the  indiij-nation  of  the  government  at  anv  man  who 
could,  "on  or  about  the  27tli  of  August,  when  the  en- 
emy was  approaching,  run  away,''  the  otHccr  who  had 
run  away  with  his  connnand  from  Fort  Washington — 
a  post  which  the  commanding  general  had  pronounced 
not  tenable — was  tried  by  a  court-martial  and  dismissed 
from  the  service  :  a  sort  of  vicarious  atonement,  or  sac- 
rilice  on  the  altar  of  public  opinion,  to  purge  away  the 
sins  of  those  who  were  the  lirst  to  instill  a  ])anlc  into 
tlie  peoph^  and  troops,  and  to  set  the  example  of  riui- 
niiig  away  "  wlien  ihe  enemy  was  jipproaehing"  l)la- 
densburg. 


^^T- 


254    INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


J 


!<l 


!    I 


.      il 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

Proceedings  of  the  Enemy  in  the  City. 

The  proclamation  of  the  President  to  which  we  have 
referred  states  that,  though  the  enemy  held  possession 
of  the  capital  "for  a  single  day  only,  they  wantonly 
destroyed  the  public  edifices,  having  no  relation  in  their 
structure  to  operations  of  war,  nor  used  at  the  time  for 
military  annoyance,  some  of  these  edifices  being  also 
costly  monuments  of  taste  and  of  the  arts,  and  others 
depositories  of  the  public  archives,  not  only  precious 
to  the  nation  as  the  memorials  of  its  origin  and  its 
early  transactions,  but  interesting  to  all  nations  as  con- 
tributions to  the  general  stock  of  historical  instruction 
and  political  science." 

This  is  a  true  bill.  The  use  made  by  Ross  and 
Cockburn  of  their  victory  brought  more  disgrace  upon 
their  government  than  the  defeat  at  Bladensburg  did 
upon  our  own,  and  the  President  and  cabinet  had  some 
reason  to  be  thankful  that  indignation  against  the  com- 
mon enemy  caused  their  own  agency  in  bringing  about 
the  disaster  to  be  less  carefully  scrutinized.  The  news 
of  the  capture  of  Washington  was  received  in  London 
with  exultation,  and  the  park  and  Tower  guns  were 
fired  three  dav^  pucccssivelv ;  but  when  the  details  of 
tlie  capture  became  known,  it  was  found  that  there  was 
less  cause  for  exultation  than  for  shame.  The  London 
Htatesman  compared  the  doings  of  Rosa  and  Cockburn 
witli  the  condiu't  of  the  buccaneers  and  "  fiUibusters" 


r 


ROSS   AND   COCKBURN    DENOUNCED   AT   HOME.    255 

of  old.  "  Willingly,"  it  said,  "would  we  throw  a  veil 
of  oblivion  over  our  transactions  at  Washington.  The 
Cossacks  spared  Paris,  but  we  spared  not  the  capital 
of  America."*  The  Liverpool  Mercury  judiciously  re- 
marked, "  There  are  few  of  our  readers  but  who  will 
form  their  own  comments  on  the  capture  and  destruc- 
tion of  the  seat  of  government  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  and  to  their  own  comments  we  shall  there- 
fore, on  this  particular  occasion,  leave  them.  We  love 
the  true  glory,  the  true  honor  of  our  country ;  and 
therefore,  while  we  applaud  the  spirit  and  intrepidity 
of  our  seamen  and  soldiers  who  were  the  brave  instru- 
ments of  tliis  successful  enterprise,  we  shall  add  noth- 
ing at  present  to  the  sentiments  which  wc  have  fre- 
quently and  recently  expressed  on  the  justice  and  pol- 
icy of  such  warfare.  We  will  content  ourselves  Avith 
asking  the  most  earnest  friends  of  the  conflagratory 
system  what  purpose  will  be  served  by  the  flames  of 
the  Senate  House  at  Washington  ?  If  the  people  of 
the  United  States  retain  any  portion  of  that  spirit  with 
which  they  successfully  contended  for  their  independ- 
ence, the  effect  of  those  flames  will  not  easilv  be  ex- 
tinguished.*' 

The  British  Annual  Hcgistcr  for  1814  denounced 
the  proceedings  of  Ross  and  Cockburn  as  a  return  to 
"the  times  of  barbarism,''  and  said,  "It  can  not  be  con- 
cealed that  the  extent  of  devastation  practiced  by  the 
victors  brought  a  heavy  censure  upon  the  British  char- 
acter, not  only  in  America,  but  on  the  Continent  of 
Europe." 

Anv  slnvwd,  clear-iieaded  observer,  who  had  watch- 
•  Nilos's  Register,  vol.  vii..  p.  201.  275. 


i\ 


Mgiw  |iuj».  mmffgn0figf^s*samm'mmmiml9m 


m 


'J. 


t 


'ii 


■:1 


t: 


250    INVASION   AND   CAPTUllE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

ed  the  British  troops  on  their  marcli  to  AVashington, 
would  have  inferred,  from  the  fact  tliat  they  traveled 
without  any  other  baggage  than  what  they  had  on 
their  hacks,  tliat  they  did  not  intend  to  make  a  pro- 
tracted visit.  But  the  government  authorities  seem  to 
have  heen  filled  with  the  gloomiest  anticipations.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  as  it  appears  from  his  letter  to 
the  connnittee,  dated  October  3d,  took  it  for  granted 
that  tlie  enemy  would  remain  long  enough  "to  launch 
the  new  frigate,"  which  would  require  "  four  or  five 
days,"  and  that  he  would  "in  the  mean  time  greatly 
extend  the  field  of  his  plunder  and  devastation." 

Ross  and  Cockburn,  knowing  that  they  could  spare 
but  "a  single  day  only,"  would  have  had  some  diffi- 
culty in  that  short  time  in  dispatching  any  great 
amount  of  business,  even  in  the  way  of  destruction, 
which  docs  not  require  much  forethouglit  or  ingenuity; 
and  they  would  have  had  no  leisure  left  to  visit  the 
curiosities  and  lions,  in  the  shape  of  living  statesmen 
of  note,  who  might  be  found  in  and  about  the  metrop- 
olis. The  population  of  tlie  city  was  then  very  incon- 
siderable, and  the  houses  few  in  number;  but  it  was 
and  always  will  be  a  "  city  of  magnificent  distances," 
comprising  witliin  its  corporate  limits  distinct  settle- 
ments so  remote  from  each  other  tliat  in  other  quar- 
ters of  the  world  they  might  be  considered  as  entitled 
to  the  privilege  of  a  sejiarate  dialect,  and  each  of  these 
distinct  settlements  contained  public  buildings,  which, 
under  the  new  reading  of  public  law,  it  was  the  duty 
of  the  victors  to  destroy.  To  accom})lish  this  in  the 
space  of  one  working  day  might  have  been  found  im- 
jn-acticable  without  assistance,  but  this  they  obtained 


i 


COMMODORE   TINGEY   AND   THE   LADIES.         257 


'. 


from  the  quarter  where  tliey  would  least  of  all  have 
looked  for  it.  They  little  imagined  that  America  could 
Loast  of  her  Kostopchins,  though  they  -were  on  but  a 
small  scale;  and  no  doubt  they  were  as  much  pleased 
as  surprised  to  lind  liow  much  labor  had  been  spared 
them. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  the  letter  to  wliicli 
we"  last  referred,  enters  into  an  elaborate  exposition  of 
the  reasons  which  induced  the  order  given  by  him, 
under  the  President's  direction,  for  the  destruction  of 
the  navy-yard  and  its  contents.  But  tliis  exposition 
Avould  not  have  been  necessary  if  the  proceeding  had 
not  been  one  of  a  character  to  shock  the  common  sense 
of  the  community,  and  to  appear  ridiculous  to  those 
who  were  not  under  the  intlucncc  of  the  panic.  It 
seems,  from  tlie  report  of  Commodore  Tingey,  the 
commandant  of  the  yard,  that  not  only  his  principal 
oHleer,  Captain  Creigliton,  was  "extremely  averse"  to 
the  execution  of  the  order,  and  "several  individuals 
came  in  succession''  to  beg  him  to  deviate  from  hi.i  in- 
structions, but,  the  commodore  continues, 

"A  deputation  also  of  the  most  respectable  women 
came  on  the  same  errand,  when  1  found  myself  pain- 
fully necessitated  to  inibrm  them  that  any  further  im- 
portunities would  cause  tlie  matclies  to  be  instantly 
applied  to  ihe  trains,  with  assurance,  however,  that,  if 
left  at  peace,  I  would  dehiy  the  execution  of  the  order } 
us  long  as  1  could  feel  the  least  shadow  of  justiliea- 
ion. 

Tliis  is  precisely  the  answer  whicli  Cockburn  would 
have  given  himself.  The  commodore  was  iirmer  or 
toaghcr  than  Coriolanus  at  the  gates  of  Kome,  before 


n 


'  i 


I 


11 ! 


n 


si 


I  *•• 


!  ^ 


'  I 


258     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

his  weeping  mother  and  attendant  ladies,  when  there 
was  "  no  more  mercy  in  him  than  there  is  milk  in  a 
male  tiger  ;"  for  althougli  the  ladies,  whose  attachment 
to  the  yard  carried  them  to  such  lengths,  did  desist 
from  their  importunities  and  leave  him  "  at  peace,"  yet 
at  last,  he  says,  "  the  matches  were  applied,  and  in  a 
few  minutes  the  whole  was  in  a  state  of  irretrievable 
conflagration." 

But  the  commodore  is  inaccurate,  even  accoixling  to 
his  own  showing,  in  stating  that  "  the  whole  was  in  a 
state  of  irretrievable  conflagration."  He  says,  in  his 
report  of  October  18th, 

"  From  a  momentary  impulse  and  faint  hope  of  re- 
covering the  new  schooner  Lynx,  I  directed  her  not  to 
be  fired,  and  have  the  satisfaction  to  say  that,  by  an 
almost  miraculous  escape,  she  is  still  'ours.'  " 

A  miraculous  escape  it  was,  from  two  successive 
bands  of  lynx-eyed  incendiaries,  foreign  and  domestic, 
vying  with  each  in  tlic  work  of  conflagration.  But 
probably  tlic  enemy,  on  his  arrival  at  the  yard,  find- 
ing that  his  job  was  otherwise  so  neatly  finished  to  his 
hands,  was  cheated  into  a  belief  that  the  Lynx  was 
built  of  incombustible  materials. 

The  commodore  seems  to  claim  a  credit  for  this 
miraculous  escape  of  the  Lynx  akin  to  the  glory  which 
the  gallant  Perry  won  by  his  victory  on  Lake  Erie,  for 
the  word  "  ours"  is  evidently  quoted  from  the  celebra- 
ted dispatch  announcing  that  victory.  Yet,  instead 
of  being  permitted  to  boast  of  this  exploit,  as  he  does, 
in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  ac- 
cording to  the  principles  laid  down  by  the  latter,  the 
commodore  should  have  been  tried  by  a  court-martial. 


MIRACULOUS  ESCAPE  OF  THE  LYNX. 


259 


Tlie  secretary,  in  the  course  of  his  justification  of  the 
burning  of  tiie  yard,  says  :  "  The  commandant  of  the 
navy-yard  is  a  captain  in  the  navy ;  the  vessels  and 
property  were  under  his  cliargc  and  command  ;  and  if 
no  special  order  from  the  department  had  been  issued, 
and  he  had  suffered  tlie  public  shipping  and  property 
to  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  enemv,  lie  would 
have  committed  a  high  military  crime,  for  which  he 
would  have  been  amenable  before  a  court-martial." 
Commodore  Tingey,  in  failing  to  set  fire  to  the  Lynx, 
not  only  committed  this  "high  miljtary  crime,"  but 
aggravated  it  by  disobeying  a  special  order.  Xoi^  in- 
stead of  being  brought  bcibre  a  court-martial,  he  was 
not  even  rebuked ;  and,  no  doubt,  if  all  the  public 
property  at  the  yard  had  escaped  in  the  same  miracu- 
lous manner — by  "a  momentary  impulse"  of  good 
sense  on  the  part  of  the  administration — instead  of  la- 
boring to  prove  tliat  *'  a  high  military  crime"  had  been 
committed,  they  would  have  been  prompt  to  claim 
credit  for  their  prudence  and  foresight. 

Ross  could  hardly  have  been  ignorant  that  the  navy- 
yard  was  destroyed  by  our  own  otHcials,  for,  as  he  en- 
tered the  city  about  eight  o'clock  at  niglit,  and  the 
matches  were  applied,  according  to  Connnodorc  Tin- 
gey's  report,  at  half  past  eight,  the  light  of  such  an 
extensive  confla2;ration  must  Iiavc  attracted  his  atten- 
lion  and  caused  inquiry.  Yet  he  claims  the  exploit 
as  his  own.  In  his  official  dispatch,  after  a  brief  ac- 
count of  the  battle,  he  says  : 

"  Having  halted  the  army  for  a  short  time,  I  determ- 
ihed  to  march  upon  Washington,  and  readied  tliat  city 
at  eight  o'clock.     Judging  it  of  consequence  to  com- 


200     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   "WASHINGTON. 


plete  the  destruction  of  tlic  public  Luilcliiigs  with  the 
least  possible  delay,  so  that  the  army  iniglit  retire  with- 
out loss  of  time,  the  following  buildings  were  set  lire 
to  and  consumed :  the  Capitol,  including  the  Senate- 
House  and  House  of  llepresentatives,  the  arsenal,  the 
dock-yard  [navy-yard],  trcasur}',  war  office.  President's 
palace,  rope-walk,  and  the  great  bridge  across  the  Po- 
tomac. In  the  dock-yard,  a  frigate  nearly  ready  to  be 
launched,  and  a  sloop  of  war,  were  consumed.  The 
two  bridges  leading  to  "Washington  over  the  Eastern 
Pranch  had  been  destroyed  by  the  enemy,  who  appre- 
hended an  attack  from  that  quarter.  The  object  of 
the  exjiedltlon  being  accomplished,  I  determined,  be- 
fore any  greater  force  of  the  enemy  could  be  assembled, 
to  withdraw  the  troops,  and  accordingly  commenced 
retiring  on  the  night  of  the  25th.'' 

It  Is  (evident,  from  lloss's  confession  of  his  anxiety 
to  get  away  "-with  the  least  jioSsible  delay,"  tliat  he 
must  have  felt  very  uneasy  while  in  the  city,  and  that 
it  would  not  have  re(|uired  much  to  increase  his  ap- 
prehension to  such  an  extent  as  to  communicate  to 
him  a  little  of  the  panic  which  he  had  occasioned 
among  others,  and  disincline  him  to  incur  a  '*  loss  of 
time"  by  waiting  to  set  tire  to  any  thing.  Put  the 
conflagration  at  the  navy-yard,  as  indicating  the  state 
of  feeling  which  existed,  probably  encouraged  him. 

The  burning  of  the  lower  bridge  over  the  Eastern 
Branch,  where  the  military  council  had  been  held  in 
the  morning,  took  place  after  the  retreat  of  our  troops 
to  the  city,  and  before  the  British  entered  it.  What 
the  object  of  its  destruction  was  it  is  difficult  to  im- 
agine,    '^riie  enemy  would  have  had  no  occasion  to 


t 


WHO   BUKNED   THE  BRIDGE? 


2()1 


i 


^ 


use  it,  and  would  not  have  carried  it  away  as  a  tro- 
phy. But  as  all  the  materials  had  been  got  ready  in 
the  morning,  both  to  burn  and  blow  it  up,  it  was  prob- 
ably destroyed  on  the  same  principle  which  has  induced 
some  thrifty  housewives,  after  a  fit  of  sickness  in  the 
family,  to  swallow  the  medicine  which  was  left,  in  or- 
der to  save  money  and  prevent  waste. 

Ross  unduly  claims  credit  for  destroying  "the  great 
bridge  over  the  l*otomac."  The  glory  of  this  achieve- 
ment must  be  divided.  It  appears,  from  the  report 
made  to  the  committee  of  investigation  from  the  Ord- 
nance Department,  that  a  non-commissioned  otlicer, 
connnanding  a  guard  of  our  troops  posted  on  the  A'ir- 
ginia  side  of  tlie  bridge,  "  perceiving  a  body  of  the 
British  ready  to  pass  over,  concluded  the  surest  and 
best  method  to  prevent  it  was  to  destroy,  by  tire,  that 
end  and  part  where  he  was  posted,  and  that  the  other 
end,  on  the  ^Vasliington  side,  was  lired  by  the  enemy." 
The  Britisli  could  have  had  no  intention,  pressed  as 
they  were  for  time,  to  cross  a  bridge  a  n.ile  in  length ; 
but  the  "  Subaltern  in  America"'  states  that  they  were 
expecting  an  attack  from  "  a  large  American  force" 
which  showed  itself  "on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  Po- 
tomac." The  dcstructicn  of  the  bridge,  tliorefore,  in- 
cluding a  quantity  of  military  stores  at  the  Virginia 
end,  was  probably  the  strange  result  of  mutual  panic. 
Each  party  descried  an  army  of  men  in  buckram  at  the 
other  end,  and  "  blazed  away"  at  the  bridge. 

Among  the  "  public  buildings"  which  Ross  enume- 
rates as  having  been  destroyed  is  a  "rope-walk." 
There  was  no  public  or  government  building  of  that 
description,  as  he  probably  knew,  for  the  National  In- 


I 


262     INVASION  AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


telligencer  of  August  31,  1814,  says :  "  The  enemy 
was  conducted  through  the  city  by  a  former  resident, 
who,  with  other  detected  traitors,  is  now  in  confine- 
ment." The  same  paper  states  that  "the  rope-walks, 
of  lencli  Kinggold,  Heath  &  Co.,  and  John  Chalmers, 
were  destroyed  by  lire,  without  any  pretence  being  as- 
signed therefor  that  we  know  of"  Men  engaged  in 
such  deeds  do  not  trouble  themselves  much  in  hunt- 
ing for  or  assigning  pretences.  Their  reasons  for  the 
destruction  of  the  rope-walks  were,  perhaps,  an  in- 
stinctive antipathy  to  hemp,  and  lively  recollection  of 
a  particular  use  to  which  rope  is  sometimes  applied. 
They  might,  in  their  own  minds,  have  justified  the  de- 
struction on  the  ground  of  self-defence,  and  that  they 
would,  at  some  future  time,  stand  in  danger  of  their 
lives  from  the  kind  of  article  there  manufactured. 

According  to  the  report  of  the  committee  of  investi- 
gation, the  danger  done  to  the  public  by  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  navy-yard,  Capitol,  President's  house,  and 
other  public  buildings,  amounted  to  a  little  more  than 
a  million  of  dollars,  more  than  one  half  of  it  consisting 
of  the  damage  done  by  the  destruction  of  the  navy- 
yard  and  its  contents,  including  the  new  frigate  Co- 
lumbia. The  sloop-of-war  Argus,  lying  in  the  stream 
at  the  navy-yard,  if  manned  by  Barney's  seamen, 
might  have  been  saved,  or  even  used  as  a  battery  to 
protect  the  yard ;  but  the  panic  which  prevailed  ap- 
peared to  have  destroyed  all  powers  of  reasoning  or 
forethought. 

The  value  of  the  Congress  library,  destroyed  with 
the  Capitol,  was  not  estimated  by  the  connnittee.  It 
was  not  a  very  valuable  collection ;  but  Ross  and  Cock- 


THE   enemy's    hostility   TO    THE    TRESS.       2G3 


lemy 
dent, 
itine- 
^valks . 
.mers, 
ng  as- 
ved  in 
liunt- 
for  the 
an  in- 
tion  of 
pplied. 
the  de- 
at  they 
of  their 

:ed. 

investi- 
destruc- 
usc,  and 
ore  than 
)nsisting 
le  navy- 
o;ate  Co- 
c  stream 
seamen, 
attery  to 
ailed  ap- 
oning  or 

yed  with 
ittee.  It 
ind  Cock- 


burn,  on  this  occasion,  wanted  only  the  opportunity 
to  render  themselves  even  more  infamously  renowned 
tlian  the  barbarian  calif  who  burned  the  Alexandrian 
library,  for  he  had  at  least  the  excuse  of  not  knowing 
the  value  of  what  he  destroyed.  Their  hostility  to 
literature  was  shown  also  in  another  way,  by  the  de- 
struction of  the  types  and  furniture  of  the  office  of  the 
National  Intelligencer,  for  whicli  they  had  the  excuse 
of  the  able  and  effective  su]->port  which  that  paper  gave 
to  the  administration  and  the  war.  It  was  a  hisrh 
compliment  paid  to  the  editors  of  that  paper,  though, 
no  doubt,  one  which  they  would  cheerfully  have  dis- 
pensed with. 

The  following  account  of  the  attack  of  his  majesty's 
forces  upon  the  office  of  the  National  Intelligencer  is 
derived  from  an  authentic  source : 

"When  it  became  known  that  the  British  forces 
had  landed  at  Benedict,  on  the  Patuxent,  with  the  prob- 
able design  of  advancing  upon  the  scat  of  government, 
fifty  miles  distant,  a  levy  en  masse  of  the  District  mili- 
tia was  ordered  by  the  government,  and  tliis  ncluded 
all  the  workmen  employed  in  the  office  of  the  National 
Intelligencer  newspaper.  The  sudden  withdrawal  of 
these  men  from  their  business  would,  of  course,  have 
caused  tlie  immediat*^  suspension  of  tlie  paper,  and  cut 
off  from  the  country  the  only  source  of  regular  infor- 
mation from  Washington  of  the  deeply-interesting 
events  which  impended.  To  prevent  this  evil,  one  of 
the  editors  of  the  paper  (the  other  had  been  absent 
some  weeks  with  his  family  on  a  visit  to  his  parental 
home  in  the  Soutli)  stated  the  case  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  who   immcdiateh    directed  that   a   sufficient 


n 


I 


2G4      INVASION    AND    CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

number  of  the  workmen  slioulcl  be  relicM; J  iijm  mili- 
taiy  duty  temporarily,  and  furloughed  for  i'>civ  regidar 
occupation  in  the  printing-office.  Thus  the  paper  con- 
tinued to  be  issued  as  usual,  daily,  up  to  the  morning 
of  the  24th  of  August,  althougli  the  men  were,  during 
the  whole  time,  very  restive  at  being  kept  from  their 
friends  and  comrades  in  the  field,  and  only  consented 
to  continue  at  their  duty  by  the  reiterated  promise  of 
the  proprietor  that,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  ascertained 
that  the  enemy  were  approaching  the  city,  he  and  they 
would  all  leave  the  office,  and  go  and  join  their  respect- 
ive companies. 

"  On  the  morning  of  the  24th  the  paper  was  got 
ready  and  put  to  press  about  2  o  clock,  and  the  editor 
retired  to  his  residence  and  went  to  bed.  About  3 
o'clock  he  was  awakened  by  a  messenger  from  the 
printing-office,  and  informed  that  the  Post-office  was 
shut  up  and  abandoned,  every  thing  removed,  nobody 
there  to  receive  the  papers  or  attend  to  any  thing,  and 
the  mails  discontinued.  Soon  after  daybreak  the  edi- 
tor rose  and  repaired  to  the  office,  where,  having  sum- 
moned tlie  workmen,  he  informed  them  that,  the  mails 
having  stopped  and  cut  off  conmumication  beyond  the 
city,  it  was  useless  to  persevere  in  publishing  the  pa- 
per, therefore  he  should  forthwith  leave  home  to  join 
his  company  (Davidson's  infantry)  on  the  eastern 
branch  of  the  Potomac,  and  left  them  free  to  repair 
also  to  their  companies,  wdiich  they  did.  The  Intelli- 
gencer of  that  morning  contained  an  article  on  the  proba- 
ble intentions  of  the  enemy,  which  closed  with  this  pro- 
phetic sentence :  '  In  a  few  hours  we  believe  the  enemy's 
object  will  be  developed  and  the  issue  determined.' 


1 


•I?? 


i   . 


I 


OFFICE    OF  THE    INTELLIGENCER    PF.STJiOVEJ).    260 


mili- 

o 

r  con- 
Drniiig 
luring 
1  their 
scntcd 
lisc  of 
rtained 
id  they 
•cspect- 

vas  got 

e  editor 

Vhout  3 

L-om  the 

tice  was 
nobody 

ing,  and 
the  cdi- 

ng  sum- 
ic  mails 
ond  the 
the  pa- 
G  to  join 
eastern 
o  repair 
e  Intelli- 
iie  proba- 
this  pro- 
3  enemy's 
lined.' 


'"  The  British  forces  entered  Washington  that  even- 
ing, and  bivouacked  on  the  Capitol  Hill.  TJic  next 
day,  Adnural  Cockburn,  in  hid  progress  tlu'ough  the 
city  (by  the  way  of  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  which  was 
then  the  only  regular  or  used  street  or  road  from  one 
part  of  the  city  to  the  otlicr),  halted  in  front  of  the  of- 
fice of  the  National  Intelligencer,  attended  by  a  body 
of  sailors  and  soldiers.  Tlic  National  Inlellifxcncer, 
then  the  conlidential  journal  of  ]\Ir.  ]\Iadison"s  admin- 
istration, and  a  warm  advocate  of  the  war,  vras  con- 
ducted by  two  gentlemen,  one  of  whom,  the  senior  ed- 
itor, ]Mr.  Gales,  was  a  native  of  England,  though  re- 
moved to  the  United  States  with  his  parents  in  child- 
hood. 

"  The  zeal  of  the  Intelligencer  in  support  of  the 
war,  coupled  with  the  fact  that  one  of  its  editors  was 
by  birth  an  Englishman,  had  exasperated  Admiral 
Cockburn  violently  against  the  journal  and  its  propri- 
etor, and  being  unable  to  capture  the  obnoxious  editor 
(who  was  still  in  North  Carolina  with  his  family),  he 
determined  to  burn  down  the  printing-office  and  its 
contents,  which  purpose,  however,  he  was  prevented 
from  executing  by  the  entreaties  of  the  females  of  the 
contiguous  houses,  which  would  have  been  consumed 
with  the  office  building  (the  men  of  the  famihcs  being 
absent  with  the  troops).  But  the  admiral  vented  his 
spleen  on  the  printing  materials  and  other  property  in 
the  building.  He  had  the  library,  of  several  hundred 
volumes,  removed  to  the  street  (assisting  himself  in 
the  work)  and  burned,  threw  all  the  tyjies  and  print- 
ing materials  out  of  the  upper  windows,  and  broke  and 
destroyed  all  the  presses,  thereby  inflicting  a  loss  on 

M 


*  '1 


[I  I 


II 


i 

1  ■ 

1^ 

1 

f 

1 

' 


2GG     INVASION    AND    (.'A  1  "11:^1':    OF    WASHINGTON. 

the  proprietors  of  some  thousands  of  dollars,  and  then 


.'par 


ted. 


?5 


It  was  the  destruction  of  the  puhUc  buildings  at 
Washington  by  the  enemy  which  occasioned  the  in- 
dignant connncnts  of  the  })rcss  both  mi  Great  Britain 
and  on  tlie  Continent.  Ijiit  private  p/opcrty  also,  to 
a  largc  amount,  was  destroyed,  a  fact  wh:ch  lioss  very 
naturally  omitted  to  state  in  his  public  dispatches. 
The  National  Intelligencer  of  August  31,1814,  says : 
"  When  v;o  remarked  in  our  paper  of  yesterday  that 
private  properly  had,  in  general,  l)ecn  scrupulously  rc- 
Gpcctcd  by  the  enemy  during  his  late  incursion,  we 
spoke  what  we  believed  from  a  hasty  survey,  and  per- 
liaps  without  sullicient  inquiry.  Greater  respect  was 
certainly  paid  to  private  property  than  has  usually 
been  exhibited  by  the  enemy  in  his  marauding  parties. 
No  houses  were  half  as  \wmi\\  jdundcrcd  by  the  enemy 
as  by  the  knavish  wretches  about  the  town  who  prof- 
ited by  the  general  distress.  Tliere  were,  however, 
several  private  buildings  wantonly  destroyed,  and  some 
of  tliose  persons  who  remained  in  the  city  were  scan- 
dalously maltreated.  Among  the  private  buildings 
destroyed  was  the  dwelling-house  owned  and  occujiied 
by  ]\lr.  Kobert  Sewnll  (tbrmerly  rented  by  ]\Ir.  CJal- 
latiii),  from  behind  which  a  gnn  was  tired  at  General 
Ross,  which  killed  the  horse  he  rode.  The  liouses 
built  tor  General  Washington  on  the  brow  of  Ca])itoI 
ilill,  the  large  liotd  belonging  to  Daniel  (Jarroll,  of 
Duddington,  and  otliers,  and  recently  occupied  by  ^Ir. 
Tomlinson;  the  roj)e-walks  of  Tench  Ringgold,  Heath 
^  Co.,  and  John  Chalmers,  were  destroyed  by  tire, 
without  any  j)ret(Mice  being  assigned  therefor  that  we 
I  now  of."' 


I 


1 1 


-J" 


MUTILATION    OF   THE    NAVAL    MONUMENT.       267 


?upiccl 

\ 

•.  (Jal- 

cncral 

I 

louses 

a 

>i|)itol 

"^Bd 

(,11,  of 

J 

.y  .Mr. 

m 

Heath 

m 

y  lire, 

-  * 

lat  we 

'I 
i 

i 

>■ 

i 

i 

1 

One  of  the  least  creditable  acts  committed  by  the 
enemy  during  his  stay  in  the  city  was  tiie  mutilation 
of  the  monument  which  now  stands  opposite  the  wcFt 
front  of  the  Capitol,  and  which  had  heen  erected  at  tlic 
navy-yard  by  private  subscriptions  of  officers  of  the 
navy,  to  commemorate  their  conn'ades  who  were  killed 
in  the  war  with  Tripoli.  There  was  nothing  in  this 
monument  which  could  ofi'end  the  national  pride  of 
Englishmen,  except  so  far  as  it  brought  to  their  recol- 
lection the  gaUantry  of  our  naval  heroes.  There  could, 
therefore,  have  been  no  other  than  a  malicious  motive 
for  the  defacement  of  it.  A  correspondent  of  the  Na- 
tional Intelligencer,  writing  shortly  after  the  event, 
gives  the  following  account  of  it : 

"This  elegant  monument  of  the  liberality  and  gal- 
lantry of  our  naval  heroes  has  been  shamefully  defaced 
by  the  hand  of  some  barbarian.  On  the  base,  the 
Genius  of  America  is  represented  by  a  female  iigure 
pointing  to  an  inscription  and  raising  a  view  of  the 
battle  before  Tripoli,  instructing  her  chddrcn  avIio  are 
standing  beside  her.  The  pointing  tinger  and  thumb 
have  been  cut  olK  llistorv — a  female  fisure,  who  is 
represented  as  recording  the  event — has  been  robbed 
of  iier  })en  ;  and  a  iigure  of  l\imc,  who  is  represented  as 
descending  in  a  cloud,  covering  the  deeds  of  her  sons 
with  the  palm  and  crown  of  glory,  has  been  robbed  of 
the  palm  at  the  expense  of  the  hand  that  held  it. 
From  every  inquiry  it  is  possible  to  make,  there  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  but  that  it  was  the  dciliberate  act  of 
some  of  the  liritish  oilicer>',  as  several  of  ihem  were 
seen  to  be  on  the  base  of  the  monument  by  the  neigh- 
bors around  the  vard.'' 


tl  ' 


ih 


M 


i 


268     INVASION    AND    CAPTLIIE    OF    WASHINGTON. 

In  the  course  of  their  operations  the  British  met 
with  a  singular  accident,  the  horrible  consequences  of 
which  probably  made  them  exceedingly  cautious  in 
their  subsequent  explorations  through  the  city.  At 
Ch'eenleaf's  Point  there  was  an  arsenal,  witli  one  or  two 
otlier  })ublic  buildings,  which,  with  their  contents,  had 
been  partially  destroyed  by  our  own  people  before 
abandoning  them.  In  the  hope  of  saving  tlie  powder, 
a  large  (juantity  of  it,  in  kegs,  was  concealed  in  a  dry 
well  near  the  barracks.  Vn  the  day  after  the  capture 
of  the  city,  a  party  of  200  British  soldiers,  with  sev- 
eral officers,  was  sent  down  to  the  Point  to  complete 
the  destruction  of  what  might  be  found  there  :  and  one 
of  these  officers,  in  a  letter  wliich  was  publislied  in  a 
London  ncwsi)aper,*  gives  the  following  account : 

'"One  of  the  artillery-men  most  unfortunately  drop- 
ped a  liglited  port-firc  into  the  well,  whicli,  with  a 
mngazine  about  twelve  yards  distant,  full  of  shells, 
charged  and  primed,  blew  u})  Avith  the  most  tremen- 
dous explosion  I  ever  heard.  One  house  was  unroof- 
ed, and  the  walls  of  two  others,  which  had  been  burnt 
an  hour  before,  were  shook  down.  Large  pieces  of 
earth,  stones,  bricks,  shot,  shells,  etc.,  burst  into  the 
air,  and,  falling  among  us  (who  had  nowhere  to  run, 
being  on  a  narrow  neck  of  land,  with  the  sea  [llivers 
Potomac  and  Eastern  Branch)  on  three  sides),  killed 
about  twelve  men  and  woundc*!  above  thirty  more, 
most  of  them  in  a  dreadl'ul  manner.  I  liad  the  good 
fortune  to  escape  with  whole  skin  and  bones,  ])ut  some- 
what bruised.  The  groans  of  the  ])cople  almost  bur- 
ied in  the  earth,  or  with  leg;-«  and  arms  broke,  and  the 

*  Nik's's  Register,  vol.  vii..  S»|ii'k'iiK'tit,  p.  !."»<). 


i 


THE    BRITISH    OFFICERS   TAKE    A    COLLATION.    2C){) 


h  met 
CCS  of 
ous  in 

r.       At 

or  two 
ts,  had 
"bctbrc 
owtlcr, 
L  a  dry 
:aptiirc 
til  sev- 
)mplctG 
uid  one 
cd  in  a 
lit: 

[y  drop- 
witli  a 
shells, 
trcuicn- 
unrool- 
'u  hiirnt 
cecs  of 
uto  the 
to  run, 
Kivers 
),  killed 
y  more, 
he  good 
it  aomc- 
ost  bur- 
and  the 


/a 


sight  of  pieces  of  bodies  lyiiig  about,  was  a  thousand 
times  more  distressing  than  the  loss  we  met  in  the 
lield  the  day  before." 

The  loss  of  the  British  by  this  accident  is  l)elieved 
to  be  greater  than  is  stated  by  the  writer  of  the  fore- 
going letter.  On  the  day  succeeding  the  occurrence, 
the  author  of  this  volume,  as  brigade  ins})ector,  visited 
the  place,  and  witnessed  the  horrible  spectacle  of  legs, 
arms,  and  heads  protruding  iVom  tlie  mounds  of  earth 
thrown  up  by  the  explosion,  '^i'iu  buildings  destroy- 
ed were  of  little  value. 

Among  the  boasted  exploits  of  tiie  British  In  the 
city  was  that  of  enjoying  a  feast  in  the  President's 
house,  at  tlic  exjiense  of  Mr.  ]\[adison,  before  they  set 
hrc  to  the  buildincr.  A  letter  from  one  ol'  their  mid- 
shipmen,  published  in  a  Tjondon  paper,*  says,  "When 
the  general  entered  ^h:  ]\ladison*s  house  in  the  ca})i- 
tal,  he  found  the  table  spread  for  dinner,  and  ail  the 
fruits  and  wines  in  cool.  The  othcers  reQ;aled  them- 
selves  with  whatever  they  wanted,  and  then  set  lire  to 
the  house.''  Another  aecoimt  says  that  this  alleged 
banquet  was  on  a  collation  which  ^Mr.  ]\huii.  on  had 
directed  to  be  prepared  tor  tin  ;  i-inci})al  officers  of  gov- 
ernment and  of  the  army,  ■'.\h(  i  they  should  return 
from  the  expected  victory  it  ])ladcn.-burg,  which  would 
have  ji'iven  the  wines  :>ii.}»le  ^ime  to  <^ool.  Bui,  in 
point  of  fact,  it  Is  believed  tliat  the  iirlti<di  found  no 
banquet  at  the  President's  house,  save  such  refresh- 
ments as  were  kept  In  readiness  for  the  nu'ssengers 
and  officers  returning  Iron,  errands  oi  calling  on  duty, 
day  or  niaht. 


f 


niji 


270     INVASION    AND    CAFFUKE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


m    I' 


li     ^  I 


f 


!  -■' 


Cockbum  made  hiinsclt'  quite  at  liomc  in  the  city, 
exhibiting  in  the  streets  u  gross  levity  of  manner, 
displaying  sundry  articles  of  trifiiug  value  mIucIi  he 
had  taken  from  the  President's  house,  and  repeating 
many  of  the  coarse  jests  and  reproaches  of  the  Fed- 
eral Ilcpublican  respecting  the  chief  magistrate.  He 
rode  about  the  city  U2)on  a  marc  with  her  colt  trot- 
ting after  her,  -which  he  would  not  allow  to  be  dis- 
turbed. 

Ross,  it  appears,  was  an  Irishman  by  birth.  Arm- 
strong, in  his  "Notices,"  calls  him  "a  dashing  Irish 
general,  who  had  ac([uired  his  morals,  as  well  as  his 
tactics,  in  the  Spanish  war."  He  is  said  to  have  been 
more  courteous  and  mild  in  his  deportment  than  Cock- 
burn,  notwithstanding  the  pretended  faith  of  the  latter 
in  Chesterlield.  ]5ut  Jioss  was  the  chief  of  the  expe- 
dition, and,  as  justly  remarked  by  Niles  in  his  Regis- 
ter,* "Why,  then,  should  the  contlagration  be  charged 
to  Cockburn?  In  a  homely  proverb,  e.vacthj  suited  to 
this  occasion,  '(.live  the  devil  his  due.'  Ross  made 
the  burning  a  subject  of  boasting."  '^I'he  ditTerencc  in 
the  manners  of  the  two  was  probably  the  usual  difler- 
encc  between  officers  of  the  navy  and  army  in  the 
liritish  service:  and  Cockburn,  as  th(>  sailor,  may  have 
been  the  more  frank  and  generous  of  the  two,  notwith- 
standing his  rudoness  of  manner. 

The  maimer  of  the  British  retreat  from  the  city,  as 
it  is  described  by  the  author  of  "The  Subaltern  in 
America,"  was  as  cautious,  and  stealthy,  and  precipi- 
tate as  was  natural  for  a  retreating  army  under  such 
circumstances.     I  Ic  says  ; 

*  Vol  \ii.,  Snj>f»lemcnf,  \k  \TtT. 


.it 

it 


THE    ENEMY    IJETIRE. 


271 


it 


In  the  mean  while,  the  ofKccrs  of  the  diiicrcnt  cor})s 
had  been  direeted,  in  a  whisper,  to  make  ready  lor 
falling  hack  as  soon  as  darkness  should  set  in.  From 
the  men,  however,  the  thing  was  kept  profoundly  se- 
cret. They  were  given,  indeed,  to  understand  that  ali 
important  manceuvre  would  be  effected  befoi'e  to-mor- 
row morning,  but  the  hints  tlirown  out  tended  to  in- 
duce an  expectation  of  a  I'lirther  ad\'ancc  rather  than 
of  a  retreat.  A  similar  rumor  was  permitted  quietly 
to  circulate  among  the  inhabitants,  witii  the  view, 
doubtless,  of  its  making  its  way  into  the  American 
camp ;  while  all  persons  were  required,  on  pain  of 
death,  to  keep  witiiin  doors  from  sunset  to  sunrise. 
This  done,  as  many  horses  as  could  be  got  together 
were  put  in  re(|uisition  for  the  transport  of  the  artille- 
ry ]']vcn  the  few  wounded  oliiccrs  who  had  accom- 
panied the  column  were  required  to  resign  theirs,  and 
mine,  among  the  number,  was  taken  away.  J5ut  the 
precaution  was  a  very  just  and  proper  one.  Not  only 
were  tJie  guns,  by  thi.<  means,  rendered  more  portable, 
but  the  danger  of  a  betrayal  from  a  ncigli,  or  the 
trampling  of  liooves  along  the  paved  streets,  was  pro- 
vided against;  and  though  individuals  might  jiud  did 
sutler,  their  suilerings  were  not  to  be  put  into  the  scale 
against  the  [)ublir'  good. 

*Vlt  was  about  eight  o'clock  at  night  wlicn  a  stafll- 
officer,  arriving  ui)oji  the  ground,  gave  direction  for  the 
corps  to  form  in  marching  order.  JM-cparatory  to  this 
stop,  large  qtuuitilies  of  fresh  fuel  were  hea})ed  upon 
the  iires,  while  from  cvvry  company  a  few  men  were 
selected  who  should  remain  beside  them  till  the  pick- 
ets willulnnv,  and   move  from  lime  to  time  about,  ■  -» 


li 


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1*72     INVASION   AND   CAFrURE   OF   WASUINGTON. 

as  that  their  figures  might  be  seen  "by  the  light  of  the 
blaze.  After  this,  the  troops  stole  to  the  rear  of  the 
lires  by  twos  and  threes  ;  when  iar  enough  removed  to 
avoid  observation,  they  took  their  places,  and,  in  pro- 
found silence,  began  their  march.  Tlie  night  was  very 
dark.  Stars  there  were,  indeed,  in  the  sky,  but,  for 
some  time  after  quitting  the  light  of  tlic  bivouac,  their 
influence  was  wholly  unfelt.  \Ve  moved  on,  however, 
in  good  order.  2so  man  spoke  above  his  breath,  our 
very  steps  were  planted  lic'htly,  and  wc  cleared  the 
town  without  exciting  observation.'' 

This  mode  of  getting  away  frorx  a  conquest  was 
deficient  in  mclodramaiic  dignity,  it  is  true,  but  it 
showed  the  old  soldier;  for  Iloss,  having  acconq)lis]ied 
the  object  of  IiIl  expedit'on,  had  nothing  further  to  de- 
sire than  to  retreat  qiuckly  and  unmolestedly  to  the 
siiipping,  and  this  he  could  not  inive  been  so  likely  to 
do  if  he  liad  announced  and  signalized  his  dejiarture  by 
a  blowing  of  trumpets,  beating  of  drums,  and  otiier 
noise,  and  "ponq)  and  circumstance  of  glorious  war." 

l''rom  the  description  of  Surgeon  (Jatlett,  tlic  appear- 
ance of  the  enemy  on  his  retreat  must  have  been  rath- 
er forlorn  than  martial.     He  says: 

"They  appeared  to  be  preparing  to  move;  had 
about  forty  miserable-looking  horses  lialtered  up,  ten 
or  twelve  carts  and  wagons,  one  ox-cart,  one  coachee, 
and  several  t'ts,  v.hich  the  officers -n^  ere  indiistrionslv 
assisting  to  tucklc  up,  and  which  were  immediately 
sent  on  to  13"  lensburo-  to  move  off  their  wounded.  A 
drove  of  sixty  or  seventy  cuttle  preceded  this  caval- 
cade. On  our  arrival  at  Bladensburg,  the  surgeons 
wore,  ordorod  to  select  all  the  wounded  who  could  walk 


I 


i  s   »  ' 


LOSS    OF   THE    ENI:MY — THEY    KE-EMBARK.       273 


)poai'- 
rath- 

liad 
),  ten 

cllCG, 

)uslv 
atcly 

a.  A 

:aval- 

geons 
\valk 


<i 


1 


(those  with  broken  ariiLs  and  the  like),  and  send  them 
oil"  iiiHiK-diatcly.  The  tbrtv  horses  were  mounted  with 
such  as  coukl  ride,  the  carts  and  wagons  loaded,  and 
ninety  odd  wounded  left  behind.'' 

The  National  Intelligencer  of  August  31  and  Sep- 
tember 1,  1814,  states  that  "the  enemy  did  not  bury 
their  dead,  except  those  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
their  camp.  The  rest,  in  number  near  two  hundred, 
were  buried  by  a  connnittee  of  our  own  citizens  sent 
out  for  the  purpose  ;"'  and  that  ''•  the  loss  of  the  ene- 
my, before  he  regained  his  ships,  probably  exceeded  a 
thousand  men.  ile  lost  at  least  two  hnndred  killed 
in  tlie  battle  and  by  explosion,  and  three  or  four  hnnd- 
red  wounded.  ]\Iany  died  of  fatigue,  numbers  were 
taken  prisoners  by  the  cavalry  hanging  on  his  rear, 
and  not  a  few  deserted." 

The  enemy  occupied  four  days  in  their  retreat  to 
Benedict,  which  tiiey  reached  on  the  evening  of  the 
29th  of  August,  and  re-cmbarkcd  the  following  day. 
Cockburn  states  in  his  dispatch  that  they  reached  Up- 
per ^larlborough  on  the  evening  of  the  2()tli,  "without 
molestation  of  any  sort — indeed,  without  a  sinjrle  mus- 
ket  beino:  fired.''  Tlieir  armv  remained  the  whole  dav 
of  the  2cSth  at  Xotlingham,  while  the  crews  of  their 
boats  were  engaged  in  removing  the  plunder. 

This  chajiter,  in  Avhich  wc  have  hastily,  and  per- 
haps witli  somewh.it  of  an  impatient  spirit,  reviewed 
scenes  which  left  no  pleasrnt  impress  upon  our  mem- 
ory, the  reader  will  probably  thank  us  for  bringing 
to  a  close  with  the  following  interest ing  connnunica- 
tion  from  the  linn,  liiehard  Hush,  of  Pennsvlvania, 
wlioso   name   lu^s   been   so  fre(picntlv   mentioned  in 

:\l  2 


I  ' 


274     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

these  pages.  Its  intrinsic  claims  to  attention,  as  the 
reminiscences  of  an  intelligent  contemporary  and  wit- 
ness of  the  occurrences  to  which  it  refers,  are  greatly 
enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  venerable  writer  is  now 
the  sole  survivor  of  Mr.  jMadison's  cabinet ;  that  his 
position,  therefore,  was  such  as  to  give  him  peculiar 
opportunities  of  being  thoroughly  informed,  and  that 
his  character,  independently  of  position,  was  tlien,  as 
it  is  now,  such  as  to  command  respect  for  every  thing 
emanating  from  his  pen. 


"Sydenham,  near  Philadelphia,  10th  July,  IS")'). 

"My  DEAii  Sir, — Having  made  a  simple  acknowl- 
edgment of  your  letter  of  the  2Gth  of  June,  I  now 
proceed  to  give  you  what  informat;"'n  I  can. 

"  In  preparing  a  history  of  the  '  Invasion  and  Cap- 
ture of  Washington,'  you  propose  to  yourself  a  meri- 
torious task,  and  I  regret  that  I  have  preserved  no 
notes  or  memorandums  on  the  subject.  It  is  but  lit- 
tle I  can  say  that  is  likely  to  be  of  interest  to  you,  as 
the  story  is  an  old  one,  and  I  shall  be  the  more  dis- 
trustful of  this  little,  as  there  must  necessarily  be 
chasms  in  my  memory  after  the  lapse  of  forty  years. 
I  have,  indeed,  to  this  hour,  the  vivid  imjn'cssion  upon 
my  eye  of  columns  of  flame  and  smoke  ascending 
throughout  the  night  of  ihc  24th  of  August  from  the 
Capitol,  President's  house,  and  other  public  edifices,  as 
the  whole  were  on  fire,  some  burning  slowly,  others 
with  bursts  of  Hame  and  sparks  mounting  high  up  in 
the  dark  horizon.  This  never  can  be  forgotten  by  me, 
as  I  accomjxinicd  out  of  the  city  on  that  memorable 
night  in  1S14,  President  Madison,  ^Ir.  .Jones,  tiicu  See- 


.^ 


tttm^nmStiU^mt^ 


STATEMENT   OF    MR,  KUSII. 


275 


retaiy  of  tlic  Navy,  General  ]\Iason,  of  Aiinalo.stoii  Isl- 
and, ]\lr.  Ciiarlcs  Carroll,  of  Belle vuc,  and  Mr.  Tench 
Ilinggold.  There  were  no  others  of  our  group  that  i 
remember. 

"  If  at  intervals  the  dismal  siglit  was  lost  to  our  view, 
we  got  it  agahi  from  some  hill-top  or  eminence  wiierc 
we  paused  to  look  at  it.  AVc  were  on  horseback,  at- 
tended by  servants,  proceeding  on  the  Virginia  side  of 
the  Potomac,  which  we  crossed  at  the  Little  Falls,  in- 
tendiiio:  to  rccross  at  tlie  CU'cat  Falls  that  niti-lit  or  the 
next  mornlnir,  so  as  to  be  aj^ain  on  the  3Lirvland  side, 
and  return  to  Washinc-ton  as  the  movements  of  the 
enemy  and  our  own  strength  might  prompt. 

"Mr.  IMonroc,  Secretary  of  State,  was  active  in  his 
steps  that  night  and  next  day  in  rousing,  by  suitable  ap- 
peals, the  peo})le  of  the  surrounding  country.  There  had 
not  been  so  vehement  and  united  a  feelinix  a^'ainst  the 
enemy  since  tlie  war  began,  as  his  defeats  at  Baltimore, 
New  Orleans,  and  elsewhere  soon  and  signally  attested. 
Stuns:  by  the  disaster  of  tlie  mornins;,  and  shocked  at 
the  confhigration  we  beheld,  the  first  object  of  the  gov- 
ernment was  to  assemble  such  a  force  from  the  nei<2;h- 
boring  country,  known  to  be  populous,  ab.liough  A\'asli- 
ington  and  its  inmiediate  vicinity  at  that  epoch  were 
not,  as  not  merely  to  overmatch  him  fully  should  an- 
other encounter  take  phice,  but  cut  oti'  liis  retreat  to 
his  ships.  This,  it  was  believed,  could  be  done.  It 
was  certainly  the  intention.  Its  execution  was  pre- 
vented by  the  whole  invading  force  hurrying  oft'  on 
the  night  of  the  25th  of  August,  leaving  a  good  portion 
of  their  slain  for  us  to  bury,  and  of  their  wounded  to 
our  en  re. 


276     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WAi^HXKGTON. 


i| 


'    VI 


I 


! 


"  TlicsG  duti'"  j  wore  performed  as  humanity  dictated, 
notwithstanding  our  fresh  memory  of  the  wholesale 
burning  of  our  puhlic  edifices  of  costly  nd  noble 
structure,  containing  the  national  archives,  libraries, 
historical  memorials — some  not  to  be  repi;!ced — mod- 
els of  ingenuity  and  art — for  even  the  Patent  Office  was 
not  ."spared — and  when  not  a  single  article  of  a  warlike 
nature  was  to  be  seen  or  found  in  any  of  these  edifices. 
To  sa'.-  thai  this  was  retaliation  for  wluu  was  alle2:cd 
to  have  been  done  by  us  in  Upper  Canada  at  an  ear- 
lier day  of  the  war  w;is  without  foundation.  13esides 
our  di.^avowal  at  that  time  of  any  intention  of  destroy- 
ino;  the  inconsiderable  buildin<i;s  (I  am  not  sure  if  more 
than  one  was  destroyed)  devoted  to  civil  jDurposes,  and 
the  proftcr  of  reparation  which  our  government  imme- 
diately made,  the  governor  of  Upper  Canada,  in  an  of- 
ficial paper  of  the  February  Avhich  preceded  the  great 
conflagration  at  Wasliington,  acknowledged  that  the 
measure  uf  retaliation  for  all  previously  reputed  mis- 
I'onduct  of  the  American  troops  in  Canada  was  then 
coiijpicte,  tlic  IJritish  having  burned  to  the  ground  the 
town  of  Ikitialo,  o])posite  the  Canadian  frontier.  No 
(.'hargo  of  any  subsequent  devastation  on  our  side  con- 
trary to  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  had  been  made 
or  pretended. 

"  I  summon  up  no  useless  recollections  in  liaving 
said  thus  much  as  introductory  to  answering  your  spe- 
cial inquiries.  The  m'"!mory  of  the  burning  of  Wash- 
ington can  not  be  obliterated.  The  subject  is  insep- 
arable from  great  international  principles  and  usages. 
It  never  can  be  thouG;ht  of  bv  an  American,  and  ouiiht 
not  to  be  thought  of  by  an  enlightened  Englishman,  bnf 


STATEMENT   OF   MR.  IIUSII. 


277 


in  conjunction  with  the  deplorable  and  reprehensible 


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tropiiy  ot" 


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it 


scenes  i  recall,  it  was 
nation.  History  can  not  so  record  it.  Our  iiitant 
metropolis  at  that  time  had  tlie  aspect  of  merely  a 
straf;-'i;Hiig  village  but  for  the  size  and  beauty  of  its 
public  buildings.  Its  scattered  population  scarcely 
numbered  eight  thousand  ;  it  had  no  fortresses  or  sign 
of  any ;  not  a  cannon  was  mounted.  The  military 
force  assembled  for  its  defence  against  the  sudden  in- 
cursion  of  bodies  of  trained  veterans  was  composed 
almost  entirely  of  m  'itia  hastily  got  tog(!tlier,  some 
comino;  in  for  the  fir  nic  on  the  mornin<i'  of  the  at- 
tack,  the  greatest  portion  reaching  the  groiuid  only 
when  the  foe  was  in  siglit,  and  the  whole  relatively 
strano'ors  to  each  other  when  the  fisj-ht  commenced. 

"Your  first  incpury,  or,  rather,  expression  of  belief, 
is  that,  on  the  day  before  the  invasion,  1  accompanied 
the  President  to  the  camp  at  'Battalion  Old  Fields,' 
between  Washington  and  the  Patuxeiit.  In  this  you 
are  right.  I  went  in  company  with  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  General  ]Mason,  ]\Iajor  Carroll,  and  ]Mr. 
Ringgold  ;  no  others  that  1  recollect,  although  we  met 
with  others  on  our  way  who  were  on  the  look-out  for 
tlie  enemy.  The  Secretary  of  "War,  General  Arm- 
strong, did  not  accompany  us,  but  was  at  tlie  camp, 
I  believe,  when  we  arrived. 

"We  learned  that  the  enemy  was  supposed  to  be 
advancing  u})on  the  camp,  and  the  force  was  drawn  up 
waiting  his  approach.  Commodore  Barney  was  there 
with  his  sailors  and  cannon,  having  blown  up  his  flo- 
tilla on  the  Patuxent  to  avoid  capture  by  a  greatly  su- 
perior force  in  boats  from  the  Britisli  fleet,  which  had 


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278     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

ascended  tliat  river.  The  enemy  did  not  approach, 
however,  and  our  men  left  their  encampment  that  even- 
ing, marching  back  to  Washington,  which  they  re-en- 
tered by  the  bridge  at  the  navy-yard  in  the  course  of 
the  niglit.  I  returned  with  tlie  President  and  the  oth- 
crs  of  our  party,  getting  back  to  AVashington  by  the 
Bhidensburg  road  an  liour  or  two  after  midnight. 

"  Your  next  supposition  is  that  I  was  with  the  Presi- 
dent on  the  field  at  Bladensburg.  In  this  you  are  also 
right.  All  indications  showing  that  a  battle  was  rap- 
idly coming  on,  I  went  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
24th  to  the  President's  to  get  the  latest  intelligence. 
Learning  that  he  had  gone  to  the  navy-yard,  I  follow- 
ed, and  found  him  there  with  the  Secretary  of  the  Xavy 
and  several  gentlemen,  w^hosc  names  I  did  not  know  or 
can  not  now  recall ;  but  I  distinctly  remember  the  pres- 
ence of  Commodore  Barney. 

"Accounts  had  come  that  the  enemy  was  advancing 
in  great  forte,  but  whether  to  enter  Washington  by 
Bladensburg  or  by  the  bridge  at  the  navy-yard  was 
still  unknown.  All  were  anxiously  waiting  informa- 
tion from  the  scouts  who  were  coming  in  in  quick  suc- 
cession. The  road  forked  not  far  from  each  place,  and 
he  might  take  his  choice  of  cither  fork.  In  fact,  to 
keep  us  longer  in  the  dark,  I  understood  that  liis  whole 
line,  iirst  taking  the  navy-yard  fork,  continued  in  it 
until  the  last  colunm  got  into  it.  I'he  army  then  sud- 
denly reversed  its  front,  and  marclied  onward  rapidly 
to  Bladensburg.  ]^arney,  as  I  have  said,  was  stand- 
ing on  tlie  ground  at  the  navy-yard,  not  far  from  the 
bridge  whicli  brings  you  into  AVashington.  lie  made 
very  urgent  applicntions  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 


f 


STATEMENT   OF    MR.  RUSH. 


279 


for  permission  to  proceed  to  Bladensburg  as  fast  as 
possible  with  his  men  and  cannon,  his  opinion  being 
that  the  attack  woukl  begin  there. 

"  The  certainty  of  tliis  at  length  becoming  known, 
all  went  to  Bladensburg.  I  accompanied  the  President 
and  those  already  with  him.  When  wc  reached  Bla- 
densburg the  enemy  was  in  sight,  and  the  firing  began 
almost  innnediately  afterward  :  their  rockets  Hew  over 
us  as  wc  sat  on  our  hor.scs.  The  Baltimore  volunteers 
and  militia,  who  formed  the  front  line,  used  their  field- 
pieces — six-pounders,  I  think — firing  only  round  shot, 
which  struck  down  but  few,  however,  and  used  their 
small  arms  with  great  spirit  at  first ;  but  most  of  it 
broke  as  the  enemy  came  on  in  increasing  numbers 
after  they  crossed  the  small  bridge  at  Bladensburg, 
intending  to  rely  upon  their  bayonets. 

"The  Secretary  of  AVar  and  commandino:  general 
were  in  close  view  of  the  front  line,  as  was  the  Presi- 
dent, doing  what  they  could  to  encourage  the  resist- 
ance. It  soon  became  ineffectual,  however,  through- 
out the  field,  but  was  resumed  by  Barney  with  re- 
markable n-allantrv  and  vi<2;or.  Notwithstandinc:  his 
eagerness  to  be  on  the  spot,  and  marching,  as  he  said, 
"on  a  trot,"  he  was  unable  to  reach  tiic  battle-ground 
nearer  than  a  couple  of  miles  or  thereabouts  from  Bla- 
densburg, up  to  which  ])oint  all  resistance  Iiad  then 
been  overcome,  and  the  field  was  clear.  But  tiierc  lie 
made  a  stand  with  his  battery  of  heavy  guns,  .support- 
ed on  his  right  by  his  seamen  acting  ns  soldiers,  and 
a  detachment  of  marines  under  the  gallant  Cai)tain 
since  Colonel^  ^liller,  and  on  his  left  by  some  volun- 


( 


teers  of  the  District  of  Columbia.     This  force,  the 


t'h 


I     I 


n 


280     INVASION   AN]J   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

whole  of  wliicli  was  inconsiderable  in  number  but 
stout  in  heart,  waiting  until  the  close  approach  of  the 
British  regulars,  opened  u^^on  them  such  well-directed 
volleys  of  grape  and  musketry  as  to  baffle  their  repeat- 
ed efforts  to  get  forward,  until,  finally,  overjoowered  by 
numbers  and  surrounded  on  all  sides — for  they  sent  a 
force  in  his  rear — Barney  was  compelled  to  yield,  and 
fell  into  their  hands  while  lying  prostrate  on  the  ground 
severely  wounded. 

"  I  returned  to  the  city  with  the  President.  ]\Ir. 
Monroe  was  also  on  the  field  doing  all  he  could  to 
prevent  the  disaster,  and  urging  good  counsel  for  wip- 
ing out  the  stain  by  another  contest  before  the  enemy 
could  escape  after  his  bold  and  too  successful  inroad. 
I  was  not  soon  enough  or  long  enough  on  the  field, 
and  had  not  the  opportunities  otherwise  of  observing 
the  precise  movements  of  the  troops  composing  the 
first  line,  or  to  become  informed  by  whom  or  by  whose 
orders  changes  of  j)Osition  were  made  as  the  enemy 
approached.  This  answers  your  inquiry  under  this 
head. 

"Your  remaining  inquiry  presupposes  that  I  was 
present  on  a  subsequent  day  at  the  camp  of  General 
Walter  Smith,  on  '  Windmill  Hill,'  in  company  witli 
the  President,  General  j\Iason,  and  Major  Carroll,  wlien 
General  Armstrong  rode  into  the  camp,  and  tlie  inci- 
dents occurred  whicli  you  mention.  I  have  no  recol- 
lection of  having  been  there  on  that  occasion,  thougli 
I  heard  of  what  passed,  seeing  the  President  nearly 
every  day ;  but,  not  witnessing  it,  I  could  not  attempt, 
at  this  remote  period,  to  speak  of  it. 

"This  closes  as  much  as  I  have  to  impart  under 


ber  but 
1  of  the 
directed 
repeat- 
ered  by 
Y  sent  a 
eld,  and 
;  ground 


i 


STATEMENT   OP    MR.  HUSH. 


281 


your  letter.  Accept  the  little  it  amounts  to  as  mv 
willing  contribution  to  your  call,  and  with  it  my  re- 
spectful and  cordial  salutations. 

"RiciiAiiD  Rush. 

"  Colonel  J.  S.  "Williams,  Washington." 


t.  llx. 
lould  to 
for  wip- 
3  enemy 
L  inroad, 
he  field, 
bscrving 
sing  the 
y  whose 
3  enemy 
der  this 

it  I  was 
General 
my  with 
)11,  when 
tlie  inci- 
10  recol- 
,  though 
t  nearly 
attempt, 


rt  under 


282     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE    OF    WASHINOTOX. 


CIIAPTEll  XY. 

The  Capitulation  of  Alexandria. 

It  nnglit  Iiave  been  supposed  that  the  administra- 
tion would  iind  some  difficulty  in  producing  the  im- 
pression that  the  success  of  the  enemy,  in  his  invasion, 
was  owing  chiefly  to  the  pusillanimity  of  the  troops  or 
of  the  people.  Pusillanimity  will  hardly  Ibe  admitted 
to  be  either  a  national  characteristic,  or  one  belonging 
to  the  people  of  Virginia  and  jNIaryland,  and  there  wore 
but  few  natives  of  other  states  then  residino;  in  the 
District  of  Columbia.  Both  before  and  after  the  battle 
of  Bladensburg,  at  Craney  Island  and  at  Baltimore, 
the  people  of  Virginia  and  jMaryland  proved  that  they 
had  lost  none  of  the  gallantry  which  distinguished 
them  in  the  Revolutionary  war.  AVhy,  then,  should 
there  have  been  such  a  remarkable  exhibition  of  pusil- 
lanimity in  the  District,  which  was  peculiarly  under 
the  guardiansliip  of  the  general  government,  and  the 
people  of  which  were  pre-eminently  blessed  in  having 
immediately  before  their  eyes  such  resplendent  exam- 
ples of  more  than  Roman  fortitude,  patriotism,  and  ut- 
ter disregard  of  selfish  considerations  ? 

But  politicians  in  a  free  country  are  seldom  deficient 
in  that  cunning  knowledge  of  human  nature,  which,  for 
a  time,  answers  all  the  purposes  of  wisdom ;  and  the 
administration  knew  that  popular  favor,  though  capri- 
cious and  apt  to  be  misplaced,  is  thorough-going  while 
it  lasts,  and,  like  woman's  love,  is  blind  to  all  faults  in 


sT. 


THE    ADMINISTKATION    verSUS   ALEXANDRIA.      283 


linistra- 
the  iin- 
ivasion, 
■oops  or 
dmitted 
longing 
ire  were 
\  in  the 
,e  battle 
Itimorc, 
[at  they 
guishcd 

should 
)f  pusil- 
'•  under 
and  the 

having 
:  exam- 
and  ut- 

leficient 
lich,  for 
md  tlie 
I  capri- 
o'  while 
uilts  in 


the  objects  of  its  affections,  can  reconcile  itself  to  any 
inconsistencies,  swallow  any  absurdities,  and  pardon 
even  gross  ill  usage  of  itself.  They  boldly  reckoned, 
therefore,  upon  the  aid  of  the  popular  party,  so  called, 
to  support  them  in  their  determination  to  traduce  the 
people  themselves ;  and  when  the  men  Avhosc  own  pu- 
sillanimity had  been  flagrant  and  notorious  gravely 
advanced  the  charge  against  a  portion  of  the  people  no 
more  liable  to  it  than  any  other  portion,  tlie  accusation 
was  accepted  at  once  as  an  article  of  political  faith, 
without  any  in(][uiry  into  the  evidence  by  which  it  was 
supported. 

Tlie  administration  had  a  particular  reason  for  as- 
sailing the  people  of  iVlexandria,  who  might  have  been 
supposed  sufliciently  punished  by  their  losses  for  any 
pusillanimity  which  they  had  exhibited.  But  the  very 
extent  of  these  losses,  which  gave  them  a  claim  upon 
the  sympathy  of  the  nation,  made  the  administration 
anxious  to  arrest  that  sympathy,  lest  it  should  term- 
inate in  censure  of  themselves.  The  property  de- 
stroyed in  Washington  belonged  chiefly  to  the  public, 
so  that  individuals  were  very  little  injured  by  its  de- 
struction, and  the  enemy  was  not  at  all  benefited. 
lUit  the  citizens  of  Alexandria  were  individually  suf- 
ferers to  a  large  amount,  and  the  enemy  escaped  with 
a  valuable  booty.  Reasons  of  state,  therefore,  and  the 
good  of  party  required  that  the  people  of  Alexandria 
should  be  vilified  as  the  authors  of  their  own  suffer- 
ings, and  the  cause  of  the  enemy's  triumph  and  gain. 

On  the  29th  of  August,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
addressed  a  letter  to  Commodore  nodjxers,  then  in 
Baltimore,  informing  him  that  "  the  terms  of  capitula- 


'f 


1 


)) 


m 


I   'I 


■■! 


284     INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 

tion  for  the  town  of  Alexandria  are  so  degrading  and 
humiliating  as  to  excite  the  indignation  of  all  classes 
of  people."  A  few  days  afterward  appeared  the  Pres- 
ident's proclamation,  in  which  he  states  that  the  people 
of  Alexandria  had  "inconsiderately  cast  themselves 
upon  the  justice  and  generosity  of  the  victor."  Both 
the  extract  of  the  letter  to  Commodore  Ilodo:ers  and 
the  proclamation  -were  published  on  the  10th  of  Sep- 
tember in  Niles's  Register,  a  paper  friendly  to  the  ad- 
ministration, the  editor  of  which,  in  the  course  of  his 
comments,  observed  that  "tlie  conduct  of  the  Alexan- 
drians was  base  and  pusillanimous,  so  as  to  excite 
rather  the  contempt  tlian  the  pity  of  their  country- 
men." This  was  just  the  impression  that  the  admin- 
istration desired  to  create. 

The  proclamation  was  astutely  worded,  so  as  to  in- 
sinuate the  charge  instead  of  advancing  it  directly.  It 
states  that  the  enemy  took  advantage  of  the  loss  of  a 
fort  "more  immediately  guarding"  the  town  of  Alex- 
andria. More  immediately  than  what?  There  is 
nothing  in  the  paper  to  explain  tliis  jihraseology,  which 
was,  no  doubt,  purposely  left  indefinite,  in  order  that 
ignorant  readers  miglit  infer  that  Alexandria  had  a  va- 
riety of  important  defences  more  or  less  distant,  but 
that  this  particular  fort  was  a  Gibraltar  in  the  imme- 
diate neighborliood  of  the  town. 

General  Wilkinson,  who  knew  the  place  well,  and 
was  a  competent  judge  of  its  strength,  represents  Fort 
AVashington,  which  is  situated  about  six  miles  below 
Alexandria,  on  the  Maryland  side  of  the  river,  as  being 
"a  mere  water  battery  of  twelve  or  fifteen  guns,  bearing 
upon  the  channel  in  the  ascent  of  the  river,  but  useless 


DEFENX'ES    Or   ALEXANDKIA. 


285 


ng  and 
classes 
c  Prcs- 
!  people 
iiselves 
Both 
ors  and 
of  Scp- 
tlie  ad- 
;  of  his 
A.lexan- 
)  excite 
loimtiy- 
adrain- 

LS  to  in- 
ktly.  It 
Dss  of  a 
f  Alex- 
here  is 
,  which 
:ler  tliat 
ad  a  va- 
ant,  but 
imme- 

ell,  and 
its  Fort 
s  below 
IS  being 
bearing 
useless 


the  moment  a  vessel  had  passed.  This  work  was 
seated  at  the  foot  of  a  steep  acclivity,  from  the  summit 
of  which  the  garrison  could  have  been  driven  out  by 
musketry ;  but  this  height  was  protected  by  an  octag- 
onal block-house,  built  of  brick,  and  of  two  stories  al- 
titude, which,  being  calculated  against  musketry  only, 
could  have  been  knocked  down  by  a  twelve-pounder."* 
This  was  its  condition  in  July,  1813.  On  the  25th 
of  July,  1814,  just  a  month  before  the  battle  of  Bla- 
dcnsburg,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  fort,  as  it  appears 
from  the  documents  appended  to  the  report  of  the  com^ 
mittee  of  investigation,  reported  to  General  A\'indcr 
"the  defenceless  situation''  of  the  post;  and  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  general,  the  War  Department  con- 
sulted an  engineer  on  the  subject,  Vvdio  reported  that 
"  the  whole  original  design  was  bad,  and  it  is  there- 
fore impossible  to  make  a  perfect  work  of  it  by  any 
alterations."  Perfection  being  unattainable,  and  the 
word  impossible  forcing  itself  into  the  military  vocab- 
ulary in  spite  of  the  sneers  of  the  secretary,  a  despe- 
rate effort  was  made  to  come  as  near  as  practicable  to 
perfection,  and  accordingly  "a  couple  of  hands  were 
ordered"  down  to  the  fort  to  execute  the  necessary  re- 
pairs, ao  doubt  they  did  all  that  two  men  could  do 
under  tli'  circumstances.  On  the  19th  of  August, 
after  the  news  of  the  landing  at  Benedict  had  been  re- 
ceived in  Washington,  and  the  British  squadron  was 
known  to  be  ascending  the  Potomac,  General  Winder 
addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which 
he  suggested  that  vessels  should  be  sunk  in  the  Poto- 
mac at  Fort  Washington  to  obstruct  the  navigation, 

*  Wilkins^on,  vol.  i.,  p.  735. 


286     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


and  that  the  garrison  should  be  re-enforced,  hut  it  does 
not  appear  that  any  attention  was  paid  to  either  sug- 
gestion. On  the  20th  of  August,  according  to  the 
statement  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  General  Win- 
der expressed  to  him  the  opinion  that  Fort  \yashington 
was  not  tenable.  On  the  night  of  General  Winder's 
retreat  to  the  city,  after  the  battle  of  Bladensburg,  he 
sent  directions,  he  says,  to  the  officer  commanding  the 
fort,  "  in  the  event  of  his  being  taken  in  the  rear  of 
the  fort  by  the  enemy,  to  blow  up  the  fort  and  retire 
across  the  river."  Three  days  after  receiving  these 
directions,  the  officer  in  command,  on  the  enemy's 
squadron  appearing  off  tlie  fort,  called  a  council  of  war, 
and  by  their  advice  abandoned  the  fort,  blowing  up  the 
magazine.  The  garrison,  it  appears  from  the  official 
report,  did  not  then  exceed  sixty  men. 

Such  was  the  mighty  fortress  '•'"more  immediately 
guarding"  the  town  of  Alexandria.  What  other  Gib- 
raltars  of  a  similar  description  guarded  it  less  immedi- 
ately we  have  not  been  able  to  learn.  The  "oldest 
inhabitant"  has  no  recollection  of  any. 

From  a  memorial  addressed  to  Congress  by  the  cit- 
izens of  Alexandria,  called  forth  by  the  abuse  lavished 
upon  them  by  those  who  were  anxious  to  conciliate 
the  favor  of  the  men  in  power,  it  appears  that,  so  far 
back  as  May,  1813,  the  common  council  of  the  city 
had  sent  a  deputation  to  the  President  to  apprise  him 
of  the  defenceless  state  of  the  town ;  and  the  reply 
which  they  received  was,  that  their  representations 
would  be  properly  attended  to,  but  that  it  was  "  im- 
possible to  extend  protection  to  every  assailable  point 
of  the  country."     Tlie  truth  of  this  remark  was  unde- 


■ 


f     tl 


NO    ASSISTANCE    AFFORDED   TO    ALKXANDKIA.    2S7 


niable,  but  it  Avas  not  altogether  relevant,  as  there  is  a 
Avidc  cliiference  between  the  expediency  and  practica- 
bility of  protecting  all  assailable  points  and  protecting 
important  points  likely  to  be  assailed.  As  may  be 
supposed,  no  results  followed  from  this  application. 
Little  or  nothing  was  done  toward  the  defence  of  the 
capital  itself,  and  it  is  therefore  not  surprising  that 
Alexandria  was  wholly  neglected.  The  corporation 
of  Alexandria,  however,  appropriated  fiiteen  hundred 
dollars  out  of  their  own  funds  to  pay  for  mounting 
some  cannon  which  were  in  the  town,  and  which  had 
been  in  the  use  of  the  militia  while  under  the  state 
government. 

The  memorialists  state  also  that 

"In  the  month  of  May,  1813,  a  deputation  from 
Alexandria,  Washington,  and  Georgetown  had  an  in- 
terview with  the  Secretary  of  War  relative  to  the  de- 
fenceless situation  of  the  District.  The  committee  did 
urge  that  a  more  sufficient  defence  might  be  afforded 
for  the  District  than  then  existed.  It  was  particular- 
ly urged  upon  the  secretary  that  the  fortifications  at 
Fort  Washington,  commonly  known  by  the  name  of 
Fort  Warburton,  should  be  increased.  In  consequence 
of  this  representation,  the  government  sent  an  engineer 
to  examine  the  fort,  who,  on  the  28th  of  May,  1813, 
reported  to  the  War  Department,  as  the  result  of  his 
examination,  that  an  additional  number  of  heavy  guns 
at  Fort  Warburton,  and  an  additional  fort  in  the  neigh- 
hood,  are  both  to  be  considered  necessary.  Notwith- 
standing the  repeated  solicitations  of  the  citizens  of 
Alexandria  in  the  year  1813,  nothing  was  done  toward 
its  defence  except  sending  an  engineer  to  examine  the 


288    INVASION   AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINGTON. 


If     i 


.;  '  I 


:l'1 


fort.  In  silence  did  Alexandria  submit  to  this  neaiect 
of  their  safety  until  the  month  of  July,  1814,  when 
the  common  council  again  endeavored  to  procure  an 
adequate  defence.  Gentlemen  acting  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  cor2)oration  in  the  month  of  July  waited 
upon  the  military  commander  of  the  10th  District  with 
the  view  of  ascertaining  what  measures  of  defence  had 
been  taken  or  were  intended  to  be  adoi)ted  for  the  de- 
fence of  the  town  of  Alexandria  and  District.  The 
general,  who  seemed  to  be  anxious  to  do  his  duty  as 
far  as  the  means  within  his  control  would  enable  him, 
stated  to  those  gentlemen  the  number  of  militia  he  ex- 
pected would  join  him,  and  which  seemed  to  be  all  the 
defence  he  calculated  upon.  This  w^as  a  species  of 
defence  which  would  certainly  be  of  no  use  against  an 
attack  by  water.  It  is  too  obvious  that  the  town  of 
Alexandria  could  not  be  defended  in  any  other  man- 
ner than  by  a  proper  fort  or  forts  below  it,  with  a  com- 
petent garrison.  The  general  commanding  the  10th 
Military  District  visited  Alexandria.  The  mode  of 
defending  it  from  a  water  attack  was  pointed  out  to 
him.  To  adopt  it  required  money.  This  he  was  not 
furnished  with.  This  difficulty,  however,  was  removed 
by  the  offer  of  three  of  the  banks  in  Alexandria  to  loan 
the  government  fifty  thousand  dollars  for  the  purpose 
of  erecting  proper  defences  for  the  District,  which  loan 
was  accepted,  and  the  money  paid  to  the  government. 
No  steps  were  taken  toward  securing  the  town  from 
attack  by  water,  but  it  was  left  to  be  defended  at  the 
fort  by  a  garrison  not  exceeding  eighty  [sixty]  men." 
But  the  people  of  Alexandria  were  not  merely  left 
without  any  assistance  from  the  general  government. 


* 


NARRATIVE   OF   THE   CITY   COUNX'IL. 


289 


neglect 
i,  when 
2ure  an 
the  au- 
r  waited 
•ict  with 
snce  had 
the  de- 
t.     The 
duty  as 
ble  him, 
a  he  ex- 
le  all  the 
)ecies  of 
jainst  an 
town  of 
ler  nian- 
li  a  com- 
the  10th 
mode  of 
d  out  to 
was  not 
removed 
a  to  loan 
purpose 
lich  loan 
3rnment. 
wn  from 
;d  at  the 
jr]  men." 
irely  left 
ernraent. 


All  tlic  means  upon  which  they  might  have  calculated 
to  make  even  a  show  of  resistance  were  taken  from 
them,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in  the  defence  of  the 
capital.  The  condition  in  which  they  were  left,  and 
the  innncdiate  causes  of  the  capitulation,  arc  succinct- 
ly, and  without  exaggeration,  set  forth  in  tlic  following 
extract  from  tlic  narrative  unanimously  concurred  in 
by  the  city  council,  and  published  by  their  order  a  few 
days  after  the  appearance  of  the  Trcsident's  proclama- 
tion : 

"  On  the  lOtli  of  August  a  levy  en  Quassc  was  made 
of  the  militia  of  the  town  and  county  of  Alexandria, 
and  on  the  20th  and  21st  they  were  ordered  to  cross 
the  Potomac,  and  stationed  between  Piscataway  and 
Fort  Warhurton.  They  took  with  them  all  the  artil- 
lery which  had  been  mounted  at  the  expense  of  the 
corporation,  except  two  twelve-pounders,  whicli  were 
left  without  ammunition,  and  nearly  all  the  arms  be- 
longing to  the  town.  They  left  no  men  hut  the  ex- 
empts from  age  and  other  causes,  and  a  few  who  had 
not  reported  themselves,  or  had  found  substitutes,  and 
it  is  not  believed  that,  after  their  departure,  one  hund- 
red effective  armed  men  could  have  been  mustered  in 
town.  The  two  iron  twelve-pounders  remained  until 
the  25th,  when,  Alexandria  being  open  to  the  enemy, 
then  in  full  possession  of  Washington,  they  were  re- 
moved at  some  distance  from  the  town  by  orders  re- 
ceived from  General  Young. 

"On  the  night  of  the  24tli  the  Alexandria  militia 
were  ordered  to  recross  the  Potomac ;  they  did  so,  and 
were  marched  through  town,  without  halthig,  into  the 
country,  and  without  givinp;  information  to  the  autlior- 

:\' 


i  i 


:i  >: 


290     INVASION   AND   CAPTUUE    OF    WASHINGTON. 


r    ' 


It 


i.MI      I 


m 


ities  or  inhabitants  of  the  place  of  their  destination  ; 
and  on  the  evening  of  the  27th,  when  the  fleet  aj)- 
proached,  the  municipal  authorities  of  the  town  knew 
not  where  they  were.  It  has  since  appeared  that  they 
were  t/ie?i  stationed  about  nineteen  miles  from  town, 
by  the  orders  of  General  Winder.  It  is  here  proper 
to  state,  that  General  Winder,  on  tlic  morning  of  the 
24th,  informed  the  members  of  the  committee  of  vigi- 
lance, who  waited  on  him,  that  he  could  send  no  part 
of  the  forces  with  him  to  Alexandria,  but  that  he  had 
ordered  General  Young  to  cross  over  to  Alexandria,  if 
practicable ;  if  not,  to  fall  down  the  river.  The  com- 
mittee of  vigilance,  on  receiving  this  information,  sent 
boats  over  to  the  Maryland  shore  sufficient  in  number 
to  bring  over  the  whole  of  General  Young's  force  at 
once ;  but  when  the  boats  reached  him,  he  had  received 
orders  from  the  Secretary  of  War  to  retain  his  position, 
as  General  Young,  in  a  communication  to  the  mayor, 
stated. 

"  The  committee  of  vigilance,  despairing  of  obtain- 
ing any  assistance  from  the  general  government,  and 
having  information  of  the  rapid  approach  of  the  enemy 
toward  the  capital  by  land,  and  that  their  squadron 
was  approaching  Alexandria  by  water,  deemed  it  their 
duty  to  recommend  to  the  common  council  a  resolu- 
tion to  tlie  following  effect :  '  That,  in  case  tlie  British 
vessels  sliould  pass  the  fort,  or  their  forces  approach 
the  town  by  land,  and  there  should  be  7io  sufficient 
force^  on  our  part,  to  oppose  them  with  any  reasona- 
ble prospect  of  success,  they  should  appoint  a  commit- 
tee to  carry  a  flag  to  the  officer  commanding  the  ene- 
my's force  about  to  attack  the  town,  and  to  procure 


(, 


Mill 


MOTIVES   OF    CAPITULATION. 


291 


lation  ; 
2et  ap- 
1  knew 
at  tliey 
I  town, 
proper 
:  of  the 
of  vigi- 
no  part 
he  had 
dria,  if 
le  com- 
)n,  sent 
number 
ibrce  at 
•eceived 
osition, 
mayor, 

obtain- 
nt,  and 
enemy 
piadron 
it  their 
resohi- 
British 
iproaeh 
(Jjidcnt 
casona- 
:omm  it- 
he  one- 
procure 


the  best  terms  for  the  safety  of  persons,  houses,  and 
property  in  their  power.  This  recommendation  was 
made  on  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Bladensburg,  and  on 
the  same  day  was  unanimously  adopted  by  the  com- 
mon council. 

"  Tlie  battle  of  Bladensburg  having  terminated  in 
the  defeat  of  our  troops,  and  General  Winder  having 
been  obliged  to  retreat  from  the  capital  toward  Mont- 
gomery Court  House,  about  fifteen  miles  to  the  west 
of  it,  the  City  of  Washington  was  left  in  the  entire 
possession  of  the  enemy.  The  citizens  of  Alexandria 
saw  nothing  to  impede  the  march  of  the  British  to 
their  town ;  saw  nothing  to  restrain  *tlicm  from  com- 
mitting the  most  brutal  outrages  upon  the  female  por- 
tion of  society,  having  neither  arms  nor  men  to  make 
defence  with.  The  President  of  the  United  States  and 
the  heads  of  the  departments  were  absent,  and  it  was 
not  known  wlierc  they  were  to  be  found ;  no  military 
commander  or  officer  of  tlie  general  government  was 
present  to  direct  or  advise." 

'J'he  British  squadron  reached  Alexandria  on  the 
evening  of  the  28th  of  August.  It  consisted  of  two 
frigates,  one  of  38  and  the  other  of  /JG  guns ;  two 
rocket  ships  of  18  guns  each ;  two  bomb  siiips  of  8 
guns  each,  and  a  schooner  of  2  guns.  This  force  was 
arranged  along  tlic  town,  a  few  hundred  yards  from 
the  wharves,  so  as  to  command  the  place  from  one  ex- 
tremity to  the  other,  the  houses  being  so  situated  that 
tliey  might  have  been  laid  in  ashes  in  a  few  minutes. 
There  was  no  possible  means  of  defence  or  resistance  ; 
for  even  if  the  old  men,  women,  and  children,  who 
were  left  in  the  town,  had  wrought  themselves  up  to 


;: 


'I' 


ii 


i'l 

[II, 


li! 


-f' 


uiij 


292      INVASION   AND    CAPTUIIE   OF    WASHINGTON-. 

tliG  pitcli  of  desperate  valor  whicli  the  admiiiistratiou 
had  established  in  theory  as  the  proper  standard  for 
the  times,  and  resorted  to  pitchforks,  pokers,  tongs, 
and  Ibrick-bats,  all  these  would  have  availed  nothing 
against  a  bombardment  by  a  naval  force.  The  asser- 
tion, therefore,  that  under  these  circumstances  the  in- 
habitants "cast  themselves"  ujDon  the  mercy  of  the 
victor  is  a  deliberate  misstatement,  for  those  who  ut- 
tered it  knew  well  the  facts  of  the  case.  The  inhab- 
itants did  not  "cast  themselves,"  but  were  cast  upon 
the  mercy  of  the  victor,  and  not  through  any  fault  or 
neglect  of  their  own,  but  of  those  by  whom  the  impu- 
tation was  originated. 

The  only  (question,  therefore,  is,  whether  they  were 
inconsiderate  in  appealing  to  the  clemency  of  the  vic- 
tor. The  mere  fact  of  making  terms  with  a  victorious 
enemy  can  not  be  regarded  as  inconsiderate  or  disgrace- 
ful in  itself,  except  by  those  chivalrous  spirits  whose 
unconquerable  valor  would  prompt  them  to  bury  them- 
selves and  all  tliat  was  dear  to  them  in  one  common 
grave  ratlicr  than  give  any  token  of  defeat  or  surren- 
der. But  this  extreme  valor,  however  it  mav  deserve 
applause,  is  not  exacted  by  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind. The  folly  or  disgrace  of  a  capitulation,  there- 
fore, must  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  terms  of  it. 

The  people  of  Alexandria  well  knew  the  character 
of  the  warfare  wliich  the  British  had  been  waging  on 
the  shores  of  the  Chesapeake.  The  proclamation  it- 
self adverts  to  the  notorious  excesses  of  the  enemy. 
All  that  the  authorities  of  Alexandria  had  in  view  by 
a  capitulation  was  to  avert  from  tlieir  fellow-townsmen 
the  outrages  which  had  been  connnitted  elsewhere. 


i 


M 


'hi 


MOTIVES    OF    CAPIirLATION. 


2U3 


The  object  of  the  leading  men  of  the  town  was,  not  to 
protect  tlie  interests  of  the  wealthier  classes,  for  it  was 
their  property  chiefly  w^hich  was  surrendered  by  the 
capitulation,  and  their  families  had  been  or  could  be 
easily  removed  to  a  safe  distance,  but  to  save  their 
poorer  fellow-citizens,  and  their  wives  and  daughters, 
from  the  consequences  which  would  have  ensued  from 
exposing  them  to  the  lust  and  brutality  of  drunken 
seamen. 

It  would,  no  doubt,  better  have  suited  the  purposes 
of  the  administration  if  the  scenes  of  IIam2)ton  had 
been  renewed  at  Alexandria,  as  the  public  indignation 
would  then  have  been  concentrated  upon  the  enemy. 
But  the  capitulation  had  the  effect  of  preventing  this, 
and  of  saving  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  from  wanton 
injury  in  person  or  property,  while  at  the  same  time  it 
gave  tlie  enemy  no  advantnges  which  he  would  not 
have  enjoyed  without  it.*     Some  of  the  conditions  of 

*  "  Tkrms  of  Capitt'LATION  presented  h\j  the  Commander  of  the 
liritish  sijiKulron  to  die  nut/tor ilics  at  Akjandria: 

"The  town  of  Alexamlria  (with  the  exception  of  ))u1ilir  works) 
shall  not  be  destroyed,  unless  hostilities  are  coninienced  on  the  part 
of  the  Americans,  nor  shall  the  inhabitants  he  molested  in  any  man- 
ner whatever,  or  their  dwelling-houses  entered,  if  the  following  arti- 
cles arc  complied  witli : 

"  AuTici.K  1.  All  naval  and  ordnance  stores  (}»ublic  and  private) 
must  be  immediately  given  u]). 

'"Art.  2.  Possession  will  be  immediately  taken  of  all  the  ship- 
ping, and  their  I'lirniturc  must  be  sent  on  board  by  their  owners  with- 
out delay. 

"  Art.  3.  The  vessels  which  have  been  stnik  must  be  delivered  up 
in  the  state  they  were  in  on  tiie  lltth  of  August,  the  day  of  tho 
scpuulrou  passing  the  Kettle  Bottoms. 

"  Art.  4.  Merchandise  of  every  description  must  be  instantly  de- 
livered uji,  and  to  prevent  any  irregularities  that  might  be  conuuitted 


f  i: 


i  ( 


i  I 


i'-i' 


294     INVASION   AND  CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

it,  which  it  was  impracticable  to  comply  with,  were  at 
once  waived  by  the  British  commander,  and  the  result 
was,  according  to  the  narrative  of  the  council,  that 
"  the  depredations  of  the  enemy,  with  a  few  excep- 
tions, were  confined  to  flour,  cotton,  and  tobacco,  which 
they  carried  off  in  some  of  the  vessels  then  at  the 
town.  Only  one  vessel  was  burnt ;  no  private  dwell- 
ing was  visited  or  entered  in  a  rude  or  hostile  manner, 
nor  were  citizens  personally  exposed  to  insult." 

The  censure  bestowed  on  the  authorities  of  Alex- 
andria for  this  capitulation  was  too  manifestly  and 
grossly  unjust  to  meet  the  concurrence  of  General 
Armstrong,  imbittcred  as  his  feelings  were  against  the 
people  of  the  District,  and  liable  as  he  was  himself  to 
more  or  less  censure  for  the  defenceless  condition  of 
the  town.  After  a  brief  mention  of  the  occurrence  in 
his  "  Notices,"  etc.,  he  says,  "  It  will  not  be  thought 
extraordinary  that,  in  choosing  between  total  and  par- 
tial ruin,  there  should  be  little,  if  any  hesitation  on  the 

in  its  embarkation,  the  merchants  have  it  on  their  option  to  load  the 
vessels  generally  employed  for  that  purpose,  when  they  will  be  towed 
off"  by  us. 

"  Art.  r>.  All  merchandise  that  has  been  removed  from  Alexan- 
dria since  the  19th  instant  is  to  be  included  in  tlie  above  articles, 

"  AuT.  G.  Refreshments  of  every  description  to  be  supplied  tho 
ships,  and  paid  for  at  the  market  i)rice  by  bills  on  the  British  gov- 
ernment. 

"  Art.  7.  Officers  will  1)e  appointed  to  see  that  the  articles  Nos.  2, 
3j  4,  and  5  are  strictly  complied  with,  and  any  deviation  or  non- 
compliance on  the  part  of  the  inhabitants  of  Alexandria,  will  render 
this  treaty  null  and  void. 

"  James  A.  Gordon, 
"Captain  of  his  majesty's  ship  Sea-Horse." 

Of  these  articles  Nos.  li  and  .1  were  protested  against  by  the  au- 
thorities of  Alexandria,  and  were  not  enforced. 


I 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE    POTOMAC. 


295 


13 


part  of  a  defenceless  town,  the  male  population  of 
which  did  not  then  exceed  one  hundred  combatants.* 
After  the  capitulation  of  Alexandria,  measures  were 
adopted  hy  the  government  to  hurry  the  departure  of 
the  enemy's  squadron  and  annoy  it  on  its  passage 
down  the  river.  A  large  body  of  seamen  was  brought 
from  Baltimore,  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
Commodores  Eodgers,  Perry,  and  Porter,  and  Captain 
Creighton,  of  the  Navy.  Conniiodore  Kodgcrs,  with 
boats  and  fire  vessels,  attacked  and  annoyed  the  rear 
of  the  enemy's  squadron.  Commodore  Porter,  assist- 
ed by  Captain  Creighton  and  other  naval  officers,  es- 
tablished a  battery  at  "  the  White  House, ''f  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Potomac,  and  Commodore  Perry 
another  on  tlie  left  bank,  at  a  place  called  "Indian 
Head."  They  were  both  assisted  by  militia  of  the 
District  and  of  Virginia,  who  behaved  well  enough  to 
show  that,  under  the  lead  of  men  in  whom  they  had 
confidence,  every  reliance  could  be  placed  on  them.- 
Commodore  Porter,  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  says,  "  Tlie  intrepidity  of  Captain  Griffith, 
of  the  Alexandria  artillery,  his  officers  and  men,  merit 
t!ic  highest  eulogiums.  They  fought  their  six-pound- 
crs  until  their  anmiunition  was  expended,  and  coolly 
retired  with  their  guns,  when  ordered  to  do  so,  under 
a  shower  of  the  enemy's  shot ;"  and  he  further  re- 
marks, "  The  militia  who  came  under  my  immediate 

♦  Vol.  ii.,  p.  133. 

t  Since  tlie  coiupletion  of  tliis  work,  the  author  has  received  an 
interestinjf  ooniniunication  from  his  friend,  Joim  S.  Gailaher,  Esq., 
late  Third  Auditor  of  the  U.  vS.  Treasury,  who  served  as  a  private  in 
a  company  of  Virjjinia  volunteers  durinj?  the  action  at  the  ^Vhito 
House,     it  will  ho  found  in  the  Appendix,  No.  VI. 


r 


f  1^1^ 


•il       I 


mi 


>    } 

A 

;! 
It 


! 


1 

1 

' 

1 

1 

; 

r 

i 

h 

ll 

'1 

296     INVASION   AND  CAPTURE   OF  WASHINGTON. 

notice,  and  were  attached  to  my  command,  voluntarily 
or  otlierwise,  conducted  tliemselves  in  a  manner  wliicli 
reflects  on  them  and  their  country  the  highest  honor. 
]Many,  before  the  battle,  requested  to  he  j^osted  near 
me,  and  there  was  no  instance  where  one  offered  to 
retire  until  I  gave  the  order  to  retire. '^ 

Commodore  Perry  says  of  the  militia  under  his  com- 
mand at  Indian  Head : 

"The  field-pieces  (six-pounders)  under  the  direction 
of  that  excellent  officer,  Mai'or  Peter,  of  the  George- 
town, and  Captain  Burch,  of  the  Washington  volun- 
teers, and  Captain  Lewis,  of  General  Stuart's  brigade, 
kejDt  up  a  very  spirited  fire.  These  officers,  together 
with  Captains  StuU  and  Davidson,  and  their  brave 
men,  behaved  in  the  handsomest  manner,  and  rendered 
all  the  assistance  their  limited  means  afforded. 

"  The  ammunition  of  the  eighteen-poundcr  and  of 
several  of  the  sixes  being  expended,  and  the  fire  of 
the  enemy  from  two  frigates,  two  sloops  of  war,  two 
bombs,  one  rocket  ship,  and  several  smaller  vessels, 
being  very  heavy,  it  was  thought  advisable  by  Gener- 
al Stuart,  ]\Iajor  Peter,  and  myself,  to  retire  a  short 
distance  in  the  rear.  This  was  done  in  good  order, 
after  sustaininfr  their  fire  for  more  than  an  hour.  Gen- 
cral  Stuart  and  Colonel  Beall  were  much  exposed  dur^ 
ing  the  whole  time  of  the  cannonading.  It  would  be 
presumption  in  me  to  speak  in  commendation  of  these 
veterans ;  I  can  not,  however,  avoid  expressing  my 
admiration  of  their  conduct.'** 

The  amount  of  damage  done  to  the  enemy  on  his 

*  These  reports  will  be  found  in  Niles's  Register,  vul.  vii.,  p.  33, 
iU,  35. 


DISCHARGE   OF   THE   DISTRICT   MILITIA. 


2y7 


his 


4 


i 


passage  down  the  river  coukl  not  be  ascertained. 
Commodore  Porter  mentions  in  his  report  that  some 
of  the  British  ships  Avere  much  crippled  ;  and  a  de- 
serter from  the  Emyalus  frigate  stated  that  on  board 
that  vessel  five  were  killed  and  seven  wounded  on 
passing  the  batteries.*  There  can  be  no  room  for 
doubt  that,  had  Fort  Washington  been  properly  garri- 
soned, and  the  channel  obstructed,  or  suitable  batteries 
erected  a:;  the  proper  time  on  the  river,  the  British 
squadron  would  never  have  reached  Alexandria. 

The  District  troops,  under  the  command  of  General 
Smith,  having  remained  encamped  until  the  departure 
of  the  British  from  the  Potomac,  were  mustered  for 
discharge  under  the  following  brigade  order : 

"  Head-quarters,  Camp  Hill,  Oct.  8th,  1814. 

'■'Brigade  Order. 
"•It  is  with  great  satisfaction  that  the  general  an- 
nounces to  the  troops  of  the  1st  Columbian  Brigade 
his  authority  to  grant  their  discharge  from  their  pres- 
ent term  of  service.  Called  as  they  were  into  the 
service  of  their  country  at  an  eventful  period,  they 
manifested  their  patriotism  by  prompt  obedience  to  the 
call,  and,  although  of  force  far  inferior,  boldly  threw 
themselves  in  front  of  an  approaching  powerful  foe, 
checked  his  progress  so  far  as  rested  within  their  lim- 
ited means,  and  yielded  the  way  to  him  only  by  orders 
from  superior  authority.  Such,  also,  was  their  con- 
duct in  the  perilous  hour  of  conflict;  and  although  the 
malio-nant  tongue  of  envenomed  slander  has  dared  for 
a  moment  to  asperse  their  fame,  the  foul  calumny  will 

*  Nilos's  Repister,  vol.  vii.,  p.  123. 


f 


\. 


i 


11/ 


1 

\ 


<    13 ; ! 


298     INVASION    AND   CAPTURE   OF   WASHINOTUN. 

Ibe  exposed,  and  the  head  of  the  author  v*  vered  with 
that  disgrace  he  so  well  merits. 

"  The  enemy  has  not  as  yet  left  our  shores.  He 
has  but  retired,  and  may  again  assail  us.  But  the 
government,  desirous  to  grant  such  relief  as  it  can 
conveniently  authorize,  the  troops  belonging  to  this 
District  will,  with  the  exception  of  officers  now  on  a 
court-martial,  be  discharged  this  day.  The  alacrity 
witli  Avhicli  they  have  obeyed  former  orders,  and  their 
zeal  while  in  service,  are  sure  pledges  that  they  will 
be  always  ready  when  their  country  calls. 

"By  order,  J.S.Williams, 

"Brigade-major  and  Inspector." 


f 


ill 


:I  with 

.     He 

ut  the 
it  can 
;o  this 
V  on  a 
lacrity 
d  their 
;y  will 

tor." 


APPENDIX. 


Ill  I 


III  lit' 


It      ; 


4 


li. 


APPENDIX. 


No.  I. 

NARRATIVE  OF  GENERAL  WINDER,  ADDRESSED  TO  THE  CHAIR- 
MAN OF  THE  COMMITTEE  OF  INVESTIGATION. 

O'Ncalc'?,  Sept.  16,  1814. 

Sm^ — The  readiest  mode  in  which  1  can  meet  the  inquiries 
which  you  have  made,  on  behalf  of  the  committee  of  which  you 
are  the  chairman,  will  be  to  give  a  narrative  of  my  agency  as 
commander  of  the  10th  Military  District,*and  to  accompany  it  with 
the  correspondence  which  I  have  had,  by  letter,  with  the  general 
and  state  governments,  and  their  respective  officers,  while  in  that 
command. 

Within  the  few  last  days  of  June,  and  before  it  was  known  that 
my  exchange  was  perfect,  although  intelligence  to  that  effect  was 
momently  expected,  I  was  at  the  City  of  Washington,  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  War  informed  me  that  it  was  in  contemplation  to  create 
another  military  district,  to  embrace  the  country  from  Rappahan- 
nock northward,  to  include  the  State  of  Maryland,  and  that  the 
President  intended  to  vest  me  with  the  command  of  it. 

On  my  return  to  Baltimore  I  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
copies  of  the  letters  herewith  transmitted,  marked  1  A,  2  A. 

About  the  4th  or  5th  of  July  1  received  a  letter,  a  copy  of  which, 
marked  1  B,  accompanies  this,  which  inclosed  an  order  constitut- 
ing the  10th  Military  District,  a  copy  of  which  is  annexed  to  the 
letter  above  referred  to. 

In  obedience  to  the  requisition  of  the  letter,  I  immediately  went 
to  Washington  and  waited  on  the  Secretary  of  War.  He  stated 
to  me  that,  in  addition  to  the  garrisons  of  the  several  forts  within 
my  district,  and  the  detachments  of  the  36th  and  38th  infantry 
then  at  Benedict,  it  was  contemplated  to  order  a  detachment  of 
cavalry,  then  at  Carlisle,  under  orders  to  be  mounted,  amounting 
to  about  one  hundred  and  fifty,  a  company  of  the  12th,  and  from 


;iu2 


APPENDIX. 


,1    I 


!    I 


IP    '^ 


one  to  two  companies  of  the  lOtli  regular  infantry,  which  would 
be  ordered  to  be  collected  from  their  several  recruiting  rendez- 
vous, and  to  march  to  tlie  City  of  Washington,  and  that  the  whole 
regular  force  thus  to  be  collected  might  amount  to  one  thousand 
or  twelve  hundred,  and  that  the  balance  of  my  command  would  be 
composed  of  militia ;  that  a  requisition  was  about  to  be  made  upon 
certain  states  for  upward  of  ninety  thousand  militia,  intended  for 
the  del'encc  of  the  maritime  frontier  of  the  country,  and  showed  me 
a  blank  circular  which  had  been  printed,  but  not  filled  up,  nor  sent 
to  the  respective  governors  of  the  states. 

I  took  the  liberty  of  suggesting  to  the  Secretary  of  War  at  that 
time  my  idea  of  the  propriety  of  calling  immediately  into  the  field 
at  least  a  portion  of  the  militia  intended  for  my  district,  and  en- 
camping them  in  the  best  position  for  protecting  the  probable 
points  at  which  the  enemy  would  strike  if  he  should  invade  the 
district  of  my  command.  The  secretary  was  of  opinion  that  the 
most  advantageous  mode  of  using  militia  was  upon  the  spur  of  the 
occasion,  and  to  bring  them  to  fight  as  soon  as  called  out.  I  re- 
turned within  a  day  or  two  to  Baltimore  to  prepare  myself  for  vis- 
iting the  different  parts  of  my  district,  and  to  explore  it  generally, 
and  particularly  those  parts  of  it  which  might  be  considered  as 
the  approaches  to  the  three  principal  points  of  it,  to  wit,  Wash- 
ington, Baltimore,  and  Annapolis. 

My  impressions  of  the  necessity  of  having  a  respectable  force 
immediately  called  into  the  field  were  strengthened  instead  of  di- 
minished by  subsequent  reflection,  and  I,  in  consequence,  on  the 
9th  of  July,  addressed  the  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  a  copy 
of  which  is  herewith  sent,  marked  3  A. 

Agreeably  to  the  suggestion  contained  in  that  letter,  I  proceeded 
to  Annapolis  to  visit  the  military  posts  there,  and  to  be  ready  on 
the  spot,  when  the  governor  should  receive  the  requisition,  and  my- 
self such  instructions  as  might  be  thought  proper  to  be  given  me, 
to  take  the  most  immediate  steps  to  accomplish  them. 

The  governor  received  the  requisition,  and  immediately  issued 
the  necessary  orders  to  have  the  quota  required  drafted. 

On  the  12th  of  July  the  secretary  addressed  to  me  a  letter  (the 
copy  of  which  is  herewith  marked  2  B),  but  which,  being  directed 
to  Baltimore,  did  not  reach  me  until  after  I  had  been  to  Upper 
Marlborough  and  again  returned  to  Annapolis,  where  it  followed 


APrExNDlX. 


303 


nie.  I  proceeded  from  Annapolis  to  Upper  Marlborough,  and  on 
the  16th  addressed  two  letters  to  the  Secretary  ol'  War,  of  which 
copies  are  sent,  marked  4  A,  5  A. 

The  apprehension  that  the  enemy  would  proceed  up  the  Patux- 
cnt  and  attack  the  flotilla  at  Notthigham,  in  consequence  of  the 
re-enforceaient  he  had  just  received,  gaining  strength,  I  proceeded 
immediately  to  Nottingham,  instead  of  going  to  the  Wood  Yard  as  I 
intended.  During  the  IGth  wc  received  no  information  of  a  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  up  the  river ;  but  on  the  17th,  about  9  o'clock, 
Mr.  Fitzluigh  arrived  express  from  the  mouth  of  the  Patuxent, 
and  stated  that  about  twenty  barges,  several  frigates,  and  some 
small  armed  vessels  were  proceeding  up  the  river.  I,  in  conse- 
quence, wrote  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  a  copy  of  which 
is  herewith  sent,  marked  6  A,  and  wrote  a  note  to  Brigadier-gen- 
eral West,  of  the  Maryland  militia,  advising  him  to  call  out  the 
militia  of  the  county. 

I  ordered  the  detachments  of  the  36th  :md  38th  to  hasten  from 
the  head  of  South  River,  by  forced  marches,  to  Nottingham. 
Three  companies  of  the  city  militia  were  promptly  dispatched  in 
consequence  of  my  letter  of  the  17th.  But  by  the  time  these  lat- 
ter had  reached  the  Wood  Yard,  and  the  regulars  Marlborough,  the 
enemy  had  entered  Hunting  Creek,  on  the  Calvert  side  of  the  riv- 
er, had  proceeded  to  Huntingtown,  burned  the  tobacco  warehouse, 
after  having  taken  off  the  principal  part  of  the  tobacco,  and  v,  ere 
retiring  down  the  river.  I  halted  the  city  militia  at  the  Wood 
Yard,  and  the  regulars  at  Marlborough. 

In  answer  to  my  letter  of  the  17th  from  Nottingham,  I  received 
the  following  answer  from  the  Secretary  of  W^ar,  marked  3  B.  As 
soon,  therefore,  as  I  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  retired  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Patuxent,  I  proceeded  to  Annapolis  to  make  the  req- 
uisition upon  the  governor,  as  directed  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  thence  to  Baltimore,  to  lend  my  aid  and  power  to  draw  out 
the  force  authorized  there. 

While  at  Annapolis,  I  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the 
letter  dated  20th  of  July,  a  copy  of  which  is  sent,  marked  7  A,  and 
at  the  same  time  made  the  requisition  on  the  governor,  herewith 
sent,  marked  1 C.  After  remaining  at  Baltimore  a  day,  and  leaving 
orders  to  Brigadier-general  Stansbury,  who  had  been  called  on  to 
command  the  militia  to  be  assembled  there,  relative  to  their  muster 


it 


«)' 


i 


1H 


111 


■li 


I 


!l 


304 


APPENDIX. 


and  inspection,  under  the  laws  of  Congress,  I  returned  to  Marlbor- 
ough to  fix  upon  an  encampment  for  the  militia  I  had  required 
from  the  governor,  and  to  be  more  at  hand  to  be  informed  of  the 
enemy's  movements.  From  Upper  Marlborough,  on  the  23d  of 
July,  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the  accompanying  letter, 
marked  8  A,  and  then  proceeded  to  the  Wood  Yard,  from  whence, 
on  the  same  day,  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War  the  following 
letter,  marked  9  A. 

The  enemy  still  remaining  inactive,  or,  rather,  confining  him- 
self to  depredations  upon  the  lower  parts  of  the  rivers  Patux;ent 
and  Potomac,  I  seized  the  opportunity  of  visiting  Fort  Washing- 
ton, and  on  the  25th  required  from  Lieutenant  Edwards,  the  com- 
manding officer,  a  representation  of  what  he  deemed  necessary  to 
complete  the  equipment  of  the  fort,  with  its  then  works,  and  re- 
ceived from  him  a  representation,  which  I  inclosed  in  a  letter  to 
the  Secretary  of  War  on  the  25th,  of  which  copies  are  sent,  mark- 
ed 10  A.     A  copy  of  his  answer,  marked  4  B,  is  herewith  sent. 

Learning  that  some  of  the  enemy's  ships  were  proceeding  up  the 
Potomac,  I  proceeded  down  to  Port  Tobacco  with  a  view  of  as- 
certaining more  precisely  his  views,  and  of  informing  myself  of 
the  country,  and  on  the  2Gth  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War  the  fol- 
lowing letter,  marked  11  A. 

Having  ascertained  the  next  morning  that  the  enemy's  ships 
had  descended  the  river,  I  returned  to  Marlborough,  and  availed 
myself  of  the  first  opportunity  I  had  to  review  and  inspect  the  de- 
tachment of  the  36th  and  38th,  and  thence  proceeded  to  Wash- 
ington City,  where  I  established  permanent  headquarters  of  the 
District  on  tiie  1st  of  August.  I  availed  myself  of  a  day  at  this 
time  to  review  and  inspect  the  two  brigades  of  District  militia  in 
Alexandria  and  this  place,  and  reported  the  result  to  Major-gen- 
eral Van  Ness,  commanding  the  District  militia,  in  the  letter  here- 
with, marked  No.  1. 

The  people  of  St.  Mary's  and  Charles's  had  become  extremely 
sore  under  the  harassing  service  to  which  they  had  been  subject- 
ed, and  the  devastation  and  plunder  which  the  enemy  had  been 
80  long  committing  on  their  shores ;  and  the  remonstrances  of 
Brigadier-general  Stuart,  commanding  the  militia  there  under  the 
state  authority,  had  become  extremely  importunate  with  both  the 
Secrotriry  of  War  and  the  President  to  receive  aid  and  protection 


APPENDIX. 


305 


from  the  general  government.  The  danger  of  throwing  a  force 
to  llir  down  into  that  neck  of  land,  which  exposed  them  to  the  dan- 
ger of  heing  cut  off,  besides  that  they  would  be  lost  Ibr  the  defence 
of  Washington,  Baltimore,  or  Annapolis,  had  hitherto  prevented 
me  from  pushing  any  part  of  my  command  so  low  down  ;  but  the 
President,  in  conversation,  told  me  that  their  situaticni  rei^uired 
aid,  and  directed  m-e  to  move  the  detachments  of  the  3Gth  and  38th 
down  to  unite  with  and  aid  General  Stuart.  I  accordingly  or- 
dered Lieutenant-colonel  Scott  to  move  from  Marlborough  to  Pis- 
cataway,  and  I  proceeded  directly  down  myself  on  the  3d.  On 
the  morning  of  the  4th  of  August  I  wrote  the  following  letter  from 
Port  Tobacco. marked  13  A,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and,  agree- 
ably to  the  intention  therein  expressed,  proceeded  twelve  miles 
below  to  General  Stuart's  camp.  1  there  Irarned  beyond  doubt 
that  the  enemy  had  returned  down  the  i:;ver  ;  and,  alter  assuring 
the  general  of  support  if  they  again  advanced  up  tlie  river,  I  re- 
turned back  agahi  to  the  City  of  Washington,  directing  Lieutenant- 
colonel  Scott,  connnanding  the  regulars,  to  take  up  his  encamp- 
ment at  a  very  convenient  place  two  miles  from  Piscataway,  on 
the  road  to  the  Wood  Yard  and  Marlborough. 

On  my  arrival  at  Washington,!  found  that  the  requisition  made 
upon  the  Governor  of  Maryland  lor  three  thousand  men,  to  be  as- 
sembled at  Bladensburg,  had  brought  to  that  {Aiico  oidv  one  com- 
pany ;  but  I  learned  that  other  detaclnnents  were  about  marciiiiig^ 
to  ih?.t.  place,  and,  in  order  that  no  delay  might  occur  in  organiz- 
ing and  eipiijiping  them,  I  order(!d  Major  Keyser,  of  the  38th  reg- 
ular infantry,  to  proceed  to  Bladensburg,  to  nuister,  inspect,  and 
drill  tlie  detachments  as  they  came  in. 

I  thence  proceeded  to  Baltimore  to  ascertain  more  precisely  the 
cfft'ct  of  the  recjuisition  made  on  Major-general  Smith  for  two 
thousand  iVom  his  division  ;  whc!i  arrived,  1  found  about  one  tliou- 
sand  two  hundred  only  assembled.  I  reviewed  and  inspecte  1 
them,  and  gave  Brigadier-general  Stansbury  orders  to  endoav;  i-, 
by  the  most  speedy  means,  to  get  in  the  delin(iuents  nnd  absentees. 

I  liad  just  learned  by  a  letter  from  tlie  CJovernor  of  Maryland, 
and  also  from  (Jenend  Smith, that,  upon  CJeneral  Smith's  apjilica- 
(ion  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  h(^  liad  detormint'il  that  the  two 
thousand  men  now  called  to  Baltimore, and  w  lueh  had  been  detach- 
ed under  a  re(iuisition  of  the  Secretary  of  War  directly  on  Gen- 


L 


?M 


APPENDIX. 


!! 


I  I 


eral  Smith  of  the  20th  of  April,  were  to  be  considered  as  part  of 
the  quota  of  Maryland  under  the  requisition  of  the  4th  of  July.  I 
had  drawn  a  different  conclusion,  and  had  so  informed  both  the 
governor  and  General  Smith  in  the  visits  I  made  to  Annapolis 
and  Baltimore  about  the  20th  of  July,  immediately  after  receiving 
the  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  17th  July,  above  ex- 
hibited. In  order  to  supply  the  deficit  in  my  calculation  upon  this 
force,  I  addressed  the  letter  of  the  13th  of  August  to  die  Secretary 
of  War,  of  which  a  copy,  marked  14  A,  is  here  presented;  pro- 
ceeded the  same  or  the  Ibllowing  day  to  W^ashington  by  the  way 
uf  Annapolis,  and  on  the  17th,  at  Washington,  the  day  following 
my  arrival,  received  the  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  of  which 
a  copy,  marked  5  13,  is  sent. 

I  should  have  stated  that,  two  days  after  my  return  to  the  City 
of  Washington,  about  the  6th  of  August,  I  received  two  letters 
from  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  one  dated  the  15th,  the  other  the 
17th  of  July,  which,  having  been  addressed  to  me  at  Baltimore, 
had  followed  me  backward  and  forward  from  place  to  place,  and, 
unfortunately,  only  reached  me  at  this  late  period  ;  copies  of  these 
are  herewith  sent,  marked  6  B  and  7  B. 

I  had,  in  the  mean  time,  addressed  the  letter  of  the  6th  of  Au- 
gust to  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  a  copy  of  which  is  sent, 
marked  1  D,  and  upon  the  6th,  on  the  receiving  the  letter  of  the 
Secretary  of  War  of  the  15th,  I  wrote  another  letter  to  the  Gov- 
ernor of  Pennsylvania,  of  which,  from  haste  or  much  occupation, 
I  did  not  take  a  copy, or  have  mislaid  it;  it  substantially, however, 
informed  him  of  the  number  of  militia  I  was  authorized  to  call  from 
liim,  requesting  him  to  hasten  their  drafting  and  organization,  and 
to  transmit  a  list  of  the  officers,  from  brigadiers  down,  who  would 
command.  Should  tliis  letter  be  deemed  material,  a  copy  can  be 
obtained  from  the  governor,  and  I  have  written  to  procure  it. 

I  addressed  on  the  16th  also  a  similar  letter  to  the  Governor 
of  Virginia.  On  the  lOtii  or  17th  of  August  T  received  from  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  Pennsylvania  an  answer,  dated  the  11th,  of 
which  a  copy,  marked  2  I),  is  herewith  sent;  and  from  the  Adju- 
tant-general of  Virginia  the  answer  and  inclosures  herewith  sent, 
marked  E. 

On  the  morning  of  Thursday,  the  I8th,  intelligence  was  received 
from  the  Ob.scrvatory  on  Point  Jjook-out  that  on  the  morning  of 


I 


IS  part  of 
'July.     I 

both  the 
Vnnapolis 
receiving 
ibove  ex- 
upon  this 
secretary 
ed  ;  pro- 

the  way 
ollowing 
of  which 

the  City 

0  letters 
)ther  the 
iltimore, 
ice,  and, 
of  these 

1  of  Au- 
is  sent, 

!r  of  the 
le  Gov- 
upation, 
owever, 
all  from 
ion,  and 
:)  would 
can  be 
it. 

)vernor 
om  the 
Ith,  of 
I  Adju- 
h  sent, 

ccived 
ing  of 


APPENDIX.  307 

the  17th  the  enemy's  fleet  off  that  place  had  been  re-enforced  by 
a  formidable  squadron  of  ships  and  vessels  of  various  sizes. 

I  immediately  made  requisitions  upon  the  Governors  of  Mary- 
land and  Pennsylvania,  and  to  various  militia  ofliccrs,  coi)ics  of 
which  are  herewith  sent,  marked  as  follows  :  to  the  Governor  of 
Pennsylvania,  3  D  ;  to  the  Governor  of  Maryland,  2  C  ;  to  Major- 
general  Smith,  of  Baltimore,  1  F  ;  to  Brigadier-general  West,  of 
Prince  George's,  Maryland,  No.  18  ;  to  Major-general  Van  Ness, 
No.  4  ;  to  Brigadier-giMieral  lluiigerford,  Virginia,  No.  14  ;  to 
*  Brigadier-general  Douglas  and  Colonel  Chilton,  of  Virginia,  and 
Brigadier-generals  Ringgold,  JSwearingen,  Barrack,  and  Foreman, 
of  Maryland,  No.  5. 

Besides  the  letters  and  correspondence  here  referred  to  partic- 
ularly, a  mass  of  correspondence  occurred  with  various  persons 
relative  to  my  command,  and  which,  as  ttir  as  1  suppose  they  can 
have  any  influence  on  the  investigation,  are  herewith  sent. 

That  with  the  Governor  of  Maryland  will  bo  found  in  bundle  C, 
and  numbered,  in  addition  to  those  already  mentioned,  from  3  C 
to  lie,  both  inclusive.  That  with  General  Smith  in  bundle  F  ; 
and  that  with  other  persons,  not  before  referred  to,  with  the  numbers 
before  referred  to,  are  cxhitjited  from  No.  1  to  No.  53  inclusive. 
Much  other  correspondence  necessary  to  be  carried  on,  artd  wliich 
occupied  much  time,  took  place,  which,  however,  is  not  sent,  as  I 
deemed  them  not  calculated  to  illustrate  the  inquiry,  and  only  cal- 
culated uselessly  to  encumber  and  embarrass  the  inquiry.  They 
will  be  furnished  if  thought  requisite. 

I  will  state  as  nearly  as  possible  the  forces  which  were  in  the 
field  under  these  various  demands  and  re(iuisitions,  the  time  of 
their  assemijling,  their  condition,  anci  subsequent  movements. 

The  returns  first  made,  when  I  came  into  command,  gave  me, 

Fort  M* Henry,  under  the  command  of  Major  Armistead, 
non-commissioned  officers,  musicians,  and  privates,  for 
duty 194 

At  Annapolis,  in  Forts  Severn  and  Madison,  under  Lieu- 
tenant Fay 39 

At  Fort  Washington,  under  Lieutenant  Edwards 49 

The  detachments  of  the  3fitli  and  3i^th,  and  a  small  detach- 
ment of  artillery  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott 330 

'CA2 


::C8 


APPENDIX. 


'    h  iti   ' 


These  corps  received  no  addition,  but  were  gradually  diminish- 
ing by  the  ordinary  causes  which  always  operate  to  tiiis  effect. 

The  two  thousand  Maryland  militia  who  were  ordered  to  assem- 
ble at  Baltimore  had  been  drai'ted  in  pursuance  of  a  requisition 
made  by  the  Secretary  of  War  on  General  tSmith  of  the  20th  of 
April,  and  as  full  time  had  been  allowed  to  make  the  draft  de- 
liberately, they  were,  as  far  as  practicable,  ready  to  come  without 
delay ;  notwithstanding.  Brigadier-general  Stansbury  was  unable 
to  Ining  to  Bladensburg  more  than  one  thousand  four  hundred,  in- 
cludiug  officers,  and  arrived  at  Bladensburg  on  the  evening  of  the 
2CJd  of  August. 

From  (rcneral  Strieker's  brigade  in  the  city  of  Baltimore,  which 
had  been  called  out  en  masse,  1  required  a  regiment  of  infantry, 
the  battalion  of  riflemen,  and  two  companies  of  artillery — not  deem- 
ing it  practicable  to  reconcile  the  jjcoplc  of  Baltimore  to  march  a 
greater  number,  and  leave  it  without  any  force,  and  being  strongly 
persuaded  that  the  exigency  would  have  drawn  in  time  a  greater 
force  from  the  adjacent  country.  The  detachment  from  Strieker's 
brigade,  under  Colonel  Stcrett,  arrived  at  Bladensburg  in  the  night 
of  the  23d  of  August,  and  the  total  amount  was  nine  hundred  and 
fifty-six. 

The  detachment  which  had  been  stationed  at  Annapolis,  under 
Colonel  Hood,  and  which  had  been  at  the  moment  transferred  i)y 
the  Governor  of  Maryland  to  my  command,  arrived  at  the  bridge 
at  Bladensburg  about  fif'tecn  minutes  before  the  enemy  appeared, 
and  I  suppose  were  from  six  to  seven  hundred  strong.  I  have 
never  had  any  return  of  it. 

The  brigade  of  General  Smith,  consisting  of  the  militia  of  the 
District  of  Columbia  on  this  side  the  Potomac,  were  called  out 
on  Thursday,  the  18th  of  August,  on  Friday  were  assembled,  and 
on  Saturday,  the  20th,  they  crossed  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge, 
and  advanced  about  five  miles  toward  the  Wood  Yard.  They 
amounted,  I  suppose,  to  about  twelve  hundred  ;  a  return  was  never 
had  before  they  separated  from  my  connnand,  as  there  was  not  an 
interval  of  sufficient  rest  to  have  obtained  one. 

CJenerul  Young's  brigade,  from  Alexandria,  between  five  and  six 
lunulred  strong,  crossed  the  Potomac  Saturday  or  Sunday,  th(j 
19th  or  20th,  and  took  post  near  Piscataway. 

The  call  for  three  thousand  militia,  under  the  requisition  of  (ho 


I      i 


i    I 


AlM'ENUiX. 


;](i9 


lave 


Jrido-o, 


■J 

111 


no 


4th  of  July,  had  produced  only  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  at  the 
moment  the  enemy  landed  at  Benedict.  In  addition  to  the  causes 
herein  heforementioned,  the  inefficacy  of  this  call  is  to  be  attrib- 
uted to  the  incredulity  of  the  people  on  the  danger  of  invasion ; 
the  perplexed,  broken,  and  harassed  state  of  the  militia  in  St.  Ma- 
ry's, Calvert,  Charles's,  Prince  George's,  and  a  part  of  Anne  Arun- 
del counties,  which  had  rendered  it  impossible  to  make  the  draft 
in  some  of  them,  or  to  call  them  from  those  exposed  situations 
where  they  had  been  on  duty  two  months,  under  the  local  calls  for 
Maryland. 

Several  other  small  detachments  of  Maryland  militia,  either  as 
volunteers,  or  under  the  calls  on  the  brigadiers,  joined  about  the 
day  before  the  action,  whose  numbers  or  commanding  officers  T 
did  not  know.  They  may  have  amounted  to  some  four  or  five 
hundred. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman,  of  the  Maryland  caviilry,  under 
an  order  of  the  Governor  of  Maryland,  with  aljout  eighty  dragoons, 
arrived  at  the  City  of  Washington  on  the  16th  of  August,  on  his 
way  to  join  General  Stuart,  in  the  lower  part  of  Charles  or  St. 
Mary's  County. 

Under  the  permission  I  just  then  received  to  accept  all  the  mi- 
litia then  in  the  field  under  the  State  of  Maryland,  I  inforn:ed  Col- 
onel Tilghman  that  I  had  no  doubt  of  the  governor's  sanction,  for 
which  I  had  applied,  and  recommended  him  to  halt  here.  lie 
agreed  not  only  to  this,  but,  by  the  consent  of  General  Stuart,  who 
happened  then  to  be  in  the  city  sick,  agreed  to  take  my  orders. 

Lieutenant-colonel  Laval,  of  the  United  States  Light  Dragoons, 
with  a  small  Sijuadron  of  about  one  hundred  and  twenty,  who  had 
been  mounted  at  Carlisle  the  preceding  Monday,  arrived  at  Mont- 
gomery Court  House  on  the  evening  of  the  10th  of  August,  re- 
ported himself  to  the  war  office,  and  received  orders  to  report  to 
me.  He  moved  on  the  next  morning,  and  crossed  the  Eastern 
Branch. 

Captain  Morgan,  with  a  company  of  about  eighty  of  the  12th 
United  States  Infantry,  joined  at  the  Long  Old  Fields  on  the 
evening  of  the  2'2d. 

Colonel  Minor,  from  Virginia,  arrived  at  the  city  on  the  evening 
of  the  23d  with  about  five  hundred  men,  wholly  unanm^d,  :uid  with- 
out equipments.      I'nder  the  direction  of  Colonel  Carberry.  who 


310 


APPENDIX. 


Ill 


;|    I 


had  been  charged  with  thio  subject,  they  received  arms,  ammuni- 
tion, &c.,  next  morning,  but  not  until  after  the  action  at  Bladens- 
burg. 

No  part  of  the  10th  had  yet  arrived. 

There  had  been  no  adjutant  or  inspector  general  attached  to  my 
command  from  its  commencement.  IMajor  Hite,  Assistant  Ad- 
jutant-general, joined  me  on  the  loth  of  August  at  Washington, 
and  Major  Smith,  Assistant  Inspector-general,  on  the  19th. 

This  was  the  situation,  condition,  and  amount  of  my  force  and 
command. 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  detail  is  continued  up  to  the  mo- 
ment of  the  battle  of  Bladensburg  ;  but,  as  the  time  at  which  the 
different  corps  respectively  joined  is  stated,  it  will  be  readily  seen 
what  troops  were  concerned  in  the  different  movements  which  will 
now  be  detailed. 

The  innumerably  multiplied  orders,  letters,  consultations,  and  de- 
mands which  crowded  upon  me  at  the  moment  of  such  an  alarm, 
can  more  easily  be  conceived  than  described,  and  occupied  me 
nearly  day  and  night  from  Thursday,  the  18th  of  August,  till  Sun- 
day, the  2 1st,  and  had  nearly  broken  down  myself  and  assistants 
in  preparing,  dispensing,  and  attending  to  them. 

On  Thursday  evening  Colonel  Monroe  proposed,  if  I  would  de- 
tach a  troop  of  cavalry  with  him,  to  proceed  in  the  most  probable 
direction  to  find  the  enemy  and  reconnoitre  him.  Captain  Thorn- 
ton's troop  from  Alexandria  was  detailed  on  this  service,  and  on 
1^'riday  morning  the  colonel  departed  with  them.  At  this  time  it 
was  supposed  the  enemy  intended  [coming  up]  the  Bay,  as  one  of 
his  ships  was  alread}  in  view  from  Annapolis,  and  his  boats  were 
sounding  South  Paver.  It  was  Colonel  Monroe's  intention  to  have 
proceeded  d'.ect  to  Annapolis  ;  but,  before  he  had  got  without 
the  city,  lie  received  intelligence  that  the  enemy  had  proceeded 
up  the  Patuxcnt,  and  were  debarking  at  Benedict.  He  therefore 
bent  his  course  to  that  place.  By  his  first  letter  on  Saturday, 
which  reached  the  President  that  evening,  he  was  unable  to  give 
any  precise  intelligence,  except  that  the  enemy  were  at  Benedict 
in  force. 

On  Saturday,  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman,  with  his  squadron 
of  dragoons,  was  disnaiol-.d  by  way  of  the  Wood  Yard  to  fall  down 
upon  the  enemy,  to  annoy,  harass,  and  impede  their  march  by 


APPENDIX. 


11 


I 


k 


s* 


I 


every  possible  means,  to  remove  or  destroy  forage  and  provision 
from  before  the  enemy,  and  gain  intelligence.  Captain  Caldwell, 
with  his  troop  of  city  cavalry,  was  dispatched  with  the  same  views 
toward  Benedict  by  Piscataway,  it  being  wholly  uncertain  what 
route  the  enemy  would  take  if  it  was  his  intention  to  come  to 
Washington. 

On  Sunday  I  crossed  the  Eastern  Branch,  and  joined  Brigadier- 
general  Smith  at  the  Wood  Yard,  where  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott 
with  the  36th  and  38th,  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Kramer  with  the 
militia  from  Bhulensburg,  had  arrived  by  previous  orders.  On  the 
road  to  the  Wood  Yard  I  received  a  letter  from  Colonel  Monroe, 
of  which  a  copy  is  sent,  marked  — ,  and  at  about  eight  o'clock  in 
the  evening  I  received  another  letter  from  him,  of  which  a  copy 
is  sent,  marked  — ,  and  in  a  very  short  time  after  he  arrived  him- 
t  elf,  and  immediately  after  Colonel  Beall,  who  had  seen  a  body  of 
the  enemy,  which  he  estimated  at  four  thousand  (without  suppos- 
ing he  iiad  seen  the  whole),  enter  Nottingham  on  Sunday  evening. 
Colonel  Monroe,  being  much  exhausted,  retired  to  rest.  I  gave 
Colonel  Beall,  on  account  of  his  experience,  orders  to  proceed  and 
join  Colonel  Hood  on  his  march  from  Annapolis,  and  take  com- 
mand of  the  detachment.  I  occupied  the  night  in  writing  letters 
and  orders  to  various  officers  and  persons,  and  at  daylight  ordered 
a  light  detachment  from  General  Smith's  brigade  under  Major 
Peter,  the  regulars  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott,  and  Laval's 
cavalry,  to  proceed  inmiediately  toward  Nottingham  to  meet  the 
enemy. 

I  proceeded  immediately  in  advance  myself,  accompanied  by 
Colonel  Monroe  and  the  gentlemen  of  my  staff.  I  had  learned 
that  Colonel  Tilghman,  with  his  cavalry,  on  the  advance  of  the 
enemy,  had  fallen  back  upon  Marlborough  the  evening  before,  and 
had,  during  the  night,  sent  him  an  order  *o  proceed  upon  the  road 
from  Marlborough  to  Nottingham,  and  meet  at  the  Chapel.  Hav- 
ing got  considerably  in  advance  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott's  and 
Major  Peter's  detachment,  and  also  to  obtain  intelligence,  I  halted 
at^Ir.  Oden's.  within  half  a  mile  of  the  junction  of  the  roads  from 
I\IarlborouGfh  and  the  Wood  Yard  to  Nottingham,  directing  Laval 
to  gain  the  Marlborough  roud,  post  himself  at  the  Chapel,  and  push 
forward  patrols  upon  all  the  roads  toward  Nottingham,  In  less 
than  half  an  hour,  and  before  the  detachments  of  Scott  and  Peter 


U    I 


:]\2 


APrENDIX. 


li;ul  come  up,  intelligence  was  brought  that  the  enemy  was  inoving 
on  Ironi  Nottingham  in  force  toward  the  Cliapel.  I  immediately 
proceeded,  with  the  gentlemen  who  were  with  me,  to  gain  an  ob- 
servation of  the  enemy,  and  came  within  view  of  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance about  two  miles  below  the  Chapel.  The  observation  was 
continued  until  the  enemy  reached  the  Chapel,  and  Scott  and  Peter 
being  then  near  two  miles  distant  from  that  point,  and  it  being 
therefore  impossible  for  them  to  reach  the  junction  of  the  Marlbor- 
ough and  Wood  Yard  road  before  the  enemy,  I  sent  orders  for 
them  to  post  themselves  in  the  most  advantageous  position,  and 
wait  for  mc  with  the  body  of  the  cavalry.  I  turned  into  the  road 
to  the  Wood  Yard,  and  detached  a  small  party,  under  Adjutant- 
general  Ilite,  on  the  Marlborough  road,  to  watch  the  enemy's 
movements  on  that  road  and  give  information.  Upon  arriving  at 
Odcn's,  himself  or  some  other  person  of  the  neighborhood  whom 
I  knew,  and  on  whom  I  could  rely,  inibrmed  me  that  there  was  a 
more  direct  road,  but  not  so  much  frequented,  leading  from  Not- 
tingham to  the  Wood  Yard,  and  joining  that  on  which  I  then  was, 
and  two  miles  nearer  the  Wood  Yard. 

A  doubt  at  that  time  was  not  entertained  by  any  body  of  the  in- 
tention of  the  enemy  to  proceed  direct  to  Washington,  and  the  ad- 
vantage of  dividing  their  force,  and  proceeding  on  two  roads,  run- 
ning so  near  each  other  to  the  same  jjoint,  so  obvious,  that  I  gave 
orders  to  Scott  and  Peter  to  retiir,  and  occupy  the  fast  eligible 
position  between  the  junction  of  that  road  and  the  one  we  were  on 
and  the  Wood  Yard ;  dispatched  a  patrol  of  cavalry  to  observe 
that  road,  and  give  the  earliest  notice  of  any  advance  of  the  en- 
emy upon  it.  I  still  continued  the  observation  of  the  enemy  my- 
self, and  he  turned  a  part  of  his  colunm  imo  the  road  to  the  Wood 
Yard,  and  penetrated  a  skirt  of  wood  which  hid  the  junction  of  the 
Marlborough  and  Wood  Yard  road  from  view,  and  there  halted  it, 
within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  of  Odcn's  house.  I  hesitated  for  some 
time  whether  to  attribute  his  delay  to  a  view  which  he  may  have 
had  of  Scott's  and  Peter's  detachments,  or  to  a  design  to  conceal 
his  movement  toward  Marlborough,  the  road  to  that  place  being 
concealed  by  woods  from  any  point  of  observation  w  hich  could  be 
gained. 

It  appeared  afterward  that  his  whole  force  halted  there  for  an 
hour  or  upward,  and  thus  continued  in  an  uncertainty  as  to  his 


APl'ENDIX. 


»>  1  o 


US  moving 
mediately 
I  in  an  ob- 
emy's  ad- 
ation  was 
and  Peter 
d  it  being 
3  IVIarlbor- 
orders  for 
sition,  and 
o  the  road 
Adjutant- 
D  enemy's 
arriving  at 
lood  whom 
lere  was  a 
from  Not- 
[  then  was, 

M 

V  of  the  in- 
md  the  ad- 
roads,  run- 
that  I  gave 
rst  eligible 
tve  were  on 
to  observe 

of  the  en- 
cnemy  my- 
3  the  Wood 
ction  of  the 
re  halted  it, 
Dd  for  some 
3  may  have 

to  conceal 
place  being 
ch  could  be 

here  for  an 
y  as  to  his 


inteiuU-'J  route.  1  had,  in  the  moan  time,  rode  l)ack  and  as.si.sted 
I'ctcr  and  .Scott  to  post  their  detachments  in  ;i  iUvorablo  position, 
from  uhcncc  I  entertained  a  hope  to  have  given  the  enemy  a  seri- 
ous check,  '"'thout  much  risk  to  this  detachment.  Orders  had 
been  previoi,  y  sent  to  General  ISmith  to  post  his  wh(»lc  detach- 
ment in  conjunction  with  Commodore  Barney,  who  hrul  by  this 
tiine  joined  him  'rom  Marlborough  with  about  four  hundred  sail- 
ors and  marines,  and  had  taken  also  command  of  the  marines  un- 
der Captain  xMiller,  who  had  arrived  from  the  city  the  night  be- 
fore. I  presumed,  from  the  appearance  of  this  force,  it  was  about 
one  hundred  or  one  luuulred  and  twenty.  As  soon  as  I  had  sat- 
isfied myself  as  to  the  position  and  disposition  of  Scott's  and  Pe- 
ter's detachments,  1  advanced  again  toward  the  enemy  to  ascer- 
tain his  i-ituation  and  intentions.  It  had  now  become  certain  that 
he  had  taken  the  road  to  jNlarlborougli,  ancLColonel  Monroe  cross- 
ed over  to  that  place  to  join  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman,  and  ob- 
serve his  movements. 

I  sent  an  order  immediately  to  Scott  and  Peter  to  retire  back  to 
General  Smith,  and  the  latter  to  take  post  at  the  point  where  the 
roads  from  ^V^ashingt{)n  City  and  the  ^Vood  Yard  to  Marlborough 
unite.  This  order  was  incorrectly  delivered  or  misutiderstood, 
and  he  took  post  instead  at  the  point  where  the  roads  from  the 
"Wood  Yard  and  Marllxu-ongh  to  the  City  of  Washington  unite.  The 
mistake,  howi'vcr,  produced  no  inconvenience,  but,  on  the  contra- 
ry, was  perhaps  better  than  the  position  to  which  1  had  directed, 
because  it  threw  my  force  more  between  Marlborough  and  Bla- 
densburg,  and  also  in  command  of  the  road  by  which  the  enemy 
did  finally  advance,  which  the  other  position  wouhl  not  have  done. 
Its  inconvenience  was  that  it  left  open  the  road  to  Fort  Washinu'-- 
ton,  and  rendered  General  Young's  junction,  if  it  should  become 
proper  to  advance  him,  hazardous  on  that  road.  It  further  became 
necessary  to  retire  still  further  back,  and  the  only  position  where 
the  troops  could  be  tolerably  accommodated,  or  posted  to  advant- 
age, was  at  Dunlap's,  or,  as  it  is  generally  called,  the  Long  or  Bat- 
talion Old  Fi(dds. 

(General  Smith  was  therefore  ordered  to  retire  to  that  point  with 
the  whole  of  the  troops  except  the  cavalry,  liieutenant-colonel 
Tilghman  and  f';ipt:iin  Herbert  were  cliargtMl  with  hovering  upon 
llie  enenjy  on  all  the  roads  leading  from  Bladensburg,  from  the 

o 


;U4 


AITENDIX. 


%f 


north,  and  from  Annapolis,  to  i\Iarlborough.  With  Laval's  caval- 
ry I  advanced  to  the  nearest  and  most  convenient  positions  be- 
tween the  Wood  Yard  and  Marlborough,  and  Ibund  the  enemy 
quietly  halted  at  Marlborough.  Tilghman's  cavalry  picked  up 
one  or  two  prisoners  who  had  straggled  beyond  the  enemy's  pick- 
ets, and  my  examination  of  the;  ,i  confirmed  me  that  the  enemy  did 
not  contemplate  leaving  Marlborough  that  day. 

After  remaining  near  Marlborougli  in  observation  till  toward  the 
latter  part  of  the  afternoon,  I  returned  to  General  Smith,  where  I 
arrived  toward  the  close  of  the  day.  About  dark  1  learned  that 
the  President  and  heads  of  departments  had  arrived  at  a  house 
about  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  the  camp.  1  detached  a  captain's 
guard  to  his  quarters,  advanced  the  cavalry  of  Laval  on  the  roads 
toward  Marlborough,  with  orders  to  patrol  as  close  upon  the  ene- 
my as  possible  during  the  course  of  the  night ;  and,  after  having 
waded  through  the  iufmitc  applications,  consultations,  and  calls 
necessarily  arising  fio.n  a  body  of  two  thousand  five  hundred  men, 
not  three  days  from  vheir  homes,  witlrout  organization  or  any 
practical  knowledge  of  service  on  the  part  of  their  officers,  and 
being  obliged  to  listen  to  the  officious  but  well-intended  informa- 
tion and  advice  of  the  crowd,  who,  at  such  a  time,  would  be  full 
of  both,  I  lay  down  to  snatch  a  moment  of  rest. 

A  causeless  alarm  from  one  of  the  sentinels  placed  the  whole 
force  liOfier  arms  about  three  o'clock  in  the  morning.  A  short 
time  after  sunrise  I  rode  over  to  the  quarters  of  the  President  to  in- 
form him  and  the  Secretary  of  War  of  the  state  of  things.  Upon 
my  return,  rumors  prevailed  that  the  enemy  had  taken  the  road  to 
Queen  Anne,  which  was  directly  leading  to  Annapolis.  I  could 
not,  however,  suppose  that  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman  and  Cap- 
tain Herbert  would  fail  to  advise  me  if  the  Aictwere  so.  The  ru- 
mor, however,  gained  ground,  and  just  at  this  time  Mr.  Luffbor- 
ough,  of  this  city,  with  some  fifteen  or  twenty  mounted  men,  offer- 
ed himself  ready  to  perform  any  duties  on  which  I  could  employ 
them.  I  immediately  dispatched  him  to  ascertain  the  truth  of 
this  report,  by  penetrating  to  that  road,  and  also  to  obtain  whatever 
information  he  could  relative  to  the  enemy.  About  twelve  o'clock 
he  sent  me  decisive  information  that  the  enemy  were  not  on  the 
Annapolis  road. 

T  received  constant  intelligence  that  the  enemy  still  remained  in 


|i      I 


APPENDIX. 


?Ao 


al's  caval- 
iitions  be- 
lie caemy 
picked  up 
my's  pick- 
cuemy  did 

toward  the 
:h,  where  I 
turned  that 
at  a  house 
a  captain's 
n  the  roads 
^n  the  ene- 
fter  having 
i,  and  calls 
indred  men, 
ion  or  any 
>friccrs,  and 
ed  informa- 
ould  be  full 

.1  the  whole 
A  short 
sidcnt  to  in- 
ngs.     Upon 
the  road  to 
IS.     1  could 
in  and  Cap- 
The  ru- 
^Ir.  Luffbor- 
mcn,  oflfer- 
ould  employ 
le  truth  of 
in  whatever 
Ive  o'clock 
not  on  the 

remained  in 


I 


•  parutoi  s  to  a  general 

and  tlie  information 

lo  enemy  intended  no 

solved  to  endeavor  to 


IMarlbornr  and,  ihci  ii)re,  felt  no  doubt  »'vit,  '•"'•.  intended  to 
take  the  i.. .  ,  "o  Ann:  .ilis,  an  ^t^ivcmc  upon  ih  .l  road  was 
only  an  advance  party  fur  nbsci  -  iiH,  and  i 
movement;  and  as  the  morni  advanci 
brought  still  confirmed  the  impr-  ssion  thiii 
movement  ironi  Upper  Marlborough,  I  i' 
concentrate  the  force  (which,  I  hoped,  had  now  considerably  ac- 
cumulated within  my  reach)  down  upon  the  enemy's  lines  nenr 
Marlborough. 

I  accordingly  ordered  a  light  detachment  to  be  sent  forward  by 
General  Smith,  under  Major  Peter ;  and  having  also  learned  by 
Major  Woodyear,  of  General  Stansbury's  stalT,  that  he  had  arrived 
the  evening  before  at  Bladensburg,  I  sent  orders  to  him  to  advance 
toward  Marlborough,  and  to  take  post  at  the  point  where  the  Old 
Fields  to  Quecii  Anne  crosses  the  road  from  JBladensburg  to  Marl- 
borough, which  brought  him  within  four  miles  of  the  Old  Fields, 
and  within  from  six  to  eight  of  the  enemy.  I  was  anxiously 
waiting  to  hear  of  Lieutenant-colonel  IJeall's  progress  with  the 
detachment  for  Annapolis,  and  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett's  from 
Baltimore. 

The  President  and  heads  of  departments  had  been  on  the  field 
since  about  eight  o'clock.  I  communicated  my  views  and  inten- 
tions as  above  detailed,  and  informed  them  that  I  proposed  my- 
self to  pass  over  the  road  from  Bladensburg  to  Marlborough,  to 
meet  General  Stansbury,  to  make  closer  observations  upon  the  road 
direct  from  the  enemy  to  Bladensburg,  and  to  establish  more  thor- 
oughly a  concert  between  Stansbury  and  Smith's  command  ;  to  be 
also  nearer  to  Beall,  to  give  him  also  a  direction  toward  the  ene- 
my on  the  road  leading  into  Marlborough  from  the  north,  if  my 
intelligence  should  continue  to  justify  it,  and  to  draw  down  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Sterett,  with  his  force,  as  soon  as  I  should  ascertain 
where  he  was.  I  accordingly,  with  a  troop  of  Laval's  cavalry, 
proceeded  about  twelve  o'clock.  Upon  arriving  at  the  Bladensburg 
road,  I  halted,  and  pushed  a  patrol  of  cavalry  down  toward  Marl- 
borough. 

In  a  few  minutes  after,  three  of  Captain  Plerbert's  troop,  who 
were  observing  down  the  same  road,  arrived  with  two  prisoners, 
whom  they  had  just  seized  in  a  very  bold  and  dexterous  manner. 
The  information  of  these  prisoners  confirmed  the  impression  that 


'    :!i 


;>iG 


APPENDIX. 


i  : 


I 


i'i* » 


;i) 


if 


ill 


li 


tlio  LMieiny  did  not  iiilond  to  move  from  Miirlbormigli  tliat  day ; 
and,  as  it  was  now  one  o'clock,  1  ielt  lillle  doubt  of  it.  Ai'ter  ro 
niaiiiiiig  home  time  Ibr  iiitelliyciiee  Irom  the  United  States  dra- 
goons tliat  1  liad  sent  down  with  orders  to  press  down  a.s  closely 
as  possible  upon  tlie  eiuany,  a  sliglit  firing  was  heard  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  enemy,  which  1  concluded  was  from  the  enemy's  picket 
upon  this  i)arty.  A  few  minutes  confirmed  this  conjcrtuie  by  the 
return  of  a  dragoon  with  this  intelligence.  A  more  coiisiderable 
firing  was  then,  however,  heard,  which  1  concluded  to  be  a  skir- 
mishing by  Peter's  detachment  with  the  enemy,  put  upon  the  alert 
and  advance  by  the  firing  at  the  dragoons. 

The  firing  soon  after  ceased,  and  after  having  sent  for  the  pur- 
pose of  ascertaining  the  fact,  w  ith  directions  to  Ibllow  with  intel- 
ligence on  toward  IMadcnsInirg,  in  which  direction  I  proceeded, 
with  the  expectation  of  meeting  General  .Stansbury,  and  with  the 
intention  to  halt  him  until  my  intelligence  should  decide  my  fur- 
ther proceedings. 

I  had  proceeded  within  four  or  five  miles  of  Bladcnsburg  with- 
out meeting  General  Stansbury,  when  I  was  overtaken  by  Major 
M'Kcnney,  a  volunteer  aid  with  General  Smith,  who  informed  mo 
that  Peter  had  skirmished  with  the  advancing  enemy,  who  had 
driven  him  back  on  General  Smith,  and  that  the  enemy  had  halt- 
ed within  three  miles  of  the  Old  Fields  ;  that,  agreeably  to  my  di- 
rection upon  the  probability  of  an  attack,  General  Smith  had  sent 
off  the  baggage  across  the  Eastern  Branch,  and  that  himself  and 
Commodore  Barney  had  drawn  up  the  forces  ready  to  receive  the 
enemy,  should  he  advance.  On  my  way  toward  Bladensburg  I  had 
led  orders  with  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman's  cavalry  to  continue 
their  observation  on  the  Bladensburg  and  Marlborough  roads,  and 
in  ease  the  enemy  should  move  on  that  road,  to  give  General  Stans- 
bury immediate  notice  and  fall  back  on  him.  In  proceeding  to 
the  Old  Fields,  I  met  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman  himself,  and 
renewed  these  directions.  Captain  Herbert  was  also  between 
General  Stansbury  and  the  enemy  with  the  same  instructions. 

When  Major  M'Kenncy  gave  me  the  intelligence  of  the  advance 
of  the  enemy,  I  dispatched  an  aid  to  General  Stansbury  with  di- 
rections to  him  to  fall  back  and  take  the  best  position  in  advance  of 
Bladensburg,  and  unite  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterctt  with  him  should 
he  arrive  at  Bladensburg,  as  I  expected,  that  evening ;  and  should 


APPENDIX. 


.-,17 


ioli  tli;iL  day ; 

it.  Allcr  10 
d  Stales  dra- 
wn ah>  closely 
1  111  the  dircc- 
nciuys  picket 
jci'tiMC  by  the 
i  cdiisiderable 

to  bo  a  skir- 
upou  the  alert 

nt  for  the  pur- 
L)\v  willi  iiitel- 
i  I  proceeded, 
,  and  with  the 
ecidc  my  fur- 

cnsburfT  with- 
kea  by  Major 

0  inlbrmed  me 
}my,  who  had 
emy  had  halt- 
ably  to  my  di- 
mith  had  scut 
It  himself  and 
to  receive  the 
Icnsburg  I  had 
ry  to  continue 
igh  roads,  and 
General  Stans- 
prococding  to 

1  himself,  and 
also  between 

istructions. 
of  the  advance 
sbury  with  di- 
in  advance  of 
ith  him  should 
g ;  and  should 


ho  be  attacked,  to  resist  as  long  as  possible,  and  if  ol)Iig('d  to  re- 
tire, to  retreat  tow;ircl  the  city. 

1  reached  the  Old  Fields  about  five  o'clock  in  the  altenioon, 
and  found  General  Smith  and  (Jommodore  IJarney  had  judiciously 
posted  their  men  in  expectation  of  the  enemy,  and  were  expecting 
his  approach.  The  head  of  the  enemy's  column  was  about  three 
miles  from  our  position,  and  five  miles  from  l\larll)orough.  Ho 
must  have  reached  that  point  by  or  before  three  o'clock,  and  his 
halt  there  at  that  peri(j(l  of  the  day,  so  short  a  distance  from  Marl- 
borough, and  apparently  only  drawn  out  by  my  j'arties  pressing 
upon  him,  and  at  a  point  from  whence  he  could  take  the  road  to 
Bladensburg,  to  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge,  or  Fort  Washington 
indill'ereutly,  or  it  might  be  to  cover  his  march  upon  Annapolis, 
to  which  place  he  had  strong  temptations  to  proceed.  His  force 
was  very  imperfectly  known,  the  opinions  and  representations  va- 
rying from  four  to  twelve  thousand  ;  the  better  opinion  fixed  it 
from  five  to  seven  thousand.  If  he  supposed  his  force  insufiicient 
to  proceed  to  Washington,  and  further  re-enforcements  were  ex- 
pected, which  all  information  concurred  to  state,  the  natural  con- 
clusion was  that  he  would  seek  some  place  where  he  could  in  se- 
curity refresh  his  men,  and  place  them  in  comfortable  quarters  near 
a  convenient  port  for  his  ships,  and  whence,  upon  receiving  re-en- 
forcements, he  would  be  ready  to  act  against  the  important  points 
of  the  ct)untry.  Having,  therefore,  already  accomplished  one  great 
ol)jcct  of  the  expedition — the  destruction  of  Commodore  Barnev's 
flotilla — if  he  was  not  in  a  condition  to  proceed  further  into  the 
country,  Annapolis  olfered  him  a  place  in  all  respects  such  as  he 
would  desire.  It  brought  him  to  a  fine  port,  where  his  ships  could 
lie  in  safety ;  it  afi'orded  abundant  and  comfortable  quarters  for 
his  men  ;  magazines  and  store-houses  for  all  his  stores  and  muni- 
tions of  every  description  ;  was  capable,  with  very  little  lalior,  of 
being  rendered  impregnable  by  land,  and  he  commanded  the  wa- 
ter;  it  was  the  nearest  point  of  debarkation  to  the  City  of  Wash- 
ington, without  entering  a  narrow  river  liable  to  great  uncertainty 
in  its  navigation  from  adverse  winds,  and  was  at  hand  to  Balti- 
more ;  equally  threatening  these  two  great  points,  and  rendering 
it  absolutely  necessary  to  keep  a  force  doul)ly  sufiicient  to  resist 
him — one  for  the  protection  of  Washington,  the  other  for  Baili- 
more.     The  squadron  which  was  ascending  tlie  Potomac,  and  hud 


APPENDIX. 


now  passed  the  Kettle  Bottoms,  the  only  obstruction  in  the  nav- 
igation of  the  river,  might  be  only  a  leint,  the  more  effectually 
to  conceal  their  intentions  against  Annapolis,  or,  what  was  more 
probable,  was  intended  to  unite  with  the  land  force  and  co-operate 
in  a  joint  attack  on  Washington.  It  was  therefore  strongly  be- 
lieved that  tlie  land  force  was  destined  to  proceed  and  take  Fort 
Washington  in  the  rear,  where  it  was  wholly  defenceless,  while  it 
was  capable  of  offering  very  formidable  resistance  to  the  ascent  of 
ships  up  the  river,  and,  imperfect  as  it  was,  perhaps  capable  of 
repulsing  them  altogether.  And  it  was  therefore  that  I  sent  to 
General  Young,  when  the  force  of  General  Smith  fell  back  to  the 
Old  Fields,  to  take  a  position  so  as  to  protect  Fort  Washington, 
and  avoid  being  taken  in  the  rear  by  the  enemy. 

If  the  object  of  the  enemy  was  to  proceed  direct  to  W^ashington, 
the  road  by  Bladensburg  offered  fewer  obstructions  than  that  over 
the  Fiastern  Branch  Bridge,  although  it  was  six  miles  further  ;  and 
yet,  if  I  had  retired  toward  Bladensburg,  I  should  have  been  re- 
moved so  much  further  from  annoying  or  impeding  the  enemy,  if 
he  proceeded  to  Fort  Washington,  and  I  should  have  left  the  road 
to  Washington  City,  by  the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge,  open  to  him, 
which,  although  I  had,  as  I  supposed,  left  a  secure  arrangement 
for  its  destruction,  yet  the  importance  of  leaving  that  bridge  as 
long  as  possible  on  account  of  its  great  value  to  us,  and  the  danger 
that,  in  the  multitude  of  business  which  was  accumulated  on  everv 
person  during  such  an  alarm,  confusion  and  disorder  arising  at 
such  a  moment,  with  such  raw,  undisciplined,  inexperienced,  and 
unknown  officers  and  men,  rendered  it  hazardous  to  trust  this  di- 
rect and  imi)ortant  pass  unguarded. 

It  was  under  all  these  circumstances  that,  after  waiting  for  the 
enemy  at  the  Old  Fields  till  sundown,  I  determined  to  retire  over 
the  Eastern  Branch  Bridge,  in  which  Conunodore  Barney  concur- 
red, and  his  force,  with  mine,  pnK-eedcd  accordingly. 

My  reasons  for  not  reiuaining  attlu;  Old  Fields  during  the  night 
was  that,  if  an  attack  should  lie  made  in  the  night,  our  own  supe- 
riority, which  lay  in  artillery,  was  lost,  and  the  inexperience  of  the 
troops  woidd  subject  them  to  certain,  infallible,  and  irremrdialile 
disorder,  and  probably  destruction,  and  thereby  occasion  the  loss  <  f 
a  full  half  of  the  force  which  I  could  hope  to  t)ppose,  under  more  fa- 
vorable circumstances,  to  (he  enemy. 


APPENDIX. 


319 


ion  in  tlie  nav- 
loro  elTectiKilly 
,vhat  was  more 
and  co-operate 
re  strongly  be- 

and  take  Fort 
iceless,  while  it 
,0  the  ascent  of 
aps  capable  ol" 

that  I  sent  to 
fell  back  to  the 
rt  Washington, 

to  Washington, 
i  than  that  over 
cs  further ;  and 
I  have  been  re- 
the  enemy,  if 
,ve  left  the  road 
je,  open  to  him, 
re  arrangement 
f  that  bridge  as 
,  and  the  danger 
ulated  on  evew 
)rder  arising  at 
spcricnced,  and 
to  trust  this  di- 

waiting  for  the 
'd  to  retire  over 
Harney  concur- 
rly. 

luring  the  night 
,  our  own  supc- 
"cporience  of  the 
nd  irremediabh^ 
ision  the  loss  <  f 
,  under  more  fa- 


The  reasons  for  retiring  by  the  Eastern  Brancl;  Bridge  were 
the  absolute  security  it  gave  to  that  pass,  the  greater  facility  of 
joniing  General  Young  and  aiding  in  the  protection  of  Fort  Wash- 
ington, tho  greater  facility  of  pursuing  the  enemy  should  \w  n^- 
cede  and  proceed  to  Annapolis,  and  the  certainty  that  I  could  draw 
General  Stansbury  and  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett  to  me  if  the  en- 
emy advanced  too  rapidly  for  nic  to  advance,  and  unite  to  support 
them. 

Under  ihc  hai-assing  and  perplexing  cmbarrassmenttj  arising  from 
having  a  mass  of  men  suddcidy  assembled,  witliuut  organization, 
discipliiu',  or  officers  of  any,  the  least,  knowledge  of  service,  ex- 
cept in  the  c;xse  of  Major  Peter,  or,  if  possessing  it,  unknown  to 
me  as  such,  and  the  wearied  and  exhausted  state  in  which  inces- 
sant application  and  exertion  for  nearly  five  uninterrupted  days 
and  nights  bad  left  me,  these  views  olfcred  .themselves  to  my  mind, 
and  determined  mc  to  fall  back,  on  Tuesday  evening,  to  the  bridg(; 
instead  of  J51adensburg.  Since  the  event  has  passed,  and  if  a 
movement  to  Bladensburg,  had  it  been  made,  would  not  liavc  in- 
duced the  enemy  to  pursue  another  course,  it  is  easy  to  determine 
that  a  retreat  to  Bladensburg  nught  have  been  better ;  but  those 
who  undertake  to  pass  a  judgment  should  place  themselves  back 
to  the  moment  and  situation  I  was  in  when  1  formed  the  resolu- 
tion, and  it  will  be  very  ilillicult  to  fnul  it  an  error;  or  if  one,  it  is 
of  that  sort  which  is  supported,  when  viewed  in  perspective,  by 
stronger  reasons  than  those  which  oj)pose  it,  and  is  only  found  to 
be  an  error  by  experience,  which  so  often  confounds  all  reason 
and  calculation. 

Upon  arriving  at  the  bridge,  about  eight  o*clock,T  directed  Gen- 
eral Smith  to  halt  his  men  in  the  most  convenient  position  near 
the  bridge  on  this  side,  and  I  passed  over  and  rode  directly  to  the 
President's,  and  informed  him  of  the  tbtMi  state  of  thin"s.  I  had 
expected  I  should  proliably  have  l()und  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
other  heads  of  departments  there;  but  they  had  respectively  re- 
tired to  th(-ir  homes.  I  returned  toward  the  liridgc,  leaving  at 
I\l'lvcowin\s  hotel  the  lM)rrowed  horse  «)n  which  I  rode.  Moth 
those  I  had  with  me  iieing  exhausted  and  worn  down,  and  as  1 
knew  no  one  who  had  a  horse  in  a  ditlerent  .^il nation,  1  proeeede<l 
to  the  camp  un  foot.  General  Smith  wa.s  not,  at  the  moment, 
there. 


■r-wi'i"imwmiijiiii 


;;2i> 


APPENDIX. 


I  proi-ocdcd  on  to  tlio  briJire,  vvlicro  I  found  aI)Out  thirty  men 
witlx  axes,  for  the  purpose  of  eutting  the  bridge  down,  and  no  oth- 
er preparation  for  destroying  it  made.  1  proceeded  again  to  tlie 
camp,  detached  a  party  of  vohnitecrs  to  burn  tlie  upper  bridge  nt 
once,  detached  a  party  of  rcguhir  infantry  across  tlie  bridge,  ia 
advance  toward  the  enemy  about  half  a  mile,  to  prevent  bun  from 
seizing  it  by  surprise,  and  posted  liurch's  artillery  to  coumiand  the 
pass  of  the  bridge  on  this  side.  I  learned  at  the  bridge  that  some 
persons  from  the  navy-yard  had  been  to  the  bridge  to  take  some 
steps  for  destroying  it ;  and  knowing  that  this  was  the  nearest,  and 
the  only  place,  indeed,  from  whence  1  could  draw  the  powder,  boats, 
and  combustibles  for  the  i)m'])0sc  of  rendering  its  destruction  sure 
at  any  moment,!  proceeded,  accompanied  by  ]\lajor  Cox,of  George- 
town, to  ascertain  what  preparations  had  been  made.  I  arrived 
there  about  twelve  or  one  o'clock,  saw  C'olonel  Wharton,  who  rc- 
ll'rred  me  to  Connnodorc  Tiagey,to  whom  I  then  proceeded,  and 
aroused  him  from  bed.  lie  informed  me  that  several  casks  of 
powder  were  ready  in  boats  to  be  sent  from  the  navy-yard  to  blow 
up  the  bridge  when  necessary,  1  begged  him  to  increase  the 
quantity  of  powder,  to  furnish  a  quantity  of  combustiljles,  also,  to  be 
laid  upon  the  bridge,  that  its  destruction,  when  necessary,  in  one 
way  or  other  might  be  ])Ut  beyond  doubt.  Connnodorc  Tingey 
undertook  to  have  what  I  requested  provided  sent  witiiout  delay 
to  the  bridge.  I  returned  to  the  bridge  to  sec  that  the  diflerent 
detachments  which  I  had  stationed  there  were  upon  the  alert,  and 
understood  the  objects  for  which  they  were  detached  ;  and  I  thcnco 
returned  to  the  camp  between  three  and  four  o'clock,  uuich  ex- 
hausted, and  considerably  hurt  in  the  right  arm  and  ankle  from  a 
severe  fall  which  I  had  into  a  gully  or  ditch  on  my  wav  to  the 
navy-yard.  I  snatched  about  an  hour  or  two  of  sleep,  rose,  and 
proceeded  to  gather  my  attendants  and  horses,  much  exhausted 
and  worn  down  by  the  incessant  action  of  the  three  preceding 
days,  and  proceeded  to  establish  my  head-quarters  at  a  liouse  near 
the  bridge. 

]My  patrols  and  vedettes  not  having  yet  iirought  mo  any  intelli- 
gence of  a  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  being  still  doubtful  wheth- 
er he  might  not  move  upon  Amiapolis,  Fort  Warburton,  or  toward 
the  bridge  rather  than  ]}Iadeiisburg,  1  held  the  iM)sition  near  the 
bridge  as  that  which,  under  all  circumstane'cs,  woulil  enable  me 


APPENDIX. 


321 


mit  thirty  ition 

viijaiul  no  oili- 

;d  again  to  tlvc 

ppev  bridge  at 

tlic  bridge,  ia 

;veiit  liim  from 

)  coixmiand  tliG 

idgc  that  some 

3  to  take  some 

;ic  nearest,  and 

powder,  boats, 

estruciiou  burc 

*ox,ot'ticorge- 

de.     I  arrived 

larton,  who  rc- 

procecded,  and 

^•eral  casks  of 

y-yard  to  blow 

J  increase  the 

bles,  also,to  be 

;cssary,  in  one 

u)dorc  Tingey 

witliont  dehiy 

t  the  different 

the  aku't,  and 

;  and  I  tlienco 

X'k,  miicli  cx- 

ivnldo  from  a 

ly  way  to  the 

eep,  rose,  and 

ich  exhausted 

roe  preceding 

t  a  liouse  near 

Tie  any  intclli- 
)nl)ll"nl  whcth- 
ton,or  toward 
ition  near  tlio 
!d  enable  mo 


't 

1 
i 


best  to  act  against  the  enemy  in  any  alternative.  I  learned  about 
tbi.s  time,  with  considerable  mortilication,  that  Cuncral  .Slaiif-bury, 
tVom  misunderstanding  or  some  other  cause,  instead  of  holding  a 
position  during  the  night  in  advance  of  Bladensburg,  had  taken  one 
about  a  mile  in  its  rear,  and  that  his  men,  from  a  causeless  alarm, 
had  been  underarms  the  greater  i)art  of  the  night,  and  moved  once 
or  twice,  and  that  he  was  at  that  moment  on  his  march  into  the 
city.  I  instantly  sent  him  an  order  to  resume  his  position  at  Bla- 
densburg ;  to  post  himself  to  the  best  advantage  ;  make  the  utmost 
resistance,  and  to  rely  upon  my  supporting  him  if  the  enemy  should 
move  npon  that  road.  1  had,  at  a  very  early  hour  in  the  morning, 
detached  Cnpiain  Graham,  with  his  troop  of  A'irginia  cavalry,  to 
proceed  by  Bladensburg  down  upon  the  road  toward  tin;  enemy, 
and  insure,  by  that  means,  tnnely  notice  to  General  Stansbury  and 
myselt',  should  the  enemy  turn  that  way.  'With  this  adilition  to 
the  cavalry  already  on  those  roads,  it  became  impossible  for  the 
enemy  to  take  any  steps  nnobserved.  Achlitional  cavalry  patrols 
and  vedettes  were  also  detached  upon  all  the  roads  across  the 
bridge,  to  insure  the  certainty  of  intelligence,  let  the  enemy  move 
as  he  might. 

Colonel  Minor  had  also  arrived  in  the  city  the  evening  before, 
with  five  or  six  hundred  militia  from  Virginia,  but  they  were  with- 
out arms,  accoutrements,  or  amnmnition.  I  urged  him  to  hasten 
his  eiiuipment,  which  I  learned  was  delayed  by  some  difliculty  in 
finding  Colonel  Carberry,  charged  with  that  business  ;  and  lie  had 
not  received  his  arms,  &c.,  when,  about  ten  o'ckudi,  I  received 
intelligence  that  the  enemy  had  turned  the  head  of  his  column 
toward  Bladensburg.  Commodore  Barney  had,  upon  my  sugges- 
tion, posted  his  artdlery  to  coamiand  the  bridge  early  in  the  morn- 


ing. 


As  soon  as  I  learned  the  enemy  were  moving  toward  Bladens- 
burg, I  ordered  General  Smith,  with  the  whole  of  the  troops,  to 
move  immediately  to  that  point. 

The  necessary  detention  arising  from  orders  to  issue,  interroga- 
tions and  applications  to  be  answered  from  all  puints  licMug  past, 
I  proceeded  on  to  Bladensburg,  leaving  the  President  anil  some  of 
the  heads  of  departments  at  my  ([uarters,  where  they  had  bein 
for  an  hour  or  more. 

1  arrived  at  the  bridge  at  Bladensburg  about  twelve  o'clock,  where 

<)  2 


h  • 


I     »'■ 


Mi 


I 


Ilii 

;lt' 


1 1' ' 


(ii 


APPENDIX. 


I  found  Lieutenant-colonel  Beall  had  that  moment  passed  with  his 
command,  having  just  arrived  iVom  Annapolis.  1  had  passed  the 
line  of  Stanbl)iiry".s  brigade,  formed  in  the  field  upon  the  left  of  the 
road,  at  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  the  bridge  ;  and 
on  the  road,  a  short  distance  in  the  rear  of  Stansburys  line,  I  met 
several  gentlemen,  and  among  the  others,  I  think,  ^'Ir.  Francis 
Key,  of  Georgetown,  who  informed  me  that  he  had  thought  that 
the  troops  coming  from  the  city  could  be  most  advantageously  post- 
ed on  the  right  and  left  of  the  road  near  that  point.  General 
Smith  being  present,  Mr.  Key  undertook,!  believe,  being  sent  for 
that  purpose,  to  show  the  positions  proposed.  I  left  General  Smith 
to  make  a  disposition  of  these  troops,  and  proceeded  to  the  bridge, 
where  I  found  Lieutenant-colonel  Beall,  as  before  stated.*  I  in- 
quired whether  he  had  any  directions  as  to  his  position;  he  re- 
plied he  had  been  shown  a  high  hill  upon  the  right  of  the  road, 
ranging  with  the  proposed  second  line.  It  being  a  conmianding 
position,  and  necessary  to  be  occupied  by  some  corps,  1  directed 
him  to  proceed  agreeably  to  the  instructions  he  had  received.  I 
then  rode  up  to  a  battery  which  had  been  thrown  up  to  command 
the  street  which  entered  Bladensburg  from  the  side  of  the  enemy 
and  the  bridge,  where  I  found  the  Baltimore  artillery  posted,  with 
the  Baiiimore  riflemen  to  support  them.  Upon  inquiry,  I  learned 
that  General  Stansbury  was  on  a  rising  ground  upon  the  left  of 
his  line.  I  rode  immediately  thither,  and  found  him  and  Colonel 
Monroe  together.  The  latter  gentleman  informed  me  that  he  had 
been  aiding  General  Stansbury  to  post  his  conunand,  and  wished 
me  to  proceed  to  examine  it  with  them,  to  sec  how  far  I  approved 
of  it.  We  were  just  proceeding  with  this  view,  when  some  per- 
son rode  up  and  stated  that  the  news  had  just  been  received  of  a 
signal  victory  obtained  by  General  Izard  over  the  enemy,  in  which 
one  thousand  of  the  enemy  were  .slain,  and  many  prisoners  taken. 
I  ordered  the  news  to  be  innnediately  communicated  to  the  troops, 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  additional  impulse  to  their  spirits  and 

*  FAnco  writiiij;  tho  iiliovc,  I  linvc  soon  floncral  8iiuth,  who  informs  me  tlmt  Mr. 
Key  Inul  bi'iu  cxaininiiii;  llic  (ground.-'  willi  liiiii,im(l  that  it  was  liis  vicwri  tluit 
Mr.  Key  liad  bocn  Htatinp.  lie  rame  up  at  the  moment  Mr.  Key  had  fjiveu  nie 
the  information.  I  liave  been  under  the  impression,  till  tlius  rorrected,  that  it, 
was  tlie  riUfifje-tinn  of  Coliuul  Monroe  and  (ieneral  Stansbury  that  laid  .-Uf^g(!sted 
that  iiojition.  The  rirciiniHtHnce  l8  immaterial  except  for  the  purpose  of  literal 
accuracv  when  nereHsiirv. 


APPENDIX. 


;  passod  with  liis 
I  hud  passed  the 
311  the  left  of  the 
the  bridire  ;  and 
iiry's  Hne,  I  met 
;ik,  ^'Ir.  P>anois 
lad  thought  tliat 
ntagcously  post- 
point.     General 
3,  being  sent  for 
:  General  Sniitli 
'd  to  the  bridge, 
stated.*     I  in- 
losition;  he  re- 
!Cht  of  the  road, 
a  eommandinnr 

a 

3rps,  I  directed 
id  received.     I 
up  to  command 
e  of  the  enemy 
ry  posted,  with 
[uiry,  I  learned 
pon  the  left  of 
m  and  Colonel 
nc  that  he  had 
id,  juid  wished 
far  I  approved 
lien  some  pcr- 
i  received  of  a 
icmy,  in  which 
isoners  taken, 
to  the  troops, 
ur  spirits  and 

)niis  ino  that  Mr. 
IS  his  views  that 
I'y  liiid  fjivou  ino 
xtrrocted,  that  it 
at  liad  Fiiggcistcd 
lurjiosc  of  literal 


-i 


I 


courage.  Tlic  column  of  the  enemy  at  this  moment  appeared  in 
sight,  moving  up  the  Eastern  Branch  parallel  to  our  position. 
From  the  left,  where  I  was,  I  perceived  that  if  the  position  of  tlio 
advanced  artillery  were  forced,  two  or  three  pieces  upon  the  left 
of  .Stansbi:ry  would  be  necessary  to  scour  an  orchard  which  lay 
between  his  line  and  his  artillery,  and  for  another  rifle  company  to 
increase  tlie  support  of  tliis  artillery. 

These  were  promptly  sent  forward  by  General  Smith,  and  post- 
ed as  hastily  as  possible,  and  it  was  barely  accomplished  before  I 
was  obliged  to  give  orders  to  the  advanced  artillery  to  open  upon 
the  encmv,  who  was  descending  the  street  toward  the  bridge.  All 
farther  examination  or  movement  was  now  impossible,  and  the  po- 
sition where  I  then  was,  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the  left  of 
JStansbury's  line,  being  the  most  advanced  position  from  which  I 
could  have  any  commanding  view,  1  remained  there.  The  fire  of 
our  advanced  artillery  occasioned  the  enemy,  who  were  advancing, 
and  who  were  light  troops,  to  leave  the  street,  and  they  crept 
down  under  the  cover  of  houses  and  trees,  in  loose  order,  so  as 
not  to  expose  them  to  risk  from  tiie  shot ;  it  was  therefore  only 
occasionally  that  an  object  presented  at  which  the  artillery  could 
fire. 

In  this  sort  of  suspension,  the  enemy  began  to  throw  his  rockets, 
and  his  light  troops  began  to  accimiulatc  down  in  the  lower  parts 
of  the  town  and  near  the  bridge,  but  principally  covered  from  view 
by  the  houses.  Their  light  troops,  however,  soon  began  to  issue 
out  and  press  across  the  creek,  wliich  was  every  where  fordalile, 
and  in  most  places  lined  willi  bushes  or  trees,  which  were  suffi- 
cient, however,  to  conceal  the  movements  of  light  troops,  who  act, 
in  the  manner  of  theirs,  singly.  The  advanced  riflemen  now  be- 
gan to  fire,  and  continued  it  for  half  a  dozen  rounds,  when  I  observed 
them  to  run  back  to  the  skirts  of  tlie  orchard  on  the  left,  where 
they  became  visil)le,  the  boughs  of  the  orchard  trees  concealing 
their  original  position,  as  also  thr  )f  the  artillery  from  view.  A 
retreat  of  twenty  or  thirty  yards  from  their  original  position  to- 
ward the  left  brought  them  in  view  on  the  edge  of  the  orchard. 
They  halted  there,  and  seemed  for  a  moment  returning  to  their 
position;  luit  in  a  few  minutes  entirely  broke,  and  retired  to  the  left 
of  .Stansl)ury's  line.  1  immediately  ordered  the  5th  Baltimore 
regiiiKut,  TiieMteiianl-colone'  Steret,  being  the  left  of  St.uisburv's 


324 


AITENDIX. 


ill '  m 


i»i< 


line,  to  advance  and  sustain  the  artillery.  Tlioy  promptly  com- 
menced this  movement ;  but  the  rockets,  which  had  I'ur  tlic  first 
three  or  four  passed  very  high  above  the  heads  of  the  line,  now  re- 
ceived a  more  horizontal  direction,  and  passed  very  close  above  the 
heads  of  ►SluiV/Zs  and  Ragan's  regiments,  composing  the  centre  and 
left  of  tStansbury's  line.  A  universal  lliglit  of  these  regiments 
was  the  consequence.  This  leaving  the  right  of  the  5tli  wholly 
unsupported,  I  ordered  it  to  halt,  rode  swiftly  across  the  field  to- 
ward those  who  had  so  shamefully  fled,  and  exerted  my  voice  to 
the  utmost  to  arrest  them.  They  halted,  began  to  collect,  and 
seemed  to  be  returning  to  their  places.  An  ill-founded  reliance 
that  their  officers  would  succeed  in  rallying  them,  when  I  had 
thus  succeeded  in  stopping  the  greatest  j)art  of  them,  induced  me 
innuediatcly  to  return  to  the  5lh,  the  situation  of  which  was  likely 
to  become  very  critical,  and  that  position  gave  me  the  best  com- 
mand of  view.  To  my  astonishment  and  mortification,  however, 
w  hen  I  had  regained  my  position,  I  found  the  whole  of  these  regi- 
ments (except  tliiity  or  forty  of  Ragan's,  rallied  by  himself,  and  as 
many,  perhaps,  of  Sliutz's,  rallied,  I  learn,  by  Captain  Shower  and 

C':i[)tain ,  whose  name  1  do  not  recollect)  were  Hying  in  the 

utmost  precipitation  and  disorder. 

The  advance  1  artillery  had  immediately  followed  the  rillemen, 
and  retired  by  the  left  of  the  5th.  1  directed  them  to  take  post  on 
a  rising  ground  which  I  pointed  out  in  the  re;ir.  The  5th,  and 
the  artillery  on  its  left,  still  remained,  and  I  hoped  that  their  fire, 
notwithstanding  the  obstruction  of  the  boughs  ol'the  orchard,  which, 
being  below,  covered  the  enemy,  would  liave  been  enabled  to  scour 
this  approach  and  prevent  his  advance.  The  enemy's  light  troops, 
by  single  men,  showed  themselves  on  the  lower  edge  of  the  lelt 
of  the  orchard,  and  received  the  fire  of  this  artillery  and  the  5th, 
which  made  them  draw  back.  The  cover  to  them  was,  however, 
so  complete,  that  they  were  enabled  to  advance  singly,  and  take 
positions  from  which  their  fire  annoyed  the  5th  considerably, 
without  eiliier  that  regiment  or  the  artillery  being  able  to  return 
the  fire  with  any  probability  of  ell'ect.  In  this  situati' n  I  had  ac- 
tually given  an  order  to  the  5th  and  the  artillery  to  retire  up  to  the 
hill,  toward  a  wood  more  to  the  letl  and  a  little  in  the  rear,  for  tho 
purpose  of  drawing  them  farther  from  the  orchard,  and  out  of  reach 
of  the  (MKMuv's  (irc^  wliil(>  he  was  sheltered  by  the  orchard.     An 


Ari'i:Ni>ix. 


325 


promptly  com- 
dd  I'ur  llic  iirst 
'c  line,  now  rc- 
-'losc  above  the 
the  centre  and 
icso  regiments 
lie  5tii  wholly 
=s  the  field  to- 
d  my  voice  to 
0  collect,  and 
inded  reliance 
I,  when  I  had 
n,  induced  me 
icli  was  likely 
the  best  com- 
ion,  however, 
ol'  these  reiri- 
imself,  and  as 
Shower  and 
ilying  in  the 

the  riflemen, 
take  j)ost  on 
'I'e  5th,  and 
at  their  fire, 
hard,  w  hich, 
lied  to  scour 
light  troops, 
13  of  the  tell 
imd  the  5th, 
S  however, 
ly,  and  take 
insiderahl}^, 
le  to  return 
n  I  had  ac- 
'■<"  up  to  the 
car,  for  the 
>nt  of  reach 
li'ird.     An 


I 
I" 


■A' 

1 

'i 


4 


V 


aversion,  however,  to  retire  before  the  necessity  became  stronger, 
and  the  hope  that  the  enemy  would  issue  in  a  body  from  ihe  left 
of  the  orchard  and  enable  us  to  act  uj)()n  him  on  terms  of  eijuality, 
and  the  fear  that  a  movement  of  retreat  might  in  raw  troops  j)ro- 
duce  some  confusion  and  lose  us  this  chance,  induced  nie  instant- 
ly to  countermand  the  order,  and  direct  the  artdlery  to  fire  into  a 
wooden  barn  on  the  lower  end  of  the  orchard,  behind  which  I  sup- 
posed the  enemy  might  be  sheltered  in  considerable  numbers. 
The  fire  of  the  enemy  now  began,  however,  to  annoy  the  5tli  still 
more  in  wounding  several  of  them,  and  a  strong  column  of  the  en- 
emy having  passed  up  the  road  as  high  as  the  right  of  the  5th,  and 
beginning  to  deploy  into  the  field  to  take  them  in  flank,  I  directed 
the  artillery  to  retire  to  the  hill  to  which  1  had  directed  the  Bal- 
timore artillery  to  proceed  and  halt,  and  ordered  the  8tli  regiment 
also  to  retire.  This  corps,  which  had  licretoibre  acted  so  firmly, 
evinced  tlie  usual  incapacity  of  raw  troops  to  make  orderly  move- 
ments in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  their  retreat  in  a  very  few 
moments  became  a  flight  of  absolute  and  total  disorder. 

The  direct  line  of  retreat  to  the  whole  of  this  first  line  being  to 
the  hill  on  which  I  had  directed  the  artillery  to  halt,  and  imme- 
diately in  connection  with  the  positions  of  General  Smith's  corps, 
which  were  not  arrayed  in  line,  but  posted  on  advantageous  posi- 
tions in  connection  with  and  sepporting  each  other,  according  as 
the  nature  of  the  ground  admitted  and  required,  I  had  not  for  a 
momcMit,  dispersed  and  disordered  as  was  the  w  hole  of  Stansbury's 
command,  sup[)osed  that  their  retreat  would  have  taken  a  dilfereut 
direction.  IJut  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  whole  mass  were 
throwing  themselves  off  to  the  right  on  the  retreat  toward  Mont- 
gomery Court  House,  and  flying  wide  of  this  point ;  the  whole  of 
the  cavalry,  probatjly  from  the  pressure  of  the  infantry  that  way, 
were  also  thrown  wide  of  the  line  of  retreat  toward  the  right. 

After  making  every  effort  to  turn  the  current  more  toward  Gen- 
eral Smith's  command  and  the  city  in  vain,  and  finding  that  it  was 
impossible  to  collect  any  fi)rcc  to  support  the  artillery,  which  I  had 
directed  to  halt,  and  finding  also  that  the  enemy's  light  troops  were 
extending  themselves  in  that  direction,  and  pressing  the  pursuit,  I 
directed  the  artdlery  to  continue  their  retreat  on  the  road  they 
then  were  toward  the  Capitol,  it  being  impossible  for  them  to  get 
acro.i-s  to  ihi^  turniiike  road  or  unite  wi  ',  Chmum-iI  Smith's  briixado. 


I  •iHllil 


32(5 


APPENDIX. 


:     ; 


iilt' 


'■(I-  I  r  ■ 


'W 


i '   ]  ■  M 


i      1 


I        •!! 


The  hope  of  again  forming  the  first  line  at  this  point,  and  there 
renewing  the  retreat,  or,  at  all  events,  of  being  able  to  rally  them 
between  the  Capitol  and  that  point  and  renewing  the  contest,  in- 
duced me,  at  the  moment  I  directed  the  5th  regiment  to  retreat, 
to  request  Mr.  Riggs,  of  Georgetown,  to  proceed  to  the  President. 
and  inform  him  that  we  had  been  driven  back,  but  that  it  was  my 
hope  and  intention  to  form  and  rene\v'  the  contest  between  that 
place  and  the  Capitol. 

As  soon  as  I  found  it  vain  longer  to  endeavor  to  turn  the  tide 
of  retreat  toward  the  left,  I  turned  toward  the  positions  occupied 
by  Lieutenant-colonel  Beall,  Conniiodorc  Barney,  and  General 
Smith.  ]}y  this  time  the  enemy  had  advanced  up  the  road,  had 
driven  back  Lieutenant-colonel  Kramer's  command,  posted  on  the 
right  of  the  road,  and  in  advance  of  Commodore  Barney,  after 
having  well  maintained  his  position  and  much  hurt  the  enemy,  and 
also  continued  to  fire  during  his  retreat.  lie  had  come  under  the 
destructive  fire  of  Commodore  Barney,  which  had  turned  him  up 
the  hill  toward  Lieutenant-colonel  Beall,  whose  detachment  gave 
one  or  two  inefi'cctive  fires  and  lied.  Their  position  was  known 
to  me,  was  very  conspicuous,  and  the  extreme  right.  The  enemy, 
therefore,  had  gained  this  ccnmianding  position,  and  was  passing 
our  right  flank ;  his  force  pursuing  on  the  lelt  had  also  advanced 
to  a  line  with  oui*  left,  and  there  was  nothing  there  to  oppose  him. 
To  preserve  Smith's  command  from  being  pressed  in  front  by  fresh 
troops  of  the  enemy,  who  were  coming  on  at  the  same  time,  while 
they  were  under  the  certainty  of  being  assailed  on  both  flanks  and 
the  rear  by  the  enemy,  who  respectively  gained  them,  in  which 
circumstances  their  destruction  or  surrender  would  have  been  in- 
evitable, I  sent  (my  horse  being  unable  to  move  with  the  rapidity 
I  wished)  to  General  Smith  to  retreat.  I  am  not  acquainted  with 
the  relative  position  of  the  difierent  corps  composing  his  command, 
and  can  not,  therefore,  determine  who  of  them  engaged  the  enemy, 
nor  could  I  sec  how  they  acted  ;  but  when  I  arrived  in  succession 
at  his  different  corps,  which  I  did  as  soon  as  practical)le,  I  do  not 
recollect  to  have  found  any  of  them  that  were  not  in  order,  and 
retreating  with  as  little  confusion  as  could  have  been  expected. 
When  I  reached  the  road  I  found  Commodore  Barney's  men  also 
retiring  on  the  road,  he  having  been  overpowered  by  those  who 
drove  offlJrair,;  n  ininent  about  the  time  I  sent  the  order  to  retreat. 


int,  and  there 
to  rally  them 
e  contest,  iii- 
iit  to  retreat, 
ho  President 
at  it  was  my 
between  that 

turn  the  tide 
)ns  occupied 
md  General 
lie  road,  had 
losted  on  the 
larney,  after 

enemy,  and 
le  under  the 
■  ned  him  up 
hmcnt  gave 

was  known 
rhe  enemy, 
ivas  passing 
io  advanced 
appose  him. 
ont  by  fresh 
time,  \vhilc 
1  flanks  and 
a,  in  which 
ve  been  in- 
he  rapidity 
xintcd  with 

command, 
the  enemy, 
succession 
e,  I  do  not 
order,  and 

expected. 
i  men  also 
those  wlio 
to  retreat. 


I 


;-'3f 


APPENDIX. 


i 


4 


2 


i'M 


827 


I  still  had  no  doubt  but  that  Stansbury's  corrimand  and  the  cav- 
alry would  have  fallen  down  upon  the  Capitol  by  the  roads  which 
enter  that  part  of  the  city  from  the  north,  and  still  solaced  n»yself 
Willi  the  persiiasion  that  1  should  be  able  there  to  rally  them  upon 
the  city  and  Georgetown  troops,  who  were  retiring  in  order,  and 
make  another  eflert  in  advance  of  the  Capitol  to  repulse  the  enemy. 

After  accompanying  the  retreating  army  within  two  miles  of  the 
Capitol,  I  rode  forward  for  the  purpose  of  selecting  a  position,  and 
endeavoring  to  colle^^t  those  who  I  supposed,  from  the  rapidity 
of  their  flight,  might  have  reached  that  point.  A  half  a  mile  in 
advance  of  the  Capitol  I  met  Colonel  Minor  with  his  detachment, 
and  directed  him  to  form  his  men,  wait  until  the  retreating  army 
passed,  and  protect  them,  if  necessary.  When  I  arrived  at  the 
Capitol  I  found  not  a  man  had  passed  that  way,  and,  notwith- 
standing the  commanding  view  which  is -there  afforded  to  the  north, 
I  could  see  no  appcaranco  of  the  troops.  I  dispatched  an  order  to 
call  in  the  cavalry  to  me  there. 

In  a  few  moments  the  Secretary  of  State  and  the  Secretary  of 
War  joined  inc,  besides  that  they  had  been  witnesses  to  the  dis- 
persion of  the  troops  and  the  exhaustion  of  those  just  halted  by  me. 
I  stated  the  diminution  of  my  force,  and  the  extent  jf  the  positions, 
which  rendered  it  impossible  to  place  the  force  I  then  had  in  such 
a  position  as  to  prevent  tlie  enemy  from  taking  me  on  the  flank  as 
well  as  front,  and  that  no  reasonable  hope  could  be  entertained 
that  we  had  any  troops  that  could  be  relied  on  to  make  a  re- 
sistance as  desperate  as  necessary,  in  an  isolated  building  which 
could  not  be  supported  by  a  sufficiency  of  troops  without ;  indeed, 
it  would  have  taken  nearly  the  whole  of  the  troops  to  have  sufii- 
ciently  filled  the  two  wings,  which  would  have  left  the  enemy  mas- 
ters of  every  other  part  of  the  city,  and  given  him  the  opportuni- 
ty, without  risk,  in  twenty-four  hours,  to  have  starved  ihem  -nto  a 
surrender.  The  same  objection  equally  applied  to  the  occupation 
of  any  part  of  the  city. 

Both  these  gentlemen  concurred  that  it  would  subject  my  force 
to  certain  capture  or  destruction  ;  and  in  its  reduced  and  exhaust- 
ed condition,  it  was  wise  and  proper  to  retire  through  Georgetown, 
and  take  post  in  the  rear  of  it,  on  t'.e  heights,  to  collect  my  force. 
I  accordinfrly  pursued  this  course,  and  halted  at  Tenleytown  two 
miles  from  ( Jeorgctown,  on  the  Frederick  road.    Here  was  evinced 


I 


328 


APPENDIX. 


in  I 


111  iillill' 


^  ■"  • 


WW 


I  '1 


Jl! 


I 


ono  of  the  great  defects  of  all  undisciplined  and  unorganized  troops ; 
no  ellbrt  could  rouse  oiRccrs  and  men  to  the  exertion  necessary  to 
place  themselves  in  such  a  state  of  comfort  and  security  as  is  at- 
tainahle  even  under  very  disadvantageous  circumstances.  Such 
of  them  as  could  he  lialted,  instead  of  making  those  cHorts,  gave 
themselves  up  to  the  uncontrolled  feelings  which  fatigue,  exhaus- 
tion, and  privation  produced,  and  many  hundreds,  in  spite  of  all 
precautions  and  efforts,  passed  on  and  pursued  their  way,  either 
toward  home,  or  in  search  of  refreshments  and  quarters.  After 
waiting  in  this  position  until  I  supposed  I  collected  all  the  force 
that  could  he  gathered,  I  proceeded  ahout  five  miles  further  on 
the  river  road,  which  leads  a  little  wide  to  the  left  of  Montgomery 
Court  House,  and  in  the  morning  gave  orders  for  the  whole  to 
assemhle  at  Montgomery  Court  House. 

This  position  promised  us  shelter  from  the  rain  that  began  to 
fall  an  hour  hefore  day ;  was  the  most  probable  place  for  the  sup- 
ply of  provisions,  which  the  troops  very  much  needed,  and  was  a 
position  from  which  wo  could  best  interpose  between  the  enemy 
and  Baltimore,  and  to  which  place,  at  that  time,  nobody  doubted 
he  intended  to  go  by  Ian  .1  I'rom  Washington. 

In  pursuance  of  this  view,  among  the  first  acts  after  my  arrival 
at  Montgomery  Court  House  was  to  direct  a  lett-  r  to  General 
Strieker,  who  conunanded  at  Baltimore,  informing  him  that  it  was 
my  intention  to  gather  my  force  together  there,  receive  what  re- 
enforcements  I  could,  show  myself  to  the  enemy  as  strong  as  pos- 
sible, hang  on  his  flank  should  he  move  to  Baltimore,  intimidate 
and  harass  him  as  nmch  as  possible  in  his  movements,  and  en- 
deavor always  to  preserve  the  power  of  interposing  between  him 
and  Baltimore ;  directing  him  to  re-establish  the  dispersed  com- 
mand of  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett,  multiply  his  means  as  nmch 
as  possible,  stop  all  re-enforcements  of  militia  from  IMaryland, 
Pennsylvania,  or  elsewhere,  and  present  himself  to  the  enemy  at 
the  crossing  of  the  Patapsco  in  as  imposing  a  form  as  possible. 

This  letter  I  sent  by  Captain  Aisquith,  whom  I  found  at  Mont- 
gomery with  fifteen  or  twenty  others,  the  only  part  of  the  Balti- 
more detachment  which  had  not  returned  home. 

The  first  object  was,  in  the  absence  of  quarter-master  and  con- 
tractor, to  make  efforts  to  provide  quarters  and  refreshments  for 
mv  men :  a  few  provisions  were  found  there  belonging  to  the  con- 


^ 


•  V 


APPENDIX. 


P,29 


mized  troops; 

necessary  to 
irity  us  is  at- 
mces.     Such 

cfTorts,  ^ave 
gue,  cxliaus- 
i  spite  of  all 
■  ^vay,  eitlicr 
•tcrs.  After 
all  the  force 
s  further  on 
Montgomery 
ho  whole  to 

lat  began  to 
for  the  suj)- 
,  and  was  a 
the  enemy 
»dy  doubted 

my  arrival 
to  General 

that  it  was 
e  what  re- 
>ng  as  pos- 

intimidate 
s,  and  en- 
tween  him 
irsed  com- 
i  as  much 
Maryland, 

enemy  at 

possible. 

at  Mont- 
the  Balti- 

and  con- 

monts  for 
the  con- 


4 


tractor,  and  a  person  temporarily  appointed  to  issur-,  and  the  most 
active  men  ol'  the  place  called  upon  and  authorized  to  get  in  pro- 
visions. 

The  next  object  was  to  obtain  a  return  of  tbe  diU'erent  corps, 
which,  iVom  causes  that  can  easily  be  understood  among  undisci- 
plined men  and  unskilful  officers,  proved  abortive  before  we  moved 
next  day.  The  arrival  of  several  detachments  of  re-enlbrcements, 
the  reports  of  officers  bringing  on  detachments,  who  wanted  or- 
ders and  instructions,  and  the  multiplied  complaints  of  men  and  of- 
ficers crowded  together  in  small  cpiarters,  or  entirely  out  of  doors 
in  a  rainy,  tempestuous  day,  the  calculations  and  arrangements 
necessary  for  ulterior  operations,  and  to  meet  the  demands  and 
wants  of  the  great  force  which  my  calls  were  likely  to  produce, 
may  be  sup[)osed  to  have  been  as  much  as  could  be  borne  l)y  the 
effi)rts  and  attention  of  one  man,  which  Iw  was  obliged  to  encoun- 
ter for  the  want  of  a  skilful,  or  even  organizetl  stall"  of  any  kind. 

No  r(>gular  details  for  service  of  any  kind  could  be  performed, 
and  all  the  duties  of  this  description  were  necessarily  performed 
by  the  voluntary  zeal  of  those  corps  who  could  not  be  borne  down 
or  discouraged  by  difficulties.  My  efforts  were  devoted  to  en- 
deavor to  prepare  the  detachment  to  move  down  toward  the  city, 
and  hang  upon  and  strike  at  the  enemy  whenever  an  opportunity 
occurred.  The  next  morning,  however,  beibro  a  return  of  the 
corps  could  be  had,  and  their  situation  known,  I  received  intelli- 
gence that  the  enemy  had  moved  from  Washington  the  preceding 
night,  and  was  in  full  march  for  Baltimore.  I  instantly  put  my 
conmiand  under  arms,  multiplied  and  strengthened  my  patrols  to 
gain  intelligence,  and  advanced  as  rapidly  as  was  practicable  to 
Balthnurc.  When  the  forces  arrived  at  SnelFs  Bridge,  on  tho 
upper  branch  of  the  Patuxent,  I  had  concluded  that,  if  the  enemy 
Avas,  as  we  had  still  reason  to  believe,  proceeding  to  Baltimore,  it 
would  be  mosf,  advisable  for  mo  to  proceed  directly  thither,  to  lep  i 
the  whole  force  of  my  power,  as  commander  of  the  district,  to 
call  out  and  bring  into  activity  the  resources  of  the  place,  aufl  also 
because  it  was  likely  to  become  tho  most  important  station  of  tho 
command.  I  accordingly  left  tho  command  with  General  Stans- 
bury,  senior  brigadier,  and  proceeded  that  niji-ht  to  Baltimore,  On 
the  road  I  met  an  express  from  Major-geiKn-il  8.  Smith,  who  de- 
livered mo  a  letter,  in  which  ho  informed  me  that  ho  had  been  call- 


■  f 


:*( 


330 


APPENDIX. 


i: 


M\ 


ed  out  into  service,  and  had  assurnod  tlio  command  according  to 
his  rank  ;  and  by  the  time  I  rcaithcd  JJaltimore,  I  also  learned 
that  the  enemy  was  proceeding  to  Mailborough,  and  not  toward 
IJalthuore. 

If  I  liad  had  longer  time,  or  to  repeat  the  action  oC  Bladensburg, 
I  could  correct  several  errors,  which  might  materially  have  af- 
fected the  issue  of  that  battle.  The  advanced  force  ought  to  have 
been  nearer  to  the  creek,  along  the  edge  of  the  low  ground,  where 
they  would  have  been  skirted  with  bushes,  and  have  avoided  the 
inconvenience  of  the  cover  which  the  orchard  afforded  the  enemy. 
The  edge  of  the  low  grounds  on  the  right  of  the  road  ought  to 
have  been  lined  with  musketry,  nid  a  battery  of  cannon  also  plant- 
ed in  the  field  on  the  right  of  th(  'ad,  directly  fronting  the  bridge  ; 
and  if  Commodore  Barney's  hcav}  atillery,  with  his  more  expert 
artillerists,  had  occupied  the  position  which  the  advanced  artiller- 
ists did,  and  these  posts  been  obstinately  defended,  the  enemy* 
would  not  have  crossed  the  river  at  that  point,  but  would  have  been 
obliged  to  have  made  a  circuit  around  to  his  right,  and  have  cross- 
ed above  and  at  the  upper  end  of  the  town ;  or,  if  the  whole  force 
had  been  posted  at  the  position  of  the  second  line,  with  all  the  ad- 
vantage which  it  afforded,  and  had  acted  uiJi  tolerable  courage 
and  firmness,  the  event  might  have  been  different ;  but  no  advant- 
age of  position  is  proof  against  groundless  panic,  and  a  total  want 
of  discipline,  skill,  and  experience. 

On  the  night  of  my  retreat  to  the  city,  I  sent  Assistant-adjutant- 
gcneral  Ilite  down  to  General  Young  to  inform  him  of  the  move- 
ment, and  to  direct  him  to  take  the  best  position  to  secure  Fort 
Washington  and  his  junction  wdth  me  ;  or,  in  case  the  enemy 
should  interpose  between  him  and  me,  to  have  his  boats  ready  to 
transport  his  men  across  the  river ;  or,  if  he  could  not  do  that,  to 
fall  down  the  river  and  unite  with  General  Stuart,  and  harass 
the  enemy  in  the  rear ;  and,  above  all,  to  be  alert,  and  keep  a  vigi- 
lant guard  upon  every  avenue  of  approach,  to  prevent  a  surprise. 
I  also  sent  by  Major  Hite  directions  to  the  commanding  officer  of 
Fort  Washington  to  advance  a  guard  up  to  the  main  road  upon  all 
the  roads  leading  to  the  fort,  and  in  the  event  of  his  being  taken 
in  the  rear  of  the  fort  by  the  enemy,  to  blow  up  the  fort  and  retire 
across  the  river. 

The  distance  of  General  Young,  and  the  necessity  of  retaining 


APPENDIX. 


331 


I  accorcHng  to 
[  also  learned 
ud  not  toward 

r  Bladensburg, 
ially  have  af- 
ought  to  have 
ground,  where 
e  avoided  the 
cd  the  enemy, 
road  ought  to 
ion  also  plant- 
\g  the  bridge ; 
5  more  expert 
meed  artiller- 
d,  the  enemy* 
uld  have  been 
id  have  cross- 
e  whole  force 
ith  all  the  ad- 
:able  courage 
ut  no  advant- 
1  a  total  want 

tant-adjutant- 
of  the  move- 
secure  Fort 
e  the  enemy 
oats  ready  to 
ot  do  that,  to 
t,  and  harass 
1  keep  a  vigi- 
it  a  surprise, 
ing  officer  of 
road  upon  all 
being  taken 
)rt  and  retire 

of  retaining 


a  position  near  the  fort  as  long  as  the  designs  of  the  enemy  re- 
mained uncertain,  rendered  it  impossible  to  have  tlie  assistance  of 
his  force  at  Bladensburg. 

There  was  not  a  bridge  on  tlie  road  which  the  enemy  pursued 
from  his  debarkation  to  Wasliington  the  destruction  of  which 
would  have  retarded  his  advance  ten  minutes.  I  believe,  in  fact, 
that  the  bridge  at  Bladcnsburg  is  the  only  one,  and  the  facility 
with  which  that  stream  is  every  where  fordable  above  the  bridge, 
rendered  useless  the  destroying  it.  Indeed,  1  believe  that,  had  ar- 
tillery been  posted  as  advantageously  as  it  might  have  been,  and 
well  served,  the  bridge  would  have  acted  as  a  decoy  to  the  enemy 
to  lead  him  into  danger,  and  have  been  useful  to  us. 

Those  who  have  that  happy  intrepidity  of  assurance  in  their 
own  capacity  to  see  with  certainty,  in  all  cases,  the  means  by 
which  they  could  have  avoided  the  errors  of  others,  and  by  which 
past  calamities  might  always  have  been  averted,  will  fmd  my  con- 
demnation easy.  Those  who  are  disposed  to  measure  dilficultics 
by  the  limits  of  human  capacity,  and  who  will  impartially  place 
tliemselves  in  my  situation,  will  fmd  it  difficult  to  decide  that  any 
errors  have  been  committed  which  might  not  have  been  equaled 
or  surpassed  by  any  other  connnander,  or  that  the  calamities  which 
have  followed  could  have  been  averted  or  mitigated. 


No.  II. 

REPORT  OF  GENERAL  STANSBURY. 

Baltiirior<%  November  15,  1814. 

By  general  orders  from  the  War  Department  of  the  20th  of 
April,  1811,  Major-genera!  Smith  was  directed  to  draft  from  his 
division,  and  hold  in  readiness  to  march  at  a  moment's  warnincr, 
two  thousand  men,  officers  included. 

By  Major-general  Smith's  division  orders  of  the  29th  of  April, 
I  was  directed  to  furnish  by  draft  from  my  brigade,  as  its  quota, 
one  thousand  of  this  requisition,  and  hold  them  in  readiness  to 
march,  at  a  moment's  warning,  to  Baltimore  for  its  defence.  The 
Isi  of  May  those  orders  were  complied  with,  agreeably  to  a  de- 
tail accompanying  said  orders. 

On  the  15th  of  July  Major-general  Smith  issued  division  or- 


'ilnii 


':i 


APPENDIX. 


dors  requiring  thn  quota  from  my  brigade,  the  11th,  and  that  from 
tlie  2d  and  Utli,  to  march  and  rendezvous  at  Baltimore.  My  or- 
ders were  issued  on  the  I'Jth  ;  the  troops  began  lo  assemble  on 
the  24th,  and  were  encamijed  about  one  and  a  half  mUes  north- 
ward of  the  city,  at  a  place  called  Camp  Fairfield. 

On  tlie  21st  of  July,  by  iNIajor-general  Smith,  I  was  directed  to 
take  chargp  of  this  brigade,  and  commenced  preparing  for  their 
reception.  Early  in  August,  General  Winder,  being  vested  with 
the  command  of  the  10th  jNIilitary  District,  superseded  General 
Smith  in  the  connnand. 

On  Saturday,  August  the  20th,  about  1  o'clock  P.M.,  I  received 
by  express  letter  No.  1,  directing  me  to  move  down  with  my  whole 
force  for  Washington. 

By  this  morning's  regimental  reports,  the  force  of  my  brigade, 
then  in  camp,  appeared  as  follows : 

The  first  regiment,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  llagan,  officers  in- 
cluded, 550  ;  second  regiment,  under  Lieutenant-colonel  Shutz,  of- 
ficers also  included,  fit  for  duty,  803. 

I  immediately  issued  orders  for  wagons  to  be  procured,  provis- 
ions served  out,  tents  struck,  and  every  thing  prepared  to  march 
that  evening.  But  the  dilhculty  of  obtaining  wagons  to  transport 
tents  and  camp  C(juipage  prevented  my  moving  more  th:iu  that 
part  of  the  brigade  this  evening.  The  residue  followed  on  the 
morning  of  the  21«t.  The  advance  party  encamped  at  the  Stag 
tavern  ;  the  rear  three  miles  short  of  it,  on  the  evening  of  the  21st. 

About  10  o'clock  P.M.  I  received  from  CJencral  Winder,  by 
cxi)rcss,  letter  No.  2,  dated  the  21st,  directing  me  to  halt  until 
further  orders.  August  22il,  at  10  o'clock  A.]\L,  received  from 
General  Winder  letter  No.  3,  dateil  at  the  Wood  Yard  the  21st, 
10  o'clock  P. 1\L,  directing  me  to  advance  with  all  speed  to  Bla- 
densi)urg.  In  consequence  th(>rrof,  the  line  of  march  was  taken 
lip  innnediat(>ly,  and  at  7  o'clock  P.M.  we  arriveil  ;it  JJladens- 
burg.  The  first  n'giment  encaniped  on  th(^  hill  southeast,  thi^  sec- 
ond on  the  northwest  of  the  town;  and  on  Tinv'^dny  mo:  iiing,  the 
23d,  joined  tiu-  first  regiment  on  Lowiich  s'  llill,tuar  Bladrnsburg. 
About  10  o'clock  A.M.  received  from  General  Wind(>r  letter  N(». 
'l,dat(!d  at  l[ead-(iunrters,  Battalion  Old  Fields,  August  22d,  con- 
taining orders  to  march  my  brigade  (with  the  troo|)s  under  Colo- 
nel Sterett,  if  they  had  joined  me)  slowly  toward  Marl!>oroug!j, 


ArrENDix. 


nd  that  from 
re.  My  or- 
assemblo  on 
miles  nortii- 

s  directed  to 

ing  for  their 

vested  with 

ded  General 

.,1  received 
th  my  whole 

my  brigade, 

I,  officers  in- 
cl  tShutz,  of- 

iircd,  provis- 
cd  to  inarch 
to  transi)ort 
re  than  that 
iwed  on  the 
at  tlie  fStag 
[oftheilxt. 
Winder,  hy 
;o  halt  until 
ceived  from 
rd  the  'J  1st, 
)eed  to  JJhi- 
1  was  talven 
at  ]}]adens- 
ast,  the  scc- 
noiiiing,  tho 
iladrnsljurg. 
r  hMtcr  No. 
ist  'J-Jil,  con- 
under  Colo- 
larIhoron;;!i, 


and  take  a  position  on  the  road  not  far  from  that  place,  and  thut 
ho  would  join  me  some  time  that  day. 

The  troops  under  tlio  conmuind  of  LieuttMiant-colonel  Stcrett 
had  not  joined  me,  nor  was  1  certain  at  that  time  they  would  arrive. 
The  brigade  was  instantly  put  in  motion,  and  the  march  com- 
menced toward  Marlborough,  with  a  view  of  complying  with  Gen- 
eral Winder's  orders.  I  iinnu^dinuly  dispatched  my  aid-de-camp. 
Major  Woodyear,  to  General  W  uuler,  to  connuunicate  all  the  in- 
formation which  he  might  require  as  to  my  force  ;  to  receive  par- 
ticular orders  as  to  the  position  I  should  take  in  liie  vicinity  of 
Marll)orougli ;  and  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  country,  and  of 
the  situation  of  the  enemy.  After  proceeding  about  one  mile  on 
the  road  to  Marlljorough,  I  met  Captiiiii  Moses  Tabbs  riding  ex- 
press to  inform  me  that  the  enemy,  with  their  whole  force,  had  left 
Marlborougb,  and  were  on  their  march  toward  me,  distant  about 
six  miles.  This  information  made  me  determine  to  avail  myself 
of  the  high  grounds  I  occupied  in  the  morning,  to  which  I  innno- 
diatejy  returned,  and  mule  the  necessary  preparations  to  receive 
tho  enemy.  I  directed  Captain  Tabbs  to  return  and  reconuoitro 
the  encMuy,  and  give  mc  every  information.  About  1  o'clock 
P.M.  lie  returned,  and  informed  nu;  that  the  enemy,  on  leaving 
IMarlhorougb,  had  taken  a  dill'(?rent  route.  Soon  after,  my  aid-de- 
camp, Major  Woodyear,  returned  from  General  Winder,  and  in- 
formed me  that  the  intelligence  I  had  received  of  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  wtMC  in  part  incorrect,  and  that  (Jeneral  Winder 
\vishc(l  me  to  encamp  on  the  direct  road  from  Bladenshurg  to 
Marlborough,  at  about  seven  miles  distant  from  the  latter  place. 
'J'he  assistant  adjutant-general,  Maj(u-  llite,  accompanied  Major 
Woodyear. 

By  letter  No.  i  I  was  first  informed  that  Ltoutenant-colnnel 
Stcrett's  detachment,  consisting  of  the  filth  regiment,  about  fivo 
hundred  strong ;  Major  I'iukney's  rille  battalion,  about  one  hund- 
red and  fit'ty  ;  and  Captains  Myer's  and  Magruder's  companies  of 
artillery,  about  oru'  hundred  and  fifty,  were  attached  to  my  com- 
mand. These  troojfs  had  not  joined  m(\  but  W(>re  on  tiielr  march. 
1  dis|)atched  an  express  with  this  letter  to  liieutenant-coloiiel  Ster- 
ctt  as  soon  as  received,  recpiesting  him  to  move  on  with  all  pos- 
sible expedition. 

About  sunset  en  the  ijad  he  arrived  with  liia  command,  and  en- 


3.;4 


APrExNDIX. 


camped  near  my  brigade.  The  fatigued  situation  of  his  troops  in- 
duced me  to  liait  ibr  the  night  on  the  hill  near  Biadensburg,  with 
the  intention  of  moving  toward  Marlborough  at  reveille  on  the 
21th.  At  about  8  o'clock  P.^I.,  a  militia  captain,  who  resided 
near  Biadensburg,  came  into  camp,  attended  by  one  of  my  sen- 
tinels, and  informed  me  he  was  from  General  Winder's  camp  at 
the  Battalion  Old  Fields ;  that  General  Winder  was  not  in  camp 
when  he  left  it,  and  that  it  was  apprehended  he  had  been  taken 
prisoner,  as  he  had  gone  out  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy  and  had  not 
returned  ;  that  a  detachment  from  the  army  had  skirmished  that 
day  with  the  British  ;  and  that  Brigadier-general  Smith,  of  the 
District  of  Columbia,  had  taken  the  command  of  the  army,  and 
would  certainly  join  me  in  the  course  of  the  night.  About  11 
o'clock  P.M.,  the  Secretary  of  State,  Colonel  Monroe,  with  sev- 
eral gentlemen,  came  to  my  tent ;  and,  as  well  as  I  can  recollect. 
Colonel  Monroe  observed  that  he  was  from  Washington  ;  that  he 
had  been  at,  or  heard  from  the  camp  of  General  Winder ;  that 
there  was  an  alarming  silence  with  respect  to  General  Winder, 
who  had  gone  out  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy  and  had  iKJt  been  heard 
of,  and  it  was  feared  he  was  tnken  ;  that  General  Smith  had,  by 
persuasion,  taken  the  command,  anil  that  the^;  w  dd  move  toward 
and  join  me  before  morning,  he  expected,  fron*  '.  '  attalion  Old 
Fields,  and  advised  vigilance  to  prevent  surprise  .  .joon  after  the 
departure  of  Colonel  Monroe,  the  advance  pickets,  on  the  road  by 
which  we  expected  the  enemy,  and  which  was  the  direct  one  from 
Marlboroogh,  fired,  and  in  a  few  UKunrnts  my  whole  command 
were  under  arms  and  prepared  lur  action.  Th(^  cavalry,  under 
Colonel  T  Ighman,  who  had  c(nne  into  town  a  little  after  dark  for 
refreshments,  were  ordered  down  the  Marlborough  road,  except 
Captain  Herbert,  with  his  troop,  who  was  directed  to  push  down 
the  road  toward  the  Battalion  Old  Fields  imtil  he  should  fall  in 
with  (Jcneral  Winder's  army,  which  I  was  confident  would  join 
me  that  night. 

The  troops  were  inider  arms  until  after  2  o'clock  A.M.  of  the 
24th,  when,  l)eing  advised  by  ihe  cavalry  that  tlu;  enemy  were  not 
near,  I  ordered  them  to  retire  to  their  tents,  but  to  be  ready  to  turn 
out  at  a  moment's  warning  ;  and  strong  picket  guards  were  placed 
on  the  road  in  every  direction.  Sujjposing  my  right  and  rear  cov- 
ered by  General  Winder's  fttrce,  1  fe''  no  apprehensions  of  surprise 


APJ'ENDIX. 


335 


r  his  troops  iii- 
lensburg,  with 
evcille  on  tiie 
I,  who  resided 
ne  of  my  sen- 
der's camp  at 
s  not  in  camp 
id  been  taken 
ly  and  had  not 
virmished  that 
Smith,  of  the 
tlie  army,  and 
it.     About  11 
roc,  with  sev- 
c;in  recollect, 
gton  ;  that  ho 
Winder;  that 
[icral  Winder, 
lot  been  heard 
Smith  had,  by 
move  toward 
'  attalion  Old 
oon  after  the 
n  the  road  !)y 
rect  one  from 
ole  command 
avalry,  under 
liter  dark  for 
road,  except 
()  j)iish  down 
ishoidd  fall  in 
t  would  join 

\M  of  the 
my  were  not 
ready  to  turn 

were  placed 
ind  rear  cov- 
is  of  surprise 


n 


4 


there,  and  no  expectation  that  the  enemy,  without  first  beating 
General  Winder,  could  approach  me  either  by  the  Battalion  or 
river  road.  But  about  half  after  2  o'clock  A.M.,  Major  Bates, 
Assistant  Adjutant-general  of  Militia,  came  to  me  from  Washing- 
ton with  a  message  from  General  Winder  informing  me  that  Gen- 
eral Whider  had  retreated  from  Battalion  Old  Fields  into  the  City 
of  Washington  across  the  bridge,  which  he  had  ordered  to  be  burn- 
eil ;  and  that  the  general  expected  I  would  resist  the  enemy  as 
long  as  possible  should  he  move  against  me  in  luat  direction. 
Tlius  was  my  expectation  of  security  from  the  Battalion  and  river 
roads  cut  olT,  my  right  llauk  and  rear  uncovered,  and  liable  to  be 
attacked  and  turned,  without  the  possi!)iliiy  of  securing  it  in  the 
position  I  then  lay. 

I  instantly  sent  for  Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett  of  the  5th,  Major 
I'inkney  of  the  rille  corps,  and  Lieutenant-fitlonel  Ragaii,  Lieuten- 
ant-colonel Sluitz  iieing  present,  officers  in  wlumi  1  placed  th(^  high- 
est confidence,  and  stated  to  them  the  information  and  orders  1  h:ul 
just  received  from  ( Jeneral  Winder,  and  our  situatictn  with  resjjcct 
to  the  enemy.  They  were  unanimous  in  opinion  that  our  situation 
on  that  hill  could  not  be  defended  with  the  force  then  under  my 
command,  worn  down  by  hunger  and  fatigue  as  they  were,  and  that 
it  was  indispensal)ly  necessary  for  the  security  of  the  army  that 
\V('  should  immcdiaicly  retire  across  tiie  bridge  of  Bladeiisburg, 
and  take  a  position  on  the  road  between  Bladeiisburg  and  the  city 
whicii  we  could  defend.  Golonel  Tilgiiman,  of  the  cavalry,  ob- 
served he  thought  wc  had  no  time  to  lose.  In  this  opinion  I  per- 
fectly coincided.  Orders  were  instantly  given  to  striki'  tent.s  and 
prepare  to  march,  and  in  about  thirty  minutes,  without  noise  or 
confusion,  the  whole  were  in  motion,  and  about  half  past  three 
o'clock  in  the  morning  passed  the  bridge  at  Bladt'iisburg  leading 
to  the  f'ity  of  \\  ashingtuu.  Securing  ocr  rear  from  suri)rise.  w(! 
halted  in  the  road  until  the  approach  of  day,  with  a  view  of  finding 
some  place  where  water  could  be  had,  in  order  that  the  men  might 
cook  their  provisions  and  rel'resh  themselves  lor  a  (cw  monn'uts. 
The  provisions  consisted  of  salt  beef  of  infi-rior  quality,  the  flour 
old  and  musty.  At  daylight  I  moved  on  to  the  foot  of  a  hill  near 
a  brick-yard,  and  there  ordered  tlie  troops  to  refresh  them.selves. 
This  w;is  aliout  one  and  a  half  miles  from  Bladeiisburg. 

Early  in  the  morning,  I  had  dispatched  Major  Woodyear  to 


o  >■)  p 


APPENDIX. 


i 


*  1. 


1    I'     \i 


i  i 


' '  ,it 


Washington  to  inform  General  Winder  of  my  moveniciits  and  sit- 
uation, of  the  exhausted  state  of  the  troops,  and  the  impracticabil- 
ity of  their  meeting  the  enemy,  in  their  present  liitigued  state, 
vviih  any  prospect  of  success,  unless  re-enforced.  I  rode  to  the  top 
of  the  hill  to  examine  the  country.  On  my  descending  it  again, 
a  note  was  presented  to  mo  by  an  express  from  General  Winder, 
dated  at  Washington  (written,  I  presume,  without  a  knowledge  of 
my  movements),  directing  me  to  oppose  the  enemy  as  long  as  I 
could  should  ho  attempt  a  passage  by  the  way  of  IJladensburg. 
This  note  I  have  mislaid.  I  called  a  council  of  war,  consistincf  of 
Lieutenant-colonel  Slerett,  Lieutenant-colonel  Ragan,  and  Major 
Pinkncy.  I  laid  the  letter  before  them.  Colonel  ISterett  observed 
that  he  marched  from  lialtimore  with  a  determination  to  defend 
the  city  ;  that  his  men,  the  day  before,  by  a  forced  march  from  the 
IJuck  tavern,  or  8nowdcn's,  reached  Bladensburg  without  halting 
to  couk ;  that  they  had  been  under  arms  nearly  the  whole  of  the 
night,  without  any  sleep  or  food ;  that  Major  Pinkney's  riflemen, 
and  the  two  companies  of  artillery,  were  in  the  same  situation ; 
and  that  they  were  so  completely  worn  down  and  exhausted  that 
he  should  consider  it  a  sacrifice  of  both  officers  and  men  to  seek 
the  enemy  at  any  considerable  distance  from  General  Winder's 
force,  as  no  good  could  result  therefrom.  Major  Pinkney  and  Col- 
onel Ragan  expressed  themselves  to  the  same  elTect,  and,  with 
Colonel  ISterett,  urged  the  propriety  of  moving  farther  on  the  road 
toward  the  city,  with  a  view  of  taking  a  stand  on  some  more  fa- 
vorable ground  for  defence,  with  a  better  prospect  of  being  joined 
l)y  the  forces  under  (reneral  Winder,  and  expressed  their  willing- 
ness to  give  their  opinions  in  writing.  I  could  not  but  admit  the 
corrcH'tness  of  their  views,  and  ordered  tlic  wagons  to  move  on 
slowly  toward  the  citv<  intending  to  follow  on  with  the  trctops. 

At  this  moment  .Major  Woodyear  returned  from  W  ashington, 
with  positive  orders  from  General  Winder  to  give  the  enemy  bat- 
tle at  RladiMishurg,  should  he  move  that  way,  and  that  lie  would 
join  me  if  necessary. 

I  immediately  ordered  the  troops  to  rrtraco  thoir  stops  to  IJla- 
densburg,  determined  to  maintain,  if  possible,  the  ground  at  all 
hazards. 

On  arriving  in  the  orchard  near  the  mill,  1  directed  the  artillery 
to  post  theiuisclvea  behind  a  sniull  breastwork  ef  tlirt  tliat  lately 


!  I 


APPENDIX. 


aa; 


emcnts  and  sit- 
u  iinpracticabil- 
futigued  state, 
I  rode  to  the  top 
ending  it  again, 
k'neral  Winder, 
a  knowledge  of 
ny  as  long  as  I 
)f  IJladensburg. 
ir,  consisting  of 
gan,  and  Major 
Sterctt  observed 
lation  to  defend 
march  from  the 
without  halting 
he  w  hole  of  the 
kney*s  riflemen, 
same  situation ; 
I  exhausted  that 
nd  men  to  sock 
ncral  Winder's 
inkney  and  Col- 
flbct,  and,  with 
her  on  the  road 
some  more  fa- 
of  being  j')incd 
d  their  willing- 
)t  but  admit  the 
ns  to  move  on 
the  troops, 
m  Washington, 
the  enemy  bat- 
that  lie  would 

ir  steps  to  Ula- 
ground  at  all 

ed  the  artillery 
dirt  that  lately 


had  been  thrown  up  by  Colonel  Wadsworth.  Tins  battery  com- 
niiuuled  the  pass  into  Bladensburg  and  the  bridg(>  southwesterly 
of  the  town.  Our  artillery  consisted  of  six  six-pounders;  Major 
Puikney's  battaUon  of  riflemen  on  their  right,  under  cover  of  the 
town  and  bushes,  also  commanding  the  pass  by  the  biidge  ;  two 
companies  from  Lieutenant-colonel  Shutz's  regiment,  under  the 
command  of  Captains  Duckcr  and  Gorsuch,  acting  as  riflemen,  al- 
though principally  armed  with  muskets,  on  the  left  of  the  artillery, 
near,  and  protected  by,  the  barn,  intended  to  defend  the  road  lead- 
ing by  the  mill,  on  the  left  of  the  battery,  into  the  field;  Colonel 
JSterett's  regiment  was  halted  in  the  orchard,  on  the  right  and  in 
the  rear,  and  the  regiments  of  Colonels  Ragan  and  Slnitz  were  also 
halted  in  the  orchard,  in  the  rear  and  on  the  left  flank,  near  the 
creek.  My  intentions  were  that  they  should  remain  here  to  re- 
fresh themselves  as  long  as  possible,  and, -as  soon  as  the  enemy 
appeared,  to  form  Colonel  .Sterett's  regiment  (in  whom  1  placed 
great  confidence)  on  the  right,  their  left  resting  on  and  support- 
ing the  right  of  Major  Pinkncy's  riflemen,  in  view  of  the  bridge 
and  fronting  the  road,  along  which  ran  a  fence,  and  act  as  occa- 
sion should  require.  Colonels  Itagan's  and  Shutz's  regiments 
were  to  be  drawn  up  in  echelon,  their  right  resting  on  the  left  of 
Captains  Duckcr's  and  Gorsuch's  rifle  companies,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  enemy  from  pressing  and  turning  our  lell,  hoping  that 
General  Winder  would  join  inc  before  the  battle  would  commence, 
and  occupy  the  ground  in  my  rear  as  a  second  line.  About  11 
o'clock  A.M.  I  was  informed  by  a  dragoon  from  Lieutenant-colo- 
nel Beall  that  he  was  on  the  road  from  Annapolis  to  Bladensburg, 
with  al)out  eight  hundred  men,  distant  from  me  about  five  mile:-;, 
and  wished  to  know  the  distance  and  situation  of  the  enemy.  1 
directed  the  dragoon  to  return  and  inform  him  that  I  had  that  mo- 
ment received  inlbrmatuju  that  the  British,  with  their  whole  force, 
were  approaching  Bladensburg  by  the  river  road,  and  that  tlu-y 
were  only  three  and  a  half  miles  distant,  and  advised  the  colom  I 
to  file  off  to  his  right  and  cross  above  Bladensburg,  to  fall  into  an 
old  road  which  I  understood  led  to  our  lell  toward  Washintrtoii, 
and  lake  a  position  on  the  high  grounds  north  and  northwest  of 
Blad(Mi.sburg,  which  would  completely  protect  my  left  by  prevent- 
ing the  enemy  from  outflanking  us  that  way,  and  force  their  main 
body  across  the  bridge,  in  the  face  of  my  artillery  and  riflemen  on 

P 


I 


A 


338 


AiTENDlX. 


J' 


Hi 


:mI 


I 


:<'!  i 


ll'.^ 


Mil! 


I'l; 


ii 


ii 


'!!( 


the  main  road,  and  expose  them  to  the  fire  of  the  5th  regiment 
under  Colonel  Sterett,  who  would  be  protected  by  the  fence. 

This  advice  it  appeared  Colonel  Beall  only  took  in  part,  I  pre- 
sume from  an  anxious  wish  to  place  himself  between  the  enemy 
and  the  city.  He  sent  his  baggage  oiTto  the  right,  and  with  his 
troops  passed  the  bridge  at  Bladensburg  about  thirty  minutes  be- 
fore tlie  enemy  appeared  on  Mr.  Lowndes'  lull,  and  took  his  station 
on  the  hill,  as  I  was  informed,  near  the  brick-kiln  where  we  halt- 
ed in  the  morning,  about  one  and  a  half  miles  in  my  rear,  and  on 
the  left  of  the  road  leading  to  the  city.  About  meridian  the  ene- 
my could  clearly  be  seen  making  toward  us  by  the  river  road. 

While  I  was  giving  some  directions  to  the  artillery,  ^  )u. 
Lieutenant- colonels  Ragan's  and  Shutz's  regiments  had  oeen 
moved  from  the  place  where  I  had  stationed  them,  and  marched 
out  of  the  orchard  up  the  hill,  and  formed  in  order  of  battle  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  yards  above  the  orchard,  and  upward  of  five 
hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  artillery  and  riflemen.  Thus  un- 
covered by  the  trees  of  the  orchard,  their  situation  and  numbers 
were  clearly  seen  by  the  enemy  from  Lowndes'  Iliil,  and  the  flanks 
of  the  artillery  and  riflemen  unprotected,  and  laid  liable  to  be  turn- 
ed, our  main  body  being  placed  too  far  off  to  render  them  any  aid. 
On  riding  up  the  hill  to  know  who  had  ordered  this  movement,  I 
was  informed  that  General  Winder  was  on  the  ground.  At  this 
time  I  met  with  Brigadier-general  Smith,  of  the  District  of  Co- 
lumbia, and  some  conversation  took  place  between  us  respecting 
the  order  of  battle  and  seniority ;  the  particulars  I  do  not  recol- 
lect. I  immediately  rode  to  the  mill,  where  I  understood  General 
Winder  was,  and  found  him  reconnoitring  the  position  of  the  ene- 
my. While  in  conversation  with  him,  tlie  5th  regiment  was  taken 
out  of  the  orchard,  marched  up  the  hill,  and  stationed  on  the  left 
of  Colonel  Shutz's  regiment,  that  of  Colonel  Ragan  being  on  the 
right,  its  right  resting  on  the  main  road  ;  but,  as  1  before  observed, 
the  whole  at  so  great  a  distance  from  the  artillery  and  riflemen 
that  they  had  to  contend  with  the  whole  British  force,  and  so  much 
exposed  that  it  has  been  a  cause  of  astonishment  they  preserved 
their  ground  so  long,  and  ultimately  succeeded  in  retreating. 
Whose  plan  this  was  I  know  not ;  it  was  not  mine,  nor  did  it 
meet  with  my  approbation  ;  but,  finding  a  superior  oflicor  on  the 
ground,  I  coneluded  he  had  ordered  it,  consequently  did  not  inter- 


AITENDIX. 


339 


le  5th  regiment 
the  fence. 
L  in  part,  I  pre- 
,-eeii  the  enemy 
lit,  und  with  his 
rty  minutes  be- 
took liis  station 
where  we  lialt- 
tiiy  rear,  and  on 
cridian  the  enc- 
3  river  road, 
rtillery,  '^     )u. 
aents  had  occn 
m,  and  marched 
r  of  battle  about 
J  upward  of  flvo 
nen.     Thus  un- 
:)n  and  numbers 
11,  and  the  flanks 
iablc  to  be  turn- 
er them  any  aid. 
his  movement,  I 
ound.     At  this 
District  of  Co- 
n  us  respecting 
I  do  not  recol- 
crstood  General 
ition  of  the  ene- 
mcnt  was  taken 
oned  on  the  left 
in  being  on  the 
jcfore  observed, 
ry  and  rillemcn 
CO,  and  so  much 
they  preserved 
in    rijtreating. 
iiino,  nor  did  it 
r  odifcr  on  the 
y  did  not  iuter- 


.1 


M 


M 


fere.  General  Winder  asked  me  where  I  meant  to  take  my  sta- 
tion. I  answered,  about  the  centre  of  my  brigade.  He  said  he 
would  take  his  on  the  left  of  the  5th  regiment.  General  Winder 
was  extremely  active  in  givmg  directions  and  eneouiagnig  il;e 
men.  I  took  my  station  in  the  centre  of  Colonels  Ragan's  anu 
Shutz's  regiments,  but  occasionally  rode  along  the  line,  encour- 
aging the  men,  and  giving  orders  to  the  officers.  Major  Wood- 
year  1  directed  to  keep  with  the  left  of  Colonel  Shutz's  regiment, 
to  cheer  up  the  men  and  assist  the  officers.  Major  Randall  rode 
with  me.  Soon  after,  the  action  commenced  by  the  artillery  and 
riflemen  at  the  battery.  The  fire  of  the  artillery  had  great  effi}ct, 
"n-i  r-v^dcntly  produced  confusion  in  the  ranks  of  the  enemy,  who 
i.  jk  shelter  behind  a  warehouse,  from  whence  they  fired  rockets ; 
but  a  few  well-directed  shots  drove  them  from  this  position.  A 
flanking  party,  concealed  by  the  banks  and'bushes,  pushed  up  the 
river  to  turn  our  left,  wiiile  a  strong  force  attempted  the  bridge ; 
but  the  incessant  and  well-directed  fire  from  our  artillery  and  rifle- 
men at  the  battery  occasioned  evident  confusion  among  their  ranks, 
so  much  so  that  their  officers  could  be  seen  actively  engaged  pre- 
venting their  retreating,  and  pushing  them  on  to  the  bridge  ;  and 
here  I  tliink  the  enemy  suflered  considerably.  At  length  they  suc- 
ceeded in  passing  the  bridge  in  small  parties  at  full  speed,  which 
formed  after  crossing.  I  had  ordered  forty  horsemen  with  axes 
to  cut  away  this  bridge  before  the  near  approach  of  the  enemy, 
and  saw  them  with  their  axes.  Why  this  order  was  not  executed 
I  never  could  learn.  It  is  certain  the  enemy  could  have  forded 
the  stream  above  ,•  but  I  considered  it  would,  in  some  degree,  im- 
pede their  progress,  and  give  our  artillery  and  riflemen  more  timo 
and  opportunity  to  act  with  effi^ct  against  them. 

The  artillery,  under  the  command  of  Captains  IMyer  and  I\Ia- 
grudcr.  and  the  riflemen,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Major 
Pinkney,  behaved  in  the  most  gallant  manner  (this  gallant  officer 
in  the  course  of  the  action  was  severely  wounded),  but  the  supe- 
rior force  of  the  enemy,  and  ihf  rapidity  with  which  he  moved, 
compelled  them  to  retire  ;  but  one  of  the  pieces  was  lost,  and  this 
was  rend(>re(l  harmless  befi)re  it  was  abandoned. 

The  enemy  took  cvrry  advantage  of  the  cover  alTorded  them  by 
the  trees  of  the  orchard,  and  their  light  troops  from  thence  kept 
up  a  galling  fire  upon  our  line.     On  this  party,  when  advanced 


340 


APPENDIX. 


fci 


"I  ;(■ 


i    I!'::;- 


'  'ii 


!'t 


nearer,  the  5th  regiment,  under  Colonel  Sterctt,  opened  a  steady 
and  well-directed  fire,  which  was  followed  by  the  fire  from  the 
right,  and  ultimately  from  our  centre,  when  the  firing  on  both  sides 
became  general.  After  a  few  rounds,  the  troops  on  the  right  be- 
gan to  break.  I  rode  along  the  line,  and  gave  orders  to  the  offi- 
cers to  cut  down  those  who  attempted  to  fly,  and  suffer  no  man  to 
leave  the  lines.  On  arriving  at  the  left  of  the  centre  regiment,  I 
found  Lieutenant-colonel  .Shutz's  men  giving  way,  and  that  brave 
officer,  with  Major  Kemp,  aided  by  my  aid-dc-camp,  Major  Wood- 
year,  exerting  themselves  in  rallying  and  forming  them  again. 
Captain  Callaway's  company  and  part  of  Captains  Shower's  and 
Randall's  companies  were  rallied  and  formed  again,  and  behaved 
gallantly.  The  rest  of  Colonels  Shutz's  and  Ragan's  regiments 
fled  in  disorder,  notwithstanding  the  extraordinary  exertions  of 
their  officers  to  prevent  it.  On  the  left  I  soon  after  discovered  a 
part  of  the  5th  regiment  giving  way,  and  that  excellent  officer. 
Lieutenant-colonel  Sterett,  with  those  under  him,  most  actively 
engaged  forming  them  again.  Soon  after  the  retreat  became 
general,  and  all  attempts  to  rally  them,  and  make  a  second  stand, 
were  fruitless.  With  a  body  of  United  States  cavalry,  I  endeav- 
ored to  protect  the  rear  and  right  of  the  retreating  men,  so  as  to 
prevent  their  falling  into  the  enemy's  possession. 

The  men  under  my  command  were  worn  down  and  nearly  ex- 
hausted from  long  and  forced  marches,  want  of  food,  and  watch- 
ing. They  had  been,  with  very  little  intermission,  under  arms 
and  marching  from  the  time  of  their  departure  from  Baltimore, 
with  but  little  sleep,  bad  provisions,  and  but  little  opportunity  to 
cook.  They  certainly  were  not  in  a  condition  to  go  into  battle ; 
but  my  orders  were  positive,  and  I  was  determined  to  obey  them. 

Before  and  during  the  action,  I  did  not  see  any  of  the  force  I 
was  led  to  expect  would  support  me.  I  understood  since  that 
they  were  on  their  way  to  my  assistance,  and  I  presume  exertions 
were  made  to  bring  them  up. 

Before  and  during  the  retreat  I  heard  the  thunder  of  Commo- 
dore Barney's  artillery,  but  till  then  I  did  not  know  he  was  near. 
I  believe  there  were  few,  if  any  other,  troops  in  the  field  when  the 
action  commenced  than  the  three  regiments  of  infantry  under  Lieu- 
tenant-colonels Sterett,  Ragan,  and  Shutz,  Major  Pinkney's  battal- 
ion of  riflemen,  Captauis  Myer's  and  Magruder's  companies  of  ar- 


APPENDIX. 


341 


,  opened  a  steady 
the  fire  from  the 
•ing  on  botli  sides 
5  on  the  right  be- 
Drders  to  the  offi- 

suf!cr  no  man  to 
!entre  regiment,  I 
ly,  and  that  brave 
mp,  Major  Wood- 
ling  them  again, 
ins  Shower's  and 
2:ain,  and  behaved 
agan's  regiments 
ary  exertions  of 
ifter  discovered  a 
excellent  officer, 
m,  most  actively 
!  retreat  became 
G  a  second  stand, 
avalry,  I  endeav- 

II g  men,  so  as  to 

1  and  nearly  ex- 
food,  and  watch- 
5ion,  under  arms 
from  Baltimore, 
e  opportunity  to 
3  go  into  battle  ; 
;d  to  obey  them, 
ly  of  the  force  I 
stood  since  that 
esume  exertions 

ider  of  Commo- 
)vv  he  was  near, 
e  field  when  the 
itry  under  Lieu- 
'inkney's  battal- 
ompanies  of  ar- 


t'Uery,  amounting  to  about  2150  men,  exclusive  of  two  regiments 
ot  cavalry,  who  did  not  act. 

C^eneral  Winder,  on  the  field  of  battle,  displayed  all  possible 
zeal,  activity,  and  personal  bravery  in  encouraging  tlie  men  to 
light,  ai:d  after  they  broke,  in  his  exertions  to  rally  them. 

I  saw  the  President  and  some  of  the  heads  of  departments  ia 
the  field,  but  did  not  perceive  that  any  of  them  took  any  part  in 
the  arrangements  made  lor  battle.  Colonel  Monroe,  the  then  Sec- 
retary  of  State,  appeared  extremely  active  in  his  clTorts  to  aid  the 
oflicers  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties,  and  exposed  himself  to 
much  danger. 

To  my  aid-de-camp.  Major  Edward  G.  Woodyear,  and  my  act- 
ing I3rigade-major,  Major  Beall  Randall,  I  am  much  indebted  for 
their  unremitted  exertions  in  encouraging  the  men  l)efore  and 
during  the  action,  and  the  7.eal  displayed  by  them  in  their  at- 
tempts to  keep  the  ranks  unbroken  and  to  rally  the  men,  in  which 
they  in  some  degree  succeeded  ;  for  the  company  of  Captain 
Cralloway,  and  part  of  Shower's  and  Randall's  were  rallied,  and 
were  among  the  last  troops  who  left  the  field,  and  did  not  retreat 
until  directed  ;  some  of  them  were  killed,  and  several  severely 
wounded. 

On  arriving  at  the  city,  with  part  of  Colonel  Laval's  United 
States  cavalry  covering  the  retreat,  and  collecting  the  rear  of  our 
scattered  troops,  I  found  General  AViniler's  command  had  passed 
through  it  toward  Georgetown.  I  proceeded  there,  and  then  fol- 
lowed to  a  village  a  few  miles  beyond  it,  where  I  overtook  him 
with  troops  collecting  under  his  command,  and  some  of  those  of 
my  brigade.  The  army  thence  proceeded  to  Montgomery  Court 
House  on  the  'J5th  of  August,  where  it  was  hourly  re-enforced  by 
those  who  fied  from  the  field. 

As  there  had  been  no  place  assigned  by  the  commanding  gen- 
eral previous  to  the  action  to  which  the  men  should  retreat  in 
case  of  a  defeat,  many  of  those  under  my  immediate  command  had 
fled  from  the  field  toward  Baltimore. 

On  the  "Joth  I  dircctcul  my  aid,  iNIajor  Woodyear,  to  push  on 
from  Montgomery  C^ourt  House  to  that  place,  organize  the  drafted 
men,  and  bring  them  on  to  any  point  that  General  Winder  should 
direct. 

On  Friday,  August  20,  at  about  10  o'clock  A.M.,  we  took  up 


B 


I 


34l 


APPENDIX. 


t  •  Jl 


i  -I 


the  line  ^  rch  from  Montgomery  Court  House  on  the  road 

leading  to  i.  ..timore,  witli  llie  L'nited  States  infantry  under  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Scott ;  Major  Peter's  carps  of  artillery  ;  General 
Smith's  brigade  of  District  troops ;  the  regiment  of  militia  from 
Annapolis  and  Anne  Arundel  County,  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
colonels  Beall  and  Hood  ;  some  riflemen  from  Frederick,  Allegha- 
ny, and  other  places  ;  a  large  body  of  cavalry,  and  part  of  my  bri- 
gade of  drafted  militia — a  force  respectable  as  to  numbers  and  ap- 
pearance ;  and  that  night  encamped  about  halfway  between  Mont- 
gomery Court  House  and  Ellicott's  upper  mills.  General  Win- 
der, having  received  some  information  respecting  the  enemy  in- 
dicating intentions  of  moving  against  Baltimore,  concluded  his 
presence  there  was  indispensable.  He  set  out  for  that  place,  leav- 
ing me  in  command  of  the  army,  with  directions  to  follow  him  in 
the  morning.     Colonel  Monroe  was  with  us. 

During  this  night  several  expresses  arrived  from  the  City  of 
Washington,  by  whom  I  was  informed  of  the  retreat  of  the  ene- 
my, said  to  be  in  such  haste  and  confusion  that  many  of  their  sol- 
diers were  straggling  about  in  every  direction ;  that  the  main 
army,  after  rcachii.g  Bladcnsburg,  had  taken  the  road  to  Marlbor- 
ough, leaving  their  wounded.  I  ordered  the  cavalry  to  follow 
them,  harass  their  rear,  and  pick  up  the  stragglers.  Reports  from 
Georgetown  and  the  city  reached  me  that  the  arms  of  many  of 
the  enemy  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  blacks,  and  it  was  ap- 
prehended that  they  would  take  advantage  of  the  absence  of  the 
men  to  insult  the  females,  and  complete  the  work  of  destruction 
commenced  by  the  enemy  ;  and  at  the  earnest  solicitation  of  Brig- 
adier-general Smith  and  Major  Peter,  who  expressed  much  anxie- 
ty respecting  their  families,  and  considering  it  all-important  to 
prevent  further  injury  to  the  city,  I  ordered  the  troops  of  the  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  to  move  thither  for  its  prqtection. 

Having  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  retreated  to  their  ship- 
ping, I  ordered  the  Prince  George's  troops  down  to  Bladcnsburg, 
and  those  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonels  Beall  and 
Hood  to  remain  encampe-d  on  the  ground  then  occupied  until  they 
had  orders  from  General  Winder  ;  and  in  the  morning  of  the  27th, 
with  the  T^iitod  States  infantry,  my  brigade,  and  part  of  Colonel 
Laval's  cavalry,  marched  for  Baltimore  in  a  very  heavy  rain.  On 
my  arrival  there  in  the  evening  I  waited  on  General  Winder,  and 


M 


APPENDIX. 


343 


ouse  on  the  road 
mtry  under  Lieu- 
rtillcry  ;  General 
It  of  nulitia  from 
3(1  by  Lieutenant- 
rcderick,  AllejTlia- 
id  part  of  my  bri- 
numbers  and  ap- 
ly  between  Mont- 
.  General  Win- 
\g  the  enemy  in- 
•c,  concluded  his 
r  that  place,  leav- 
'<  to  follow  him  in 

Tom  the  City  of 
treat  of  the  ene- 
lany  of  their  sol- 
;  that  the  main 
road  to  Marlbor- 
avalry  to  follow 
i.  Reports  from 
rms  of  many  of 
s,  and  it  was  ap- 
3  absence  of  the 
■k  of  destruction 
icitation  of  Briji;-- 
sed  much  anxie- 
all-important  to 
•oops  of  the  Dis- 

ed  to  their  ship- 
to  Bladensburg, 
onels  Beall  and 
Hipied  until  they 
ling  of  the  27th, 
part  of  Colonel 
leavy  rain.  On 
ral  Winder,  and 


i 


detailed  to  him  what  I  had  done  since  he  left  me,  with  which  he 
appeared  well  pleased. 

Belijre  I  conclude,  I  must  observe  that  Major  Pinkney,  with 
most  of  his  battalion,  and  part  of  the  two  companies  of  artillery, 
retired  from  their  advanced  position  to  the  left  of  the  5th  regi- 
ment, and  with  that  regiment  continued  to  behave  with  that  gal- 
lantry which  had  distinguished  them  in  tlie  onset,  and  only  retired 
when  pressed  by  superior  numbers,  and  then,  as  I  am  informed,  by 
orders  from  the  commanding  general. 

Tobias  E.  Stansbury. 

Hon.  IL  M.  Jolmson,  Cliainnan,  &c.,  (T.c. 


No.  III. 

STATEMENT  OF  GENERAL  WALTER  SMITH. 

Siu, — In  comphance  with  the  request  contained  in  your  favor 
of  the  28th  ult.,  inclosing  a  copy  of  a  resolution  of  the  honorable 
the  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States,  appointing  a 
eommittce  to  investigate  the  causes  which  led  to  the  success  of 
the  enemy  in  his  late  enterprise  against  this  city,  I  have  the  honor 
respectfully  to  submit  for  the  consideration  of  the  committee  ihe 
following  detailed  report  as  connected  with  the  inquiry,  and  em- 
bracing, as  you  wish,  a  view  of  the  numbers,  the  movnments,  the 
conduct,  and  disposition  of  the  troops  of  Washington  and  George- 
town  under  my  command,  from  the  period  they  were  called  into 
service  until  the  2 1th  of  August,  the  disastrous  day  of  battle  at 
Bladensburg,  together  with  such  facts  and  circumstances  relative 
to  the  subject  as  present  themselves. 

Late  at  night  on  the  18th  of  August,  T  received  orders  to  call  out 
the  whole  of  the  brigade  under  my  command,  to  rendezvous  on  the 
evening  of  the  following  day  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber,  in  Washing- 
ton, and  to  report  to  General  Winder.  The  troops  assembled  ac- 
cording to  orders,  but,  being  deficient  in  many  essential  supplies  for 
actual  service,  were,  after  an  inspection,  dismissed  until  the  ensu- 
ing morning,  the  20th,  when,  every  exertion  on  the  part  of  the  of- 
ficers being  made  to  perfect  their  equipment,  they  moved  oft'  from 
the  Capitol  about  3  P.M.,  crossed  the  Eastern  Branch, and  halted 
four  miles  therefrom  on  the  road  leading  to  Nottingham.     They 


;;4-t 


APPEND  ex. 


)    .'I 


t      m 


I!,.  I 


I     fii; 


wove  here  ovf;rtaken  by  the  bajorr^fag-e^whcn  it  was ascprttiined  there 
was  a  great  ileficicncy  of  necessary  camp  equipage,  the  puhlic  storet* 
being  exhausted  ;  many  of  the  troops  were  compelled  to  lie  out  in 
the  open  field;  and  of  the  essential  article  of  flints,  u[)on  a  recpu- 
silion  of  one  thousand,  only  two  hundred  could  be  iiad.  .Cleans 
were  inuiiediately  adopted  to  supply  the  hitter  defect  from  private 
resources;  the  formnr  was  never  accomi)lished.  On  the  follow- 
ing morning,  tlic  :;21st,  the  militia  companies  deficient  in  numbers 
were  consolidated,  and  the  supernumerary  ofliccrs  detached  to 
bring  up  delinquents.  The  force  on  the  ground  amounted  to  about 
one  thousand  and  seventy,  comprised  into  two  regiments,  com- 
manded by  (-olonels  IMagruder  and  Brent,  and  consisting  of  the 
following  description  of  troops  :  two  companies  of  artillery,  twelve 
six-pounders,  and  two  hundred  and  ten  men  ;  two  companies  of 
riflemen,  nominally,  but  armed  icilh  muskets,  the  Secretary  of  War 
having  declined  or  refused  to  furnish  rifles,  one  hundred  and  sev- 
enty men  ;  one  company  of  grenadiers,  forty  men ;  and  five  com- 
panies of  light  infantry,  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  :  in  all, 
about  six  hundred  and  seventy  of  volunteers,  the  residue  common 
militia.  Having  here  done  all  that  could  be  done  for  the  organ- 
ization of  the  troops,  and  to  enable  them  to  move  with  celerity, 
they  were,  according  to  previous  orders  from  General  Winder, 
put  in  motion,  and  after  a  hot  and  fatiguing  march,  encamped  that 
evening  after  dusk  near  the  Wood  Yard.  At  this  place  I  found 
the  United  States  3Gth  regiment,  Lieutenant-colonel  Scott,  about 
three  hundred  and  fifty  strong,  and  a  squadron  of  cavalry  under 
the  command  of  Lieutenant-colonel  Tilghman  ;  the  latter  soon 
after  moved  olT  to  reconnoitre  on  the  different  roads  between  the 
Wood  Yard,  Marlborough,  and  Nottingham.  While  the  troops 
were  occupying  the  ground,  1  received  a  message  from  General 
Winder,  then  at  the  Wood  Yard,  requesting  an  interview  at  his 
quarters ;  after  which  I  returned  to  camp  at  9  o'clock,  and  again 
at  his  request  joined  him  at  13,  where  Cohmel  Monroe  soon  after 
arrived  witli  the  intelligence  of  the  arrival  at  Nottingham  (distant 
about  twelve  miles)  of  the  enemy  in  considerable  f()rce,  both  by 
land  and  water.  I  received  orders  immediately  to  return  to  camp, 
and  hold  the  troops  in  readiness  to  march  at  the  shortest  notice, 
and  was  instructed  by  General  Winder  to  direct  Lieutenant-colonel 
Scott,  of  the  36th  United  States  regiment,  to  get  his  men  immo- 


^j 


Ari'ENDJX. 


;;45 


'CPrtiifrir^d  tfir-ro 

.li"  public;  stori's 

k'd  to  Ho  out  ill 

3,  upou  a  f('nui- 

e  liad.     JMeans 

ct  from  private 

On  tho.  follow- 

ont  iu  tunnljcrs 

i-s  (Ictaclicd  to 

ouute;!  to  about 

:'g'inioiits,  com- 

nsistiiig  of  tJic 

rtillcry,  twelve 

companies  of 

crctary  of  ^Var 

ndred  atid  sov- 

and  five  com- 

y  men  :  in  all, 

siduc  common 

for  the  organ- 

with  celerity, 

neral  ^^"indcr, 

mcamped  that 

place  I  found 

l  Scott,  about 

avahy  under 

le  latter  soon 

between  the 
le  the  troops 
rom  General 
crview  at  his 
3k,  and  agnin 
00  soon  after 
fham  (distant 
i)rce,  both  by 
urn  to  camp, 
Driest  notice, 
Miant-colonel 

men  imme- 


diately under  arms,  and  to  march  accordinjj  to  orders  previously 
given  him.  1  reached  the  camp  about  2  o'clock  A.M.  ;  the  troop.s 
were  roused,  the  tents  struck,  the  bag-gage-watrous  loaded,  and  the 
men  gni  nnmediately  under  arms,  and  so  remained  until  sunrise 
the  :J-Jil,\\heu  (reneral  NN'mder  arrived  and  directed  an  advanced 
corps  to  be  formed  and  march  nnmediately,  to  consist  of  about 
three  hundred  men,  artillerists  and  infantry.  This  was  promptly 
done,  and  placed  under  the  direction  of  Major  Peter,  consisting  of 
his  own  artillery,  Captain  Davidson's  light  infantry,  and  Captain 
Stull's  ride  corps,  armed  irith  inushcts.  They  moved  immediate- 
ly on  the  road  to  Nottingham,  and  were  soon  after  followed  by  the 
main  body  to  support  them.  Major  Peter,  with  the  advance  corps, 
moved  on  for  fom*  or  five  nules,  when  he  fell  in  with  Colonel  La- 
'  all's  cavalry,  a  j-art  of  Colonel  Tilghman's,  and  the  SOth  United 
.States  regin  L-nt  retiring.  The  troops  were  halted,  and  a  posi- 
tion taken  to  "epel  the  enemy,  now  rapidly  approaching.  General 
V'inder  In  "e  joined  our  troops,  and  soon  after  orders  were  given 
to  fall  back,  whic!  was  done.  The  main  body  had  meanwhile 
arrived  at  a  posiMo"  within  two  miles  of  the  advance,  where  they 
found  tlr  m-.irinc  corps,  isler  the  command  of  Captain  Miller, 
with  five  pie  'cs  of  heavy  artillery,  judiciously  posted. 

This  position  not  being  deemed  fiv^rable  for  the  infantry,  they 
were  directed  to  rest  on  their  arms,  uhde  I  rode  briskly  forward 
to  discover  one  more  adapted  to  them ;  but  none  presented,  except 
for  light  troops,  a  body  of  which  was  thrown  in  advance  into 
the  woods,  and  the  residue  of  the  troops  disposed  of  to  act  ac- 
cording to  circumstances.  Here  we  received  advice,  about  11 
o'clock,  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy  and  of  the  retiring  of  our  ad- 
vance troops,  and,  immediately  after,  orders  from  CJeneral  Winder 
to  send  off  the  baggage  from  where  it  had  been  left  in  the  morn- 
ing to  the  "  Long  Old  Fields,"  and  for  the  troops  to  retire  slowly 
upon  the  same  road.  About  this  time  successive  heavy  explo- 
sions from  the  direction  of  Marlborougli  announced  the  destruction 
of  Commodore  Barney's  flotilla,  which  was  known  to  be  in  that 
vicinity,  and  also  that  this  course  would  be  adopted  should  the  en- 
emy approach  in  such  force  by  land  and  water  as  to  render  re- 
sistance unavailing.  It  was  hence  inferred  that  the  enemy  had 
ascended  the  Patuxent  in  force  ;  that  a  column  of  troops  had  co- 
operated by  taking  the  road  in  that  direction,  which  was  soon  aft- 

P2 


1 


t 


1' 


>ll)l 


m 


1(1 '  r#i 


It    «*'1'li 


'm> 


1/   I' 


I,  .■ 

1 

I 

1    ,       ii 

)             i 

V 

'         1 

1 

'     l' 

'          ^ 

^  « 

,n4G 


APPENDIX. 


erward  confirmed  ;  and,  with  the  advices  suhsequcntly,  that  tho 
whole  of  their  army  had  filed  off  on  that  road,  and  taken  possession 
oi'  Marlborough.  Our  troops  halted,  and  assembled  at  the  Ibrlc  oi' 
the  roads  on  this  side  of  the  Wood  Yard,  one  of  which  leads  to 
Marlborough,  the  oilier  to  this  place.  We  here  fell  in  with  Com- 
modore Barney  and  his  sailors,  and,  after  a  short  rest,  the  whole 
moved  on,  and  about  4  P.M.  arrived  at  the  Long  Old  Fields. 
Here,  pursuant  to  directions  from  General  Winder,  I  assumed  the 
connnand  of  the  assembled  forces,  those  of  Connnodore  Biuncy 
excepted,  consisting  now  of  the  following  troops,  viz.  :  District 
volunteers  and  militia,  one  thousand  and  sevt  ty  ;  Lieutenant-col- 
onel Scott's  30th  United  States  regiment,  three  hundred  and  fifty  ; 
Lieutenant-colonel  Kramer\s  battalion  of  drafted  nulitia,  two  hund- 
red and  forty  ;  and  Major  Waring's  battalion  of  Prince  George's 
militia,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  :  total,  about  eighteen  hund- 
red men.  An  encampment  was  formed  for  the  night,  and  such 
positions  taken  as  were  best  calculated  to  resist  a  night  attack  ; 
the  cavalry  being  already  stationed  in  advance  on  the  dilferent 
roads  leading  to  Marlborough,  with  orders  to  keep  patrolling  par- 
ties constantly  upon  the  enemy's  quarters,  and  to  advise  of  all  his 
movements.  The  troops,  being  greatly  fatigued,  sought  in  sleep 
that  repose  they  so  nmch  wanted.  In  this  they  were  disappointed. 
An  alarm  gun  aroused  them  about  '2  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the 
23d.  They  were  <iuickly  formed  in  the  front  of  their  encampment, 
and  dispositions  made  to  meet  and  repel  the  expected  attack  ;  but 
in  a  short  time  it  was  ascertained  to  be  a  false  alarm,  and  the 
troops  were  dismissed,  l)nt  with  orders  to  hold  themselves  ready 
for  their  posts  at  a  moment's  warninu.  At  daylight  General  Win- 
der gave  orders  to  have  the  tents  struck  and  the  bn<TfTanr('- wantons 
loaded,  and  that  the  whole  should  be  ready  to  move  in  one  hour. 
Those  orders  were  comjilied  with  with  all  {)ossii)Ie  expedition. 
Shortly  after  the  troops  were  got  und(>r  arms,  and  were  joined  by 
another  small  detachment  of  Prince  George's  militia,  \mder  (he 
command  of  Major  Mavnard,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty.  TIk? 
whole  were  held  ready  to  move  according  to  orders.  About  this 
time  T  received  directions  from  General  Winder  to  have  formed 
an  advance  corjis,  constructed  as  the  one  of  the  pr(>ceding  day, 
and  be  prepared  to  move  as  his  sidisequent  orders  shotdd  desig- 
nate.    Peter's,  Davidson's,  and  StuU's  companies  were  again  se- 


APPENDIX. 


•>  i" 


qucntly,  that  the 
taken  possession 
3d  at  tlie  fork  oi' 
f  which  leads  to 
ell  in  with  Com- 
t  rest,  the  whole 
ung  Old  Fields, 
•r,  I  at^sumed  the 
iraodorc  Barney 
s,  viz.  :    District 

Lieutcnant-col- 
nulred  and  fifty ; 
iulitia,two  hund- 
Princc  George's 

eighteen  hund- 
night,  and  such 

a  night  attack ; 
on  the  (lilTcrent 
p  patrolling  par- 
advise  of  all  his 
sought  in  sleep 
're  disappointed. 
?  morning  of  the 
cir  encampment, 
:!ted  attack  ;  but 
!  alarm,  and  the 
lemselvcs  ready 
It  General  Win- 
'apgage-wagons 
v(>  in  one  hour. 
il)h^  e\pe(htion. 

wore  joined  by 
ilitia,  under  thr, 
and  fifty.  Th(i 
rs.  Almut  this 
to  have  formed 
pn^eeding  day, 
s  should  desig- 
were  again  se- 


lected for  this  purpose,  and  formed  accordingly.  The  President 
of  the  United  States,  accompanied  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and 
others  of  his  oalfinet,  now  came  upon  the  ground,  and  reviewed 
the  trotips.  Aoout  10  o'clock  Cieneral  A\  aider  lett  the  camp,  ac- 
companied by,  and  having  under  his  command  or  direction,  sev- 
eral troops  of  cavalry,  intending  to  reconnoitre  on  the  road  lead- 
ing from  Marlborough  to  Bladensburg,  as  well  as  to  be  situated  in 
a  position  where  he  might  more  conveniently  communicate  with 
the  troops  expected  from  Baltimore,  leaving  directions  that  I  should 
report  to  him  at  the  Cross  Roads,  it  being  the  intersection  of  a 
road  proceeding  from  the  Old  Fields,  and  crossing  the  before-men- 
tioned road,  about  five  miles  distant.  Ilis  orders  were  that  the 
advance  troops  should  move  forward  m  the  direction  of  Marl- 
borough, reconnoitre  the  enemy,  approach  him  as  near  as  possible 
without  running  too  much  risk,  and  to  annoy  him  either  in  his  po- 
sition or  in  his  movements  by  all  the  means  in  their  power,  and 
that  I  should  remain  with  the  main  body  at  the  Old  Fields,  and 
act  according  to  the  intelligence  I  should  receive  of  the  move- 
ments of  the  enemy.  If  they  moved  upon  Bladensburg  by  the 
road  before-mentioned,  that  1  should  approach  them  by  the  inter- 
secting road  from  the  Old  Fields,  and  attack  tlicir  lett  flank,  or  if 
upon  the  road  we  now  occupied,  that  we  should  make  the  best  pos- 
sible dispositions  in  our  power,  and  receive  him  there,  unless  cir- 
cumstances imperiously  forbade  ;  otherwise  to  retire  by  a  road  in 
our  rear  to  Bladensburg  or  to  Washington,  as  at  the  time  should 
seem  most  advisahlc.  In  conformity  with  this  arrangement,  Ma- 
jor Peter,  with  the  advance  corps  and  v.ith  Captain  Caldwell's 
cavalry,  which  had  joined  us,  marched  about  11  o'clock.  About 
a  quarter  of  a  mile  in  front  of  our  then  camp  the  road  forks,  both 
leading  to  Marll)orough,  one  on  the  main  stag<"-road,  by  which  the 
distance  was  about  eight  miles,  the  other  turning  to  the  left,  a 
more  direct  route,  Init  not  so  good  a  road,  about  six  miles.  This 
last-mentioned  road  was  taken  by  our  advancing  troops.  The  com- 
mander was  instructed  to  report  every  hour.  The  residue  of  our 
troops  were  dismissed  to  refresh.  From  this  period  until  2  o'clock 
several  deserters  and  prisoivrs  were  brought  into  camp,  and  I  v.as 
rngtiged  in  ex.\miiuiig  them  when  intelligenco  was  received  froiM 
Major  Peter  that  the  enemy  had  left  Marlborough,  ami  were  ad- 
vancing rapidly  upon  the  road  which  we  then  occupied  in  great 


'in 


?AS 


APPENDIX. 


f       if  M  ■ 

i' 


I: 


bur " 


If 


'litilii  < 


Ml 


force ;  that,  according  to  his  estimation  of  their  column,  and  the 
hest  information  he  could  obtain,  their  force  was  not  less  than  six 
thousand  men  ;  that  he  had  had  a  skirmish  with  them,  in  which 
they  had  endeavored  to  outflank  him,  and  tliat  he  was  then  retir- 
ing iK'iure  them.  A  part  of  Colonel  Laval's  cavalry,  having  then 
juined  us,  were  immedialely  detached  to  cover  tli(3  retreat,  and  the 
whole  of  our  troops  ordered  under  arms.  Conferring  with  Com- 
modore Barney  on  the  subject,  I  proposed  making  a  stand  in  our 
then  position,  with  which,  with  his  characteristic  gallantry,  he 
promptly  accpiiesced,  professing  his  willingness  to  co-operate  in 
any  measures  that  might  be  deemed  most  advisable.  The  troops 
were  immedintcly  formed  in  order  of  battle,  extending  nearly  a 
quarter  of  a  r.ule  on  each  side  of  tht;  road;  those  of  Commodore 
iJanu'y,wiih  his  heavy  artillery,  the  marines  under  Captain  Mil- 
ler, and  the  3Gth  United  ^States  regiment,  being  posted  on  the  right 
of  the  road  ;  the  District  troops,  and  the  residue  of  those  attached 
to  them,  on  the  left — our  advaiu-ed  troops,  as  they  arrived,  taking 
their  stations  in  the  line,  and  the  artillery,  in  which  it  was  ascer- 
tained we  were  greatly  their  superior,  and  for  which  the  ground 
was  admirably  adajited,  so  posted  as  to  hav(>  the  best  elVect;  in- 
ilced,  so  hironi.''  did  we  deem  our  position  in  front  that  we  were 
apprehensive  that  the  enemy,  upon  viewing  us,  would  forbear  to 
assail  us  by  daylight,  or  that,  availing  of  his  numbers,  he  would 
endeavor  to  outflank  us.  To  gu:ivd  against  this  last,  parties  of 
light  tn)Ops  and  cavalry  were  detached  to  cover  both  flanks.  We 
remained  thus  two  or  three  hours  calmly  awaiting  the  approach 
of  the  enemy,  our  vedettes  suec(>sively  aiuunnu'ing  his  continued 
progress.  Al)out  5  I*. M., General  \Viniler,  who  had  been  apprised 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  arrived  in  camp.  He  e.vamined  the 
diflercnt  positions,  and  approved  of  them  ;  but  the  day  being  now 
nearly  spent,  and  it  being  ascertained  that  the  enemy  had  not  ar- 
rived witli  n  a  distance  in  which  he  would  now  probably  be  able 
to  make  his  attack  while  it  lasted,  and  il  being  deemed  unadvis- 
aiilo  to  rec(>iv(^  a  night  attack  there,  \\hen  our  advantage  of  artil- 
lery would  be  unavailing,  he  gave  the  ordiM-s  to  retire  about  sun- 
.'-et,  and  the  whole  of  the  troops,  much  wearied  and  exhausted,  en- 
camped late  in  the  ni'iht  within  this  city. 

Thus  terminated  the  four  days  of  service  of  (he  troop.s  of  this 
District  preceding  the  airnir  at  Hladensburg.     They  had  been  nn- 


ArPKNDlX. 


340 


'olumn,  and  the 
ot  loss  than  six 
ihem,  in  which 
was  then  retir- 
ry,  having  then 
retreat,  and  the 
rinir  with  (Joni- 
;  a  stand  in  our 
e  gallantry,  he 
3  co-operate  in 
e.     The  troops 
Muiing  nearly  a 
of  Commodore 
er  Captain  Mil- 
ited  on  the  right 
f  those  attached 
arrived,  taking 
h  it  was  ascer- 
lich  the  ground 
hcst  cflect;  in- 
t  that  we  were 
ould  lorhear  to 
l)(M-s,  he  would 
ast,  parties  of 
h  Hanks.    We 
the  approach 
U  his  contiiuied 
leen  apprised 
e  evammed  the 
day  heiiig  now 
ny  had  not  ar- 
thahly  he  ahlo 
Mued  imadvis- 
iiitage  of  artil- 
tir(^  aliout  sun- 
exhausted,  en- 
troops  of  this 
/  had  hern  tin- 


m 


der  arms,  with  hut  little  intermission,  the  whole  ot  the  time,  hoth 
night  and  day  ;  had  traversed,  during  their  ditferent  marches  in 
advance  and  retreat,  a  considerahle  tract  of  country,  exposed  to  the 
burnmg  heat  of  a  sultry  sun  by  day,  and  many  of  them  to  the  cold 
(h.'ws  of  the  night,  uncovered.  They  had,  in  this  period,  drawn 
hut  two  rations,  the  requisition  th'Tcfor,  in  the  first  instance,  hav- 
ing been  hut  parti;'.lly  complied  with,  and  it  being  afterward  almost 
impossible  to  procure  the  means  of  transportation,  the  wagons  em- 
ployed by  our  (piartermaster  for  that  purpose  being  constantly  im- 
pressed by  the  government  agents  for  the  purpose  of  removing  the 
j)ublic  records  when  the  enemy's  approach  was  known,  and  some 
of  them  thus  seized  while  proceeding  to  take  in  provisions  for  the 
army. 

Those  hardships  and  privations  could  not  be  but  severely  dis- 
tressing to  men,  the  greater  jKirt  of  whom  possessed  and  enjoyed 
at  home  the  means  of  comfortal)le  living,  and  from  their  usual  hab- 
its and  pursuits  in  lif(!  but  ill  (lualified  to  endure  them.  They, 
however,  submitted  without  murmuring,  evincing  by  their  patience, 
their  zeal,  and  the  promptitude  with  which  they  obeyed  every  or- 
der, a  magnanimity  highly  honorable  to  their  character.  CJreat  as 
was  their  merit  in  this  resjject,  it  was  no  less  so  in  the  spirit  man- 
ifested whenever  an  order  was  given  to  inarch  to  meet  the  foe; 
and  at  the  "  Long  Old  Fields,"  where  his  attack  was  momently  ex- 
pected in  overwhelming  force,  they  displayed,  in  presence  of  many 
spectators,  although  scarcely  any  of  them  had  ever  been  in  action, 
a  firmness,  a  resolution,  and  an  intrepidity  which,  whatever  might 
have  been  the  n.-sult,  did  honor  to  their  country. 

On  Wednesday  morning,  tlw;  'JJth  of  August,  at  II  A.M.,  I  re- 
ceived orders  from  (Jeneral  W  inder  to  iletach  one  piece  of  artil- 
lery and  one  company  of  infantry  to  repair  to  the  Kastern  IJranch 
Uridine,  and  there  report  to  Colonel  ^\'a^lsworth  ;  and  to  proceed 
with  the  residue  (d'tlie  troo[)s  to  IMadensburg,  and  take  a  position 
to  support  (tcneral  JStansbury.  'J'his  order  was  put  in  inunediale 
execution,  and  the  troo[)s  for  Tiladeiisburg  moved  olV  with  ail  the 
expedition  of  which  they  were  capable.  Having  l)nt  them  in  mo- 
tion, I  passed  on  ahead,  in  order  that  I  nnudit  select  my  position 
against  their  arrival.  I  found  (ieneral  Stansbury  posted  on  the 
west  side  of  the  Eastern  llranch,  his  rii^ht  resting  on  the  main 
roa<l,  distant  from  the  bridge  at  niadensbnrg  five  or  six  buml!"  1 


I 


350 


APPENDIX. 


■ 


it, 


yards,  and  extending  northeastwardly,  his  left  approaching  nearer 
to  the  creek.  An  extensive  apple-orchard  was  in  his  front,  and, 
one  hundred  to  two  hundred  yards  in  advance,  a  work  thrown  up, 
commanding  the  bridge,  occupied  by  a  corps  of  artillerists  with 
five  or  six  pieces,  and  appeared  to  be  supported  by  some  rille  and 
light  companies.  In  his  rear,  on  the  right,  was  a  thick  under- 
growth of  wood,  and  directly  behind  that  a  deep  hollow  or  ravine, 
open  or  cleared,  of  about  sixty  yards  in  width,  which  the  main 
road  crosses.  The  ravine  terminates  on  the  lefl  in  a  bold  accliv- 
ity, about  two  hundred  yards  from  the  road  ;  the  rest  of  the  ground 
in  his  rear  was  open,  unbroken,  and  gradually  ascending  fields. 
Having  hastily  examined  the  grounds,  and  concluded  on  the  dis- 
positions I  should  make,  I  apprised  General  JStansbury  of  my 
views  as  to  the  troops  under  my  command,  suggesting  that,  if  his 
line  should  be  forced  and  he  could  again  form  on  my  left,  the  na- 
ture of  the  ground  there  would  be  favorable  for  a  renewal  of  the 
action,  which  might  then  become  general.  By  this  time  we  re- 
ceived advice  that  the  enemy  were  near  Bladensburg,  and  I  left 
him  to  hasten  the  arrival  of  my  troops.  They  moved  rapidly  on, 
notwithstanding  the  excessive  heat  of  tiic  day,  covered  with  clouds 
of  dust,  and  were  promptly  disposed  of  as  follows  :  Lieutenant-col- 
onel Scott,  with  tlie  JOth  V.  S.  regiment,  was  posted  in  a  field  on 
the  left  of  the  road,  his  right  resting  upon  it,  and  commanding  the 
road  descending  into  the  ravine  before  mentioned,  in  the  rear  of 
General  Stansbury's  right,  and  the  rest  of  his  line  commanding  the 
ascent  from  the  ravine.  This  position  wns  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  in  the  rear  of  the  front  line,  but  extending  to  the 
right.-  In  the  same  field,  a!)oiit  one  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of 
the  3(5th  regiment,  Colonel  Magruder  was  posted  with  a  part  of 
the  1st  regiment  of  District  militia,  his  right  also  resting  upon  the 
road,  the  h'ft  advanced,  presenting  a  front  obliquely  to  the  road, 
and  situated  to  cover  and  co-operate  with  the  36th  regiment; 
Major  Peter,  with  his  artillery,  six  .six-pounders;  Captain  David- 
Bon'.s  liglit  infiintry,  and  Captain  Stu'l's  rilh^  corps,  armed  with 
niu.i/ift.'!,  all  of  the  same  regiment,  were  ordcrcil  to  take  possession 
of  the  abrupt  acclivity  before  mentio:;;^d,  termin;iling  tlio  ravine. 
This  was  deemed  a  desirable  position,  because  it  commanded  com- 
pletely the  ravine  and  the  road  crossing  it,  and  a  considerable  ex- 
t.'nt  of  the  .<rrou;id  over  whifh  the  front  line  would  necessarily  ro- 


V.  « 


tf' 


APPENDIX. 


351 


roaching  nearer 

I  his  front,  and, 
^ork  thrown  up, 
artillerists  with 
J  some  rirto  and 

a  thick  under- 
jIIow  or  ravine, 
v'hich  the  main 

II  a  bold  accliv- 
>t  of  the  ground 
icending  fields. 
Jed  on  the  dis- 
insbury  of  my 
ting  that,  if  Ills 
ny  left,  the  na- 
renewal  of  the 
is  time  we  re- 
urg,  and  I  left 
red  rapidly  on, 
red  with  clouds 
jieutonaiit-col- 
d  in  a  field  on 
mmaiiding  the 
in  the  roar  of 
mmanding  the 

'.  one  iiundrcd 
tending  to  the 
in  the  rear  of 
lith  a  pnrt  of 
Hting  upon  tlio 
'  to  the  road, 
Ith  regiment; 
^ptain  David- 
,  armed  with 
ke  possession 
g  the  ravine, 
manded  coin- 
siderablc  cx- 
Jcessarily  re- 


tire if  forced  back  ;  but,  after  a  short  space  of  time,  report  was 
made  to  nin  that  broken  grounds  interrupted  the  approach  to  it 
vvitli  artillery  but  l)y  a  circuiious  route  that  would  consume  much 
time,  and  that,  in  case  of  retreat,  the  grotmd  in  the  rear  was  such 
as  might  endanger  the  safety  of  the  guns.  It  was  mentioned,  at 
the  same  time,  that  near  to  it  was  a  commanding  position  for  ar- 
tillery, and  easy  of  access  from  and  to  the  road.  I  yielded  with 
reluctance  to  the  ai)andonment  of  the  position  first  ordered,  but 
time  did  not  admit  of  hesitation.  Meanwhile  I  had  posted  Lieu- 
tenant-colonel Kramer,  with  his  battalion  of  INIaryland  drafted  mi- 
litia, in  the  woods  on  the  right  of  the  road,  and  commanding  the 
ravine  which  continued  in  that  direction,  with  orders  that,  if  forced, 
he  should  retire,  by  his  right,  through  a  body  of  woods  in  that  di- 
rection, and  rally  and  form  with  the  troops  stationed  in  the  rear,  on 
the  extreme  right.  Upon  examining  the 'position  taken  by  Major 
Peter's  battery,  it  was  found  that  the  range  of  his  guns  was  prin- 
cipally throuf^h  that  part  of  the  field  occupied  by  the  3r)th  regi- 
ment. To  remove  one  or  the  other  became  necessary,  and  the 
difficulty  (»f  the  ground  for  moving  artillery,  and  the  exigency  of 
the  movement  left  no  alternative.  The  3Gth  fell  back  about  one 
hundred  yards,  losing,  in  some  measure,  the  advantage  of  its  ele- 
vated ground,  and  leaving  the  road.  The  pcsition  of  the  1st  regi- 
ment District  militia,  frnin  this  circumstance,  was  also  necessarily 
chanprcd.  It  fi'll  back  about  the  .same  distance,  its  right  ^^till  rest- 
ing on  the  road,  and  now  formed  nearly  in  line  with  the  3fith.  Of 
the  '2d  rerjinKMit  District  militia,  *\\o  pieces  of  artillery  and  one 
company  of  riflemen,  armed  with  muskets,  were,  by  directions  of 
General  Winder,  sent  on  to  the  front;  with  these  he  llnnkcd  the 
extreme  left  of  the  front  line ;  two  pieces  more  of  artillery  were 
posted  in  the  road  near  the  bridge  at  liladensburg  ;  the  residue 
of  that  regiment,  about  three  liuiidred  and  fifty  strong,  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Hrent,  was  lormed  as  a  reserve  a  short  dis- 
tance in  the  rear  of  Major  Peter's  battery,  and  so  disposed  as  to 
act  on  the  right,  or  left,  or  in  front,  as  occasion  might  retpiire. 
Near  them  was  posted,  in  the  same  manner.  Major  Waring's  Prince 
ficorffc's  battalion  of  militia,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty.  Colo- 
nel  William  D.  Ijeall,  with  a  regiment  of  troops  from  Anna[)olis, 
passed  throurrji  HIadensburg  as  our  troops  arrived,  and  took  a  po- 
sition on  1h«  right  of  the  road  and  nearly  fronting  it,  at  a  distance 


>  .i: 


^  • 


ki 


i  *' 


i'H 


1  '. 
1  ' 


:i52 


APl'ENDIX. 


ot"  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  yards.  Previous  to  tlio  arrival  of 
the  troops  on  the  ground,  General  Winder  came  up  from  the  city, 
and,  being  made  acquainted  with  the  intended  dispositions  of  the 
troofps,  as  well  as  tlie  ground  reserved  for  Commodore  Barney  and 
the  marines,  approved  of  and  confirmed  them. 

About  half  past  twelve  o'clock,  and  whdc  the  troops  were  yet 
taking  their  diflTerent  positions,  innumerable  rockets,  thrown  from 
the  heights  at  Bladensburg,  announced  the  arrival  of  the  enemy 
there ;  and  at  this  period  Commodore  Barney's  sailors  and  ma- 
rines, in  quick  march,  arrived,  and  took  possession  of  the  ground 
previously  assigned  them,  his  artillery  being  posted  in  and  near  the 
road  upon  its  right,  commanding  the  road  and  open  field  in  front ; 
and  his  infantry,  together  with  the  marines  under  Captain  Miller, 
extending  to  the  right,  thus  occupying  the  interval  uf  ground  be- 
tween Colonel  Magruder's  1st  regiment  District  militia  and  Colo- 
nel Beall's  Maryland  regiment.  The  firing  of  artillery  in  front 
soon  commenced,  and  immediately  after  that  of  musketry,  in  quick 
and  rapid  succession.  In  a  few  minutes  the  whole  right  and  cen- 
tre of  the  front  line,  with  some  small  exceptions,  were  seen  retir- 
ing in  disorder  and  confusion.  The  firing  still  continued  on  the 
extreme  left,  but  shortly  after  it  also  broke,  and,  although  it  retired 
in  more  order,  yet  none  could  be  rallied  so  as  to  renew  the  action 
with  eflect,  and  also  soon  entirely  quitted  the  field. 

Meanwhile  the  left  of  the  enemy,  in  heavy  column,  passed  along 
the  road  crossing  the  ravine.  They  were  here  encountered  by 
the  troops  of  Colonel  Kramer,  po,sted  in  the  woods  on  the  edge  of 
the  ravine.  These,  after  a  short  confiict,  were  compelled  to  re- 
tire, which  they  did  principally  under  cover  of  the  adjacent  woods, 
and  formed  with  the  troops  of  Colonel  Beall  on  the  right.  The 
enemy's  column  now  displayed  in  the  field  on  the  right  of  the  road. 
They  here  became  exposed  to  the  oblique  fire  of  Major  Peter's 
battery,  which  was  kept  up  with  great  animation.  Still  pressing 
on  to  the  front  of  our  right,  they  came  in  contact  with  the  heavy 
artillery  of  Commodore  Barney,  and  of  the  troops  posted  there. 
Here  the  firing  became  tremendous.  They  were  repulsed,  again 
returned  to  the  charge,  succeeded  in  forcing  the  troops  on  the 
right,  and  finally  carried  the  position  of  Commodore  Barney. 

The  dispersion  of  the  front  line  caused  a  dangerous  opening  on 
our  left,  of  which  the  enemy  in  that  quarter  promptly  availed. 


J    ' 


APPENDIX. 


353 


1  tho  arrival  ot' 
1  iVom  the  city, 
pobitiuiis  of  tlio 
ore  Barney  and 

roops  were  yet 
s,  thrown  from 
'  of  tlie  enemy 
ailors  and  ma- 
i  of  the  ground 
in  and  near  the 
I  field  in  front ; 
Captain  Miller, 
ui'  ground  be- 
litia  and  Colo- 
tillcry  in  front 
;ketry,  in  quick 
right  and  cen- 
ere  seen  retir- 
ntinued  on  the 
lOugh  it  retired 
lew  the  action 

I,  passed  along 

ncountered  by 

)n  the  edge  of 

mpelled  to  re- 

Ijaccnt  woods, 

c  right.     Tho 

It  of  tho  road. 

Major  Peter's 

►Still  pressing 

ith  the  heavy 

posted  there. 

Dpulsed,  again 

roops  on  tho 

IJarney. 

IS  opening  on 

iptly  availed. 


lie  advanced  ra})idly  ;  then,  wlieeling  on  liis  lei\,  .soon  gained,  and 
M'as  turning  our  left  flank.  To  oppose  this  alarming  movement,  1 
directed  Colonel  lirent,  with  the  '2d  regiment  of  District  nuhtia, 
to  take  a  position  sail  more  to  the  left ;  and  he  was  proceeding  in 
the  execution  of  this  order,  when  orders  came  from  General  Win- 
der for  the  whole  of  the  troops  to  retreat.  The  elTorts  of  the  en- 
emy Imd  hitherto  l)een  directed  princii)ally  against  the  right  and  left 
of  our  wliole  line  of  battle.  The  troops  of  this  District,  and  a  part 
of  those  attached  to  them,  occupying  positions  mostly  in  the  cen- 
tre, and  some  of  them  dinicult  of  access,  were  eonse([uently  but 
partially  engaged,  and  this  principally  with  light  troops  and  skir- 
mishers, now  pressing  forward,  supported  by  a  column  of  infantry. 

1  here  beg  leave  to  refer  to  the  reports  of  Colonels  Bri.'ut  and 
Thompson,  Xos.  1  and  "i,  showing  the  positions,  and  the  part  taken 
by  their  respective  ccnnmands  during  the  at^tion. 

The  order  to  retreat  was  executed  by  regiments  and  corps,  as 
they  had  been  formed,  and  with  as  much  order  as  the  nature  of 
the  ground  would  jjermit.  The  first  and  second  regiments  halted 
and  fi)rmed.  after  retreating  five  or  six  hundred  paces,  but  were 
again  ordered  by  (General  Winder  to  retire.  At  this  moment  I 
lell  in  with  General  Winder,  and,  after  a  short  conference  with 
him,  was  directed  to  move  on  and  collect  the  troops,  and  prepa.-c 
to  make  a  stand  on  the  heights  westward  of  the  turiii)ike  gate. 
This  was  done  as  last  as  the  troops  came  up.  A  front  was  again 
presented  toward  the  enemy,  consisting  principally  of  the  troops 
of  this  District,  a  part  of  those  who  had  been  attached  to  them  in 
the  action,  and  a  A'irginia  regiment  of  about  four  hundred  men, 
under  Colonel  Minor,  which  met  us  at  this  place.  While  the  lino 
was  yet  forming,  I  received  orders  from  CJeneral  AA'inder  to  fall 
back  to  ilie  Capitol,  and  there  form  for  !)attle.  1  took  the  liberty 
of  suggesting  my  impression  of  the  preferable  situation  we  then 
occupied;  but,  expecting  that  he  might  be  joined  there  by  som  : 
of  the  di-spcrscd  troops  of  the  front  line,  ho  chose  to  make  the  st-^'id 
there.  Approaching  the  Capitol,  I  halted  the  troops, and  requested 
his  orders  as  to  the  fi)rmation  of  the  line.  Wo  found  no  auxilia- 
ries there.  He  then  conferred  for  a  few  moments  with  General 
Armstiong.  who  was  a  short  di.stance  from  us,  and  then  gave  or- 
ders that  the  whole  should  retreat  through  Washington  ;ind 
Georgetown.    It  is  impossible  to  do  justice  to  the  anguish  evinced 


»!■: 


354 


APPENDIX. 


u » 


by  the  troops  of  Washington  and  Georgetown  on  the  receiving 
of  this  order.  The  idea  of  leaving  their  families,  their  houses,  and 
their  honjes  at  the  mercy  of  an  enraged  enemy  was  insupportable. 
To  preserve  that  order  which  was  maintained  during  the  retreat 
was  now  no  longer  practicable.  As  they  retired  through  Wash- 
ington and  Georgetown,  numbers  were  obtaining  and  taking  leave 
to  visit  their  homes,  and  then  again  rejoining ;  and  with  ranks 
thus  broken  and  scattered,  they  halted  at  night  on  the  heights  near 
Tcnleytown,  and  on  the  ensuing  day  assembled  at  Montgomery 
Court  House. 

I  have  thus,  sir,  given  a  detailed,  and  what  will,  I  apprehend,  in 
many  respects,  be  deemed  too  minute  an  account  of  the  short  tour 
of  service  of  the  District  troops  under  my  command  which  pre- 
ceded the  capture  of  this  capital.  I  fear  its  length  may  trespass 
toi.  uch  on  the  patience  of  your  honorable  committee.  I  thought 
it,  however,  due  to  the  occasion,  and  conformable  to  the  spirit  and 
pui-port  of  your  inquiries.  I  had  another  object.  The  troops  of 
Washington  and  Georgetown  have  been  assailed,  in  the  public 
prints  and  elsewhere,  with  calumnies  as  unmerited  as  they  are 
cruel  and  wanton.  They  have  heard  of  them  with  indignant  as- 
tonishment. Conscious  that  in  no  instance  have  they  been  want- 
ing in  the  duty  they  owed  to  their  country  or  to  themselves,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  in  obedience  to  the  call  of  their  government,  have 
with  alacrity  obeyed  its  orders,  and  intrepidly  fronted  an  enemy 
vastly  their  superior  in  force,  and  never  yielded  the  ground  to 
him  but  by  orders  emanating  from  superior  authority,  they  can  not 
lestrain  the  feelings  excited  by  such  manifest,  such  unprovoked 
injustice.  They  have  seen  with  satisfaction  the  resolution  of 
Congress  to  inquire  into  this  subject,  and,  persuaded  of  the  justice 
and  impartiality  of  your  honorable  committee,  entertain  a  confident 
assurance  that  the  result  of  your  investigation  will  afford  relief  to 
their  injured  feelings.  Connected  with  this  subject,  I  beg  leave 
to  refer  to  a  letter  of  General  Winder,  No.  3,  in  answer  to  an  in- 
quiry made  of  him  as  to  the  general  conduct  of  the  brigade  while 
under  his  command. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc.,  W.  Smith, 

IJrigadier-general  1st  Columbian  brigade. 
Hon.  R.  M.  Johnson. 

P.S, — I  ought  to  have  mentioned  that  parts  of  two  companies 


APPENDIX. 


355 


n  the  receiving 
heir  houses,  and 
s  insupportable, 
ring  the  retreat 
through  Wash- 
md  taking  leave 
and  with  ranks 
the  heights  near 
at  Montgomery 

,  I  apprehend,  in 
Df  the  short  tour 
land  which  pre- 
th  may  trespass 
ittee.  I  thought 
to  the  spirit  and 
The  troops  of 
d,  in  the  public 
ted  as  they  are 
th  indignant  as- 
they  been  want- 
themselves,  but, 
ivernment,  have 
jnted  an  enemy 
[  the  ground  to 
[ty,  they  can  not 
iich  unprovoked 
e  resolution  of 
ed  of  the  justice 
rtain  a  confident 
1  afford  relief  to 
ect,  I  beg  leave 
inswcr  to  an  in- 
le  brigade  while 


unibian  brigade, 
two  companies 


of  the  United  States  12th  and  38th  regiments  were  attached  to 
the  SGtii  regiment,  under  Lieutciiunt-colonel  Scott.  Previous  to 
the  march  to  Bladensburg,  eighty  men  of  his  command  had  been 
stationed  near  the  Eastern  liranch  Bridge,  and  did  not  join  until 
after  the  action.    His  force  then  was  less  than  three  hundred  men. 

W.  S. 


No.  IV. 

COLONEL  GEORGi:  MINOR'S  STATEMENT. 

In  answer  to  the  stvcral  interrogatories  made  by  Colonel  R.M. 
Johnson,  cliairman  of  the  committee  of  inquiry  into  the  causes  of 
the  destruction  of  the  public  buildings  in  the  City  of  \\'ashington, 
as  hereunto  annexed,  state  as  follows,  viz.  : 

On  Friday,  the  19th  of  August  la.st,  was  jnformed  (not  officially) 
of  the  collecting  of  the  enemy's  forces  in  our  waters,  namely,  the 
Potomac  and  Patuxcnt.  Immediately  issued  orders  for  the  ren-i- 
ment  under  my  command  to  assemble  at  Wren's  tavern  on  the 
Tuesday  following,  it  being  the  nearest  point  of  the  county  of 
Fairfax  to  the  city  ;  and  on  Sunday,  the  21st,  received  orders, 
tlirough  Brigadier-general  Douglas,  to  repair  with  a  detachment 
of  ninety  men,  that  had  been  prcviou.sly  placed  in  detail,  to  march 
at  a  moment's  warning,  to  the  aid  of  General  Ilungcrford,  whose 
head-quarters  were  in  the  counties  of  Westmoreland,  King  George, 
or  Northumberland  ;  and  to  make  one  other  requisition  of  one 
iuuidrcd  and  forty  men,  exclusive  of  officers,  and  order  them  to  the 
aid  of  General  Winder,  City  of  Washington.  And  on  Monday 
evening,  the  22d,  received  a  verbal  message  from  the  President, 
by  Mr.  John  Graham,  to  hasten  on  the  troops  which  had  been  or- 
dered from  my  regiment,  whicli  will  more  llilly  appear  by  said 
Graham's  letter  to  General  Winder,  to  which  I  beg  leave  to  refer 
the  committee;  and,  after  informing  Mr.  Graham  the  purport  of 
the  orders  I  had  received,  we  both  concluded  it  would  be  proper 
for  him  to  return  to  Washington,  and  have  the  orders  first  alluded 
to  countermanded,  so  as  to  justify  me  in  marching  with  my  whole 
force  to  the  city,  which  consisted,  as  well  as  I  can  recollect,  of 
six  hundred  infantry  and  about  one  hundred  cavalry;  and  the  said 
Graham  returned  to  Wren's  tavern  on  Tu':'sday  evening,  the  23d, 
with  General  Winder's  orders,  written  on  the  same  letter  to  which 


Il 


liii 


I         '  !i 


I 


■    i' 


856 


APPENDIX. 


I  have  referred  the  committee,  on  the  receipt  of  which  I  took  up 
my  line  of  niarcii  immediately,  and  arrived  at  the  Capitol  l)et\\eon 
sunset  and  dark,  and  immediately  made  my  way  to  the  President 
and  reported  my  arrival,  when  he  referred  me  to  General  Arm- 
strong, to  whom  I  repaired,  and  informed  him  as  to  the  strength 
of  the  troops,  as  well  as  to  the  want  of  arms,  ammunition,  etc., 
which  made  it  as  late  as  early  candle-light,  when  I  was  informed 
hy  that  gentleman  the  arms,  etc.,  could  not  be  had  that  night,  and 
directed  me  to  report  myself  next  morning  to  Colonel  Carberry, 
who  would  furnish  me  with  arms,  etc.,  w'hich  gentleman,  from  ear- 
ly next  morning,  I  diligently  sought  for,  until  a  late  hour  of  the 
forenoon,  without  being  able  to  find  him,  and  then  went  in  search 
of  General  Winder,  whom  I  found  near  the  Eastern  Branch,  when 
he  gave  an  order  to  the  armorer  for  the  munitions  wanting,  with 
orders  to  return  to  the  ('apitol,  there  to  await  further  orders. 

On  my  arrival  at  the  armory,  found  that  department  in  the  caro 
of  a  very  young  man,  who  dealt  out  the  stores  cautiously,  which 
went  greatly  to  consume  time ;  as,  for  instance,  when  flints  were 
once  counted  by  my  officers,  who  showed  every  disposition  to  ex- 
pedite the  furnishing  the  men,  the  young  man  had  to  count  them 
over  again  before  they  could  be  obtained  ;  and  at  which  place  I 
met  with  Colonel  Carberry,  who  introduced  himself  to  me,  and 
apologized  for  not  bring  found  when  I  was  in  search  of  him,  stat- 
ing he  had  left  town  the  evening  before,  and  had  gone  to  his  seat 
in  the  country.  After  getting  the  men  equipped,  I  ordered  them 
on  to  the  Capitol,  and  waited  myself  to  sign  the  receipts  for  the 
munitions  furnished  ;  and,  on  my  arrival,  was  informed  by  INIajor 
Hunter,  who  commanded  in  my  absence,  orders  had  been  given  to 
march  to  Bladensburg,  when  we  took  up  our  march  for  that  place, 
and  met  the  retreating  army  on  this  side  the  turnpike  gate  ;  and 
was  ordered  by  one  of  General  Winder's  aids  to  form  the  line  of 
battle  on  a  height  near  that  place,  and  was  soon  after  ordered  by 
the  general  in  person  to  throw  back  my  regiment  from  that  posi- 
tion into  sections,  and  to  wait  until  the  retreating  army  had  pass- 
ed, and  cover  their  retreat;  and  immediately  afler  sent  his  aid  to 
direct  me  to  countermarch  immediately,  and  come  to  the  Capitol. 

After  returning  there,  halted  the  troops  to  wait  further  orders, 
imtil  {general  Winder  directed  me  to  march  them  on,  without  tell- 
ing me  where ;  of  course  1  marched  with  the  other  troops  until  I 


ArrKNDix. 


357 


which  I  took  up 
Capitol  hctweon 
to  the  PresicJt'Ut 
)  General  Arm- 
to  the  strength 
nimunition,  etc., 
I  was  intbrmcil 
d  that  night,  and 
olonel  Carherry, 
leman,  from  ear- 
late  hour  of  the 
1  went  in  search 
rn  Branch,  when 
IS  wanting,  with 
:her  orders, 
ment  in  the  caro 
autiously,  which 
A'hen  Hints  were 
lisposition  to  ex- 
d  to  count  them 
t  which  place  I 
[.sell'  to  me,  and 
'cli  of  him,  stat- 
gone  to  his  seat 
,  I  ordered  them 
receipts  for  the 
)rmed  hy  INIajor 
d  heen  given  to 
li  for  that  place, 
ipiko  gate  ;  and 
brm  the  line  of 
fter  ordered  hy 
from  that  posi- 
army  had  pass- 
sent  his  aid  to 
to  the  Capitol, 
further  orders, 
nn,  without  tell- 
r  troops  until  I 


came  to  the  Six  Buildings,  where  I  took  the  left-liaiul  road,  lead- 
ing to  the  foundry,  and  there  occupied  the  nearest  height  to  that 
place,  and  sent  the  adjutant  to  lind  where  the  general  had  made 
his  rallymg-poim,  -md  was  informed  at  Tenleytown,  wlirre  I  march- 
ed that  evening,  and  found  the  troops  movuig  oil'  to  encamp  at 
some  convenient  place  on  the  river  road,  where  I  followed  on  un- 
til I  saw  two  harns,  where  I  made  to,  and  rested  for  the  night. 
Next  morning  sought  for  General  Winder ;  met  him  on  the  road 
leading  from  Tenleytown  to  where  my  troops  lay,  when  he  ordcr- 
t'd  me  to  Montgomery  Court  House,  and  from  thence  to  Baltimore. 
Given  under  my  hand,  City  of  Washington,  3()lh  of  Octoher, 

1811.  GkoRGE    iMiNOK, 

Colonel-commandant  GOth  regiment  Virginia  militia. 


I 


No.  V. 

rUOM  MAJOli  GEOUUE  PLTEK  To  COI.ONKL  ,).  S.  WILLIAMS. 

Montiinvpi'd,  May  24,  1>54. 

Dear  Sir, — Your  communication  of  the  18th  instant  has  been 
duly  received.  After  the  unfortunate  aflair  of  Bladenshurg  I  was 
called  upon  hy  Colonel  R.  IM.  Johnson,  appointed  chairman  of  a 
committee  of  Congress  to  investigate  the  capture  of  Washinirton. 
I  (h^clmed  making  any  communication.  Cabinet  ministers,  rival 
candidates  for  the  presidency  (Monroe  and  Armstrong),  generals, 
iield-ollicers,  captains,  and  subalterns,  and  citizens,  had  all  made 
communications  to  the  chairman  and  his  committee,  presentino- 
such  a  variety  of  views  and  statements  connected  with  the  opera- 
tions of  the  U.  S.  army,  and  the  landing  and  advance  of  the  British 
army  under  the  command  of  General  Ross,  that  I  Iclt  convinced 
it  would  be  impossible  for  any  committee  to  make  such  a  report 
as  would  embrace  a  true  statement  of  the  military  operations  con- 
nected with  the  capture  of  Washington. 

I  still  most  reluctantly  make  any  statements ;  and  but  for  va- 
rious publications,  doing  great  injustice  to  many  portions  of  the 
army,  and  misstatements  of  facts,  I  would  not  be  induced,  at  this 
late  period,  to  present  my  recollections  of  the  operations  of  that 
day  to  you. 

It  is  well-known  to  all  connected  with  the  army  on  that  occa- 


4 


Hll  '!' 


358 


APPENDIX. 


S' 


■T'  1' 


il 


U 


^i    ^\ 


r^tf 


sion,  that  tbc  «  b  "ncc  was  under  my  immediate  command,  which 
gave  me  an  o:  ^  Lunitv  of  knowing  as  much  connected  with  the 
operations  as  Ui  .  oi'ier  officer  connected  with  the  army.  I  was 
the/i>5/  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  the  last  piece  of  artillery  fired  at 
the  battle  of  Bladensburg  was  from  my  battery,  after  1  had  re- 
ceived an  order,  through  you,  from  General  JSmith  to  retreat. 

To  enter  into  all  the  details  and  movements  would  be  more  than 
I  can  undertake  by  letter ;  but  if  you  can  make  it  convenient  to 
visit  me,  I  would  go  more  into  general  details,  and  relate  many 
circumstances  that  are  too  voluminous  for  my  letter-conununica- 
tion. 

It  is  not  my  intention  to  impute  blame  or  censure  to  any  one. 
A  want  of  military  experience  was  the  groundwork  of  all  the  er- 
rors committed  in  the  military  operations  of  that  day.  Winder  and 
Armstrong  were  both  loudly  condemned  and  charged  with  things 
that  both,  in  my  opinion,  were  innocent  of.  The  great  defect  was 
the  want  oi  military  experience.  From  General  Armstrong  I  re- 
ceived every  equipment  that  was  necessary  to  render  my  corps  ef- 
ficient in  every  respect,  while  many  complained  of  their  inability 
to  procure  such  arms  and  equipments  as  were  necessary  to  render 
them  efficient ;  and  I  personally  know  that  StuU's  rifle  corps  were 
supplied  with  muskets  instead  of  their  proper  arms.*  No  sooner 
was  it  announced  that  the  enemy  had  arrived  at  Benedict,  than  I 
was  sent  for  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  was  offered  the  ap- 
pointment of  colonel,  and  the  command  of  volunteer  corps  in  the 
District  of  Columbia.  I  w-as  aware  of  the  jealousy  and  heart- 
burning that  it  would  create  with  the  officers  commanding  militia 
regiments  to  have  the  volunteer  companies  of  their  several  regi- 
ments taken  from  them  at  the  moment  that  they  expected  to  meet 
the  enemy,  and  recommended  things  to  be  left  as  they  were,  and 
I  would  continue  to  command  the  artillery,  and  StuU  and  David- 
son's companies,  which  had  been  with  me  on  more  occasions  than 
one. 

The  first  error  committed  was  in  detaining  my  artillery  and  oth- 
er troops,  which  were  in  a  state  of  readiness  for  moving,  two  days 
from  the  City  of  Washington,  until  the  body  of  the  militia  could  be 
furnished  with  the  necessary  equipments  to  take  the  field.     You 

*  It  is  jicrsonally  known  to  tho  iiulhor  tlmt  rirtos  were  refused  to  this  corps, 
wliich  caused  great  excitement  and  iuJignatiou  at  the  time. 


amand,  which 
cled  with  the 
iiniiy.  I  was 
tillery  fired  at 
Iter  1  lud  re- 

0  retreat. 

1  be  more  than 
convenient  to 

d  relate  many 
>r-conununica- 

rc  to  any  one. 
V  of  all  the  er- 
.    Winder  and 
;ed  with  things 
rcat  defect  was 
Lrmstrong  I  re- 
:r  my  corps  ef- 
f  their  inability 
[ssary  to  render 
ifle  corps  were 
*     No  sooner 
encdict,  than  I 
offered  the  ap- 
er  corps  in  the 
usy  and  heart- 
nanding  militia 
ir  several  regi- 
pected  to  meet 
they  were,  and 
lull  and  David- 
occasions  than 

tillery  and  oth- 
Dving,  tw-o  days 
militia  could  be 
the  field.     You 

'used  to  this  corps, 


APPENDIX. 


3o0 


% 


will  recollect  tlic  nights  of  the  '22d  and  23.1.  ]My  detachment  was 
kept  under  order  to  move  toward  Notliughain.  The  order  to 
march  was  given  alioul  sunrise  on  the  mornnig  of  tlie  22(1.  llav- 
inir  hailed  for  a  few  moments  in  adviince  of  the  "  Wood  Yard,"  to 
enable  the  troops  to  get  water  to  drink,  Captain  Edward  G.Will- 
iams, of  the  cavalry,  approached  in  great  haste,  and  s\.id  he  "  had 
been  detached  for  the  purpose  of  procuring  axes  to  fell  trees  across 
the  road  to  obstruct  the  advance  of  the  enemy."  In  a  moment  my 
troops  were  in  marching  order.  1  proceeded  but  a  short  distance, 
when  1  met  Colonel  Tilghman  or  your  brother.  Lieutenant-colonel 
Olho  II.  Williams,  commanding  some  two  hundred  cavalry,  retir- 
ing to  get  on  the  road  which  led  to  Ranter's  tavern,  General  Win- 
der being  undir  the  impression  that  the  enemy  contemplated  an 
attack  upon  Fort  Washington.  This  was  the  great  error  connnit- 
ted  by  (ieneral  Winder  on  that  day.  I  was  also  advised  to  fall 
back,  l)ut  as  my  instructions  were  to  advance  until  I  met  General 
Winder  or  the  enemy,  1  continued  on  my  course. 

A  short  time  alterward  I  met  Lieutenant-colonel  Wm.  Scott  at 
the  head  of  the  regidar  troops,  also  retiring.  1  told  him  what  my 
orders  were,  and  that  I  should  continue  to  advance,  lie  very 
promptly  said  he  "  was  a  young  officer  of  but  little  experience,  and 
would  most  cheerfully  co-operate  in  any  movements  that  1  made. 
I  continued  to  advance  until  I  came  in  sight  of  Oden's  house, 
where  1  found  the  enemy  posted.  There  I  made  a  disposition  to 
meet  the  enemy  :  tStull  and  Davidson  upon  the  right,  my  six 
pieces  of  artillery  in  the  centre,  guns  loaded,  matches  lighted,  and 
Scott,  with  the  regulars,  upon  the  left.  1  had  occupied  this  position 
but  a  short  time,  when  General  Winder  arrived,  complimented  me 
for  the  position  I  occupied,  but  considered  we  were  not  in  suffi- 
cient force  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  advised  that  we  should  fall 
back  and  occupy  a  new  position.  We  did  so.  General  Winder  ac- 
companying us.  We  had  hardly  taken  possession  of  the  new  po- 
sition, when  we  heard  the  reports  of  the  explosion  of  Barney's 
flotilla.  If  General  Winder,  instead  of  detaching  the  cavalry,  had 
employed  this  regiment  under  Colonel  Tilghman,  the  regiment  of 
infantry  under  Colonel  Scott,  my  six  pieces  of  artillery,  and  the 
two  light  companies  of  StuU  and  Davidson,  and  had  marched  and 
attacked  their  rear,  I  do  not  believe  the  enemy  ever  would  have 
reached  Washington.     But  the  general  had  taken  up  the  impres- 


I    ■'i"! 


'MO 


APPENDIX. 


I 


* 


i     P 


B  :« 


sion  that  the  enemy  first  contemplated  the  capture  of  Fort  VVash- 
iiigtou,  to  enable  their  fleet  to  pass  up  the  Potomac,  and  the  cap- 
ture of  Washington  was  contemplated  by  the  joint  operations  of 
the  fleet  and  army.  This  I  looked  upon  as  the  great  error  of 
the  campaign;  for  the  troops  composing  the  army  of  (Jcneral 
Winder  were  better  calculated  to  meet  the  enemy  by  detachments 
than  in  any  gaicral  engagement,  the  most  of  them  being  militia, 
concentrated  on  the  sjjur  of  the  occasion,  with  little  or  no  military 
experiei  ce.  I  was  onlered  to  fall  back  and  join  the  concentivtion 
of  the  ar.Tiy  at  "  Long  Old  Fields."  In  returning,  1  saw  where 
General  Smith,  in  advance  of  the  "  Wood  Yard,"  hod  occupied  a 
position,  calculating  upon  the  advance  of  the  enemy  by  that  route. 
On  my  arrival  at "  Long  Old  Fields,"  in  addition  to  .Smith's  brig- 
ade, I  Ibund  the  flotilla-men  under  Commodore  IJarney,  with  a 
batt(>ry  of  two  eigliu  en-i)oundfrs,  and  the  marines  under  the  com- 
mand of  their  gallant  kuuler,  (Japtain  (late  Colonel)  Miller.  You 
will  recollect,  during  the  nights  of  the  2'2d  and  i23(l,  the  constant 
alarms  by  guns  being  fired  by  the  sentinels  dtn-ing  the  night,  til- 
ways  the  result  of  an  army  composed  principally  of  raw  militia. 
During  the  morning  of  the  i-3d  I\L-.  Madison  and  his  cabinet  ar- 
rived in  camp.  About  8  or  9  o'clock  1  was  sent  for  i)y  (I(>ncial 
Winder.  Th(^  President  and  cal)inet  were  with  him,  when  he  in- 
formed mc  that  there  were  such  various  accounts  of  the  jjosition 
and  movements  of  the  enemy  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  de- 
cide liow  to  act ;  that  he  wished  I  would  take  the  detachment  un- 
der my  command,  and  proceed  on  the  rente  to  Marlborough  until  1 
could  ascertain  correctly  the  situatioii  of  the  British  army.  Hav- 
ing advanced  within  a  short  distance  of  Marlborough,  in  tlu'  neigh- 
borhood of  Magruder's  Ikhisc,  1  discovered  the  advanced  picket 
guard  of  the  enemy,  !md  ascertained  from  Mr.  Magrudcr  or  Mr, 
Tyler,  who  occupied  the  house,  that  some  of  tiic  British  ollicers 
had  been  with  him  a  few  moments  before,  and  had  informed  bim 
that  about  the  middle  of  the  day  they  shoidd  take  up  their  line  of 
march  for  the  ('ity  of  Washington.  1  had  forgotten  (o  mention 
that,  in  addition  to  my  own  detachment.  con:<isling  of  Stull  and 
Davidson's  corjis,  Captain  Caldwell,  commanding  about  a  dozen 
of  the  city  cavalry,  accompanied  me.  I  had  advanced  Lieutenant 
Lear,  of  this  troop,  with  a  corporal  and  six  men,  and  liieutenant 
Wiley,  of  StuU's  company,  with  a  small  dctachm    it,  to  advise  of 


W    t 


^' 


AITENDIX. 


.'i(jl 


re  of  Fort  Wash- 
nac,  and  the  oap- 
lint  operations  ot" 
ic  great  error  of 
army  of  General 
ly  by  detachments 
leni  being  militia, 
ttle  or  no  military 
the  concentration 
ling,  I  saw  where 
,"  hc.cl  occui)ie(l  a 
my  by  that  route. 
11  to  ^smith's  brig- 
e  Harney,  with  a 
:s  under  the  coni- 
iiel)  Miller.     You 
'J3(l,  the  constant 
ring  the  night,  ;il- 
ly  of  raw  mililia. 
[id  his  cabinet  ar- 
nt  for  by  (lenei-al 
him,  wIkmi  lie  in- 
its  of  the  position 
ble  for  liim  to  de- 
e  detachment  un- 
arlborough  until  I 
lish  army.     Ilav- 
lugli,  in  the  neigh- 
advanced  picket 
i\l:m ruder  or  i\Ir. 
le  15riti>li  ollicers 
liii'l  informed  liiiii 
e  u[)  their  line  of 
gotten  to  mention 
iting  of  Stull  and 
ig  :ibout  a  dozen 
aiu'cd  liieuleiiant 
n,  and  liieutenant 
11    ,t,  to  advise  of 


the  approach  of  the  enemy.  Occupying  the  high  hdl  above  INIa- 
gnider'.s  house,  from  whence  I  could  overlook  much  of  the  country 
toward  iMarlborougli,  1  made  the  following  <lisj)osition.  David- 
son's company  on  the  right,  my  battery  of  six  pieces  occupving 
the  road,  and  StuU's  company  occupying  the  face  of  the  hill  on 
the  lift.  1  remained  but  a  short  time,  when  Lear  and  Wiley, with 
their  detachments,  returned,  informing  me  that  the  enemy  had 
t.ikrMi  u[)  their  line  of  inarch,  and  were  entering  the  road  I  occupied. 
I  t(tok  my  position  on  the  road  with  my  artillery.  At  that  moment 
('a[>tain  Lulfborough,  who  commanded  a  company  of  "  Orange- 
men" raised  upon  the  spur  of  the  occasion,  arrived  with  a  message 
from  (Jeneral  Winder,  saying  "my  artillery  was  too  important  an 
arm  of  his  army ;  that  ho  wished  me  to  send  it  to  the  rear ;  and 
that,  if  an  »»pportunity  ollen^d,  I  might  f(>ei  the  enemy  with  Stull's 
and  Davidson's  companies."  I  had  hardly  ordered  the  artillery  to 
retire,  when  the  Hritish  oilicers.  General  Ross  being  one  of  them, 
ajipeared  upon  the  summit  of  the  hill  1  had  letl.  I  ordered  Cap- 
tain Stull  to  give  those  red-coat  gentlemen  a  shot,  intending  only 
a  platoon  to  have  fired,  when  the  whole  company  leveled  and  fired,* 
the  ((iRcers  retiring  on  the  slope  of  the  hill  on  the  other  siilc.  At 
(hi.-  moment  the  advance  of  the  IJritish  commenc'd  firing  upon 
.Stull's  ('(Miipany.  The  company  reloaded  and  fired,  and  fell  back 
a  short  distance, when  they  advanced  a  second  time  in  good  order, 
fired  another  volley,  and  retired.  By  this  time  the  enemy  was 
advancing  in  large  numbers.  I  imined lately  sent  orders  lor  two 
pieces  of  arti'lery  to  halt,  and  to  form  on  a  commanding  piece  of 
ground  in  the  rear.  I  gave  orders  to  Captain  Davidson  to  occupy 
a  brush  fence  upon  my  left,  but  which  order  was  misunderstood, 
and  Ik;  continued  to  retire  in  good  order.  I  was  detained  upon 
th(;  ground  a  few  moments  to  secure  tlit;  .s:ifety  of  Stull's  onhsrly 
sergeant  (Nicholls),  who  was  sun-struck,  and  with  dilficulty  was 
saved  from  capture.  I  immediately  joined  the  artillery,  and  by 
firing  two  or  three  discharges  I  caused  tlu;  main  body  of  the  IJrit- 
ish army  to  halt,  while  they  sent  out  large  flanking  parties  to  the 
right  and  to  the  lell.  Colonel  Laval,  of  tl;o  regulars,  with  two 
i.-oops  of  cavalry,  joined  me.  I  proposed  to  him  ti.  protect  my 
(lanks,while  I  could  keep  the  enemy  at  arm's  length  with  my  artil- 

•  Hu.t  this  roniimny  hciii  nrmiul  witli  rifl.-s,  tlioso  ofnoow  must  have  falk-ii,  aiwl 
with  it  till'  def.'nt  (.f  tliclr  project. 

Q 


362 


APPENDIX. 


hiii' 


1  n 


n 


"4! 


lery,  for  I  found  they  were  deficient  in  that  arm.  He  excused 
himself  by  saying  his  horses  were  not  trained,  and  that  he  eoukl 
do  nothing  to  assist  me.  1  had  been  promised  by  General  Winder 
that,  in  case  of  meeting  with  the  enemy,  I  should  be  re-enforced  ; 
that  he  would  order  on  the  troops  from  Bladensburg,  under  the 
command  of  (rcncral  Stansbury,  to  the  scene  of  action.  General 
Winder's  correspondence  with  General  .Stansbury  will  account  for 
the  non-arrival  of  the  troops  under  his  command.  Why  General 
Winder  did  not  order  General  Snutirs  brigade,  with  the  marines 
and  notilla-men,  I  can  not  account.  1  retired  to  the  camp  allcr  a 
fatiguing  day's  march,  and  fountl  the  troops  there  drawn  up  to  re- 
ceive the  enemy. 

Genera!  IJo.ss,  who  had  occupied  Centroville,  sent  back  to 
Marlborough  during  the  night,  and  dragged  up,  with  his  sailors, 
some  two  or  three  pieces  of  light  artillery,  the  only  guns  he 
l)rought  with  him  to  Hladeusburg.  Another  error  that  my  friend, 
General  Winder,  committed,  was  his  forced  march  from  "  Long 
Old  Field.s"  to  Washington,  I'or  nothing  was  to  be  apprehended  on 
the  part  of  the  British  attempting  an  attack  on  i\\o.  city  by  tlie 
only  bridge  that  then  crossi^l  the  Eastern  Branch.  Ilis  true 
course  woultl  have  been  to  hav(^  broken  uj)  his  army  in  iletiich- 
ments, and  to  have  attacked  the  enemy  in  iVont  and  on  both  Hanks; 
his  superior  command  in  cavalry,  in  artiMery,  and  the  grounds  be- 
tween Bladensburg  and  Gcntrevill(>  aHording  the  opportunity  for 
the  operation  of  tlu)se  two  important  arms  of  his  army.  SmitlTs 
brigade,  and  the  troops  attached  to  that  brigade,  crossed  the  Mast- 
crn  Braru'li  Bridire  during  liu^  night  of  the  'J.'hI.  Being  much  ex- 
liausted  and  fatig\ie(l,  I  had  lain  down  in  my  tent,  w  u^n  (Jeneral 
Winder  caHed  upon  me,  and  laid  also  upon  my  p.i'let.  The  con- 
versation ensued,  in  which  he  referred  to  the  failure  of  Stansbury 
(o  join  me,  and  the  inofTiciency  of  the  troops  that  he  had  to  com- 
mand. I  was  so  exhausted  with  the  fatigues  of  the  day  that  T  fell 
asleep.  When  I  awoke  the  general  was  gone.  The  m^xt  morn- 
ing 1  received  an  order  to  cover  the  approach  of  the  bridge  wiJh 
twelve  pieces  of  artillerv.  comprising  my  own  six  and  Captain 
iJurcb's  artillery.  Ilavinii  completed  the  order,  I  waited  upon  (Jen- 
eral \\  inder  lo  tell  jiini  of  the  impossibility  ol'  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy  to  cross  the  bridge  ;  that  no  military  man  would 
attempt  to  cross  such  a  stream  with  an  army,  having  no  artillery 


h 


APPENDIX. 


36;i 


.     He  excused 

d  that  he  eouhl 

L^cneral  Winder 

he  re-enforced; 

burg,  under  the 

ction.     General 

will  account  lor 

Why  Cieneral 

kith  the  marines 

iif  cauip  alter  a 

drawn  up  to  re- 

e,  sent   hack  to 
with  his  sailors, 
e   only  guns  he 
r  that  my  friend, 
rch  from  "  Long 
1  apprehended  on 
I  ilie  city  hy  tiie 
anch.     His  true 
army  in  dctach- 
(I  on  hotli  tlanks; 
the  gro\inds  he- 
^  opportunity  for 
luiny.     SmilhV 
roHsed  the  lOast- 
Bciiig  much  ex- 
t,  w  len  General 
„i'!i't.     The  con- 
irc  of  Stansl)ury 
t  h<>  had  to  com- 
ic day  that  1  fdl 
The  next  morn- 
'  the  hridpe  with 
six  and  Captain 
v;'ited  upon  Gen- 
y  attempt  on  the 
ifnry  man  would 
iviuR  no  artillery 


to  drive  us  from  the  occupation  of  the  bridge.  In  a  few  moment: 
a  messenger  arrived,  announcing  that  the  enemy  were  on  tin 
march  to  Bladcnsburg.  I  was  ordered  immediately  to  advance 
with  the  same  detachment,  and  that  the  main  body  would  follow 
imnunhately  after.  On  my  arrival  on  the  ground  which  we  occu- 
])ied  during  the  battle,  a  position  was  shown  me  by  F.  S.  Key 
(acting  aid  lo  General  Smith),  difficult  of  access,  being  isolated  by 
numerous  and  large>  ravines  on  one  side  and  a  stream  on  the  other, 
as  one  of  three  positions  I  might  occupy  with  my  artillery.  This 
being  no  position  for  light  artillery,  such  as  I  commanded — for,  if 
once  placed  there,  it  could  not  in  any  way  be  manceuvred  so  as  to 
be  of  any  service — I  selected  a  commanding  spot  on  the  left  of 
Barney  as  the  second  best  situation  for  artillery  to  command  the 
road,  which  was  reserved  for  Barney's  heavier  pieces,  having 
posted  JStull  and  Davidson  at  the  head  of  a  wooded  ravine  on  my 
left. 

The  position  of  the  various  troops,  perhaps,  is  better  known  to 
you  than  to  me,  arising  from  the  duties  pertaining  to  yon  as  brig- 
ade-major. But,  from  my  recollection  (and  you  can  correct  any 
errors),  Colonel  ('ramer's  detaciiment  was  on  the  extreme  right, 
between  the  marines  and  Eastern  Branch  ;  Barney's  artilk^ry  and 
Miller's  marines  occupied  the  ground  from  tlie  road  to  the  woods 
where  Cramer  was  posted;  ('olonels  Hood  and  Beall  were  upon 
the  hill  in  the  re:ir  ^>i  iiarncy  and  Miller;  Colonel  Magrnder's 
regiment  was  placed  in  support  of  the  left  flank  of  Barney's  bat- 
tery ;  Coloiu.'l  Scott,  with  the  regulars,  ('olonel  Brent,  witii  the 
2d  reginieiit  of  General  Smith's  brigade,  and  Major  ^^'arren,  \»  ith 
•ii  battalion  of  Marvl;'!)-'  militia,  in  the  rear  of  my  guns;  Stull  and 
Dfidson  at  the  head  of  the  ravine,  on  the  extreme  lefi. 

The  firiiig  very  soon  commenced,  after  the  troops  had  taken  th  ^ir 
posi  ions,  with  Stansbury's  brigad(>,  which  formed  an  advanced 
ind  separate  division  of  the  forces  under  General  Winder,  where 
had  been  -  -  ncentratcd  the  conmiander-in-chief  and  the  several 
heuris  o.'' departments.  The  action  with  this  line  continued  biit  a 
short  tinu\  wliet>  1  saw  three  or  four  detachments  of  the  Balti- 
more voluntriis  maintaining,  with  great  odds,  a  conlliet  with  the 
enemy.  They  very  soon  had  to  yic  Id,  and  from  one  of  the  wound- 
ed men  who  joined  me,  who  said  he  belonged  to  Captain  War- 
field's  coinpanv,  1  learnt^d  that  it  was  Sterett's  and  Warfield's 


■f'  ! 


;i()4 


AI'PENDIX. 


'^ 


mill 


lij  ! 


t  I 


Mi 


rornpanies,  with  a  detachment  of  riflemen,  and  perhaps  others. 
By  this  time  the  enemy,  in  great  force,  had  thrown  themselves 
heliind  a  large  irame  barn,  which  stood  between  them  and  the  po- 
sition occupied  by  my  battery.  I  ordered  six  pieces  of  artillery, 
with  round  shot,  to  open  upon  the  barn,  whic'i  drove  them  frnm 
tliat  position.  They  then  marched  toward  the  bridge  that  crossed 
a  small  branch  on  the  road,  when,  comnig  within  reach  of  Barney's 
[)ositioii,  his  heavy  guns  (eightecn-pounders)  opened  most  fatally 
upon  the  advancing  column  of  the  enemy,  my  guns  keeping  up 
a  cross-fire  at  the  same  instant,  which  forced  them  to  retire  down 
the  branch  toward  the  woods,  when  they  came  in  contact  with 
Colonel  Cramer's  detachment,  and,  having  driven  him  from  the 
woods,  they  again  occupied  the  plain  in  front  of  Miller  and  Bar- 
ney, where  they  met  wit.i  the  most  formidable  resistance  they  en- 
countered during  the  day.  I  thought  then,  and  am  still  of  the 
.-anio  opinion,  that  if  General  Smith  had  ordered  to  the  riirht,  at 
lliat  moment,  a  part  of  my  battery,  and  the  regulars  under  Col- 
onel Scott,  the  advance  of  the  enemy  would  have  been  repulsed. 
The  great  loss  of  the  enemy  in  this  conflict  was  sustained  princi- 
[)ally  from  Barney's  and  Miller's  front-fire  and  the  cross-fire  of 
my  artillery.  There  was  a  sufficient  munber  of  troops  in  the  rear 
of  my  guns,  if  brought  into  relief  of  Barney  and  Miller,  to  have  re- 
pulsed the  enemy,  killed  and  crippled  as  they  were  at  that  mo- 
ment. 

I  visited  the  wounded  Briti-sh  officers  after  my  return  to  Wash- 
ington. Colonel  Thornton,  who  commanded  the  British  advance, 
spoke  of  its  being  the  heaviest  fire  from  artillery  that  he  had  ever 
<!Xperienced.  Colonels  Thornton  and  Wood,  and  Major  Browne, 
all  of  the  85th,  being  wounded  in  the  action,  were  left  behind,  along 
with  others,  after  the  retreat  of  the  British  army.  The  latter  iii- 
lormed  me  that  he  was  detached  to  capture  \n\  artillery,  btit,  on 
luiding  the  head  of  the  ravine  guarded,  he  advised  his  men  to  lie 
down  I'-Util  he  could  be  re-enforced.  Immediately  after,  he  re- 
ceived a  severe  wound  from  a  canister-shot,  and  had  no  recollec- 
tion of  any  thing  afterward. 

Having  retired  fnmi  the  field  by  orders  received  through  you, 
iilier  passing  the  turnpike  gat(>,  I  was  ordered  to  fi)rm  the  artille- 
ry ;  and  Smith's  brigade,  Ilood'.s  and  13ealPs  rejjiments,  with  many 
other  troops,  asrain  i)resented  a  very  nsspectable  appearance.     1 


w 


)crhaps  others. 
\vn  thomselven 
lem  and  the  po- 
ces  of  artillery, 
rove  them  frniu 
I  go  that  crossed 
ach  of  Barney's 
led  most  fatally 
uns  keeping  up 
1  to  retire  down 
in  contact  with 
n  him  from  thi> 
Miller  and  15ar- 
istancc  they  en- 
am  still  of  the 
to  the  ri>::ht,  at 
lars  under  ("ol- 
;  been  repulsed, 
sustained  princi- 
10  cross-fire  of 
oo])s  in  the  rear 
illcr,  to  have  re- 
vere at  that  mo- 
return  to  Wash- 
British  advance, 
that  he  had  ever 
Major  Browne, 
("ft  hohiiid,  along 
The  latter  iii- 
artillery,  hut,  on 
d  his  men  to  lie 
ely  after,  he  ro- 
had  no  recoUec- 

■ed  through  you, 

form  the  artilie- 

iKMits,  with  many 

appearance.     I 


APPENDIX. 


.thij 


oiiiititid  U)  mention  tiial  i  brought  from  the  lield  lour  ol  Barney \s 
wounded  men  and  one  of  the  Baltiiaorc  volunteers  on  my  guns. 
rruMi  tins  last  position  we  were  ordered  to  move  to  tli>'  (.'apitol. 
U  the  north  gate,  my  artillery  in  advance,  General  Winder  w:i.-. 
.11  conversation  with  me,  when  Colonel  Monroo  and  Cieneral  Arm- 
.slrong  rodu  up.  The  latter  inquired  of  General  Winder'*  what  lie 
inliMidcd  to  do."  General  Winder  very  promptly  n.'plied '"  tha; 
ihe  Baltimore  troops  had  gone  olV  in  a  diircrent  direction  from 
W  ashington  ;  that  Ikirney's  guns  were  captured  ;  and  that  he  vva: 
not  ill  a  situation  to  meet  the  enemy,  and  that  he  should  retire  ti. 
the  heigliis  above  Georgetown."  Monroe  and  Armstrong  botl; 
liowed  and  wheeled  their  horses,  and  the  troops  eonlinued  llicii 
line  of  march  to  the  neiirhl)orhuod  of  Tenleytown.  I  r('f<  r  to  tin 
conversation  there  given,  having  Ixien  present,  and  retaining  a  dis- 
tinct rccollcr.lion  of  what  was  said  on  that  occasion.  Gciiem' 
Vrmstrong,  in  his  Memoirs  relating  to  the  War  of  181:2,  says  he 
advised  General  Winder  to  occui)y  the  Cajjitol,  with  Barney's  and 
l^eter's  artillery;  (Jolonel  Monroe  concurred  with  General  Win- 
der in  the  retrograde  movement.  In  justice,  to  Winder  and  Mon- 
roe, I  do  not  lie.siuitc!  to  say  that  no  suidi  recommendation  from 
tieneral  Armstrong  took  place  (jii  that  occasion.  In  justice  in 
General  Armstrong,  I  would  say  that  every  thing  I  required  t«' 
render  my  corps  efficient  was  furnished  with  cheert'idne.s.s  mid 
(iromptne.ss ;  and  from  the  commencement  nf  the  time  he  becanu 
Secretary  of  War  to  the  close  of  the  campaign  at  Hladensbiirg, 
he  and  Mr.  Madison  had  shown  gre;it  anxiety  to  orgam/e  the  vol- 
unteers of  the  District  of  <  "oluinbia,  including  artillery,  cavalry,  in 
laiitry,  and  rillenuMi  under  my  command,  and  had  actually,  at  oiii 
lime,  made  out  the  commissiuns.  You  know  that  my  position  in 
advance  prevented  me  iVom  knowing  what  arrangements  and  otliei 
matters  relating  to  its  movements  were  going  on  with  the  army. 
I  can  only  speak  of  things  that  '^anu!  within  mij  own  knmvl'dgr. 
There  are  many  things  and  occurrences  which  are  too  v(jluminoiis 
lor  a  letter  communication.  If  your  object  is  to  write  a  histor\ 
of  that  campaign,  lei  mc  entreat  of  you  to  d(  justice  to  <///,  and 
these  that  are  cniiiled  to  merit  for  honest  and  lailhfiil  .servici  > 
rendered  upon  that  occasion  to  receivt  it.  Krom  your  letter  i  fear 
roil  contemplate  censure  toward  tho.'*e  troops  under  li'  command 
of  Stansbiirv      I  had  Imt  little  opportunity  of  ludirum  of  their  ac- 


t 


366 


APPENDIX. 


,  1     I 


ii« 


lions,  and  therefore  can  not  speak  advisedly  upon  the  subject.  I 
know  tliat  llie  wiiole  cavalry  force  of  the  army,  comprising  five  or 
bix  hundred  men,  well  mounted,  was  with  that  wing  of  the  army, 
;uid  that  they  were  never  brought  into  action.  The  position  se- 
icctcd  to  fight  a  battle  was  a  most  unfortunate  one  for  the  Amer- 
ican army  ;  a  good  situation  ibr  skirmishing,  and  for  detachments; 
;o  have  engaged  in.  13ut  the  strong  arm  of  General  Winder's 
;irniy  was  artillery  and  cavalry,  both  of  which  the  enemy  was  de- 
ik'iciit  in,  and  an  open  plain,  of  all  others,  ought  to  have  been  se- 
■ected  to  have  met  the  enemy,  when  artillery  and  cavalry  could 

lave  been  usefully  employed. 
I  am  laboring  at  this  time  under  a  painful  indisposition,  a'  d 

lave  gone  much  farther  into  detail  than  1  intended.  Such  state- 
".icnts  as  have  come  within  your  own  knowledge,  and  you  know  to 
ue  corrP(;t,  you  can  adopt ;  any  thing  you  believe  I  have  slated 
10  be  erroneous,  reject.  I  believe  that  great  injustice  was  done 
;;oth  to  Winder  and  Armstrong.     That  both  were  anxious  for  the 

access  of  our  arms,  I  have  no  doubt,  and  that  the  great  errors 

uimnitted  were  owing  to,  perhaps,  the  conflicting  views  of  the 
iieads  of  departments  and  the  commander-in-chief. 

I  do  not  pretend  to  r:peak  of  the  operations  of  Stansbury's  brig- 
ade, as  but  a  part  of  it  was  in  view  from  the  position  1  occupied  ; 
:aid  although  the  most  of  those  appeared  to  make  no  resistance, 
still  there  were  several  companies  or  detachments  that  maintained 
their  ground  most  gallantly,  until  compelled  to  retreat  by  superior 
torce.  This  Ov'curred  before  I  connnenccd  the  action,  on  the  right 
wing.  Nor  do  I  pretend  to  speak  of  other  troops  that  were  en- 
gaged, such  as  Magruder,  Reall,  and  Hood's  regiments,  as  my 
own  engagements  were  of  such  a  nature  as  to  preclude  my  seeing 
any  of  the  operations  except  those  of  Barney  and  Miller,  and  the 
action  of  my  own  guns  being  all  occupied  at  the  same  time  upon 
I  he  principal  body  of  the  opposing  troops.  Again  I  must  repeat 
that  I  have  never  been  able  to  account  for  (General  .Smith's  not 
bringing  into  action  the  regular  troops  under  Colonel  Scott.  Nor 
have  1  referred  to  the  Vandal  course  pursued  by  the  enemy :  the 
destruction  of  the  r;!pitol,  President's  house  and  public  buildings, 
some  few  private  buildings,  and  the  destruction  of  Gales  and  Sea- 
ton's  pres.s  ;in(l  type,  while  lh<^y  spared  the  press  and  type  of  otli- 
ei"ii  within  the  city.     They  had  a  right  to  destroy  the  navy-yar'l 


subject.     1 

ising  five  or 
af  the  army, 

position  se- 
r  tlie  Amer- 
dctaehnicntb 

al  Winder's 
ciny  was  de- 
ave  been  se- 
avalry  could 

position,  01  d 

Such  state - 

you  know  to 

^  have  stated 

ce  was  done 

ixious  for  the 

great  errors 

views  of  the 

nsbury's  bng- 
n  I  occupied ; 
10  resistance, 
lat  maintained 
at  by  superior 
II,  on  the  right 
that  were  en- 
ments,  as  my 
jde  my  seeing 
liller,  and  the 
me  time  upon 
I  must  repeat 
il  ^Smith's  not 
1  Scott.  Nor 
i>  enemy  :  the 
blic  buildings, 
I  ales  and  Sea- 
d  type  of  ot li- 
the navv-vnril 


APPENDIX. 


;ui7 


and  ships  of  war,  the  small  fort  and  laboratory  at  Greenleaf's 
Point,  cannon,  and  every  tiling  of  a  naval  and  military  character, 
;ind  yet  they  filled  to  destroy  almost  the  only  foundry  (Foxairs) 
;it  that  time  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  cannon  for  the  army 
;iiid  navy.  Another  great  error  committed  ijy  my  friend,  General 
Winder,  was  the  removal  of  the  troops  in  the  rear  of  Georgetown, 
instead  of  occupying  the  situation  directly  north  of  the  city,  from 
whence  he  would  have  been  enabled  to  have  acted  offensively 
against  the  enemy  ;  they,  being  without  cavalry,  could  not  have 
made  any  sudden  inroad  upon  his  army  without  being  advised  of 
it.  Indeed,  the  organization  and  equipment  of  the  enemy,  totally 
without  cavalry,  and  l)ut  two  or  three  pieces  of  artillery,  rendered 
their  situation  alarminLily  precarious  after  they  connnenced  their 
retreat  from  the  City  of  Washington,  provided  the  United  iStates 
cavalry  and  other  troops  had  been  sufiicieotly  near  to  have  com- 
menced operations  against  them. 

I  have  already  said  so  much,  I  must  decline  saying  any  thing 
more. 

V'ery  respectfully  yours,  Gkorge  Peteii. 


No.  VI. 

A  VOLUNTEER  fORVS  FROM  VIUGINI.V. 

WiisliiiijjtoH,  5tli  September,  \b.'>6. 

Dear  Colonel, — In  compliance  with  your  suggestion,  I  give 
vou  a  brief  notice  of  some  of  the  events  coming  under  my  person- 
al observation  forly-two  years  ago,  in  connection  with  the  opera- 
tions of  the  military  of  the  District  of  Columl)ia.  I  write  you  on 
the  anniversary  of  the  battles  at  the  White  House  and  Indian 
Head,  a  day  as  nearly  similar,  in  all  respects,  to  the  5th  of  Sep- 
tember, INl  1,  as  it  well  could  be. 

The  company  of  volunteer  riflemen  to  which  I  belonged  (though 
then  a  mere  lK)y  of  less  than  eighteen  years)  was  commanded  by 
Captain  George  W.  Uumphnys,  of  Jefferson  County,  as  gallant 
an  officer  ajul  liberal  gentleman  as  I  have  ever  met  with.  On  the 
ifternoon  of  the  iWd  of  August,  1H14,  a  letter  was  received  at 
f  'harlestovvn,by  express,  from  Captain  (afterward  (Jeneral)  Henrv 
St.  George  Tucker,  advising  that  the  British  troops  had  been  land- 
ed from  the   thtt  at  Nottingham,  and  were  on  their  inarch  to 


*i 


368 


APPENDIX. 


<; 


t'l 


;  ■  i 


« 


Wasliingtou.  lie  invoked  him  to  raise  volunteers  without  delay, 
and  come  to  the  rescue.  Thomas  Griggs,  Jun.,  an  eminent  lavvrycr 
and  influential  and  popular  citizen,  mounted  a  block,  and  read  the 
letter  to  the  eager  crowd  who  had  been  waiting  for  news.  A 
.-jhout, "  To  the  rescue !"  immediately  went  up  after  a  brief  address 
from  Mr.  Griggs ;  the  drum  and  file  were  sent  through  the  streets 
to  beat  up  volunteers,  and  before  sunset  a  company  of  over  fifty 
men  was  raised,  although  the  county  had  then  in  service,  at  Nor- 
folk, two  or  three  companies  of  militia.  There  was  no  time  to 
furnish  ourselves  with  uniforms;  knapsacks  were  speedily  pro- 
vided by  the  ladies  of  the  town  ;  and  each  man  was  on  the  ground 
at  roll-call  the  next  morning  On  the  23d  we  marched  to  Harper's 
F'erry,  eight  miles  distant,  to  procure  arms  and  to  increase  our 
forces.  Here  we  found  a  company  of  about  fifty  of  the  armorers 
and  citizens  enrolled  under  the  command  of  the  superintendent  of 
the  armory  (Colonel  Stubblcfield),  and  the  two  companies  were 
consolidated  into  one,  and  furnisliod  mostly  with  the  short  rifles 
then  in  the  arsenal,  a  weapon  at  that  time  deemed  sure  and  dead- 
ly in  the  hands  of  a  good  marksman.  Early  on  the  24th  of  Au- 
gust we  embarked  upon  two  flour-boats  down  the  Potomac,  a 
stream  then  rugged  and  diflTunilt  of  navigation ;  but  wo  were  in 
charge  of  two  or  three  of  the  Stridors,  skilful  boatmen  and  enter- 
prising men  in  every  thing  they  undertook.  A  few  hours  after 
starting  we  landed  to  have  a  regular  election  of  officers,  and  con- 
cluded that  the  superintendent  of  the  armory  and  some  of  his  most 
skilful  workmen  should  return  to  carry  on  the  manufacture  of 
arms,  a  duty  equally  as  important  as  fighting.  The  following  of- 
ficers were  then  chosen  :  George  W.  Humphreys,  captain  ;  Thom- 
as Griggs,  James  L.  Hanson,  Joseph  Blackburn,  and  Samuel  Rus- 
sell, lieutenants. 

We  reached  Seneca  Creek  on  the  evening  of  the  24th,  hearing 
distinctly  during  the  day  the  cannonading  at  the  battle  and  the  ex- 
plosion at  the  navy- yard.  We  saw  the  light  from  the  burning 
public  buildings,  and  were  satisfied  the  enemy  had  possession  of 
the  city.  This  idea  was  confirmed  to  us  in  the  morning  by  some- 
body from  the  seat  of  war,  and  we  forthwith  set  out  on  our  march 
to  join  General  Winder  at  Rockville.  During  our  march  we  en- 
countered that  terrific  storm  so  well  remembered  l)y  the  inhabit- 
ants of  the  District  and  by  the  survivors  among  the  invaders. 


APPENDIX. 


869 


ithout  delay, 

linent  lawyer 

and  read  the 

or  news.     A 

brief  address 

rh  the  streets 

of  over  fifty 

vice,  at  Nor- 

is  no  time  to 

speedily  pro- 

3n  the  ground 

id  to  Harper's 

increase  our 

the  armorers 

srintendent  of 

[iipanics  were 

le  short  rifles 

ure  and  dead- 

0  24th  of  Au- 

0  Potomac,  a 
it  we  were  in 
len  and  enter- 
iw  hours  after 
cers,  and  con- 
ne  of  his  most 
lanufacture  oi" 
3  following  of- 
iptain ;  Thom- 

1  Samuel  Rus- 

!  24  th,  hearing 
tie  and  the  cx- 
n  the  burning 

possession  of 
rning  by  somc- 
L  on  our  march 

march  we  en- 
ly  the  inhabit- 

invadcrs. 


Hearing  that  the  enemy  had  gone  to  Baltimore,  we  set  out  in 
that  direction,  but  soon  received  orders  to  join  the  forces  at  Wash- 
ington under  General  Walter  Smith,  of  whose  command  we  found 
you  (permit  me  to  say)  the  energetic,  skilful,  and  popular  brigade- 
major.  On  our  entry  into  Georgetown  (and  I  shall  never  forget 
tlie  impressir.i  ii'ade  upon  me  by  the  firs';  magnificent  view  from 
the  heights)  we  were  handsomely  entertained  by  that  hospitable 
old-school  gentleman,  Washington  Bowie,  and  welcomed  by  the 
citizens,  our  officers  and  some  of  the  men  being  well-known  to 
them. 

After  spending  a  day  or  two  at  Grecnleaf's  Point  (the  enemy 
tlien  in  possession  of  Alexandria),  we  were  stationed,  with  the 
troops  under  General  Smith,  on  Camp  (now  Observatory)  Hill. 
From  Camp  Hill  we  were  ordered  to  march,  at  5  o'clock  '^n  the 
evening  of  Friday,  the  2d  of  September,  ta  join  Commodore  Porter 
at  the  White  House,  below  Mount  Vernon,  where  that  gallant  of- 
ficer was  busily  engaged  in  erecting  a  temporary  battery  on  a 
MufT,  so  as  to  conmiand  the  channel  of  the  Potomac,  running  with- 
in loss  than  fifty  yards  of  the  Virginia  shore. 

The  enemy  had  been  lying  at  anchor  for  several  days  after 
leaving  Alexandria,  waiting  a  fair  wind  to  enable  him  to  pass  with 
his  prizes,  consisting  of  twenty-one  vessels  laden  with  flour  ;ind 
other  provisions.  His  fleet  consisted  of  the  frigates  Sea-Horse 
and  FiUryalus,  and  five  or  six  bomb  ships.  The  scene  was  new 
and  exciting  to  one  who  had  seen  so  little  of  "  the  pomp  and  cir- 
cumstance of  war,"  and  none  of  its  realities.  Our  company  con- 
tained many  most  expert  riflemen — men  who  not  only  used,  but 
constructed  those  deadly  weapons  with  which  we  were  armed ; 
and  the  corps,  though  there  had  been  but  little  time  for  drill  in 
the  field,  felt  something  more  than  the  confidence  of  raw  militia- 
men, and,  I  may  say,  were  "eager  for  the  fray."  That  they  did 
some  execution  upon  the  decks  of  the  enemy's  vessels  the  offi- 
cial account  of  C'aptain  Gordon  bears  testimony. 

Commodore  Porter,  in  his  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
dated  the  7th  September,  1814,  giving  an  account  of  the  aflair 
near  the  White  House,  describes  with  some  minuteness  the  oper- 
ations of  the  cnorny.     Among  other  things  he  says  : 

"The  two  frigates  anchoicd  abreast  [of  the  battery],  the  bombs, 
sloops,  and  smaller  vessels  nassed  outside  them,  all  pom-jng  ir.ta 

i)  2 


'MO 


APPENDIX. 


*!   I J 


f,         J 


I  !i^    ': 


the  battery  and  neighboring  woods  a  tremendous  fire  of  every  de- 
scription of  missiles.  In  the  woods,  on  the  left,  a  company  of  ri- 
flemen, from  Jefferson  County,  Virginia,  under  Captain  George  \V. 
Humphreys,  greati"  distinguished  themselves  by  a  well-directed 
fire  on  the  enemy '^  decks,  as  did  a  company  of  militia,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Janney,  who  was  posted  by  me  on  the  right. 
The  first  compat.  -  lost  one  man  killed,  and  one  sergeant  and  four 
privates  wounded  ;  the  latter,  two  privates  killed." 

The  private  killed  in  Captain  Humphrey's  company  was  David 
Harris,  of  Shepherdstown,  a  nuj-t  worthy  young  man,  who  left  a 
mother  and  ot'ier  relatives  in  tliat  gallant  town,  celebrated  for  the 
quota  of  fightiii ,  men  furnished  in  the  Revolutionary  era.  Ser- 
geant David  Humphreys  (a  merchant  of  Charlestown,and  long  an 
efficient  magistrate)  had  his  right  arm  shattered  with  a  grape-shot, 
and  it  was  found  necessary  to  have  it  amputated.  Hugh  M'Don- 
ald  was  shot  through  tlie  body  with  a  grape-shot,  but  survived. 
William  Phielding  was  wounded  in  the  fleshy  part  of  the  thigh ; 
Thomas  Stedman  had  one  of  his  fingers  injured,  and  Lieutenant 
Blackburn  had  his  cheek  grazed  with  a  ball.  There  are  now  not 
fifteen  survivors  of  the  company  within  my  recollection. 

In  his  n  turn  of  killed  and  wounded  (during  twenty-three  days' 
operation  in  the  Potomac),  Captain  Gordon  mentions  seven  killed 
and  thirty-five  wounded  on  board  his  ships — a  much  greater  loss 
than  we  suffered,  notwithstanding  our  imperfect  defences. 

In  commending  Lieutenant  King,  of  the  Sea-IIorse,  who  got  out 
of  his  sick-hammock  to  command  while  passing  the  batteries,  Cap- 
tain Gordon  states  that  the  first  two  guns  pointed  by  Lieutenant 
King  disabled  each  a  gun  of  the  enemy.  This  is  true.  One  of 
the  guns  was  split  to  the  touch-hole,  and  another  had  a  wheel  of 
the  carriage  shattered.  The  fire  of  grape  and  shells  was  inces- 
sant for  more  than  two  hours,  while  the  riflemen  of  Captain  Hum- 
phreys were  down  at  the  water's  edge,  aiming  at  the  decks  and 
rigging  as  long  as  a' man  was  to  be  seen  on  either. 

My  dear  sir,  I  have  made  this  iiasty  sketch  much  longer  than  I 
intended,  but  I  was  encouraged  by  you  to  hope  that  some  of  the 
incidents  might  be  worth  reciting.  I  am  glad  you  have  undertaken 
the  task  of  vindicating  the  reputation  of  the  troops  engaged  in  the 
ill-fated  field  of  Bladensburg.  Better  materials  for  gallant  and 
efficient  service  than  the  vohmteers  and  militia  of  the  District  I 


I     'ii 


Al'PENmX. 


371 


if  every  de- 
ipany  of  ri- 
George  W. 
ell-directed 
a,  under  the 
III  the  right, 
ant  and  four 

r  was  David 
,  who  left  a 
•ated  for  the 
r  era.  Ser- 
and  long  an 
I  grape-shot, 
ugh  M'Don- 
ut  survived. 
)f  the  thigh ; 
1  Lieutenant 
are  now  not 
on. 

/^-three  days' 
seven  killed 
greater  loss 
ices. 

,  who  got  out 
ittcrics,  Cap- 
y  Lieutenant 
uc.  One  of 
d  a  wheel  of 
Is  was  inces- 
laptain  Ilum- 
16  decks  and 

longer  than  I 
t  some  of  the 
re  undertaken 
ngaged  in  the 
r  gallant  and 
the  District  T 


have  never  seen  any  where,  and  my  opportunities  have  not  heeii 
limited.  Every  impartial  man,  even  of  the  enemy,  will  admit  that 
the  disaster  was  not  to  be  attiil)uted  to  the  troops.  They  were 
not  only  ready,  but  eager  for  a  more  active  participation  in  the 
field  than  was  allowed  them.  The  incredulity  of  General  ^..ii- 
strong,  Secretary  of  War,  as  to  the  attempt  of  the  British  to  make 
an  attack  upon  Washington  prevented  the  necessary  precautions, 
and  the  disposition  of  the  troops  on  the  day  of  battle  was  any  thing 
else  than  judicious.  The  actual  commander  was  paraly/od  by  the 
presence  of  a  superior  who  had  taken  none  of  the  preliminary 
measures  suggested  by  military  experience. 
With  great  respect,  your  fnon', 

.Idtis  :^.  Gallaher, 
A  private  <  ;  *uprain  Humphreys's  Riflemen. 
Colonel  John  S.  Williams,  AVasliingto.i. 


TUF   F.vn, 


